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KEY FINDINGS
 ■ In 2019, a global total of more than 131 square 
kilometres was cleared of anti-personnel mines,  
with more than 96% of recorded clearance occurring 
in States Parties to the APMBC. However, this total 
is a marked decrease on output in 2018 of more than 
155 square kilometres, and was the lowest recorded 
clearance globally for more than ten years. The true 
total area of clearance is probably considerably 
greater, but data recording and reporting problems 
prevent accurate reporting of a higher figure, in 
addition to a lack of transparency by several States  
not party.
 ■ In total, almost 164,000 emplaced anti-personnel 
mines were destroyed during clearance and explosive 
ordnance disposal operations (EOD), an increase 
compared to 153,800 in 2018. In addition, 39,700 
anti-vehicle mines were destroyed during clearance  
of anti-personnel mined areas in 2019, a slight increase 
on the 38,500 destroyed the previous year. When 
considered together with the area of land cleared, this 
might indicate more targeted and efficient clearance 
was achieved in 2019.
 ■ No clearance was recorded or reported for 2019 in 
eight States Parties: Cameroon, Cyprus, DR Congo, 
Eritrea, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Senegal. A small 
amount of mined area was, however, cancelled through 
non-technical survey in Cyprus and reduced though 
technical survey in Senegal. Some clearance, including 
in spot tasks, may also have occurred but which was  
not reported.
 ■ No State Party fulfilled its APMBC Article 5 obligation 
to survey and clear all mined areas containing 
anti-personnel mines in 2019, but Chile declared 
completion in February 2020. Since entry into force  
of the APMBC in 1999, 33 States (all States Parties 
to the APMBC, except for Nepal) and 1 other area 
(Taiwan) have completed mine clearance.1 Mauritania 
was on this achievement list last year but has since 
reported newly discovered mined areas under its 
jurisdiction or control and is seeking a new extension 
to its Article 5 deadline.
 ■ As at 1 October 2020, 57 States and 3 other areas 
were confirmed or suspected to have anti-personnel 
mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or 
control,2 an overall increase of one State on the 
previous year. While Chile was removed from list, 
Mauritania and Mali3 were added. 
Of the 57 affected States, 35 are party to the APMBC. 
As at 1 October 2020, three of the 35 States Parties 
(Cameroon, Mali, and Nigeria) did not have a legal 
Article 5 deadline in force, but have ongoing Article 
5 obligations due to new contamination from the use 
of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature 
by non-State armed groups on areas under their 
jurisdiction or control. These States must therefore 
request an extension to their previously expired 
deadlines and submit Article 7 reports detailing the 
new contamination and clearance of anti-personnel 
mines of an improvised nature. In addition, Eritrea’s 
Article 5 deadline expires on 31 December 2020 after  
it was granted an interim extension at the Fourth 
Review conference in November 2019. However,  
as at 1 October 2020 Eritrea had yet to request a 
deadline extension.
1 States Parties: Albania, Algeria, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Chile, Rep. of Congo, Costa Rica, Denmark, Djibouti, France, The Gambia, Germany, Greece*, 
Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Jordan, Malawi, Montenegro*, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Republic of North Macedonia, Palau*, Rwanda, Suriname, 
Swaziland, Tunisia, Uganda, Venezuela, and Zambia. In addition, State not Party, Nepal, and “other area”, Taiwan, have also completed mine clearance. *Indicates 
States Parties not listed on the AMPBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU)’s list, “States Parties That Have Completed Article 5”, at: bit.ly/30xgu9r, presumably 
because they did not officially report having mined areas under the APMBC and/or have not made a formal declaration of fulfilment of their clearance obligations 
under the Convention. Mauritania declared completion previously in 2018, but has subsequently reported having mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and 
has therefore been taken off this list.
2 Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, DR Congo, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Dem. Rep., Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Myanmar, Nagorno-Karabakh, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Peru, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Korea, South Sudan,  
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Western Sahara, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. States Parties  
to the APMBC are in bold. Other areas are in italics.
3 Mali, which faces a rising threat from anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, as a result of escalating conflict involving armed non-state actors, has been 
added to Mine Action Review’s list of States Parties to the APMBC with anti-personnel mine contamination.
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 ■ Based on Mine Action Review’s assessment of the extent 
of contamination in affected States Parties, Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, and Iraq are massively contaminated (defined 
as covering more than 100km2 of land), while heavy 
contamination (covering more than 20km2) exists in 
Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Thailand, Turkey, and 
Yemen. In other affected States Parties, the extent of 
anti-personnel mine contamination is medium or light.
 ■ As at 1 October 2020, of the 35 mine-affected States 
Parties, 9 (Cameroon, DR Congo, Eritrea, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Palestine, and Sri Lanka) had yet to 
submit an Article 7 report covering 2019, which is a  
legal obligation under the APMBC. 
 ■ Only Oman, Peru, Serbia, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom/
Argentina, and Zimbabwe appear to be on track to meet 
their respective current Article 5 deadline.
 ■ In Mine Action Review’s assessment of national mine 
action performance in 2019, two States Parties had 
demining programmes rated as very good: Chile (which 
has now fulfilled its Article 5 obligations) and Zimbabwe. 
Six were assessed to be good: Afghanistan, Angola, 
Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. 
A further 12 States Parties had demining programmes 
rated as average: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, DR 
Congo, Ethiopia, Iraq, Oman, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, 
Sudan, Tajikistan, and Turkey. Chad, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Niger, Somalia, and Yemen attained only a rating of 
“poor”, while Eritrea, Senegal, and Ukraine all rated 
“very poor”. 
Seven States Parties were not ranked: Argentina,  
Cyprus, and Palestine (not assessed due to issues 
related to lack of jurisdiction or control of mined areas); 
Mauritania (not assessed due to the fact it only reported 
the discovery of new CMR contamination in 2020); and 
Cameroon, Mauritania, Mali, and Nigeria (not assessed 
due to insufficient information available to assess 
performance in 2019).
 ■ The Oslo Action Plan (OAP) was adopted by the Fourth 
Review Conference of the APMBC in November 2019. 
Mine Action Review has assessed implementation of 
the OAP action items related to survey and clearance 
in 2020 and will assess progress annually, through to 
the Convention’s Fifth Review Conference in 2024. Our 
provisional 2020 baseline results of the survey and 
clearance related indicators monitored can be found 
on the Mine Action Review website, together with a 
supporting guide to the OAP. 
The results of Mine Action Review’s 2020 baseline 
assessment will be finalised following the Eighteenth 
Meeting of States Parties on 16-20 November 2020. Mine 
Action Review welcomes feedback from States Parties 
and other stakeholders on the results of the provisional 
assessment. Please email MineActionReview@npaid.org 
with any feedback or additional information for Mine Action 
Review’s consideration.
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SUMMARY
In February 2020, Chile declared it had fulfilled its clearance 
obligations under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC), the 32nd State Party to do so. Chile’s 
remarkable rate of clearance in the first two months of 
2020 saw the destruction of 12,526 anti-personnel mines 
and 10,170 anti-vehicle mines, allowing it to meet its treaty 
deadline with days to spare. Two further States—the United 
Kingdom and Argentina—were set to be added by early 2021 
to the list of those whose clearance was complete, with 
planned release of remaining mined areas on the Falkland 
Islands/Malvinas.
But despite Chile’s achievement, as at 1 October 2020, 57 
States and 3 other areas still had anti-personnel mines in 
mined areas under their jurisdiction or control, an overall 
increase of one State on the previous year. Mauritania, which 
had previously declared fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations 
in 2018, reported newly discovered mined areas under its 
jurisdiction or control in 2020. Mali, which faces a rising threat 
from anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, as a result 
of escalating conflict involving armed non-state actors, has 
been added to Mine Action Review’s list of States Parties to 
the APMBC with anti-personnel mine contamination.
Recorded clearance for 2019 worldwide was down 
significantly compared to the previous year, reducing from 
155km2 in 2018 to 131km2 in 2019, the lowest recorded for 
more than a decade. This can be largely ascribed to an almost 
50% drop in clearance output in Cambodia, from 41km2 in 
2018 to 21km2 in 2019. There was also a large decline in 
clearance output in Croatia in 2019 compared to the previous 
year, down from 48km2 to 39km2. However, while the amount 
of area cleared decreased compared to 2018, the total of 
almost 164,000 anti-personnel mines destroyed during 
clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations 
in 2019 was considerably greater than the 153,800 destroyed 
in 2018. This might indicate more targeted and efficient 
clearance was achieved in 2019.
In fact, though, given that several States have either not 
reported at all on significant clearance progress (e.g. Iran 
and Syria) or have done so only partially or inaccurately 
(e.g. China, Iraq, and Ukraine), the global figure is certainly 
higher. In all of these States, significant demining has 
certainly occurred. Mine Action Review figures are, though, 
conservative, to avoid exaggerating what is undoubtedly 
welcome progress. 
That said, in nearly all affected States, the COVID-19 
pandemic had been impacting negatively to some degree 
on operations in 2020, whether through the mandatory 
halting of operations under national lockdown rules, reduced 
operations due to distancing measures in place to help 
prevent the spread of the virus, difficulties in international 
staff returning to or visiting mine action programmes due to 
travel restrictions, or other impacts. Survey and clearance 
results for the year are therefore likely to evidence a 
reduction in output, although the extent of the impact is, 
as yet, unknown and will vary between affected countries. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has, however, also revealed the 
adaptability and resilience of the mine action sector, with 
national authorities, operators, and implementing partners 
striving to find ways to continue land release operations, 
training, capacity development and more, whenever possible 
and where required, remotely.
Of the 57 affected States around the world, 35 are party 
to the APMBC. As at 1 October 2020, three of these States 
Parties (Cameroon, Mali, and Nigeria) did not have a 
legal Article 5 deadline in force, but have ongoing Article 
5 obligations due to new contamination from the use of 
anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature by non-State 
armed groups on areas under their jurisdiction or control. 
These States must therefore request an extension to 
their previously expired deadlines and submit Article 7 
reports detailing the new contamination and clearance of 
anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature. 
Two of the 35 affected States Parties, Eritrea and Senegal, 
appeared to be in violation of their clearance obligations 
under the Convention, because they were making insufficient 
progress in clearing mined areas under their jurisdiction 
or control. Clearance must occur “as soon as possible” 
according to the terms of Article 5. Moreover, unjustified 
delays in clearing military bases, borders, or other “sensitive 
areas” of anti-personnel mines also constitutes prohibited 
use under Article 1 of the APMBC. In the case of Eritrea, 
States Parties should implement all of the provisions of 
Article 8 of the Convention and mandate a fact-finding 
mission to the country with a view to supporting Eritrea’s 
swift return to compliance. Eritrea’s individual failure is also 
the Convention’s collective failure. States Parties should 
no longer turn a blind eye to Eritrea’s non-compliance, 
and should urge and support Eritrea to comply with its 
international legal obligations. Eritrea’s Article 5 deadline 
expires on 31 December 2020 after it was granted an interim 
extension at the Fourth Review conference in November  
2019. Eritrea was expected to submit a more detailed 
extension request by 31 March 2020, for consideration at  
the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2020, 
but as at 1 October 2020 had not yet done so. 
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GLOBAL CONTAMINATION
As at 1 October 2020, 57 States and three other areas were contaminated by anti-personnel mines globally, as listed in Table 1.
Asia (including the Middle East) is the most affected continent by number of countries, with 23 mine-contaminated States. 
Most are not party to the APMBC. Across Asia (including the Middle East), Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Oman, Palestine, Sri 
Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Yemen are all States Parties. China, India, Iran, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (Lao PDR), Lebanon, Myanmar, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Pakistan, the Republic of 
Korea (South Korea), Syria, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam are all States not party. 
Africa is the second most affected region with 18 States and Western Sahara (the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic) 
remaining contaminated with anti-personnel mines. Angola, Cameroon, Chad, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe are all States Parties to the APMBC. Egypt, Libya, 
Morocco are States not party; along with other area Western Sahara.1 
In Europe, 11 States and Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh are still mine-affected. The seven States Parties are: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Cyprus, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine, as well as, with respect to the Falkland Islands/Malvinas,  
the United Kingdom. Affected States not party are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia, as well as other areas Kosovo  
and Nagorno-Karabakh. 
In the Americas, only 5 States remain affected by anti-personnel mines: States Parties Argentina (Malvinas), Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Peru, and State not party Cuba.
Table 1: Global Anti-Personnel Mine Contamination (at 1 October 2020)
States Parties States not party
Afghanistan Nigeria** Armenia Lebanon
Angola Oman Azerbaijan Libya
Argentina* Palestine China Morocco
Bosnia and Herzegovina Peru Cuba Myanmar
Cambodia Senegal Egypt North Korea
Cameroon** Serbia Georgia Pakistan
Chad Somalia India Russia
Colombia South Sudan Iran South Korea
Croatia Sri Lanka Israel Syria
Cyprus Sudan Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan
DR Congo Tajikistan Lao People’s Dem. Rep. Vietnam
Ecuador Thailand 22 states not party
Eritrea Turkey
Ethiopia Ukraine




35 states parties 3 other areas
* Argentina is mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. The United Kingdom also claims sovereignty over the Islands and  
  exercises control over them. 
** Has not yet submitted a request to extend its already expired Article 5 deadline.
In addition, State Party Burkina Faso may also be contaminated by victim-activated improvised explosive devises (IEDs) which 
meet the definition of an anti-personnel mine. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) deployed to Burkina Faso in September 
2019 and as part of its work was developing a consolidated IED incidents database.2
1 The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is considered a State by the African Union but not by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), who is the 
depository of the APMBC.
2 Burkina Faso webpage, UNMAS, accessed 12 September 2020 at:  
bit.ly/2Feh1p2; and “Explosive Developments: The Growing Threat of IEDs in Western Niger”, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), 19 June 
2019, at: bit.ly/35sZ6p0.
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Table 2 below summarises what is known or reasonably believed about the extent of contamination in affected States Parties. 
It is therefore an assessment by Mine Action Review of the extent of anti-personnel mine contamination based on available 
evidence, as opposed to the claims of governments or mine action programmes, some of which do not stand up to scrutiny.
Table 2: Extent of Anti-Personnel Mined Areas in Affected States Parties (at 1 October 2020)
Massive (>100km2) Heavy (>20km2) Medium (2–20km2)
Light (<2km2) or extent of 
contamination unclear
Afghanistan Angola Argentina* Cameroon**
Cambodia BiH Chad Cyprus













* Argentina is considered mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. The United Kingdom also claims sovereignty over the  
  Islands and exercises control over them. 
** Has not yet submitted a request to extend its already expired Article 5 deadline. 
Every State should establish a national baseline of contamination as soon as security permits. This is the basis for effective 
planning. A number of States, such as BiH and Senegal, still do not have a comprehensive baseline despite being party to the 
APMBC for more than two decades. Once a national baseline has been established, release by non-technical and technical 
survey is a critical focus. Such survey serves to confirm specific areas that contain mine contamination on the basis of evidence 
and significantly reduce the size of polygons from exaggerated estimates. Clearing suspected mined areas without also 
employing survey continues to occur with respect to far too many areas that prove to have no anti-personnel mines. Operators 
in Colombia reported that no contamination was found in up to 60% of all tasks cleared in 2019. Of the total anti-personnel 
mined area cleared in Cambodia, for instance, 43 minefields were cleared during the year totalling over 1.7km2 of area but in 
which no anti-personnel mines were found. 
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES OF AN IMPROVISED NATURE
While use by States has almost ended globally,3 significant 
numbers of anti-personnel mines, especially, but not 
only, those of an improvised nature, continue to be laid 
by non-state armed groups in several States, including 
Afghanistan, Colombia, Yemen, and others.4 
Improvised munitions are both captured by and prohibited under 
the APMBC whenever they are designed to be exploded by the 
presence, proximity, or contact of a person. It does not matter 
under the Convention how these weapons were produced or 
employed, nor by whom they were laid; if they fall within the 
jurisdiction or control of a State Party, all of the Convention’s 
provisions apply. The obligations to clear mined areas and 
report on progress under Article 5 and Article 7, respectively, 
apply to anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature just as 
they do to more conventionally manufactured landmines.5
The continued and perhaps increasing use of victim-activated 
IEDs meeting the definition of anti-personnel mines by 
non-State armed groups in the Sahel, especially the Lake 
Chad Basin, continues to cause harm to civilians.6 This 
contamination must be addressed under the framework of 
the Convention, in particular Article 5 with reporting under 
Article 7. Affected States Parties in this region could benefit 
from a regional workshop, such as under the auspices of the 
Convention’s presidency of the meeting of States Parties, 
to discuss how best to report and address such devices in 
accordance with the Convention. Considerable additional 
guidance on how to address IEDs, including anti-personnel 
mines of an improvised nature, has, though, already been 
incorporated into International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). 
3 State not party Myanmar is a notable exception.
4 Presentation by Lucy Pinches, Project Manager, Mine Action Review,  
Panel Discussion on Addressing Anti-Personnel Mines of an Improvised Nature under the Convention’s Framework, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 1 July 2020, 
at: bit.ly/2Fy0kEQ.
5 See Paragraph 6 of the 2019 Oslo Declaration, adopted by States Parties to the APMBC at the final plenary meeting on 29 November 2019 during the Fourth 
Review Conference of the Convention, at: bit.ly/2DFNrqY.
6 “Landmines, improvised explosive devices pose deadly risks for displaced in Sahel and Lake Chad”, UNHCR, 28 July 2020, available at: bit.ly/3k4llpo.
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In February 2018, at its annual meeting in Geneva, the IMAS Review Board, which is chaired by UNMAS, recognised the 
requirement to provide affected States with improved guidance on how to deal with contamination from mines of an 
improvised nature as well as other IEDs while continuing to meet their reporting obligations, including under Article 7 of  
the APMBC.7 As part of the subsequent updates, a new, welcome edition of IMAS 05.10 on Information Management for Mine 
Action was published in March 2020, and now includes an annex outlining minimum data requirements for mine action.8 The 
minimum data requirements represent standardised guidance that clarifies what data needs to be collected by operators 
in all mine action programmes globally, to help improve and standardise reporting, including on anti-personnel mines of an 
improvised nature.
Anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature are also firmly embedded in the Oslo Action Plan. Action Item 21 and monitoring 
of the corresponding indicator on “the number of States Parties that apply the provisions of the Convention to anti-personnel 
mines of an improvised nature (for the purpose of this indicator: survey, clear and report)”9 will help elicit the extent to which 
these types of mines are being addressed correctly under the Convention.
STATES THAT HAVE COMPLETED ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CLEARANCE
Since 1997, clearance has been completed in 33 States (see Table 3), 32 of which are party to the APMBC, as well as in 1 other 
area (Taiwan). In March 2020, Chile became the latest State Party to report completion of clearance; it was expected to make 
a formal declaration of its completion at the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2020. As also noted above, 
Mauritania was on this achievement list last year but has since reported newly discovered mined areas under its jurisdiction or 
control and is seeking a new extension to its Article 5 deadline. Twelve of the States that completed clearance are from Africa; 
nine are from Europe; seven are from the Americas; and five are from Asia (including the Pacific and the Middle East). Nepal is 
the only State not party to have completed mine clearance on its territory.
Table 3: States Having Completed Clearance Since 1999
Albania Costa Rica Guatemala Mozambique10 Tunisia 
Algeria Denmark Guinea-Bissau Nicaragua Uganda
Bhutan Djibouti Honduras North Macedonia Venezuela
Bulgaria France Hungary Palau* Zambia
Burundi The Gambia Jordan Rwanda
Chile Germany Malawi Suriname Nepal11
Republic of Congo Greece* Montenegro* Swaziland
* States Parties not listed on the AMPBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU)’s list, “States Parties That Have Completed Article 5”, at: bit.ly/30xgu9r, presumably  
  because they did not officially report having mined areas under the APMBC and/or have not made a formal declaration of fulfilment of their clearance obligations  
  under the Convention.
By 2021, both Argentina and the United Kingdom should be added to the list, following expected completion of clearance  
in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas.
CLEARANCE IN 2019
Globally, reported clearance in 2019 covered 131km2, with the destruction of almost 164,000 anti-personnel mines and  
nearly 39,700 anti-vehicle mines (including mines destroyed during spot tasks). Of this, 126.3km2 (96%) was cleared from  
27 of 36 States Parties as summarised in Table 4 below. The largest extent of clearance in a single State (39km2) took place, 
for the second year running, in Croatia. But only 2,530 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in the process, implying that 
huge swathes of land were cleared that in fact contained no landmines. In contrast, in Turkey, 25,957 anti-personnel mines 
were destroyed during clearance of only 0.7km2, while in Zimbabwe, 38,947 landmines were destroyed during clearance of 
2.8km2, plus a further 84 mines in spot tasks, demonstrating the very high density of contamination in these two countries. 
Despite major armed conflict, in 2019 Afghanistan still managed to clear 28km2, destroying in the process more than 7,800 
anti-personnel mines.
7 Presentation by Rory, Rory Logan, Secretary of the IMAS Review Board and Advisor IHL and Policy, GICHD, Panel Discussion on Addressing Anti-Personnel Mines 
of an Improvised Nature under the Convention’s Framework, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 1 July 2020, at: bit.ly/32lt2kY.
8 IMAS 05:10 on Information Management for Mine Action, IMAS, available at: bit.ly/3bRGIaP.
9 Oslo Action Plan, Action Item number 21 Indicator.
10 Mozambique has four very small suspected mined areas that remain underwater.
11 State not party to the APMBC.
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The 131km2 of anti-personnel mined area cleared in 2019 was a decrease on the 155km2 cleared the previous year, and was the 
lowest annual output in more than ten years. However, the almost 164,000 anti-personnel mines and 39,700 anti-vehicle mines 
destroyed in 2019 were considerably more than destruction in 2018 when 153,800 anti-personnel mines and 38,700 anti-vehicle 
mines were destroyed. The increase may indicate better targeted and more efficient clearance in 2019.
No clearance was recorded or reported for 2019 (although some may have occurred) in eight States Parties: Cameroon, 
Cyprus, DR Congo, Eritrea, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Senegal. A small amount of mined area was, however, cancelled 
through non-technical survey in Cyprus and reduced though technical survey in Senegal. 
Table 4: Anti-Personnel Mine Clearance in 2019
States Parties
Area cleared  








Afghanistan 28 7,807 - 2.9
Angola 1.6 2,012 + 0.6
Argentina N/A N/A  N/A
BiH 0.5 963 - 0.4
Cambodia 20.9 8,476 - 20.1
Cameroon 0 0  0 Had yet to submit an Article 7 report (covering 2019), 
as at 1 October 2020.
Chad 0.4 0 + 0.4
Chile 0.6 4,093 - 0.4
Colombia 0.8 325 - 0.2
Croatia 39.2 2,530 - 9.2
Cyprus 0 0  0
DR Congo N/R N/R  N/R Had yet to submit an Article 7 report (covering 2019), 
as at 1 October 2020.
Ecuador 0* 62  0* *Ecuador cleared 2,899m2 of mined area in 2019, 
equivalent to less than half the size of an average 
professional football pitch. In 2018, 14,068m2 was 
cleared.
Eritrea N/R N/R  N/R Had yet to submit an Article 7 report (covering 2019), 
as at 1 October 2020.
Ethiopia 1.8 128 + 0.7
Iraq 15.7* 14,253 + 7.3 *Conservative estimate of clearance output as 
a result of a lack of reliable reporting by the 
authorities.
Mali 0  0  0 Had yet to submit an Article 7 report (covering 2019), 
as at 1 October 2020.
Mauritania 0 0  0
Niger 0* 199  0 *Niger cleared 11,500m2 of mined area in 2019, its 
first mine clearance for three years. Had yet to 
submit an Article 7 report (covering 2019), as at 1 
October 2020.
Nigeria N/R N/R  N/R Had yet to submit an Article 7 report (covering 2019), 
as at 1 October 2020.
Oman 0.1 0 +0.1
Palestine 0* 106  0 *Palestine cleared 13,976m2 of mined area in 2019 
and 5,221m2 in 2018. Had yet to submit an Article 7 
report (covering 2019), as at 1 October 2020.
Peru 0.1 1,113  0.1
Senegal 0 0  0 Had yet to submit an Article 7 report (covering 2019), 
as at 1 October 2020.
Serbia 0.6 22 + 0.3
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Somalia 1.8 274 + 0.2
South Sudan 1 437 - 1.1
Sri Lanka 2.9* 20,302* - 0.6* * Estimate based on a combination of operator and 
national authority data. Had yet to submit an Article 7 
report (covering 2019), as at 1 October 2020.
Sudan 0.9 1 - 0.1
Tajikistan 0.5 5,254 - 0.1
Thailand 0.1 2,713 - 0.4
Turkey 0.7 25,959 - 0.5
Ukraine 0.7* 12* + 0.3* * Based on available operator data. Clearance output 
not reported by Ukraine.
United 
Kingdom
3.6 319 + 2.1 * Includes land reduced through technical survey, 
as the United Kingdom does not disaggregate land 
released through technical survey from land released 
through clearance in its reporting.
Yemen 1 1,536* + 0.9 * Based on UNDP data.





(States not party 
and other areas)
4.7 26,039
Grand Totals 131.0 163,966 - 24
N/R = Not reported
In addition, in each of States not party Azerbaijan and China 1km2 was cleared (the figure for China is a low estimate).  
In Israel, 0.6km2 was cleared, while in Lebanon 0.5km2 of area was cleared, with the destruction of 25,101 anti-personnel 
mines. In Morocco, an estimated 0.5km2 was cleared (23 anti-personnel mines destroyed),12 and in Georgia, 0.4km2 was  
cleared (342 anti-personnel mines destroyed). Clearance in other areas Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara 
was of 0.3km2 (21 anti-personnel mines destroyed), 0.2km2 (114 anti-personnel mines destroyed), and 0.1km2 (4 anti-personnel 
mines destroyed) respectively. 
Total global clearance for 2019 in States not party and other areas was only 4.7km2, although clearance data were not available 
in many instances. Despite not being party to the APMBC, every State not party has obligations under international human 
rights law to clear landmines as soon as possible in order to protect life. Many do not take this obligation seriously.
ARTICLE 5 IMPLEMENTATION
Under Article 5 of the APMBC, each of the 35 mine-affected 
States Parties has a specific deadline within which it must 
complete clearance of all anti-personnel mines in mined 
areas within its sovereign territory or in other areas under 
its jurisdiction or control. When a State adheres to the 
Convention, it must fulfil this obligation as soon as possible, 
but not later than 10 years from becoming a State Party. If it 
is unable to do so, it must seek and be granted an extension 
period of up to 10 years prior to the expiry of the deadline 
in order to remain compliant with the Convention. Three 
of the thirty-five affected States Parties – Cameroon, Mali, 
and Nigeria – had no obligations under Article 5 previously 
and their respective original 10-year Article 5 deadlines had 
already expired. However, conflict has resulted in suspected 
or confirmed mined areas on their territory arising through 
use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, by 
non-state armed groups. These three States should provide 
more information in their Article 7 reports and submit 
Article 5 deadline Extension Request to remain within Treaty 
compliance while possible anti-personnel mined areas 
exist and until they can survey and if confirmed, clear them. 
As mentioned previously, State Party, Burkina Faso may 
also have contamination from anti-personnel mines of an 
improvised nature, in which case it too should seek a new 
Article 5 deadline and report under Article 7. 
As of 1 October 2020, only Oman, Palestine, Somalia, and 
Sri Lanka were still within their respective original 10-year 
deadline. All other States Parties had either been granted 
one (or more) extension periods or were in violation of the 
Convention. Table 5 summarises the Article 5 deadlines for 
all affected States Parties. Those whose deadline has expired 
are marked in bold.
12 In its voluntary Article 7 report covering 2019, Morocco reported “clearance” of a total area of 301km2, with the destruction of 23 anti-personnel mines,  
21 anti-vehicle mines, and 511 items of ERW.
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Table 5: Article 5 Deadlines for Affected States Parties
State Party Article 5 Deadline State Party Article 5 Deadline
Afghanistan 1 March 2023 Nigeria 1 March 2012
Angola 31 December 2025 Oman 1 February 2025
Argentina 1 March 2023 Palestine 1 June 2028
BiH 1 March 2021* Peru 31 December 2024
Cambodia 31 December 2025 Senegal 1 March 2021*
Cameroon 1 March 2013 Serbia 1 March 2023
Chad 1 January 2025 Somalia 1 October 2022
Colombia 1 March 2021* South Sudan 9 July 2021*
Croatia 1 March 2026 Sri Lanka 1 June 2028
Cyprus 1 July 2022 Sudan 1 April 2023
DR Congo 1 January 2021* Tajikistan 31 December 2025
Ecuador 31 December 2022 Thailand 31 October 2023
Eritrea 31 December 2020** Turkey 1 March 2022
Ethiopia 31 December 2025 Ukraine 1 June 2021*
Iraq 1 February 2028 United Kingdom 1 March 2024
Mali 1 March 2009 Yemen 1 March 2023
Mauritania 1 January 2021* Zimbabwe 31 December 2025
Niger 31 December 2020*
States Parties in bold have expired deadlines and should request a new deadline to address contamination from anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature. 
* Extension to the deadline formally requested.  
** No extension to the deadline formally requested as at 1 October 2020.
PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING ARTICLE 5
There have been many notable achievements in clearing mined areas since the entry into force of the APMBC in 1999. But 
progress in implementing Article 5 has been disappointing and far too slow in too many affected States Parties. In Chad, 
Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Niger, Senegal, and Turkey, in particular, years went by either without meaningful clearance or 
indeed, in several cases, without any clearance at all. The duty to clear anti-personnel mines from mined areas as soon  
as possible is a substantive international legal obligation. 
Table 6 summarises progress by affected States Parties in implementing their Article 5 obligations. It assesses whether  
they are on target to meet their respective deadline for completion of clearance and recommends actions to speed up  
the release of mined areas. As the Table illustrates, only Oman, Peru, Serbia, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom/Argentina,  
and Zimbabwe appear to be on track to meet their respective Article 5 deadline. Aside from these seven States, all other 
affected States Parties will either need to seek further extensions to their deadlines or they are already in violation of  
their Article 5 obligations.
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Mali 1 March  
2009
Needs Article 5 deadline 
extension and to submit annual 
Article 7 report, including 
information on anti-personnel 
mines of an improvised nature.
Mali needs to request a new Article 5 deadline. It should 
formally establish a mine action programme headed by 
a senior official and seek further assistance from the 
international mine action community, including demining NGOs.
Nigeria 1 March  
2012
Needs Article 5 deadline 
extension and to submit annual 
Article 7 report, including 
information on anti-personnel 
mines of an improvised nature.
Nigeria needs to request a new Article 5 deadline. It should 
formally establish a mine action programme headed by a 
senior official.
Cameroon 1 March  
2013
Needs Article 5 deadline 
extension and to submit annual 
Article 7 report, including 
information on anti-personnel 
mines of an improvised nature.
Cameroon needs to request a new Article 5 deadline. It 
should formally establish a mine action programme headed 
by a senior official.




In violation. No Article 5 
deadline extension requested 
as of writing.
Eritrea needs to request a further extension to its Article 5 
deadline and return to compliance with the Convention by 
clearing mined areas and reporting formally on progress.
Niger 31 December 
2020
Article 5 deadline extension 
requested to 31 December 
2024
Niger should seek to ensure that the forthcoming extension 
period is its last. It should sustain the clearance operations 
that restarted in mid 2019 after a two-year hiatus.
DR Congo 1 January 
2021
Article 5 deadline extension 
requested to 1 July 2022
DR Congo should seek to ensure that the forthcoming 
extension period is its last. DR Congo should elaborate a 
timeline for survey of remaining suspected hazardous areas, 
in addition to implementing its planned clearance. 
Mauritania 1 January 
2021
Article 5 deadline extension 
requested to 1 January 2022
Mauritania should proceed with all speed to undertake 
an assessment of the mined areas it has newly reported, 
following consultation with Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic if required.
BiH 1 March  
2021
Article 5 deadline extension 
requested to 1 March 2027
BiH needs to overhaul and strengthen all aspects of its 
mine action programme: legal, managerial, operational, 
and strategic. The newly established country coalition with 
Germany, which aimed at bringing together the authorities, 
donors, and key stakeholders could be one mechanism 
to support the necessary transformation and improve 
coordination.
Colombia 1 March  
2021
Article 5 deadline extension 
requested to 31 December 
2025
The national mine action centre, Descontamina Colombia, 
should task operators in a manner that ensures the best 
use of resources and prioritises the highest impact areas. 
Operators should also be supported to use the full toolbox of 
land release methodologies.
Senegal 1 March  
2021
Article 5 deadline extension 
requested to 1 March 2026; 
compliance in question
Senegal needs to overhaul and strengthen all aspects of 
its mine action programme: legal, managerial, operational, 
and strategic. An in-country platform bringing together 
the authorities, donors, and key stakeholders could be one 
mechanism to support the necessary transformation and 
strengthen coordination.
Ukraine 1 June  
2021
Article 5 deadline extension 
requested to 1 December 2023
Ukraine should adopt and implement mine action legislation 
without delay, enabling it to formally establish a national 
mine action authority and a functioning national mine action 




9 July  
2021
Article 5 deadline extension 
requested to 9 July 2026
South Sudan needs to significantly increase the pace of 
clearance of anti-personnel mined areas if it is to meet its 
extended Article 5 deadline.
Turkey 1 March  
2022
Will need to seek Article 5 
deadline extension in 2021
Turkey should expand large-scale survey and clearance of 
border and non-border areas.
Cyprus 1 July  
2022
Will need to seek Article 5 
deadline extension in 2021
Cyprus and Turkey should facilitate clearance of all remaining 
anti-personnel mined areas inside and outside the Buffer Zone.
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Somalia 1 October 
2022
Will need to seek Article 5 
deadline extension in 2021
Somalia should commit resources for mine action operations 
and establish a national baseline of anti-personnel mine 
contamination as soon as security conditions allow.  
Ecuador 31 December 
2022
Will likely need to seek an 
Article 5 deadline extension in 
2022; compliance in question
Ecuador should significantly increase the pace of clearance, 
dedicating the necessary resources to ensure far greater 
land release each year.
Afghanistan 1 March  
2023
Will need to seek Article 5 
deadline extension in 2022
The Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) should 
review land release standards and practices to encourage 
greater application of non-technical and technical survey to 
confirm and release mined area.
Argentina 1 March  
2023
On track None.
Serbia 1 March  
2023
Just on track Serbia should consider using its armed forces for mine 
clearance or inviting demining NGOs to help meet its Article 5 
obligations by 2023. The Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) 
should conduct non-technical and technical survey routinely, 
as part of efficient land release.




Will need to seek Article 5 
deadline extension in 2022
Mired in conflict, with large-scale new use of anti-personnel 
mines, Yemen needs to develop its mine action capacity, 
increase cooperation with international demining 
organisations and continue emergency clearance until a new 
baseline survey is possible.
Sudan 1 April  
2023
Will likely need to seek 
extension in 2022
Sudan should complete its baseline survey as soon as possible 
and ensure that evidence-based survey is conducted prior to 
clearance, to avoid clearance of uncontaminated areas. 
Thailand 31 October 
2023
Not on track Thailand should seek to conclude a bilateral cooperation 
mechanism with Cambodia that would enable both countries 
to survey and clear all mined areas along the shared border.
United 
Kingdom
1 March  
2024
On track The United Kingdom should continue the pace of land release 
operations and complete clearance of remaining mined areas 
in the Falkland Islands as soon as possible.
Peru 31 December 
2024
On track Peru should survey its outstanding mined areas to develop 
a more accurate baseline and release areas without 
anti-personnel mine contamination.
Chad 1 January 
2025
Not on track Chad needs to overhaul and strengthen all aspects of its 
mine action programme: legal, managerial, operational, 
and strategic. An in-country platform bringing together 
the authorities, donors, and key stakeholders could be one 
mechanism to support the necessary transformation and 
strengthen coordination.
Oman 1 February 
2025
On track Oman should ensure it conducts land release operations 
according to international standards, applying non-technical 
and technical survey to confirm contamination prior to 
clearance, whenever possible.
Angola 31 December 
2025
Not on track In accordance with Articles 1 and 5 of the APMBC, Angola should 
ensure the destruction of anti-personnel mines in all mined 
areas, including those in and around military installations.
Cambodia 31 December 
2025
Not on track Cambodia should seek to conclude a bilateral cooperation 
mechanism with Thailand that would enable both countries to 
survey and clear all mined areas along the shared border.
Ethiopia 31 December 
2025
Not on track Ethiopia should re-survey the Somali region to establish an 
up-to-date and accurate baseline of contamination. Ethiopia 
should ensure the re-established national mine action 
authority has the resources to sustain an effective mine 
action programme and ensure the mobilisation of resources 
to complete clearance.
Tajikistan 31 December 
2025
Not on track The Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC) should 
expedite planning and conduct of accelerated survey to 
establish a clear national baseline of contamination.









Zimbabwe 31 December 
2025
Just on track Zimbabwe should increase efforts to secure additional 
national and international funding to meet its 2025 clearance 
completion deadline.
Croatia 1 March  
2026
Not on track Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC should increase 
its survey capacity and ensure that survey is conducted 
to confirm evidence of mines before embarking on full 
clearance. The Ministry of Defence should ensure sufficient 
capacity is in place and should significantly increase 
clearance to release mined areas on military land.
Iraq 1 February 
2028
Not on track Iraq needs to overhaul and strengthen all aspects of its 
mine action programme: legal, managerial, operational, 
and strategic. An in-country platform bringing together 
the authorities, donors, and key stakeholders could be one 
mechanism to support the necessary transformation and 
strengthen coordination.
Palestine 1 June  
2028
Not on track Palestine should continue to engage positively with all 
stakeholders to promote progress in mine clearance and survey.
Sri Lanka 1 June  
2028
On track The National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) should conduct 
survey/re-survey in mine-contaminated districts to ensure 
that every effort is made to identify remaining mined areas 
and include them in its completion strategy.
States Parties in bold have expired deadlines and should request a new deadline to address contamination from anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature.
Based on the rate of current progress, the likelihood is thus that, by the time of the next APMBC Review Conference due to take 
place in late 2024, more than 25 States Parties will still be affected by anti-personnel mined areas. 
COMPLETION OF CLEARANCE BY 2025
The Third APMBC Review Conference in Maputo set 2025 as a target for a world free of anti-personnel mines. The Fourth 
APMBC Review Conference in Oslo in November 2019 reiterated this aim, with States Parties declaring that they “aspire to 
meet these goals to the fullest extent possible by 2025.”13 Yet, as we have seen, worryingly few affected States Parties are on 
track to meet the goal of completing clearance by the end of 2025. With five years still available to achieve this target, many 
States Parties could still fulfil their Article 5 obligations by the end of 2025, but it will require strong national ownership, 
elaboration of concrete action plans, application of efficient land release methodology, and sufficient and sustained funding 
through to completion. 
Each year that passes in which affected States Parties fail to make meaningful progress to release mined areas, is a missed 
opportunity and takes us further from the collective 2025 goal the mine ban community committed to in Maputo in 2014 and 
recommitted to in Oslo in 2019. 
Mine Action Review believes that the establishment of in-country national mine action platforms that strengthen coordination 
and enable open and regular dialogue among all mine action stakeholders will play an important part in supporting several 
affected States Parties to reach fulfilment of Article 5. To date, only a handful of such forums exist, but we hope that Action 
Item 44 of the Oslo Action Plan incentivises other affected States Parties to establish them.
PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
To help affected States Parties and their partners focus their capacity building and technical assistance efforts on areas of 
weakness, and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of survey and clearance programmes, a performance scoring system 
is used by Mine Action Review. The scoring criteria were developed in consultation with the Mine Action Review’s Advisory Board 
Members (The HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)), and with input from the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), including the Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP). 
Mine Action Review assesses mine action programme performance in affected States Parties according to a set of seven core 
criteria: Understanding of contamination; National ownership and programme management; Gender and diversity; Information 
management and reporting; Planning and tasking; Land release system; and Land release outputs and Article 5 compliance. 
In the scoring, additional weighting is accorded to Understanding of contamination; Land release system; and Land release 
outputs and Article 5 compliance. An average is then calculated that determines the overall score. A score of 8 or more is 
ranked Very Good. A score of 7.0–7.9 is ranked Good. A score of 5.0–6.9 is ranked Average. A score of 4.0–4.9 is ranked Poor.  
A score of less than 4 is ranked Very Poor. 
13 Oslo Declaration, para. 15.
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The text box on pages 14-15 outlines the seven programme performance criteria and key factors in detail. The results of the 
scoring for 2019 are summarised in Table 7. The country-specific assessments of the seven criteria, which should be viewed 
alongside the Recommendations for Action, are intended as an implementation tool, offered in the spirit of openness and 
constructive dialogue, to assist States Parties to identify and overcome challenges and fulfil their Article 5 obligations as 
efficiently as possible. 
The highest score was recorded by Chile, which significantly increased land release during 2019 and early 2020, culminating in 
its announcement that it had completed clearance before the expiry of its Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2020. Also ranked Very 
Good for the first year was Zimbabwe, which has strong national ownership and which increased its clearance output by 30% 
from the previous year. Close behind with an increased score in 2019 was the United Kingdom, whose combined clearance and 
release through technical survey of more than 3.8km2 in 2019 has brought it within touching distance of fulfilment of its Article 
5 obligations.
Another strong performer was Angola, whose ranking as rated Good for the first time, while Peru also increased its score 
significantly, reflecting a significant rise in clearance in 2019. Overall, two mine action programmes were ranked Very Good;  
six were ranked Good; twelve were ranked Average; six were ranked Poor; and three were ranked Very Poor. Seven States 
Parties were not ranked: Argentina, Cyprus, and Palestine (not assessed due to issues related to jurisdiction or control of 
mined areas); Mauritania (not assessed due to the fact it only reported the discovery of new mine contamination in 2020);  
and Cameroon, Mali, and Nigeria (not assessed due to insufficient information available to assess performance in 2019).
Table 7: Mine Action Programme Performance in Selected States Parties
State Party Ranking Score (2019) Score (2018) Change in Score
Afghanistan Good 7.0 7.0 0
Angola Good 7.0 6.3 + 0.7
BiH Average 5.9 6.0 - 0.1
Cambodia Good 7.0 6.8 + 0.2
Chad Poor 4.5 3.9 + 0.6
Chile Very Good 8.1 6.4 + 1.7
Colombia Poor 4.6 4.4 + 0.2
Croatia Average 6.3 6.8 - 0.5
DR Congo Average 5.1 4.9 + 0.2
Ecuador Poor 4.5 4.9 - 0.4
Eritrea Very Poor 2.7 2.7 0
Ethiopia Average 5.2 4.9 + 0.3
Iraq Average 5.1 4.9 + 0.2
Niger Poor 4.1 3.7 + 0.4
Oman Average 5.3 5.0 + 0.3
Peru Average 5.6 4.3 + 1.3
Senegal Very Poor 3.8 3.9 - 0.1
Serbia Average 6.1 6.0 + 0.1
Somalia Poor 4.6 4.6 0
South Sudan Average 6.8 6.5 + 0.3
Sri Lanka Good 7.0 7.4 - 0.4
Sudan Average 6.5 6.8 - 0.3
Tajikistan Average 6.3 6.3 0
Thailand Good 7.1 7.0 + 0.1
Turkey Average 6.3 6.2 + 0.1
Ukraine Very Poor 3.9 4.0 - 0.1
United Kingdom Good 7.9 7.1 + 0.8
Yemen Poor 4.0 4.0 0
Zimbabwe Very Good 8.0 7.8 + 0.2
Average Scores 5.7 5.5 + 0.2
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The three States Parties ranked Very Poor were Eritrea, Senegal, and Ukraine. Eritrea is in violation of the APMBC for failure 
to report on and seemingly conduct any clearance for five years. Senegal’s compliance with the Convention remains in doubt 
and it must determine a better baseline of mine contamination and start clearing confirmed mined areas. Ukraine’s progress 
in demining has been very disappointing, with coordination by the national authorities hampered by its failure to put in place 
legislation needed to establish the required infrastructure for an effective mine action programme.
Mine Action Review Criteria to Assess National Programme Performance of States Parties  
to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention




(20% of overall score)
 ■ Has a national baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination been established and is it up  
to date and accurate?
 ■ If no national baseline, or only a partial or inaccurate baseline, exists, is survey and/or 
re-survey being conducted or is it planned?
 ■ Are anti-personnel mined areas disaggregated from areas with other types of explosive 
ordnance (e.g. anti-vehicle mines or explosive remnants of war (ERW))?
 ■ Is contamination from anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature included in the national 
baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination?
 ■ Is anti-personnel mine contamination classified into suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and 
confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), based on whether there is indirect or direct evidence of 
emplaced anti-personnel mines respectively? 





(10% of overall score)
 ■ Is there a national entity, such as a national mine action authority, overseeing mine action? 
 ■ Is there a national mine action centre coordinating operations? 
 ■ Are the roles and responsibilities in mine action clear and coherent within the national 
programme? 
 ■ Is the mine action centre adequately staffed and skilled? 
 ■ Are clearance operators involved in key decision-making processes?
 ■ Does national legislation, or other suitable administrative measures, effectively underpin  
the mine action programme?
 ■ Have the authorities created an enabling environment for mine action? 
 ■ Has the government facilitated the receipt and efficient use of international assistance?
 ■ Is there political will for timely and efficient implementation of Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)?
 ■ Does the affected State contribute national resources to support the cost of the mine action 
centre and/or survey and clearance of anti-personnel mined areas?




(10% of overall score)
 ■ Does the national mine action programme have a gender policy and implementation plan?  
Do the main mine action operators have one? 
 ■ Is gender mainstreamed in the national mine action strategy and national mine action 
standards? 
 ■ Are women and children in communities affected by mined areas consulted during survey  
and community liaison activities?
 ■ Are survey and community liaison teams inclusive and gender balanced, to facilitate access 
and participation by all groups, including women and children?
 ■ Are the needs of women and children in communities affected by mined areas taken into 
account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities?
 ■ Are ethnic or minority groups in communities affected by mined areas consulted during  
survey and community liaison activities?
 ■ Do survey, clearance, and community liaison teams include representatives from different 
ethnic or minority groups, to facilitate access and participation by all groups?
 ■ Are the needs of ethnic or minority groups in communities affected by mined areas taken  
into account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities?
 ■ Is relevant mine action data disaggregated by gender and age? 
 ■ Is there equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance 
teams, including for managerial level/supervisory positions? 
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(10% of overall score)
 ■ Is there a national information management system in place (e.g. IMSMA), and is the data 
accurate and reliable?
 ■ Are data collection forms consistent and do they enable collection of the necessary data?
 ■ Is data in the information management system disaggregated by type of contamination  
and method of land release? 
 ■ Is the data in the information management system accessible to all operators?
 ■ Are ongoing efforts being made to ensure or improve the quality of data in the mine  
action database?
 ■ Does the affected State Party to the APMBC submit accurate and timely annual Article 7 
reports on Article 5 progress?
 ■ Are Article 5 extension requests of a high-quality and submitted in a timely manner?
 ■ Is the survey and clearance data reported by the affected State Party (e.g. in Article 7 
reporting) accurate and disaggregated by type of contamination (i.e. anti-personnel from 
anti-vehicle mines) and method of land release?
 ■ Does the affected State Party report on progress in Article 5 implementation at the 
intersessional meetings and Meetings of States Parties, and is reporting accurate and 
consistent between reporting periods?
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
 ■ Is there a national mine action strategy in place and does it include realistic goals for land release?
 ■ Is there a realistic annual work plan in place for land release?
 ■ Are there agreed and specified criteria for prioritisation of tasks? 
 ■ Are key stakeholders meaningfully consulted in planning and prioritisation?
 ■ Is clearance of anti-personnel mines tasked in accordance with agreed prioritisation?
 ■ Are task dossiers issued in a timely and effective manner?
 ■ Where relevant, is there a plan for dealing with residual risk and liability?  
Is it realistic and sustainable?
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM  
(20% of overall score)
 ■ Does the affected State have national mine action standards in place for land release? 
 ■ Do the standards enable or impede efficient evidence-based survey and clearance?
 ■ Are national standards reflected in SOPs?
 ■ Are standards and SOPs periodically reviewed against IMAS and international best practice,  
in consultation with clearance operators?
 ■ Is there an effective and efficient: i) non-technical survey capacity, ii) technical survey 
capacity, iii) clearance capacity in the programme? Does this include national capacity?
 ■ Are areas being cleared that prove to have no anti-personnel mine contamination?
 ■ Where relevant, is there national survey and clearance capacity in place to address anti-personnel 
mine contamination discovered after the release of mined areas or post completion?
 ■ Is there an appropriate range of demining assets (manual, mechanical, and animal detection 
systems) integrated into land release operations?
 ■ Is there an effective quality management system in place for survey and clearance operations?
 ■ Where an accident has occurred within a mine action programme was there an effective 





(20% of overall score)
 ■ Is the affected State seeking to clear all anti-personnel mine contamination from territory 
under its jurisdiction or control, including anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, 
border minefields, anti-personnel mine contamination in and around military installations,  
hard to access minefields etc.?
 ■ Have national mine action authorities set a target date for the completion of anti-personnel 
mine clearance and is this within the State Party’s Article 5 deadline? 
 ■ Is the target date for completion realistic based on existing capacity?
 ■ Is the target date sufficiently ambitious?
 ■ What were the outputs of survey and clearance of anti-personnel mined area in 2019, and  
were they greater or lesser than the previous year and why?
 ■ Are survey and clearance outputs in line with plans and Article 5 obligations?
 ■ Are anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, if present, included in the clearance  
plans and operations? 
 ■ Is the affected State on track to meet the target completion date and/or Article 5 deadline?
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THE OSLO ACTION PLAN 
The year 2019 was an important one for the APMBC, marking 
20 years since its entry into force. The Fourth Review 
Conference of the Convention was held in Oslo on 25–29 
November 2019. The anniversary represented an opportunity 
to take stock of the huge progress in Article 5 implementation 
over the last two decades, but also of lessons learned and 
challenges in implementation.14 
Of particular concern is the slow pace of survey and clearance 
in too many States Parties, including requests for repeated 
Article 5 deadline extensions by those with relatively limited 
contamination. In many cases, States Parties could have 
fulfilled their Article 5 obligations within the initial 10-year 
clearance deadline, had there been sufficient commitment  
to do so, supported by evidence-based work plans for the 
release of mined areas, application of efficient survey and 
clearance methodology, and sufficient and sustained funding.
Under Norway’s presidency of the Review Conference and  
in collaboration with States Parties, mine action NGOs, 
and other expert organisations, the five-year Oslo Action 
Plan (OAP) was elaborated. The OAP is a blueprint for 
implementation of the Convention, supporting States Parties 
and their implementing partners get to completion in the best 
way possible – efficiently, effectively, safely, and inclusively. 
For the first time, the Action Plan has action items with 
measurable indicators. This aims to establish a baseline of 
the current status of implementation against which progress 
will be measured year-on-year up to the next Review 
Conference in 2024. It is essential for national authorities 
to have the systems in place to support implementation 
of the Treaty and of the OAP. This means ensuring that the 
obligations in Article 5 and the guidance provided by the OAP 
are integrated into national strategies, annual work plans, 
information management systems, and national mine action 
standards. National ownership, the subject of the first Action 
Item, is critical to successful Article 5 implementation.15
Action Item 49 of the OAP includes an additional measure 
to help ensure compliance, calling upon States Parties to 
provide detailed information on implementing Article 5 each 
year through submitting Article 7 reports (as the Convention 
requires) and during meetings of States Parties. If a State 
Party implementing Article 5 (or Articles 3 and 4) has not 
provided information for two consecutive years, “the President 
will assist and engage with the States Parties concerned in 
close cooperation with the relevant Committee”.16 
MONITORING THE OSLO ACTION PLAN
Members of the Coordinating Committee and the President of the APMBC will be responsible for establishing a baseline value 
for the OAP and measuring progress in implementing the OAP within their mandates, with the support of the Implementation 
Support Unit (ISU). The information submitted in the States Parties’ annual Article 7 reports will serve as the main source of 
data to assess progress.
In addition to the official APMBC monitoring of the OAP, Mine Action Review is also providing civil society monitoring and analysis 
of the implementation of the OAP actions relating to survey and clearance. This is based on our broader research, which includes 
not only official treaty reporting (Article 7 reports and official government statements and updates under the Convention), but 
also liaison with national authorities, clearance operators, UNMAS, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Organization  
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the GICHD.
This year’s baseline results of Mine Action Review’s 2020 monitoring of survey and clearance related indicators can be found 
on the Mine Action Review website. They include a guide describing the Oslo Action Plan action items and indicators relevant 
for survey and clearance, along with supporting commentary on the meaning and importance of each action item, with regards 
to efficient and effective Article 5 implementation.
The results of Mine Action Review’s 2020 baseline assessment will be finalised following the Eighteenth Meeting of States 
Parties on 16-20 November 2020. Mine Action Review welcomes feedback from States Parties and other stakeholders on the 
results of the provisional assessment. Please email MineActionReview@npaid.org with any feedback or additional information 
for Mine Action Review’s consideration.
As the provisional 2020 baseline of current progress illustrates, States Parties have not yet fully implemented the action 
items and indicators applicable to them. But the hope is that through the efforts of national authorities, with the support of 
implementing partners, they can identify where there are gaps and make progress in addressing them, which will then be 
reflected in progress in the indicators each year between now and the Fifth Review Conference in 2024.
14 Lucy Pinches and Stuart Casey-Maslen, “Clearing under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention”, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), 
Occasional Papers – No. 34, The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention: 20 Years of Saving Lives and Preventing Indiscriminate Harm, 2019, p. 43, at: bit.ly/357fxXY.
15 The States Parties have defined national ownership as entailing the following: “maintaining interest at a high level in fulfilling Convention obligations; empowering and 
providing relevant State entities with the human, financial and material capacity to carry out their obligations under the Convention; articulating the measures its State 
entities will undertake to implement relevant aspects of Convention in the most inclusive, efficient and expedient manner possible and plans to overcome any challenges 
that need to be addressed; and making a regular significant national financial commitment to the State’s programmes to implement the Convention”, Oslo Action Plan.
16 Oslo Action Plan, Action Item number 49.
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The mine action community is also rightly seeking to strengthen performance in areas which were not adequately covered 
in the initial Convention text in 1999, including the importance of ensuring gender- and diversity-sensitive mine action 
programming. Norway, during its presidency of the Fourth Review Conference, established a civil society Gender Working 
Group17 that supported the presidency and States Parties to successfully ensure that a gender perspective was applied into the 
implementation of the Convention. Importantly, this has been embedded in the treaty machinery and each Committee (including 
the Committee on Article 5 Implementation) is mandated to appoint a focal point among its members to provide advice on 
gender mainstreaming and ensure that the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities are taken into 
account in the implementation of the Oslo Action Plan.
In this year’s research, Mine Action Review has seen an improvement in the availability and quality of information on gender 
provided by national authorities and their implementing partners, compared to last year when we started to ask questions related 
to the gender sensitivity of mine action programmes for the first time. Furthermore, in this year’s assessment of programme 
performance for 2019, Mine Action Review has also assessed diversity alongside gender, as initially intended. While we have 
received some information on measures national authorities are taking to consider diversity in mine action programming, the 
information received on diversity has lagged behind that on gender. It is essential that diversity is also mainstreamed within mine 
action programmes, alongside gender, especially in mine-affected countries where conflict has been on ethnic grounds.
INNOVATION
In a number of affected States Parties and States not party, 
demining operators have shown a welcome commitment to 
innovation. Action 27 of the Oslo Action Plan adopted at the 
Fourth APMBC Review Conference called on States Parties 
to “Take appropriate steps to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of survey and clearance, including by promoting the 
research, application and sharing of innovative technological 
means to this effect”. 
In September 2020, Humanity and Inclusion (HI) won a 
European Union Horizon Prize for Affordable High-Tech for 
Humanitarian Aid, for its “Odyssey2025” project. The project 
in Chad uses drones equipped with infrared cameras to 
locate mines buried in the desert, accelerating the pace of 
clearance and release of land to local populations.18
In 2019, The HALO Trust introduced a new mechanical 
vegetation cutter in Ukraine, one of the latest in the mine 
action sector’s use of commercial and bespoke mechanical 
assets to increase the efficiency of survey and clearance. The 
quaintly named “Robocut” has quadrupled the productivity of 
manual clearance in areas that have only an anti-personnel 
tripwire-threat. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) (colloquially called drones) were used by 
Norwegian People’s Aid and the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine 
Action Centre (BHMAC) for non-technical survey during the 
country-wide assessment of mined areas. In Abkhazia, HALO 
has developed and deployed bespoke operational methods 
to clear heavy rubble and unexploded ordnance (UXO). It has 
found that reinforced armouring of mechanical assets and 
the use of drones to map and identify hazardous items has 
increased its programme’s effectiveness and efficiency. 
MAG has developed an urban approach model, which 
involves threat assessment, analysis of high-level satellite 
imagery (such as urban gridding and categorisation, 
changes to building structure over time, remote battle 
damage assessments, rubble signature identification using 
machine learning, land use analysis, and 3D modelling), 
and a supporting IM platform. The approach, funded by 
the Netherlands, will be used by MAG in Iraq and is based 
on MAG’s experience from urban settings together with 
the GICHD threat assessment model. It is envisaged that 
this approach will help in the planning and prioritisation of 
survey and clearance efforts in complex urban environments, 
including in areas where conflict is ongoing or security levels 
do not yet permit deployment of teams into the area.
Finally, Fenix Insight, a UK-based mine action company, has 
developed a valuable online repository for IMAS. All of the 
normative references in the IMAS (“shall”, “should”, and 
“may”) have been incorporated in a searchable database at 
https://mineaction.net. The IMAS, which were developed 
collaboratively by experts in the sector, have continued to 
evolve throughout the 20 years of the APMBC, to capture 
and promote minimum good practice (including, crucially on 
Land Release). They serve as an invaluable tool for helping 
national authorities develop their own national standards and 
Fenix’s online repository makes the IMAS more accessible 
than ever, providing a valuable tool for the mine action sector. 
17 The Gender Working Group is chaired by The HALO Trust and MAG, and other members of the group include Dan Church Aid (DCA), GICHD, Humanity and Inclusion 
(HI), International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Mine Action Review, Mines Action Canada, and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). 
18 HI, “European Union awards HI two prizes for its innovative projects”, available at: bit.ly/33fkbC3.
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The amount of land released in 2019 dipped from the previous year although by a slightly smaller percentage than the drop in 
international donor funding. The Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) introduced a national standard for clearing 
mines of an improvised nature (called “Abandoned Improvised Mines” (AIMs)) in March 2019 and focused more attention on  
their survey and clearance. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ DMAC should review land release standards and practices to encourage greater application of non-technical  
survey/cancellation and technical survey/area reduction. 
 ■ Afghanistan should revise and update its Article 5 deadline extension request to provide a timeline to take account  
of lower levels of donor funding and the additional challenge of mines of an improvised nature. 
 ■ The Afghan government should provide funding to mine action, particularly in areas where survey and clearance 
facilitate priority national development projects.
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(20% of overall score)
7 7 Afghanistan has a good, if still incomplete, knowledge of pre-2001 anti-personnel 
mine contamination but continues to add significant amounts of previously 
unrecorded mined area to the database. There is only rudimentary knowledge of 
post-2001 contamination, including improvised mines, which may now be more 
extensive in extent and pose the main threat to civilians. 
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
8 8 The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) completed its transition to 
national management in 2018 but DMAC salaries are largely donor funded and the 
government has not yet made a significant financial contribution to the programme.  
A modest payment pledged in 2019 was received in 2020 and was followed by a 
pledge of further government funding for clearance.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
6 6 DMAC mainstreamed gender and diversity in its 2016–2020 strategic plan. Practice 
in implementing partners lags behind formal commitment to the goals while custom 
in deeply conservative Afghan society limits the extent of women’s recruitment, 
particularly in operations. Two female teams who conducted demining in Bamyan 
were reassigned to battle area tasks in the same province; women have not been 
able to work as deminers elsewhere. Mixed-gender explosive ordnance risk 




(10% of overall score)
8 8 DMAC has an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New 
Generation database that provides a range of reports and extensive disaggregated 
information. DMAC continues to work with the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) preparing to upgrade to IMSMA Core and to adopt 
new mobile data gathering technologies. Operators say DMAC’s data entry can be 
slow. Afghanistan routinely submits comprehensive Article 7 transparency reports 
though often late. National operators are not proactive reporting on their operations.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
8 8 Afghanistan produced a model extension request in 2012 and although funding 
shortfalls and insecurity ensure the MAPA will not achieve its objectives DMAC 
produced detailed work plans in consultation with operators that seek to address 
emerging challenges.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
6 6 The MAPA has national mine action standards in Dari and English that are subject 
to regular review and in 2019 it introduced new standards for clearance of mines of 
an improvised nature. Land release is achieved almost entirely by full clearance and 
DMAC consulted the GICHD with a view to increasing operational efficiency.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
7 7 The MAPA has released an average of more than 25km2 a year through clearance 
over the last five years and reached that level again in 2019 despite financial and 
security challenges. 
Average Score 7.0 7.0 Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority
 ■ Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC)
 ■ Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in 
Afghanistan (AREA)
 ■ Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA)
 ■ Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)
 ■ Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC)
 ■ Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan 
Rehabilitation (OMAR)
 ■ 22 commercial companies accredited in 2019, one 
company (Trust Demining Company) reported active  
in anti-personnel mine clearance 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Danish Demining Group (DDG)
 ■ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
 ■ The HALO Trust (HALO)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian  
Demining (GICHD) 
 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Afghanistan had more than 207km2 of contamination by conventional and improvised anti-personnel mines at the end of  
2019 (see Table 1), making it among the world’s most heavily mined countries.1 A definitive understanding of the extent of  
its contamination remains elusive due to conflict that continues to restrict survey while also adding contamination by mines  
of an improvised nature. 
Table 1: Mined area by type of contamination (at end 2019)2
Type of contamination CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total areas Area (m2)
Anti-personnel mines 1,662 119,920,460 179 50,902,554 1,841 170,823,014
Improvised mines 218 15,565,719 42 21,222,215 260 36,787,934
AP mine total 1,880 135,486,179 221 72,124,769 2,101 207,610,948
Anti-vehicle mines 936 164,455,642 327 146,561,256 1,263 311,016,898
Totals 2,816 299,941,821 548 218,686,025 3,364 518,627,846
CHAs = Confirmed Hazardous Areas SHAs = Suspected Hazardous Areas
Afghanistan reported anti-personnel mine contamination dating from before 2001 at 170.8km2 at the end of 2019 (see Table 1), 
down from 178km2 a year earlier as a result of land released through survey and clearance during 2019. DMAC also reported a 
total of 36.8km2 of improvised mine contamination. These estimates, however, significantly understate levels of contamination. 
In the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request that Afghanistan submitted in 2012  
it proposed to conduct non-technical survey in all 400 of the country’s districts. By the end of 2016, it had completed surveying 
295 districts but suspended the project due to funding shortfalls and insecurity, leaving 105 remaining to be surveyed. Since 
then, some surveyed districts have additional contamination as a result of continued fighting and there is little doubt that 
districts that have yet to be surveyed will add further contamination to the database.3 
Table 2: Pre-2001 anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2019)4
Region CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total CHA/SHA Total Area (m2)
Central 415 26,332,126 35 4,852,466 450 31,184,592
East 124 11,830,306 5 534,900 129 12,365,206
North 216 7,596,773 9 2,451,375 225 10,048,148
North East 616 41,362,130 15 8,965,142 631 50,327,272
South 83 11,376,468 60 8,977,770 143 20,354,238
South East 146 11,388,016 30 5,750,344 176 17,138,360
West 62 10,034,641 25 19,370,557 87 29,405,198
Totals 1,662 119,920,460 179 50,902,554 1,841 170,823,014
Most mines emplaced in recent years are improvised devices, which now pose a greater humanitarian threat than 
factory-made anti-personnel mines.5 The conflict in which they are being used has also prevented an accurate determination  
of the extent of improvised contamination but DMAC is clear that it far exceeds the 36.8km2 so far recorded in the database 
(see Table 3). Afghanistan reported in May 2019 that an area of 465km2 may be affected by abandoned improvised mines.6 
Table 3: Abandoned improvised mine contamination by region (at end 2019)
Region CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total CHA/SHA Total area (m2)
Central 2 591,675 0 0 2 591,675
East 59 1,514,384 10 374,585 69 1,888,969
North 2 988,874 0 0 2 988,874
North East 15 355,271 7 99,231 22 454,502
South 138 12,116,490 25 20,748,399 163 32,864,889
Totals 216 15,566,694 42 21,222,215 258 36,788,909




Most of Afghanistan’s known mine contamination resulted from the decade-long war of resistance that followed the  
Soviet invasion of 1979, the 1992–96 internal armed conflict, and the 1996−2001 fighting between the Taliban and the  
Northern Alliance. The intervention of the United States (US)-led coalition in late 2001 added considerable quantities of 
unexploded ordnance (UXO). Continuing conflict between the government and the Taliban and other armed groups is still 
adding contamination.7 
In addition to the challenge from landmines, Afghanistan contends with huge areas affected by explosive remnants of war 
(ERW). DMAC reported total mine and ERW contamination of 1,603km2 remaining at the end of 2019, of which it said nearly 
two-thirds occurred after 2001. It included North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) firing ranges covering 630km2.8
DMAC has also identified 299km2 of what it designates as “initial hazardous areas”. Most areas were subjected to a form of 
rapid survey at the request of the National Security Council but need further survey before they can be recorded as SHAs 
or CHAs. More than 60% of the total area is attributed to ERW but it includes 63km2 of suspected AIM contamination located 
largely in the south, 6km2 of anti-personnel mined area located largely in central provinces, and 48km2 of anti-vehicle mined 
area, almost entirely located in the south.9
NEW CONTAMINATION
DMAC added 56km2 of previously unrecorded ERW contamination to its database as a result of survey in 2019. It included 
nearly 21.7km2 of anti-personnel or mixed mine contamination, almost entirely dating back to before 2001 and 3.2km2 of 
abandoned improvised mines resulting from recent conflict.10 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA), 
originally established in 1989, is led by DMAC, which comes 
under the Afghanistan National Disaster Management 
Authority. DMAC fulfils the role of a national mine action 
centre. From its headquarters in Kabul and seven regional 
offices, DMAC manages and coordinates the work of national 
and international implementing partners. 
DMAC provides strategic planning and annual work plans, 
sets priorities and standards, accredits operators, conducts 
quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC), manages the 
mine action database, and conducts resource mobilisation.  
It coordinates closely with operators through technical 
working groups that address planning and priority setting, 
survey, mechanical clearance, risk education, and victim 
assistance. In 2018 a separate technical working group was 
set up to deal with AIMs.11
The MAPA is nationally managed but in 2019 remained almost 
entirely internationally funded. Since 2012, it has transitioned 
from being a project of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
to national management, a process formally completed with 
the transfer of the last positions from UNMAS to DMAC in 
June 2018. The government paid salaries of 13 members 
of DMAC’s total staff of 144 people. Most of the remainder 
are paid by UNMAS with 27 paid by the International Trust 
Fund.12 The government earmarked a payment of AFS 20 
million (approximately US$250,000) for a humanitarian 
mine clearance project for the first time in 2019 but lengthy 
bureaucratic procedures meant the funding was not received 
until 2020.13 The government pledged additional funding 
of about US$500,000 in 2020 for demining operations in 
Nangahar province’s Achin district.14 
UNMAS continued to support DMAC in 2019 employing 32 
national and 3 international staff in 2019 providing technical 
advice, training, and capacity building. It expected to add 
two more international and one national staff in 2020. 
It also remained a major channel of funding, providing 
US$17.4 million to the MAPA through the Voluntary Trust 
Fund (VTF) for projects including survey, clearance, quality 
assurance, and risk education. UNMAS reported advising 
DMAC on developing standards for survey and clearance 
of AIM and co-hosted with HALO Trust a workshop in Kabul 
on non-technical survey of AIM-affected areas. It conducted 
workshops in Kabul covering operational planning, conflict 
sensitivity training, and mainstreaming gender in mine action 
and a series of workshops on negotiating humanitarian 
access held in Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif. It also 
led an overhaul of explosive ordnance risk education.15
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) provided third party 
monitoring of all mine action and conventional weapons 
disposal projects funded by the US Department of State 
working with 18 staff, including 6 internationals. In 2019, it 
monitored 15 contracts worth approximately US$13 million: 
1 grant for non-technical survey and 14 other grants for 
non-technical survey and clearance.16
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
The MAPA has had a policy of including gender in mine  
action since 2014 and set gender mainstreaming as one 
of four goals of its 2016–20 strategic plan. It states that 
“achievable targets, reflecting prevailing circumstances 
and conditions, will be adopted to support and encourage 
progress wherever possible.”17
Progress appears to be slow. DMAC employed only four 
women among its staff of 194 as of the middle of 2019 
while the MAPA employed only 167 women out of a total 
workforce of 6,772.18 Women work in operational as well as 
administrative roles but employing women in field operations 
in particular remains challenging in Afghanistan’s deeply 
conservative society. Female deminers were employed 
for the first time in 2018 but operate in only one province, 
Bamyan. Mixed-gender explosive ordnance risk education 
(EORE) and survey teams are, however, working across  
the country.
The gender strategy and Afghanistan’s national mine action 
standards (AMAS) for community liaison underscore the 
importance of including women and girls as well as boys and 
men in non-technical survey, and pre- and post-clearance 
impact assessments and for equal access to employment 
for women. The strategy called for implementing partners 
(IPs) to identify forums in which to access under-represented 
groups, including women and girls, and to ensure data 
collection and reporting was disaggregated for gender and 
age.19 The AMAS also refer to the importance of consulting 
representatives of different groups, such as tribal and 
religious leaders.20 Explosive ordnance risk education 
teams are required to include a female and male trainer but 
deploying women as deminers has so far been achieved only 
in one province, Bamyan, because of cultural sensitivities.21
DMAC has a technical working group on gender and diversity 
working with IPs to promote implementation. DMAC’s review 
of IP project proposals also ensures gender issues are 
considered in operational planning. It operates a hotline 
taking calls from affected communities which it said also 
allows interests of minorities to be taken into account.22 
Converting policy into practice, however, remains a 
challenge. DMAC’s gender focal point resigned in October 
2018 and the post remained vacant for almost a year. The 
next appointee stayed half a year before leaving for personal 
reasons at the end of March. Similar issues hold back 
progress among IPs. DMAC reported that IPs did not have  
a dedicated gender focal point and constantly rotated the  
role among staff with other duties.23
For Danish Demining Group (DDG) – the first and only IP to 
employ female deminers – women made up 61 of its 487 
staff (12%). DDG increased its female demining component 
from one team of eight to two teams totalling sixteen, plus 
two women paramedics in 2019. The teams worked in 
Bamyan and after completing demining were assigned to 
battle area clearance of firing ranges in the same province.24 
DDG employed another 29 women as risk educators and 
facilitators, four as community engagement officers, and 
two as QA officers, along with five cleaners and a cook.25 
The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), working in the 
remote north-eastern province of Badakshan, said local 
religious tradition prevented it from employing any women.26 
The HALO Trust’s end-year staff of 2,521 included 23 women 
and it anticipated a slight increase in their number in 2020. 
HALO employed women in mixed-gender quick-response 
teams, risk education, and impact monitoring, but also 
underscored social and cultural challenges to women 
working in the field. In HALO Afghanistan’s head office 
and regional offices women also worked in information 
management, donor relations, and finance. Its field surveys 
contain specific questions to ensure inclusion of different 
groups in the community.27
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
DMAC operates an Information Management System for Mine 
Action (IMSMA) NG database and continued working with the 
GICHD in 2019 on cleaning up data as well as preparing to 
upgrade the database to IMSMA Core. DMAC expected the 
transfer to be completed in 2021.28 DMAC also worked with 
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) on installing the Mine Action Reporting System 
(MARS), a mobile system designed for data entry in the field. 
DMAC conducted two workshops with UNMAS and IPs to 
introduce the system, which was due to go into service after 
IPs completed field testing in 2020. DMAC had planned to 
introduce a cloud-based data warehouse in 2020 but reported 
the project was delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic.29
Afghanistan consistently submits comprehensive Article 
7 reports and DMAC’s information department produces a 
range of monthly, quarterly, and annual reports as well as 
reports on request and maps.30 DMAC also holds monthly 
data coordination meetings which IPs said had resulted 
in improvements, but that entry of survey and clearance 
data continued to be slow because of a shortage of trained 
information management staff in DMAC. 
Afghanistan continues to measure the progress of mine 
clearance and international funding that supports it against 
targets set in its Article 5 deadline extension request 
submitted in April 2012. The request earned praise as a 
model for its comprehensive overview of all aspects of 
Afghanistan’s response to explosive hazards, including 
milestones for clearance. After seven years of the extension 
period, Afghanistan had received 71 per cent of projected 
funding31 and corresponding clearance targets were in need 
of updating to match financial circumstances. 





The national strategic plan for 2016−20 reaffirms Afghanistan’s 
broad commitment to the APMBC and implementing its 
Article 5 obligations, but has four broad goals: facilitating 
development; engaging with other sectors and government 
departments to have them include mine action in their 
development plans; preventive action to reduce the impact of 
mines and ERW, including by enhanced resource mobilisation, 
completing survey of all communities, explosive ordnance risk 
education, and keeping its extension request work plan on 
track; and gender and diversity mainstreaming.32 
DMAC’s annual work plan sets more specific targets 
according to priorities determined by a matrix of indicators 
that takes account of blockages caused by contamination, 
proximity to communities, and device types. For Afghan 
year 1398 (1 April 2019–30 March 2020), DMAC targeted 
release of 44.7km2 of pre-2001 mine and ERW contamination, 
non-technical survey of 29 districts, and post-demining 
impact assessments in 85 contaminated areas, along with  
12 livelihood surveys.33 
In 2020, DMAC’s priorities for survey included areas where 
casualties occurred, with a focus on improvised mine 
casualties and districts where fighting raised the likelihood 
of explosive hazards. DMAC planned to focus more clearance 
resources on abandoned improvised mines.34 The HALO Trust 
cleared a number of areas of improvised mines in 2019 as a 
pilot project and together with other IPs carried out training 
in survey and clearance in preparation for operations on 
a larger scale.35 DMAC targets for 2020 included release 
of 19.5km2 of areas affected by AIMs, 40km2 affected by 
anti-personnel mines, and 45km2 by anti-vehicle mines.36
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The MAPA has comprehensive national mine action standards 
that DMAC reviews annually and amends in consultation  
with IPs. 
The GICHD noted in a 2019 capacity assessment that DMAC 
is “proactive in introducing new AMAS as and when needed” 
but had not updated them regularly. It noted that most of 
the AMAS were developed between 2011 and 2013 and some 
chapters needed to be reviewed and updated to promote 
greater efficiency.37 DMAC and the GICHD are due to review 
land release standards and are expected to undertake 
revisions to strengthen non-technical survey and increase 
operational efficiency.
DMAC introduced a policy and standing operating procedure 
(SOP) for environmental protection in mine action in 2018, 
and in 2019 Afghanistan became the first country programme 
to release a standard for tackling mines of an improvised 
nature. AMAS 06.10, Abandoned Improvised Mine Clearance, 
was released in March 2019 emphasising the neutrality of 
humanitarian mine action. The standard requires operators 
to get prior written consent from local authorities and other 
“key local stakeholders”, including armed opposition groups, 
and confirmation by the party that laid devices that they are 
abandoned and that clearance may proceed. It stipulates 
clearance should take place only in a rural or semi-rural 
setting. All action to neutralise AIMs should be conducted 
remotely or semi-remotely, and where possible devices 
should be destroyed in situ.38 
DMAC also updated AMAS 03.02 for planning and 
prioritisation in 2019, among other points developing 
procedures for IPs seeking to alter projects they have 
started.39 HALO Trust was due to deliver an AIM survey  
and clearance training course for national IPs in 2020 
covering basic and advanced non-technical survey; basic, 
intermediate and advanced clearance; a train-the-trainer 
course; and an AIM QM course for DMAC personnel.40 
The very high percentage of land released through full 
clearance – consistently around 90% of total land release  
– has called into question the efficiency of the MAPA’s land 
release practices. A GICHD assessment in 2019 observed that 
the emphasis on costs-per-square-metre cleared in tendering 
and contractual arrangements did not encourage operators to 
apply the full range of land release options, including survey. 
It recommended operations should be based on stronger 
evidence-based decision-making and that a review of land 
release applications should probe the reasons for the high 
percentage of full clearance and consider possible alternatives. 
To increase efficiency, it also recommended standardised 
training in non-technical survey and technical survey.41 
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OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Mine survey and clearance are conducted mainly by six 
national and three international IPs. The MAPA operated 
with a total of 346 operational teams in 2019: 204 manual 
clearance teams, 33 mechanical clearance teams, 40 survey 
teams, 35 explosive ordnance risk education teams, 31 teams 
conducting explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and weapons 
and ammunition disposal, and 3 victim assistance teams. 
DMAC reported total manpower of 7,050 engaged in all areas 
of mine action in 2019 (including risk education and victim 
assistance) and expected the number to rise in 2020.42 
After a big expansion in capacity in 2018, DDG employed a 
total staff of 487, including 324 in operations, conducting 
survey and clearance in eight provinces, including Bamiyan, 
Baghlan, Balkh, Kabul, Kunar, Nangarhar, Panjshir, and 
Samangan. DDG was the only IP employing women deminers, 
deploying two teams in Bamyan province, but also had 29 
women working as risk education instructors.43
FSD worked in remote northern Badakshan province 
bordering Tajikistan with total capacity of 53 staff in 2019. 
This consisted of two teams accredited for non-technical 
survey, EOD, and mine clearance, and one risk education 
team. Despite the small size of the operation it clears 
large numbers of the small Soviet-era Butterfly mines that 
contaminate the area. FSD teams travel cross-border from 
Tajikistan to reach their operating area and because of 
logistical and access difficulties for DMAC staff FSD is quality 
assured by the Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre.44 
The HALO Trust remained much the biggest operator 
in Afghanistan although the total number of employees 
decreased from 2,885 staff at the start of the year to 2,521 
at the end, mainly because of the end of a five-year United 
Kingdom-funded contract. In the process, the number of 
manual demining teams fell from 75 teams to 54 with a  
total of 1,474 deminers. HALO also finished the year with  
17 survey/EOD teams and 21 mechanical teams. It expected 
further staff cuts as other UK funding came to an end  
in 2020.45 
HALO, however, was increasing capacity to address 
Afghanistan’s AIM contamination. It increased the number 
of multi-task AIM teams conducting survey, EOD, and risk 
education from two in 2018 to twelve by the end of 2019. It 
also combined with two national IPs, Demining Agency for 
Afghanistan (DAFA) and Mine Clearance Planning Agency 
(MCPA), in setting up 11 mixed gender and multi-task quick 
response teams to undertake non-technical survey, risk 
education, EOD call-outs, small task clearance, and the 
collection of victim data. The teams help planning and project 
design by confirming hazardous areas and reporting on local 
security conditions and other issues that may affect access.46
National IPs did not respond to requests for details of their 
operations and results.
DEMINER SAFETY
DMAC reported one deminer killed and six injured in demining accidents in 2019. It attributed the casualties to carelessness, 
weakness in command group supervision, and attempts to accelerate clearance. One civilian was injured by a mine detonation 
in a location that had been cleared in 2017 and another was killed by an unspecified ERW in an area cleared in 2018.47
The biggest threat to deminers remained insecurity which blocked access to many areas. The MAPA reported 22 security 
incidents in 2019 in the course of which three deminers were killed and a fourth was injured. DMAC said the three deminers 
who died were killed in an airstrike while working on their land. Fourteen deminers were abducted as part of extortion 
attempts by armed groups but later released unharmed after negotiations by community elders.48 Most abduction incidents 
appear to involve extortion attempts by Taliban demanding payment of taxes. HALO Trust reported five such incidents but  
said they were resolved without payment for release of people or equipment.49 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Afghanistan released a total of 30.9km2 of mined area through survey and clearance in 2019, 9% less than the previous 
year but close to the level maintained in the last four years. Clearance accounted for 90% of the total area released in 2019, 
underscoring the limited contribution of cancellation and reduction to land release in Afghanistan.50 





DMAC reported release of a total of 2.9km2 through 
cancellation and area reduction in 2019, but discrepancies 
between results reported by DMAC and some IPs left 
uncertainty about the exact extent of the land released.51
DMAC’s data attributed release of 1.74km2 to cancellation 
through non-technical survey (see Table 4), a sharp reduction 
from 2018 when 12.9km2 was cancelled, mainly as a result 
of resurvey by HALO Trust quick response teams which 
accounted for 11km2 of the total. A further 1.17km2 was 
released in 2019 through area reduction (see Table 5).52 
The MAPA changed the focus of non-technical survey  
in 2019. A workshop in March 2019 concluded that the  
Mine/ERW Impact Free Community Survey (MEIFCS)  
included in Afghanistan’s Article 5 deadline extension 
request should be shelved because of mounting obstacles 
to implementation posed by lack of funding and shrinking 
access.53 DMAC instead concentrated non-technical survey 
in 2019 on two projects. The biggest, targeting 30 districts 
in 14 provinces, aimed to capture explosive ordnance 
contamination resulting from combat and did not address 
landmines. The second, concentrated on central, eastern, 
north-eastern, and southern regions, aiming to record 
contamination by both improvised and “legacy” mines.54 
HALO Trust said its quick response teams resurveyed large 
SHAs and CHAs converting them into smaller polygons  
and in the process achieving significant cancellation and  
area reduction. HALO said its teams cancelled 700,469m2  
in seven provinces in 2019, down from a little over 1km2 the 
previous year, but it released 2.56km2 through area reduction 
compared with 0.2 km2 reduced in 2018, more than half of it  
in four districts of northern Samangan province.55 
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DMAC reported that IPs released 27.9km2 through clearance in 2019 (see Table 6), nearly 10% below the 2018 level. National  
IPs together cleared 43% of the total, releasing 12.1km2. HALO Trust accounted for almost half the area released. In the 
process, IPs also destroyed fewer anti-personnel mines: 7,452 through clearance and 334 in roving EOD tasks for a total of 
7,786 mines destroyed in 2019 compared with a total of 8,859 in 2018. DMAC attributed the outcome in part to sparser levels  
of contamination as clearance progresses to remoter minefields.58 
In addition, HALO and DAFA conducted small-scale clearance of AIMs in southern Afghanistan releasing 84,972m2 and 
destroying 21 items. DAFA cleared 25,677m2 in Helmand province reportedly destroying 1 AIM. HALO worked in Helmand  
and Ghazni provinces, clearing around 59,295m2 and 20 devices. 
Table 6: Mine clearance in 201959
Operator Area cleared (m2) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed UXO destroyed
Area  269,055  29  0  22 
ATC  4,964,011 429 18  279 
DAFA 2,708,707 265 3  290 
DDG 1,748,687 450 0  696 
FSD  326,751  1,090  0  68 
HALO Trust60 13,710,302 4,771 0  439 
MCPA  1,329,584  25 0  46 
OMAR 2,885,086 393 0  289 
SDC 22,195 0 0  0 
TDC 8,642 0 0  0 
Totals 27,973,020 7,452 21  2,129 
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR AFGHANISTAN: 1 MARCH 2003 
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2013
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (10YEARS): 1 MARCH 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2013), Afghanistan is 
required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later 
than 1 March 2023. Afghanistan will not meet this deadline.
Afghanistan set out detailed timelines for completing clearance of all ERW in its first Article 5 extension but will need to 
request a second extension to its Article 5 deadline in 2022. As one of the world’s most heavily mine contaminated countries  
it will not complete clearance by 2025 either. Continuing conflict also leaves Afghanistan unable realistically to set a target  
for completion. 
The key obstacles remain unchanged:
 ■ Since starting the extension period, Afghanistan has 
never received the levels of funding required to achieve 
its targets. In 1398 (April 2019-March 2020), the MAPA 
received $45.3 million, less than half the amount 
targeted. For Year 1399, donors had committed to 
provide around $24 million as of February 2020, but  
the COVID-19 pandemic has added uncertainty to  
funding prospects.
 ■ Conflict limits access for survey and clearance teams, 
preventing an accurate determination of the extent of 
contamination and adding additional explosive hazards. 
 ■ Insecurity means that even in areas where clearance 
continues, access often requires lengthy negotiation 
with local communities and armed opposition groups, 
particularly in relation to clearance of abandoned 
improvised mines.
Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Afghanistan’s national mine action strategy makes no provision for tackling residual contamination. The issue is not a  
priority given the high levels of remaining contamination but the GICHD is recommending DMAC plan to include it in the  
next MAPA strategy.61 The GICHD observed that further support was needed to develop definitions and approaches to  
residual risk management.
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(MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE)
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Angola completed non-technical survey of all 18 provinces in 2019 and now has its most accurate baseline of anti-personnel 
mine contamination to date. Clearance increased significantly in 2019 compared to the previous year. There was an overall 
decrease in land release output, but this is expected as productivity increasingly results from clearance and technical 
survey rather than large amounts of cancellation through non-technical survey. Angola launched its National Mine Action 
Strategy 2020–2025 and an accompanying Article 5 implementation work plan, both developed under the lead of the National 
Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH), with clear targets for land release and planned 
completion of clearance by 2025. Continued improvement was also made to information management, throughout 2019 the 
database was reconciled, updated, and quality assured. But while funding in 2019 increased after years of decline, Angola still 
does not have the requisite funding or capacity to meet its clearance goals.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Angola should ensure that there are no data discrepancies between the 2018 and 2019 anti-personnel mine 
contamination figures.
 ■ Angola should accelerate the integration of mine action data from the Executive Commission for Demining (CED)  
into the CNIDAH national database.
 ■ Angola should finalise its resource mobilisation strategy increasing its international advocacy to attract new and 
former donors.
 ■ In light of its new National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025, Angola should include measurable gender and diversity 
targets in its Article 5 implementation work plan.
 ■ Angola should operationalise its new system of prioritisation, planning, and tasking of operations.
 ■ The Government of Angola should mobilise financial resources for CNIDAH’s quality management capacity to allow it 
to function effectively across provinces.
 ■ Angola should ensure that no taxes are imposed on equipment imported by international operators to carry out mine 
action operations. 











































ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025 
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE




 ■ Angola should complete the comprehensive review of its National Mine Action Standards (NMAS).
 ■ Angola should establish a national strategy on the management of residual contamination.
 ■ In accordance with Articles 1 and 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Angola should ensure the 
destruction of anti-personnel mines in all mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, including mines in and around 
military installations. 








(20% of overall score)
8 8 Angola has now completed its nationwide re-survey of anti-personnel mine 
contamination and there is a high ratio of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), from 11% 
of the total in 2018 to 96% in 2019. However, there is a discrepancy of 3.5km2 in total 
anti-personnel mine contamination between 2018 and 2019 that cannot be explained by 
the figures provided for land release, data clean-up, and additional contamination.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
6 4 Tensions between the government entities responsible for mine action (CNIDAH 
and the CED) have lessened significantly, but issues remain with coordination 
and information sharing between the two bodies. Coordination between CNIDAH 
and operators has improved with the re-establishment of mine action and donor 
coordination meetings (four were held in 2019). There is still a significant funding 
shortfall but, in 2019, the government of Angola demonstrated its commitment to 
mine action by pledging $60 million of funding to an international operator over  
five years to clear land for conservation and eco-tourism.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
6 5 Gender and diversity are included as a cross-cutting issue in Angola’s new National 
Mine Action Strategy but there are no outcomes or targets related to gender or 




(10% of overall score)
7 6 Significant improvements have been made to the CNIDAH’s national database in 
2019 through data reconciliation and quality assurance, staff training, and monthly 
data sharing meetings with operators. The database can now be considered a 
more reliable source of information following years of problems with information 
management in Angola. Some issues remain, though, as progress on integrating 
mine action data with the CED stalled in 2019.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
7 6 In 2019, Angola launched a new National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025 and 
accompanying Article 5 Implementation Work Plan 2020–2025. The strategy presents 
clear land release objectives and a frank discussion of the challenges. However, annual 
projections are unlikely to be met without a significant increase in funding and capacity. 
CNIDAH has acknowledged that its tasking, prioritisation, and planning procedures are 
inadequate and plans to introduce a new system for Angola.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
6 6 National mine action standards (NMAS) are in the process of being reviewed and an 
NMAS Review Board and Technical Working Group have been established. Quality 
management continues to be a challenge, with a lack of financial resources impacting 
on capacity at CNIDAH.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
8 7 Overall land release fell in 2019, as minefields are now more well defined and there 
was a decrease in survey output. Clearance rose significantly compared to 2018. Lack 
of funding continues to be the main challenge for Angola to meet its 2025 Article 5 
deadline. Angola does not yet have plans in place to manage residual contamination 
but aims to establish a national strategy and build capacity.
Average Score 7.0 6.3 Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ CNIDAH (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial  
de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária)
 ■ Executive Commission for Demining  
(Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ National Demining Institute  
(Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD)
 ■ Angolan Armed Forces, 
 ■ Military Office of the President 
 ■ Police Border Guard (under the CED)
 ■ The Association of Mine Professionals (APACOMINAS) (NGO)
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ APOPO
 ■ Mines Advisory Group 
(MAG)
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid 
(NPA)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at the end of 2019, according to CNIDAH, a total of 1,054 anti-personnel mined areas with an estimated size of just over 
88km2 remained to be addressed in 18 provinces (see Table 1). This includes almost 85km2 across 981 confirmed hazardous 
areas (CHAs) and just over 3.2km2 across 73 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).1 
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province (at end 2019)2
Province CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total area (m2)
Bengo 55 3,440,820 0 0 3,440,820
Benguela 48 2,537,111 0 0 2,537,111
Bié 105 5,514,496 0 0 5,514,496
Cabinda 27 1,230,321 0 0 1,230,321
Huambo 0 0 1 12,890 12,890
Huila 17 3,339,594 0 0 3,339,594
Kuando Kubango 231 17,913,343 0 0 17,913,343
Kunene 33 2,575,367 0 0 2,575,367
Kwanza Norte 23 5,520,135 0 0 5,520,135
Kwanza Sul 125 9,819,486 2 413,999 10,233,485
Luanda 9 1,121,211 0 0 1,121,211
Lunda Norte 47 1,733,252 10 143,913 1,877,165
Lunda Sul 46 7,569,410 20 1,095,145 8,664,555
Malange3 0 0 0 0 0
Moxico 177 11,135,049 39 1,211,994 12,347,043
Namibe 2 155,100 0 0 155,100
Uige 18 1,365,290 1 360,000 1,725,290
Zaire 18 9,823,000 0 0 9,823,000
Totals 981 84,792,985 73 3,237,941 88,030,926
This is a 34km2 reduction in the overall amount of 
anti-personnel mined area from the 122km2 reported at 
the end of 2018. There has also been a shift in the amount 
of contamination reported as CHAs from 11% of total 
anti-personnel mine contamination in 2018 to 96% in 2019.4 
During 2019, in addition to the 13.5km2 of land released 
through survey and clearance, approximately 18km2 
was removed from the national database through data 
reconciliation and data correction processes. Most of these 
adjustments were attributed to errors during data entry of 
both SHA and CHA polygons.5 Approximately 1km2 was added 
to the database as a consequence of survey in the Cabinda, 
Moxico, and Kwanza Norte provinces.6 However, this amounts 
to a 30.5km2 difference in overall anti-personnel mine 
contamination (3.5km2 shy of the total difference from the  
end of 2018).
In addition, as at November 2019, Angola had an estimated 
3,749km of roads contaminated with mines, of which, 3,214km 
are CHAs and 535km are SHAs.7
In 2019, non-technical survey of all 18 provinces across the 
country was completed, ensuring that previously overinflated 
minefields have now been redefined or cancelled. CNIDAH, 
The HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA) all agree that Angola now has its most 
accurate baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination 
ever.8 However, NPA emphasised the need to continue 
evidence-based survey, in order to provide more accurate 
information on the type of contamination and to increase 
further the number of CHAs.9 
In the national Mine Action Work Plan 2020–2025, CNIDAH 
states that non-technical survey will remain an integral 
component of all operations and will be conducted in 
areas that may need additional verification during the 
work plan implementation period. In addition, CNIDAH 
acknowledges the gap in coordination and monitoring of 
CED operations at provincial level and that areas cleared by 
the CED-coordinated entities may need further assessment 
and verification before they can be removed from the 
database. At CNIDAH’s request, NPA has conducted additional 
non-technical survey on SHAs in Kwanza Norte, resulting in 
the cancellation of approximately 3km2. Similar activities will 
be conducted in selected hazardous areas in 2020.10
It is also expected that, as people return to previously 
uninhabited areas, previously unrecorded mined areas will be 
added to the database and that new areas of contamination 
will be found as operators revisit more remote areas and 
address minefields where clearance has yet to begin. For 
example, in Cabinda Province, during 2019, HALO Trust 
survey teams were unable to access some of the minefields 
due to opposition from the military, meaning that they could 
not be re-surveyed.11 In 2019, the HALO Trust discovered 
19 previously unrecorded areas of anti-personnel mine 




contamination: 16 in Cabinda province, 1 in Kwanza Sul,  
and 2 in Kuando Kubango, totalling 782,892m2. Areas found 
in Cabinda province resulted mainly from the fact that a 
full re-survey of the province only took place in 2019.12 
NPA identified one new task, in Kwanza Norte province, of 
171,544m2;13 APOPO discovered two mined areas with a  
total size of 363,400m2;14 while MAG discovered 16 new  
areas totalling 262,053m2.15
Overall, Angola’s progress in land cancelled and reduced 
through the re-survey has resulted in huge land release, 
with nearly 143km2 released from 2017 to 2019 and the 
cancellation of more than 90% of SHAs recorded as a result of 
inflated estimates from the 2004–07 Landmine Impact Survey 
(LIS). It is, however, important to note that most of the land 
released has been due to cancellations through non-technical 
survey and with the completion of non-technical survey in 
all provinces and more well defined minefields, there will 
be far less cancellation from now on. Most of the remaining 
contamination is expected to be dealt with through clearance 
and technical survey.16
Angola’s contamination is the result of more than 40 years 
of internal armed conflict that ended in 2002, during which a 
range of national and foreign armed movements and groups 
laid mines, often in a sporadic manner. Historically, the most 
affected provinces have been those with the fiercest and most 
prolonged fighting, such as Bié, Huambo, Kuando Kubango, and 
Moxico. In addition to its anti-personnel mine contamination, 
CNIDAH reported that at the end of 2019 Angola had more than 
2.3km2 of anti-vehicle mine contamination.17 Many minefields 
contain a mix of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. MAG 
reported that during its operations it frequently discovers 
anti-personnel mines connected to anti-vehicle mines.18 In 
2019, The HALO Trust found an improvised anti-vehicle mine 
in Kuando Kubango province and APOPO found and destroyed 
one anti-personnel mine that was connected to three 82mm 
mortar shells.19 The HALO Trust reported that they have 
found quite a few improvised devices in Angola, particularly in 
Kuando Kubango province. In the past they have found many 
linked items with detonating cord, as well as reinforced items, 
for example anti-personnel mines coupled with blocks of TNT.20 
CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS AND OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR
Angola also has a significant problem of explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially unexploded ordnance (UXO), and what 
appears to be very limited, if any contamination from cluster munition remnants (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster 
Munition Remnants 2020 report on Angola for further information).21 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Angola’s national mine action programme is managed by two 
mine action structures. CNIDAH serves as the national mine 
action authority and reports to the Council of Ministers or, 
in effect, to the Presidency of the Republic. Surprisingly, the 
other coordination body, the CED, reports to the Ministry of 
Social Action, Family, and Women’s Promotion (MASFAMU). 
The CED’s main role is to coordinate and manage four national 
operators: The Demining Brigades of the Security Unit of the 
President of the Republic, the Angolan Armed Forces, the 
National Demining Institute (INAD), and the Brigades of the 
Angolan Border Guard Police. And while Presidential Decrees 
stipulate the mandates of both CNIDAH and the CED, there 
are clear overlaps and ambiguities as to the exact division of 
labour and their related roles and responsibilities.22 
Tensions between these entities lessened significantly in 
2019 as CNIDAH, over the past three years, has focused 
on reorganising the mine action sector and the CED is now 
more aligned with their approach and more concentrated on 
getting the job done.23 However, the CED-related activities 
do not currently fall under CNIDAH’s coordination oversight 
and are not registered in the CNIDAH-managed national 
database. This has made it difficult for Angola to describe 
in detail and with any degree of accuracy the extent of 
land released over the years. The CED operators are not 
accredited by CNIDAH, nor are their activities quality 
assured in line with International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS).24 This has resulted in limited oversight regarding 
where the CED-coordinated operations are conducted, what 
kind of activities are implemented, and what results are 
achieved.25 As at April 2020, CNIDAH was in the process of 
changing its legal status from a commission to the National 
Demining Agency (ANAM), which, it is hoped, will strengthen 
coordination mechanisms and information sharing between 
the different national bodies.26
CNIDAH has re-established mine action and donor 
coordination meetings with all partners, operators, and key 
donors every four months, with four taking place in 2019.27 
The HALO Trust, NPA, MAG and APOPO have all reported 
being consulted in key decision-making processes by the 
national authorities through participation at these meetings 
and other channels.28 For example, it was reported that all 
operators participated actively in the elaboration of Angola’s 
National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025 and Article 5 
Implementation Work Plan 2020–2025.29 
NPA is currently supporting CNIDAH to develop its capacity  
to better manage the national mine action programme, 
including in key areas such as information and quality 
management. This UK Department for International 
Development (DFID)-funded consortium project, alongside 
the HALO Trust and MAG, has been extended to run to 
March 2021.30 In 2019, NPA in partnership with the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) 
supported CNIDAH in developing Angola’s new National Mine 
Action Strategy 2020–2025 and Article 5 Implementation 
Work Plan 2020–2025. According to NPA, there has been 
visible involvement in programme ownership, with political 
buy-in from both the Angolan government and CNIDAH staff 
since the programme began.31 CNIDAH has reported that its 
internal Quality Management (QM), Information Management, 
and Planning, Prioritisation and Coordination structures have 
improved and strengthened.32 The GICHD provided strategic 
planning support to CNIDAH throughout 2019 through field 
visits and workshops and delivered an IMAS outreach 
workshop at the end of the year. The GICHD also completed 
a study on the impact of anti-vehicle mines in Angola in 
partnership with the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) and Kings College London (KCL).33
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International mine action operators continue to report 
lengthy bureaucratic obstacles in securing visas for 
expatriate personnel, compounded by a new tax law 
which added further tariffs to those already applied to 
the importation of equipment.34 NPA, MAG, and The HALO 
Trust have met with various government officials, including 
the Institute for the Promotion and Coordination of Aid to 
Communities (IPROCAC), the government entity responsible 
for coordinating humanitarian activities, to raise these 
issues. NPA has reported that while some positive steps have 
been taken, such as tax exemptions for specific demining 
equipment and support from the new IPROCAC director in 
simplifying the visa process, the main challenges remain.35
Angola’s mine action programme has faced critical 
challenges in securing financial resources in recent years. 
While the mine action programme has benefitted from 
several loyal donors that have funded the programme for 
many years, many international operators were close to 
ceasing their operations following the sharp decrease in 
international funding in 2017. As of November 2019, five 
international donor countries (Japan, Norway, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States) were funding 
international mine action organisations in Angola. In addition, 
several private companies and foundations provide financial 
support to international operators.36
In Angola’s Article 5 Implementation Work Plan 2020–2025, 
based on an estimate of remaining contamination of 92.41km2, 
clearance is budgeted to cost US$286 million through to 
completion by 2025. The Angolan government has committed 
to clear all roads in the country through its budgetary 
allocations for the CED. This would leave 90.08km2 of 
clearance and a budget projection of $279 million. A total of 
$66 million of funding had been committed to international 
operators from October 2019 onwards, with Japanese and the 
United Kingdom also expressing an interest in funding the 
sector further into the future. Based on these projections, this 
would leave a funding shortfall of $213 million for the period 
through to the end of 2025.37
The Angolan government allocated approximately $15.7 million 
to support mine action in 2019 and similar support is expected 
annually until 2025.38 These funds are split between CNIDAH, 
the CED, and INAD to cover salaries and administrative 
overheads and to support the clearance infrastructure across 
the country.39 Additionally, in 2019, the government committed 
to fund The HALO Trust in a $60 million, five-year project to 
release more than 15km2 across 153 minefields in Kuando 
Kubango province. The project is designed to release land in 
Angola’s portion of the Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Region 
(KAZA), which spans parts of Angola, Botswana, Namibia, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and which is home to the Okavango 
Delta. It will employ 840 Angolans and allow the government 
to develop the area for conservation and eco-tourism. This is 
an unprecedented commitment by the Angolan government to 
support demining.40
In 2019, a draft resource mobilisation strategy was developed 
and, as at April 2020, was still under review.41 According 
to the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025 Objective 
5 the resource mobilisation strategy will be developed and 
approved before the end of 2020 with CNIDAH taking the lead 
in its development.42
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Gender and diversity are integrated into Angola’s National 
Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 as a cross-cutting issue. The 
strategy recognises that mine action activities need to reflect 
the distinct needs of different ages, genders, and other 
diverse groups through targeted design with the collection, 
analysis and reporting of data disaggregated by sex and 
age a key precursor for this. Disaggregated data collection 
requirements have been integrated into all relevant standing 
operating procedures, forms, and other data collection 
tools.43 However, while the Strategy pledges that Angola’s 
mine action programme will ensure that gender and diversity 
considerations are taken into consideration in the planning, 
implementation and monitoring phases of all mine action 
projects, it does not say how this will be done and there 
is no mention of gender or diversity in Angola’s Article 5 
Implementation Work Plan 2020–2025.
International non-governmental organisation (NGO) operators 
stated that gender-, age-, and diversity-related concerns are 
taken into account during survey and clearance to ensure the 
different groups are reflected in demining operations. They 
further reported taking into consideration gender balance in 
the hiring of staff in mine action operations, ensuring that a 
mix of male and female staff were employed in operational 
roles in the field including in survey and community liaison 
teams, as well as in managerial positions.44




For example, at The HALO Trust, pre- and post-clearance 
household surveys allow HALO to obtain the perspective 
of diverse groups within the local communities about the 
obstacles they face due to mine contamination, as well as 
determining the main areas of relevant impact for women, 
men, boys, and girls. The HALO Trust also reported that due 
to its “100 Women in Demining in Angola” project introduced 
in 2017, there has been a huge increase in the number 
of women in its workforce across a variety of positions, 
including deminers, medics, section commanders, drivers, 
logisticians, minefield supervisors, and administrators.45 
NPA organises gender sensitivity training for its staff and, 
whenever possible, gender equality is raised with the 
national and provincial authorities. NPA ensures that job 
opportunities are accessible to women and men and do 
not contain requirements that unnecessarily discourage 
female applicants or preclude their employment.46 APOPO 
also strongly encourages women to apply for roles and 
include gender and diversity perspectives when planning 
and implementing its demining operations as one of its 
core values.47 When new survey and clearance teams are 
recruited MAG actively engages with women who make up 
about half of the newly trained recruits. As there are more 
men who come into the training with previous experience, 
they have an advantage when progressing to the final 
recruitment stage but the number of women within MAG’s 
workforce is increasing.48
In 2019, 28% of operational roles at The HALO Trust were held 
by women; at NPA the figure was 21%; at MAG, 23% and they 
expect this to increase to 28% in 2020; and at APOPO, of the 
six deminers three (50%) were women. While in managerial 
positions at The HALO Trust 13% were women, the figure was 
4.2% at NPA, and it was 2% at MAG, no percentage was given 
at APOPO, but they informed Mine Action Review that their 
Regional Manager is a woman.49
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Angola’s mine action programme has long suffered from 
significant problems with information management, in 
particular the poor quality of the CNIDAH national database. 
This is exacerbated by the lack of integration of mine action 
data held by the CED. CNIDAH reported in 2019 that progress 
in integrating data held by the CED was hampered by 
financial constraints that prevented the CED from being fully 
operational during the year.50 According to the National Mine 
Action Strategy 2020–2025, all CED-coordinated tasks will be 
reported to CNIDAH, disaggregated by survey and clearance, 
as of 2020.51
As noted above, since 2018 an NPA Capacity Development 
Adviser has been embedded in the CNIDAH team focused 
on establishing an up-to-date and more accurate mine 
contamination database, with assistance from operators. 
As part of the improvements to information management 
a monthly data-sharing mechanism between CNIDAH 
and operators has been in place since 2018 as part of the 
mine action and information management coordination 
meetings.52 Throughout 2019, the database was reconciled, 
updated, and quality assured; information management 
staff received further training; and an information sharing 
policy was established. In addition, with GICHD support, 
CNIDAH held workshops for operators in 2019 on Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) and broader 
mine action information management, to ensure all operators 
were recording information and reporting activities in the 
same way.53 CNIDAH reported that, as at November 2019, 
the national IMSMA database had been fully reconciled 
with operators’ data, and the previous data backlog and 
overinflated contamination figures have been cleared. As a 
consequence, CNIDAH now considers the national database  
to be a reliable source of information.54 
Transparency and reporting of mine action activities in 
Angola has certainly improved in recent years with timely 
and accurate submission of its most recent Article 7 reports 
and Article 5 statements at APMBC meetings.55 
PLANNING AND TASKING
Angola’s National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025 was 
developed by CNIDAH, in 2019, with support from the 
GICHD. Two strategy workshops were held during the year 
with the involvement of government ministers, the CED 
and its coordinated entities, the Association of Demining 
Professionals (APACOMINAS), disability and mine survivor 
networks, and civil society organisations, as well as 
international mine action operators.56 The strategy is aligned 
with the Oslo Action Plan and will be externally reviewed in 
2022 to take stock of achievements, assess the remaining 
challenges, and make necessary modifications to ensure the 
strategy remains relevant.57
There are five objectives within the strategy, three of which 
relate to completion of Angola’s Article 5 obligations and 
which contain specific outcomes and targets:
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1:  
LAND RELEASE
That appropriate land release activities result in the release 
of safe land and the facilitation of sustainable development. 
All hazardous areas are to be addressed by 31 December 
2025 in line with the Article 5 extension request work plan. 
The programme’s key strategic orientation for achieving 
its land release objective will focus on developing and 
fully implementing IMAS-compliant NMAS on land release, 
including by defining “all reasonable effort”.
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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 4:  
MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
A national strategy on the management of residual 
contamination will be developed by the end of 2020 under 
the lead of CNIDAH and the CED with the participation of 
all relevant actors. A national capacity to manage residual 
contamination will be trained within the first quarter of 2021.58
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 5:  
ADVOCACY, COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION
Effective coordination and information sharing are stated  
to be pre-conditions for achieving all strategic objectives.  
In addition to the bi-annual coordination meetings with 
relevant stakeholders that began in 2019, CNIDAH will 
take the lead in developing a communications plan on the 
completion process by the middle of 2021, to facilitate 
effective information sharing.59
The Article 5 implementation Work Plan 2020–2025 contains 
updated land release targets, and projected milestones 
for Malange, Huambo and Namibe provinces and on the 
standardisation of road contamination, establishment of 
comprehensive national mine action standards and a national 
residual contamination management plan.60 In 2020, the 
majority of land release was planned to take place in Kuando 
Kubango, Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, Lunda Sul, Moxico, 
Uige, and Zaire, with a land release target of 17.2km2.61 
Survey and clearance operations were suspended in Angola 
in March and April 2020, following the declaration of a State 
of Emergency, which was replaced by the State of Public 
Calamity, from 26 May 2020 due to the outbreak of COVID-19. 
At the end of April, CNIDAH authorised operators to resume 
demining activities at 50% capacity. Operators resumed 
working at full capacity from July 2020 following a national 
downgrading of the State of Emergency, but this was reduced 
to 75% capacity from 9 August.62 According to operators they 
anticipate that they will be able to make up the reduction 
in output in the coming months and, providing there are no 
major changes, should be able to meet land release targets 
for the year.63
CNIDAH has acknowledged that its tasking, prioritisation, and 
planning procedures are inadequate, and that the effective 
implementation of the work plan depends heavily on these 
processes being strengthened.64 In 2020, CNIDAH plans to 
re-establish its authority regarding the coordination of tasking 
in individual provinces, working closely with operators to 
ensure that there is no multiplication of effort in any areas 
of the country, and that all operators are clearly tasked.65 
As at April 2020, CNIDAH, in discussion with operators, 
was finalising the operationalisation of a new tasking and 
prioritisation system for Angola, the first of its kind in the 
country. Initially, a pilot system was due to be implemented in 
May 2020 and evaluated in September. However, this has been 
put on hold due to the COVID-19 outbreak and a discussion 
with operators on how to proceed is planned for September 
2020.66 The initial aim will be to align the tasking system 
across the sector and then incorporate a prioritisation system 
based on lessons learned.67
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no specific national mine action legislation  
in Angola.68
While NMAS are in place in Angola, they are not up to 
date and are not IMAS-compliant. This has resulted in a 
lack of standardisation for activities, and consequently, 
operators have been relying on their own standing operating 
procedures.69 With support of NPA’s capacity development 
project, the standards are in the process of being reviewed and 
new NMAS will be developed by March 2021. Throughout 2019, 
CNIDAH led a process of updating, reviewing, and translating 
three IMAS-compliant standards on information management, 
quality management, and post-land-release documentation. 
An NMAS Review Board, chaired by CNIDAH and with 
representation from every operator, has been established to 
oversee all aspects of standards. A Technical Working Group 
has also been set up to advise the Review Board.70
CNIDAH is responsible for undertaking external quality 
assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of mine action 
activities, including QC of all completed tasks prior to 
handover of land to beneficiaries. However, CNIDAH lacks 
the financial resources to mobilise its quality management 
capacity across provinces, which has resulted in very limited 
QA and significant delays in QC on completed tasks. This 
has also impacted negatively on handover procedures, with 
significant delays at the provincial levels.71 CNIDAH has relied 
on operators to fund its transport and, sometimes, even 
provide accommodation and per diem. This allowed CNIDAH 
to produce completion reports and remove completed 
tasks from the IMSMA database.72 In 2019, NPA conducted 
quality management training for 10 CNIDAH officers and 
intended to run similar trainings in 2020.73 According to 
APOPO, co-operation between CNIDAH and the operators has 
improved, which has facilitated the improvement of quality 
management processes.74
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Four international NGOs conducted demining for humanitarian purposes in Angola in 2019: APOPO, The HALO Trust, MAG,  
and NPA. This was the same as in 2018.
The CED’s four operators—the Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, INAD, and the Police Border Guard — were 
not operational across Angola in 2019 due to a reduction in government funding but they did undertake some commercial 
demining. A number of national commercial companies have been accredited by CNIDAH but none was active in 2019. 
APACOMINAS, the only national operator was not operational in 2019.75




Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 201976
Operator Manual teams Total deminers* Animal detection capacity Machines** Comments
APOPO 1 6 6 handlers, 14 rats 0 Unchanged from 2018
HALO 28 238 0 1 Increase from 2018
MAG 4 37 0 3 Unchanged from 2018
NPA 2 20 0 1 Reduction from 2018
Totals 35 301 6/14 5
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
Table 3: Operational survey capacities deployed in 201977
Operator NTS teams NTS personnel* TS teams TS personnel* Comments**
APOPO 0 0 2 12
HALO 2 5 N/A N/A TS personnel are also deminers
MAG 2 8 N/A N/A TS personnel are also deminers
NPA 1 2 0 0 NPA has no dedicated TS teams
Totals 5 15 2 12
NTS = Non-technical survey TS = Technical survey
According to CNIDAH, there was a general increase in the number of operational personnel across most organisations in 2019, 
which can be attributed an increase in funding for the year. There has been a significant increase in funding into the mine action 
sector in 2020 and it is expected that this will translate into further increased capacity for most operators. It was expected 
that the HALO Trust, NPA, and MAG will double their survey and clearance capacity during the 2020 operations cycle and that 
APACOMINAS will become operational throughout the year.78 
In 2019, NPA introduced Vallon detectors, which increased productivity and operational safety. NPA also improved the 
quality and efficiency of reporting from its internal information management systems by introducing “Survey123” software, 
which is closely aligned to the national IMSMA database. The HALO Trust has introduced tablets and Fulcrum software to its 
non-technical survey teams, which helps standardisation and reduces human error in data collection and entry.79
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of 13.5km2 of mined area was released in 2019, 
including more than 1.5km2 through clearance, less than 
0.8km2 through technical survey, and just under 11.2km2 
through non-technical survey.80 Clearance was up by more 
than 50% compared to 2018.
SURVEY IN 2019
CNIDAH reported that international operators released a 
total of 11.95km2 through survey in 2019: cancelling 11.20km2 
through non-technical survey (see Table 4) and reducing 
0.75km2 through technical survey (see Table 5).81 This 
represents a 28% decrease on the 16.52km2 of mined area 
released by survey in 2018.82
This is a significant decrease from 2017, when international 
operators reported cancelling more than 138km2 of SHA 
through non-technical survey and reducing a further 2.4km2 
through technical survey.83 This was due to the fact that the 
nationwide re-survey, which accounted for huge cancellation, 
was largely concluded by the end of 2018.84
Table 4: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201985
Province Operator Area cancelled (m²)
Uige NPA 4,845




Table 5: Reduction through technical survey in 201986
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CLEARANCE IN 2019
According to CNIDAH, international NGO operators cleared a total of 1.56km2 of mined area in 2019, destroying in the process 
1,943 anti-personnel mines, 96 anti-vehicle mines, and 807 ERW (see Table 6 for details).87 This is a 51% increase from the 
1.04km2 of mined area cleared in 2018.88 However, the number of square metres cleared for every anti-personnel mine found 
has also increased from 633m2 per mine in 2018 to 811m2 per mine in 2019.










Benguela HALO Trust 243,211 474 1 147
Bié HALO Trust 1,572 1 0 6
Huambo HALO Trust 657 2 0 0
Kuando Kubango HALO Trust 527,550 675 29 78
Kwanza Sul HALO Trust 78,957 590 0 120
Moxico MAG 619,984 199 66 66
Uige NPA 100,723 1 0 46
Uige APOPO 3,251 1 0 349
Totals 1,575,905 1,943 96 812
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle 
In addition, CNIDAH reported that 69 anti-personnel mines were destroyed during spot tasks: 34 by MAG and 35 by the  
HALO Trust.90
There was an overall reduction in land release productivity in 2019 compared to 2018. This was mainly because there was  
less non-technical survey in 2019 that resulted in large area cancellation. Also, clearance and technical survey are now  
being implemented mainly on CHAs, which means there is a reduction in the pace of clearance.91
There are four provinces, Malange, Huambo, Namibe and Luanda, which are very close to completion and which will be 
prioritised in 2020 and 2021. Following protracted years of clearance operations in Malange province by both national and 
international operators, it was thought that Malange had been cleared of all known minefields. However, CNIDAH received 
reports at the beginning of 2020 of newly discovered minefields. Preliminary investigations by CNIDAH, the CED and NPA 
indicated that some of the reports are credible and warrant further non-technical survey. However, as this was not within  
the plans for 2020, additional resources will need to be identified before non-technical survey can be implemented.92 
With only one minefield remaining in Huambo province, it remains close to being declared free of known minefields. 
Unfortunately, lack of access due to the single minefield being around an active military base has impeded its clearance  
despite Angola’s obligations under Article 5 of the Convention. The HALO Trust and CNIDAH continue to engage the national 
and provincial military leadership to secure access to the minefield for clearance.93
With only three minefields remaining in Namibe, CNIDAH is prioritising their clearance and is in discussion with the CED and 
Namibe provincial leadership to complete clearance before the end of 2020.94 Clearance of the last nine minefields in Luanda 
province will be prioritised by the CED in 2020 with expected completion in 2021.95
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ANGOLA: 1 JANUARY 2003
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2013
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2018
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (8YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW




Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
eight-year extension granted by States Parties in 2017), 
Angola is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in 
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. It is not on 
track to meet this deadline.
Angola was 4.5km2 shy of its Article 5 work plan target 
for land release of 17.5km2 in 2019.96 Based on the 
figures provided by CNIDAH, at the end of 2019, 88km2 of 
anti-personnel mined area remained. Its release would 
need to average 14.67km2 of land release per year for the 
next six years to the end of 2025. With the completion of 
the nationwide re-survey, it is expected that there will be a 
drop in the amount of annual land release as productivity 
is expected to mainly result from clearance and technical 
survey rather than the large amounts of cancellation from 
non-technical survey.97 
Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







With these considerations, and the current demining capacity 
in the country, Angola stated in its Article 5 implementation 
work plan that it will be ambitious for it to achieve its end of 
2025 Article 5 deadline.98 Operators and CNIDAH maintain 
that the main challenge for mine action in Angola is the lack 
of funding. While funding rose in 2019 and 2020, collectively in 
the past decade, the resources of the three largest operators, 
HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA, declined by nearly 90%.99 
As at November 2019, Angola estimated that alongside its 
own government’s financial contributions, including the 
2019 $60 million commitment made to fund the HALO Trust 
over five years, a further $213 million is needed to complete 
clearance by 2025 (or just under $36 million per year).100 
This was adjusted to $211 million in Angola’s latest Article 7 
report.101 In addition to the funding gap Angola has stated that 
it requires investment in more efficient mechanical assets to 
increase land release output, for operations to be conducted 
in line with IMAS-compliant NMAS and SOPs, and for land 
release to be fully implemented.102 
CNIDAH has reported that the completed re-survey has 
meant that demining resources are more likely to be deployed 
for clearance and technical survey on land that is actually 
contaminated and that CNIDAH will continue to impress upon 
all operators the importance of applying proper land release 
principles to reduce clearance of uncontaminated areas.103 
In 2019, however, NPA worked on seven tasks covering 
100,000m2 and only found one anti-personnel mine.104 In light 
of this, NPA restructured their programme in 2019 following 
an assessment of their clearance operations and have 
re-established a dedicated non-technical survey capacity 
from 2020 onwards that focuses on evidence-based survey 
before clearance is undertaken. NPA also expects that the 
comprehensive database review and re-survey efforts over the 
past few years will increase the efficiency of land release and 
avoid clearance taking place in areas with no contamination.105 
The HALO Trust cleared six minefields which proved to contain 
no anti-personnel mines while APOPO cleared two minefields 
and found only one anti-personnel mine.106 
Angola has also stated that going forward it is also vital 
for authorities to declare provinces “completed” in a timely 
manner, that there is an improvement in collaboration 
between CED and CNIDAH, and that CNIDAH continues to  
be supported to build capacity.107
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
With the provinces of Huambo, Malange, and Namibe all approaching completion, and in accordance with the National Mine 
Action Strategy 2020–2025, CNIDAH and the CED, with the participation of all relevant actors, aim to establish a national 
strategy on the management of residual contamination by end of 2020. The strategy will clarify roles and responsibilities, 
information management processes and reporting systems and will be formally launched and disseminated at the national 
and provincial levels. There are also targets for Angola to have a trained national capacity that can efficiently address residual 
contamination by the first quarter of 2021.108
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2023 
ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Argentina should continue to monitor the situation and provide updates if there are any changes to the status of 
control of mined areas. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION 
Argentina reports that it is mine-affected by virtue of its claimed sovereignty over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.1 On ratifying 
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Argentina submitted a declaration reaffirming “its rights of sovereignty 
over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich and the surrounding maritime areas which form an integral part of the 
territory.”2 It reiterated this declaration most recently at the Fourth Review Conference in November 2019.3 
The islands were mined, mostly by Argentinian forces, during its armed conflict with the United Kingdom in 1982. Argentina 
has reported that no other territory under its jurisdiction or control is mine-affected.4
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
Argentina has a Humanitarian Demining Working Group (Grupo de Trabajo Desminado Humanitario) established by a Ministry 
of Defence Resolution, to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is invited, and a Humanitarian Demining Training Centre (Centro 
de Entrenamiento de Desminado Humanitario).5
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Argentina has stated that it is unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it has not had access to the Malvinas due to 
the “illegal occupation” by the United Kingdom. It did, however, make an offer more than a decade ago to support demining of 
the islands. In November 2018, Argentina reiterated its claim of sovereignty over the islands and declared that if the United 
Kingdom entered into negotiations over sovereignty, an agreement on demining could be reached between the two states.6
Under Article 5 of the APMBC, and in accordance with the three-year and three-month extension granted in 2019 (the second 
extension granted since Argentina became a State Party in 2000), Argentina is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines 
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2023. In the request and in its 
statement at the Fourth Review Conference, Argentina has indicated its readiness to elaborate a new provisional agreement on 
the basis of a form of joint sovereignty with the United Kingdom, which would enable the full clearance of anti-personnel mines.7
In 2018, the United Kingdom submitted and was granted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline by an additional five years 
until 1 March 2024, which includes a plan to complete the demining of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.8 By the end of March 
2020, only four remaining mined areas remained, totalling an estimated 226,958m2, and the United Kingdom planned to 
completed clearance by the end of 2020.9
At the Fourth Review Conference, the United Kingdom responded to Argentina’s Article 5 extension request, stating that there 
could be no dialogue with Argentina on sovereignty unless requested by the Falkland Islanders and that the 2013 referendum 
made it clear that the people of the Islands do not want dialogue on sovereignty.10
ARGENTINA 
(MALVINAS)
1 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form A. 
2 Article 7 Report (covering 1999), Form A.
3 Statement of Argentina, Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 26 November 2019.
4 Statement of Argentina, 16th Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 20 December 2017.
5 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form A.
6 Statement of Argentina, 17th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 
2018.
7 Argentina 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 March 2019, at:  
bit.ly/2JBbkAM; Statement of Argentina, Fourth Review Conference, Oslo,  
26 November 2019. 
8 UK 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request.
9 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Falklands Demining Programme Work 
Plan under Article (5), 30 April 2020, pp. 3–4. 
10 Statement of United Kingdom, Right of Reply in response to Argentina’s Article 5 
Extension Request, Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 26 November 2019.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)’s new national mine action strategy for 2018–25 was adopted by the Council of Ministers in 
January 2019. 
The European Union (EU)-funded country assessment project, which took place from July 2018 to May 2020, consisted of 
non-technical survey of all remaining areas suspected to be mined. The aim of the project was to improve BiH’s baseline of 
anti-personnel mine contamination and to group together suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas 
(CHAs) into logical units/polygons based on economic, cultural, geographical, or other reasons, encompassing one or more 
impacted communities, in what the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) terms “Mine Suspected Areas” 
(MSAs). The MSAs will then be assigned as single organisational tasks to clearance operators for land release. BHMAC has 
used the results of the country assessment to inform mid-term planning and elaboration of its 2020 request to extend its 
Article 5 deadline by six years to 1 March 2027. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ BiH should adopt, without further delay, the amended demining law drafted in 2017.
 ■ BiH should implement the recommendations of both the 2015 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment, and the 2016 performance audit report of the Audit Office 
of the Institutions of BiH,1 which remain valid. In particular, BiH should continue reforming and strengthening the 
governance and management of the mine action programme.
 ■ BHMAC should fully adopt international best practice in land release and ensure that all implementing partners, 
in all parts of BiH, are conducting evidence-based survey to more accurately identify and delineate areas of actual 
contamination prior to clearance, releasing areas found not to be contaminated. 
 ■ As part of efforts to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of land release operations, BHMAC should review relevant national 
mine action standards, in collaboration between demining organisations and other implementing partners. To facilitate this 
process, BHMAC should consider re-establishing technical working groups (TWGs).
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW
9630.54KM2
HEAVY, 
(MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE)
50KM2 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021 
EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 1 MARCH 2027
BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA




 ■ BHMAC should develop a detailed, costed, and multi-year Article 5 work plan, informed by the results of the country 
assessment project, and update its national mine action strategy for 2018–25 accordingly.
 ■ BIH should fully embrace the “Country Coalition” approach, in partnership with Germany, which can provide  
a forum for regular dialogue among all mine action stakeholders to strengthen coordination and identify and  
overcome challenges. 
 ■ BHMAC should report more accurately and consistently on the extent of anti-personnel mine contamination, including 
using the classification of SHA and CHA in a manner consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
 ■ BHMAC should strive to improve gender balance in the sector, at the least by meeting the target of 40% female staff 
set by the 2003 Law on Gender Equality.








(20% of overall score)
5 5 The EU-funded “country assessment” project, which was completed in May 2020, 
groups SHAs and CHAs together into logical units/polygons known as “MSAs”, which 
are then each tasked for land release. However, while the results of the country 
assessment were expected to facilitate planning and tasking, the understanding and 
accuracy of BiH’s baseline of remaining anti-personnel mine contamination have not 
markedly improved. It is expected that many of the SHAs contained within the MSAs 
are still inflated and will be further reduced, in particular through technical survey 
(see also, criterion on Land release system below).
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
5 5 National ownership of mine action in BiH falls under the responsibility of the 
Demining Commission and BHMAC. BiH’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 
was adopted in January 2019. BiH’s Article 5 deadline extension request was 
submitted in June 2020 and then a revised submission in August 2020. Governance 
of the national mine action programme needs to be strengthened and Article 5 
implementation better coordinated. As at June 2020, the amended demining law 
(2017) was still awaiting parliamentary adoption. 
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
5 5 The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 supports the 2003 Law on Gender 
Equality. BHMAC has stated that, under its leadership, relevant actors will include 
gender in all phases of all mine action activities. Two of the three members of the 
newly appointed Demining Commission are women. However, within BHMAC’s own 
programme, and those of clearance operators too, women make up only a small 
proportion of the total number of staff, and an even smaller proportion of operations 




(10% of overall score)
6 6 BHMAC is in the process of migrating from its own information management system, 
to a new web-based system, IMSMA Core, with the support of UNDP and the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). BHMAC does not report 
accurately and consistently on the extent of anti-personnel mine contamination and 
survey and clearance output.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
7 6 The EU-funded “country assessment” project resulted in the creation of 488 “MSAs” 
(plus another 10 in progress) which will be tasked as single units for land release. 
The results of the project will inform the planning, prioritisation, and realisation of 
the Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 and of BiH’s future Article 5 implementation, as 
outlined in its 2020 extension request.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
8 8 BiH has land release standards in place, but planned to review them in 2020 to help 
ensure the efficiency of survey operations and in particular the use of technical survey 
to confirm and better delineate mined areas prior to clearance. There is also strong 
national and international demining capacity, and the full demining toolbox is deployed. 
It is now essential that all implementing partners, in all parts of the country, routinely 
apply evidence-based land release survey in accordance with IMAS. 
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
5 6 BiH is requesting a six-year extension to its Article 5 deadline to 1 March 2027. This 
target is achievable, with existing capacity, if efficient land release methodology is 
applied routinely by all clearance operators and annual targets are met. However, 
in 2019, BiH cleared under 0.54km2 of mined area, less than the 0.92km2 cleared 
the previous year and considerably below the 1km2 planned for clearance in 2019. 
Furthermore, the 3.3km2 reduced through technical survey in 2019 was also 
significantly less than the 13km2 planned. BiH did not report its annual cancellation 
output for 2019.
Average Score 5.9 6.0 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
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DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ The Demining Commission (representatives from three 
ministries (Civil Affairs, Security, and Defence) elected 
to represent BiH’s three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, 
Croats, and Serbs))
 ■ Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Armed Forces of BiH
 ■ BHMAC
 ■ Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska
 ■ Federal Administration of Civil Protection (FACP)
 ■ Non-governmental organisations:
 ■ Association UEM
 ■ DEMIRA
 ■ Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC) 
 ■ Pro Vita
 ■ Stop Mines
 ■ Udruga “Pazi Mine Vitez”
 ■ WBE
 ■ Commercial demining companies:
 ■ Detektor
 ■ N&N Ivsa
 ■ In Demining N.H.O
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR)
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)
 ■ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
BiH is heavily contaminated with mines, primarily as a 
result of the 1992–95 conflict related to the break-up of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. All warring factions 
in BiH laid mines, primarily between confrontation lines.2 
Twenty-five years after the end of the conflict, BiH is still 
one of the most heavily mined countries in Europe. BIH is 
also contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW), 
including cluster munition remnants (CMR) (see Mine Action 
Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report on 
BiH for further information). 
Minefields in BiH generally contain relatively small numbers of 
mines, which are typically either “in groups or randomly laid”. 
The quality of approximately 30% of minefield records was 
not sufficiently accurate for the identification of the precise 
minefield location and shape. Furthermore, approximately 
40% of minefield records were reportedly never made or 
handed over, and records were often destroyed or lost for 
several reasons, such as the death or emigration of the 
persons who created the minefield records.3 Physical changes 
to mined areas (such as in vegetation), and a lack of witnesses 
to the laying of the mines, pose additional challenges.4
As at end of 2019, BiH reported that the total mined area 
at the end of 2019 was 965km2. It also reported that 488 
“locations” (assumed to be synonymous with mine suspected 
areas “MSAs”), totalled an estimated 95km2.5 While not clear 
from BiH’s Article 7 report, Mine Action assumes that the 
95km2 refers to an estimate of actual confirmed mined area 
within the 965km2 total. The 965km2 of mined area as at the 
end of 2019 represents a decrease compared to the 1,018km2 
of mined area as at the end of 2018.6 
In its revised Article 5 extension request submitted in August 
2020, BiH provided a more detailed breakdown of remaining 
mined area which totalled a slightly higher 967km2 of mined 
area (see Table 1).7
A 2016 national audit office report on the efficiency of the 
demining system in BiH concluded that: “Twenty years 
after the war ended, the Mine Action Centre still does not 
have complete information on the locations of landmines 
in BiH, which is to say it does not know the total suspected 
hazardous area.”8 Similarly, a 2015 UNDP evaluation reported 
that BHMAC is aware that not all of the SHA is actually 
mined, but “without more efficient non-technical survey and 
technical survey procedures the exact extent of the problem 
cannot be quantified.”9 
During 2017, plans were formalised between BHMAC, 
clearance operators, and the EU for a country assessment to 
establish a more accurate baseline of mine contamination and 
improve the efficiency of clearance operations.10 The resultant 
“Country assessment of mine-suspected areas in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 2018–2019” project (hereafter, the “country 
assessment” project), was conducted between July 2018 and 
May 2020, and involved nationwide non-technical survey of 
mined areas conducted by BHMAC (9 non-technical survey 
teams), the Armed Forces of BiH (2 teams), and Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA, 3 teams). The remaining mined area was 
subdivided into 488 “Mine Suspected Areas” (MSAs), plus a 
further 10 MSAs in progress.11 It is unclear how much land  
was cancelled during the country assessment.12 
MSA is a BiH-specific term, not consistent with IMAS. It is 
defined by BHMAC as “an area made up of SHAs and CHAs 
which encompasses one or more impacted communities and 
due to economic, cultural or geographical and other reasons 
is selected as a logical unit”.13 MSAs have been selected by 
BHMAC in close cooperation with municipal authorities. It is 
hoped that their creation will simplify the tasking process by 
assigning clearance operators a larger geographical area 
in which to conduct land release operations (i.e. survey and 
clearance of the SHAs and CHAs within the MSAs), with MSAs 
each averaging 1.7/2.5km2 in size.14 




Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area (at start of 2020)15
Administrative level CHAs CHA area (m2) SHA area (m2) Total area of MSA (m2) Number of MSAs
Unsko-Sanki 125 2,603,992 95,806,345 98,410,337 49
Posavski 6 211,251 13,571,234 13,782,485 7
Tuzlanski 60 1,469,127 79,770,718 81,239,845 43
Zanicko-Dobojski 63 1,879,721 112,223,720 114,103,441 50
Bosansko-Podrinjski 14 785,051 46,015,957 46,801,008 19
Srednje-Bosanski 94 2,863,902 108,829,348 111,693,250 57
Hercegovacko-Neret 68 2,841,534 146,774,680 149,616,214 77
Sarajevo 24 889,543 64,764,311 65,653,854 30
Canton 10 36 1,001,512 75,717,329 76,718,841 32
BiH Federation 0 0 13,101,196 13,101,196 6
Republika Srpska 309 6,201,958 189,363,657 195,565,615 118
Totals 799 20,747,591 945,938,495 966,686,086 488
The country assessment was entirely based on non-technical 
survey and did not include any technical interventions, so 
technical survey of hazardous areas within each MSA will still 
be required to more accurately delineate mine contamination 
for clearance and reduce (or cancel) area found not to be 
contaminated. Non-technical survey field activities under the 
country assessment project were completed in December 
2019. The overall project had originally planned to be 
completed in February 2020, but was subsequently extended 
until 15 May 2020 to allow sufficient time for verification 
and analysis of the large quantities of data generated.16 
Additionally, the mapping of the MSAs created during the 
country assessment, preparation of assessment reports 
for individual MSAs for affected communities, and quality 
assurance (QA) of documents/reports also required more 
time than originally planned.17 
As a result of the non-technical survey, the GEO position of 
1,151 minefields was corrected, 300 new minefield records 
were collected, and 6,023 minefield records were deleted 
from the database.18 The project did not involve any technical 
interventions, so no area was reduced or cleared as part of it.
The intended use of the remaining mined area in BiH is as 
follows: 70% forest, 19% agriculture, 2% infrastructure,  
1% water resources, and 8% other usages.19
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Demining Commission, under the BiH Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, supervises the state-wide BHMAC and represents 
BiH in its relations with the international community on 
mine-related issues.20 The Demining Commission is composed 
of representatives from three ministries (Civil Affairs, 
Defence, and Security) elected to represent BiH’s three main 
ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs). Whereas the 
Minister for Civil Affairs remains ultimately responsible for 
mine action, the Demining Commission is the strategic body 
responsible for setting mine action policy, and it proposes 
the appointment of BHMAC senior staff, for approval by the 
Council of Ministers.21 
While parliamentary elections in BiH were in October 2018, 
a new state-level government was only formed in December 
2019. During this period, the mandate of the Demining 
Commission (the only body in BiH authorised to accredit and 
re-accredit demining organisations and to approve draft 
demining laws, work plans, and Article 5 deadline extension 
requests) expired in October 2019, affecting BiH’s internal and 
external political representation. As there was no Demining 
Commission in place from late October 2019 to 19 April 2020, 
accreditations of clearance organisations that expired could 
not be renewed during this six-month period, thereby having 
a direct impact on survey and clearance efforts. By the time 
the new Demining Commission was commissioned on 30 April 
2020, the accreditation for much of BiH’s demining capacity 
had expired and required renewal, including that of the BiH 
Armed Forces.22
Furthermore, a problem posed by the structure of the 
Demining Commission is that each of the three represented 
ministries has separate portfolios in their respective 
ministries; and their work on the Demining Commission is 
only part-time in addition to their other responsibilities.23  
In addition, according to the 2016 audit office report,  
“The Commission has not developed a methodology on  
how to monitor the work of the BHMAC”.24 
BHMAC, established by a 2002 Decree of the Council of 
Ministers, is responsible for regulating mine action and 
implementing BiH’s demining plans.25 BHMAC operates from 
its headquarters in Sarajevo, and two main offices in Sarajevo 
and Banja Luka, and eight regional offices (Banja Luka, Bihac, 
Brčko, Mostar, Pale, Sarajevo, Travnik, and Tuzla).26 
Since 2008, efforts have been made to adopt new mine 
action legislation in BiH with a view to creating a stable 
platform for mine action funding by the government and local 
authorities. BiH demining authorities are following the 2015 
recommendation of the Council of Ministers to amend the 
existing law, instead of adopting a new law,27 and a working 
group which consisted of representatives from the Ministry 
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of Civil Affairs, the Demining Commission, BHMAC, the Armed 
Forces, and the entity Civil Protections, created a first draft 
of the amended demining law.28 As at June 2020, however, 
the amended text from 2017 was still awaiting parliamentary 
adoption. Clearer legislation on liabilities related to mine 
action activities would be beneficial to all mine action 
stakeholders in BiH.
After a 10-year hiatus, Board of Donor meetings resumed 
in September 2015.29 As at July 2020, however, the last 
Board of Donor meeting had taken place in Sarajevo in 
November 2017.30 BiH’s new National Mine Action Strategy 
2018–2025 specifies that at least two such meetings should 
be organised every year.31 However, while official Board of 
Donor meetings have not taken place recently, a number of 
important multi-stakeholder workshops have. A workshop 
on 28–30 January 2020, convened by BHMAC, and attended 
by operators, expert organisations, and donors, was 
convened to present the provisional results of the country 
assessment, discuss mid-term planning, and help inform 
the elaboration of BiH’s Article 5 extension request.32 A 
further workshop on BiH’s Article 5 planning took place on 
6 March 2020, organised by BHMAC in cooperation with the 
Implementation Support Unit of the APMBC, and attended by 
state institutions, clearance operators and non‐government 
organisations (NGOs), and representatives of international 
and domestic organisations.33 Furthermore, on 28 April 
2020, BHMAC convened an online meeting with donor 
representatives, in which it provided updates on recent 
progress in mine action, including plans to amend the NMAS. 
During the meeting, donors expressed concern because 
of the delay in demining process caused by the failure to 
form the Demining Commission;34 something which has 
subsequently been corrected.
The governance of BiH’s mine action programme needs 
to be strengthened and would benefit from improved 
communication and coordination with clearance operators, 
including through the re-establishment of TWGs, which 
provide a platform for operators to discuss, learn from 
each other, and work in synergies on matters related 
to operations. In addition, it is hoped that the “Country 
Coalition” established between BiH and Germany, on which 
there was an introductory meeting in February 2020,35 
will provide a forum for regular dialogue among all mine 
action stakeholders, help demonstrate national ownership, 
strengthen coordination of Article 5 implementation, and 
identify and overcome challenges, and monitor progress 
against the 2018–25 strategy. In its 2020 Article 5 extension 
request, BHMAC and the Demining Commission committed to 
strive to increase their interaction with the donor community 
to ensure that partners are kept informed of progress in 
implementation of plans.36 
BiH’s second goal, in its National Mine Action Strategy 
2018–2025, is that the “Mine action programme in BH is 
promoted on both national and international level to increase 
its visibility and improve liability, commitment and support 
of the state”, and the strategy includes operational goals 
linked to this strategic goal.37 As committed to in its national 
mine action strategy, BiH published a separate financial 
plan for implementation of the BiH mine action strategy for 
2018–25. The plan sees BiH commit a national budget of 4.5 
million BAM (over US$2.5 million) per annum for the Armed 
Forces and 5.945 million BAM (US$3.4 million) per annum for 
BHMAC, for 2019 and 2020; which is forecast to increase to 
a total of 21.55 million BAM (over US$12.3 million, at current 
exchange rates) per annum in 2025.38 This national funding 
is in addition to forecast international funding, which is also 
budgeted in BiH’s financial plan.39 
According to BiH, as at 2020, available financial resources 
had not met the projected funding of the Mine Action Strategy 
2018–2025, which may not allow “full realisation” of the 
goals set.40 During the two-year interim extension period, 
2018–19, BiH only obtained BAM 77.84 million of the planned 
BAM 82.84 million; of which BAM 56.88 million was from the 
budgets of the state, entities, cantons, municipalities, and 
public and private sector budgets and BAM 20.96 million was 
from international cooperation and assistance.41
In order to fulfil its Article 5 obligations by 1 March 2027, 
BiH claims to require a total of BAM 336 million.42 Of the 
national funding contributions, funds for non-technical survey 
activities by BHMAC will be ensured from the budgets of 
BiH’s institutions, and implemented through operational 
activities of BHMAC. Budgets of BiH’s institutions will also 
ensure funds for technical survey and mine clearance 
activities, to be implemented by Armed Forces. Entity 
governments’ budgets will also ensure funds for technical 
survey and mine clearance operations, to be implemented 
by entity civilian protections. In addition, national funding 
will also be provided from Brčko District, cantons and 
municipalities, and public and private companies.43 
On 7 April 2020, it was announced that €10 million of EU 
funding under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 
(IPA) 2018–20 programme, which had been intended for 
humanitarian demining, was diverted to COVID-19 and 
migration issues. The EU funds had been intended for 
support of mine action in BiH, including the procurement 
of protective equipment and supplies for BHMAC’s work, 
Directorate for Civil Protection and Federal Directorate for 
Civil Protection, as well as financing of demining projects  
of priority areas.44
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 specifies 
that: “Under the leadership of BHMAC, relevant actors will 
include gender and diversity into all phases of planning, 
realisation and follow-up of all mine activities”.45 The mine 
action strategy considered and supported the 2003 Law on 
Gender Equality in BiH, which includes equal treatment of the 
genders and equality of opportunity, and prohibits direct and 
indirect discrimination on the grounds of gender. The Law 
on Gender Equality determines that equal representation 
of men and women exists when the percentage of either 
gender in bodies at all levels in BiH (state, entity, cantonal, 
and municipality level) is at least 40%. BiH’s national mine 
action strategy also considered the 2017 Gender Equality 
Action Plan.46 However, as at April 2019, out of BHMAC’s 171 
employees, only 42 were women (25%). Of BHMAC’s 107 
operations staff in the field, 10 were women (9%).47 BHMAC 
reported that it has a gender and diversity policy and that 
BHMAC upholds the Law on Gender Equality and routinely 
includes it in the development of strategies and standards.48




BHMAC has reported that it consults all groups affected 
by mines, including women and children, during survey 
and community liaison activities, and BHMAC’s survey 
and community liaison teams are inclusive with a view to 
facilitating this. BHMAC also reported that relevant mine 
action data is disaggregated by gender and age.49 BiH’s 
Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in 2020, 
did not contain information on what steps BHMAC plans 
to mainstream gender and diversity within its survey and 
clearance programme. 
In a welcome development, however, two out of three of the 
new members of BiH’s Demining Commission, adopted on  
30 April 2020, are women.50
The Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska 
reported that nearly 22% of its staff were female, including 
20% of managerial/supervisory positions, but only 5% 
of operational roles. It reported that during survey and 
community liaison activities, it cooperates with the local 
population, regardless of ethnicity; and where needed has 
representatives from different ethnic groups.51
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has a gender policy and 
equal employment opportunities for suitably qualified 
females and males. However, of MAG’s 67 staff in BiH, only 
6 are women (9%), including 3 of 54 (6%) of its survey and 
clearance personnel (including medics). Three women 
were in managerial/supervisory positions.52 MAG’s survey 
and clearance teams consult with women and men in 
communities neighbouring its operations, to obtain as much 
relevant data as possible for the conduct of land release 
activities.53 MAG also conducts regular informant interviews 
with all entity groups, and its teams are mixed and include 
all three entity groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs).54 MAG 
was planning to recruit a mixed community liaison capacity 
in 2020, which will support it to better take into consideration 
gender dynamics its land release work.55
NPA reported that it promotes gender equality in all 
aspects of its programme activities in BiH. Mixed gender 
representation is an obligation for NPA teams conducting 
community liaison and risk education.56 NPA reported that the 
overall gender split of its staff as at March 2020 was 118 men 
and 10 women, which represents 8% female staff. Of its 82 
operational staff deployed in the field, three medic positions 
and one community liaison position are held by women. NPA 
reported that it rarely received applications from women for 
vacant operational roles.57 NPA reported that it is driving 
to achieve a gender balance, and that the programme 
encourages the employment of women, including into 
managerial and operational staff positions. Five managerial 
positions in the NPA BiH programme are held by women.58 
NPA seeks input from individuals representing all gender 
and age groups in each mine-affected community, during 
survey, clearance, and community liaison activities, including 
handover of released land. This includes collection and 
analysis of good quality gender and age-disaggregated data, 
and the active involvement of women, girls, boys, and men 
in the decision-making process for establishing preferences 
that influence priority-setting. During the implementation 
of its activities, NPA teams organise meetings with female 
representatives in smaller groups, to provide a forum in 
which women may feel more comfortable to talk about 
potentially contaminated areas in their community and  
NPA’s interventions.59
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
As at June 2020, BHMAC was using its own information 
management system, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine 
Action Information System (BHMAIS), but with the support of 
UNDP and the Geneva Institute for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD), and with financing from the EU, BHMAC was in 
the process of migrating to a new web-based information 
management system, IMSMA Core.60
The joint development of IMSMA Core began in 2019. Data 
from the country assessment project was originally expected 
to be transferred in March/April 2020 and the new database 
operational by mid-2020.61 As at May 2020, the transition from 
BHMAIS to IMSMA Core was approximately 50% complete 
and was planned to be completed by the end of the year.62 The 
results of the country assessment project will be imported 
as the baseline dataset, after which records of operational 
activities will also be transferred.63 GICHD training in the 
new system was also planned for BHMAC staff, but due 
to the situation with COVID-19 in-person training will not 
be possible in 2020. Instead, options were being explored 
for internal BHMAC training with remote support from the 
GICHD.64 Once in place the database should be sustainable; 
through the programme will still be susceptible to potential 
challenges stemming from turnover of key staff positions in 
the BHMAC IM department. 65 
In addition, UNDP has developed a GIS mobile application 
which was also expected to be released in 2020.66
MAG planned to roll out its new global Information 
Management System (GIS, and compatible with IMSMA-core) 
in BiH in mid-2020.67
At present, BHMAC does not report consistently on mine 
contamination by SHAs and CHAs, in a manner consistent 
with IMAS. In addition, there are frequent inaccuracies in 
BHMAC reporting on land release.
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PLANNING AND TASKING
In 2017, BiH developed a new national mine action strategy 
for 2018–25, with support from the GICHD, which addresses 
all mine and cluster munition remnant contamination. The 
strategy was formally adopted in January 2019.68 The BiH 
previous Mine Action Strategy for 2009–19, adopted by the 
Council of Ministers in 2008,69 set the target of the country 
becoming free of mines by 2019. It failed by some distance  
to meet this target. 
The new Strategy contains a general plan and timeframe 
for the completion of mine clearance, as well as for cluster 
munition remnants. BHMAC planned to have the first revision 
of the Strategy at the end of 2020, based on the results of the 
country assessment project and progress in implementation 
of the strategy to date.70 The strategy revision should also 
reflect BiH’s new Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2027. A second 
revision was planned for 2023.71 
BHMAC also develops and implements annual work plans, 
which are adopted by the Demining Commission. Political 
issues can result in delay in adoption of annual work plans, 
for example the six-month delay in the appointment of the 
new Demining Commission. 
A three-day multi-stakeholder workshop took place on 
28–30 January 2020 in Sarajevo, to present the preliminary 
results of the EU-funded country assessment project and 
discuss how they inform mid-term planning for Article 5 
implementation.72 During the workshop, working groups 
elaborated three mid-term action plans for 20–2025, 
based on low, medium, and high scenarios for Article 5 
implementation (with completion targets of 2029, 2027, and 
2026 respectively), based on different projected capacities.73 
In June 2020, BiH submitted an extension request to extend 
its Article 5 deadline to 1 March 2027. However, the extension 
request lacked a multi-year work plan for the extension period. 
The 488 MSAs (plus an additional 10 MSAs in progress) 
created through the country assessment project, are 
intended to enable mine action operations to better respond 
to the needs of the community through the strengthening of 
community liaison and by ensuring that community needs 
are better prioritised and addressed.74 During the country 
assessment, local administrations and BHMAC agreed upon 
the size and priority of MSAs. In its extension request, BiH 
describes its prioritisation system for releasing MSAs, which 
is said to accord with humanitarian, developmental, and 
safety needs of municipality and local communities, as well 
as the level of threat (high, medium, or low).75 
MAG would like to see the availability of information 
regarding MSAs made more easily accessible to clearance 
operators to enable long-term planning and for the 
prioritisation of tasks to be made more transparent, in line 
with good practice in the sector.76
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Results of mine action in BiH show that the applied land 
release model was efficient in the period 2005–09, and 
prior to 2009, BHMAC cancelled significant amounts of land 
annually through non-technical survey.77 Since then, however, 
non-technical survey output has declined, but there remains 
very significant potential for further reduction in the size of 
the SHA through survey.
In December 2012, having recognised the need for more 
efficient land release in BiH, the EU, with pre-accession 
funding, started a pilot “land release” project with BHMAC.78 
The resulting “IPA 2011 Land Release” was implemented from 
2013 to 2016, with EU funding.79 The project enabled efficient 
tasking of systematic technical survey and technical survey 
with targeted investigation, helping ensure clearance assets 
were only directed into CHAs.80 Results from six completed 
tasks in the EU pilot project revealed that 91% of the total 
land released was cancelled through non-technical survey, 
8.5% was reduced through technical survey, and 0.5% was 
cleared.81 More recently, of the nearly 95km2 released in 
2018–19, over 89% was cancelled through non-technical 
survey, with almost 9% of the remainder reduced through 
technical survey, and less than 2% released through 
clearance.82 This and previous land release data indicate that 
actual anti-personnel mine contamination in BiH is only a 
small proportion of the total hazardous area currently on the 
database and deployment of clearance assets will therefore 
only be required for relatively small areas.83
BHMAC planned to review and update the national standards 
and standing operating procedures (SOPs) in 2020, as well 
as develop missing chapters.84 There is broad support 
among both international and national clearance operators 
for a review of standards, especially those relating to land 
release.85 The GICHD believes that, following completion 
of the country assessment, it would be beneficial to focus 
on improving the efficiency of technical survey in BiH.86 
Similarly, MAG and NPA believe that further development of 
the land release process and the use of advanced techniques 
for the assessment and identification of minefields in BiH 
is crucial to the country meeting its Article 5 obligations.87 
MAG also believes that there is scope to improve efficiency 
and effectiveness through a more integrated approach to 
land release, including on chapters governing the use of 
mechanical and animal assets, in addition to survey and 
clearance.88 BHMAC has publicly stated that it is “fully 
engaged and committed towards improving the efficiency  
and effectiveness” of its efforts.89
BHMAC has stated that it will ensure through quality 
management that all organisations accredited for technical 
survey and clearance comply with the principles of land 
release.90 




OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Non-technical survey in 2019 was conducted by the BiH 
Armed Forces, BHMAC, and NPA.91 Unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) (colloquially called drones) were used by NPA and  
the BHMAC for non-technical survey during the country-wide 
assessment of mined areas. MAG planned to deploy 
community liaison, starting in 2020.92
A total of 26 organisations are accredited for mine action 
in BiH: four government organisations (Armed Forces of 
BiH, Federal Administration of Civil Protection (FACP), 
Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska, and 
Brčko District Civil Protection), the Red Cross Society of 
BiH; seven commercial organisations (all national); and 14 
NGOs (11 national and 3 international).93 Overall demining 
capacity totalled 1,200 persons in accredited organisations, 
comprising 900 deminers and 300 others (including team 
leaders, site leader, operational officers, QA officers, and dog 
trainers). The accredited organisations also have at their 
disposal a total of 33 accredited machines (for vegetation 
removal, ground disturbance, and removal of debris), 1,166 
metal detectors, and 68 accredited explosive detection dogs 
(MDDs). In addition, BHMAC has at its disposal 44 surveyors 
(i.e. 22 survey teams for non‐technical survey and emergency 
marking), 8 officers for planning non‐technical survey 
operations, and 12 inspectors and 28 senior clerks for  
QC/technical supervision/inspection.94 
During 2018, technical survey and/or clearance of 
anti-personnel mines was conducted by the BiH Armed 
Forces, the Federal Administration of Civil Protection, the 
Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska, and 
twelve other clearance organisations, comprising nine NGOs 
(Association UEM, DEMIRA, Mine Detection Dog Centre 
(MDDC), MAG, NPA, Pro Vita, Stop Mines, Udruga “Pazi 
Mine Vitez”, and WBE) and three commercial organisations 
(Detektor, N&N Ivsa, and In Demining N.H.O).95 BHMAC had not 
expected any major changes to demining capacity in 2019.96 
Both technical survey and clearance methodology in BiH 
will include deployment of manual, mechanical, and MDD 
assets.97 BiH reported a decrease in operational capacity 
over recent years, with an average of 52 teams deployed in 
2014–17 and 36 teams deployed in 2018 and 2019.98 According 
to BiH, the problem of the ageing workforce is compounded 
by the reluctance of younger people to seek employment 
as deminers.99 Clearance and technical survey operations 
in BiH include mechanical preparation of land, manual 
clearance, and the use of MDDs and special detection dogs 
(SDDs) depending on the geographical conditions.100 Much of 
the remaining mined area is in hilly or mountainous terrain, 
which restricts the use of machinery.
The BiH Armed Forces’ survey and clearance operations, 
which include use of machinery and explosive detection dogs, 
are fully engaged from March to November, and with reduced 
activity, predominantly in southern BiH, from December 
to February.101 Since 2010, NPA has increasingly focused 
on building the capacity of the Army’s Demining Battalion. 
This involves transfer of knowledge through operational 
planning of clearance and technical survey operations; 
direct operational support; and provision of MDDs and 
equipment, among other things.102 The BiH Armed Forces 
require ongoing support to secure personal protective 
equipment, batteries for detectors, and fuel for demining 
machinery, since the Army’s own complex procurement 
system often cannot deliver such items in sufficient time.103 
NPA supported the Demining Battalion with the provision 
of eight magnetic locators/detectors, under a Swiss-funded 
contract, enabling the Battalion to establish a third team 
within its organisational set-up. This is now fully operational 
for technical survey and clearance of areas contaminated 
with CMR. NPA also loaned the Demining Battalion its Digger 
D-250 and provided direct operational support for mechanical 
ground preparation.104 The Demining Battalion also receives 
support from Austria, France, Italy, and the United States, 
as well as European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(EUFOR), which alone provides 90% of total support.105
The state operators, the BiH Armed Forces’ Demining 
Battalion and the Civil Protections, are both good partners 
and have effective capacities, but have suffered from logistical 
challenges and equipment deficits, which can prevent them 
from working at full capacity.106 Deminers in the BiH Armed 
Forces, however, are forced to stop demining at the age of 38 
(this upper limit, until recently, had been 35). This results in 
experienced deminers being forced to retire at a very early age 
and results in a high turnover of personnel.107 In the opinion of 
a UNDP expert, the BiH Armed Forces have sufficient demining 
equipment, but could benefit from stronger management and 
better oversight of demining operations.108
Federal administration of civil protection (FACP) teams 
are spatially distributed to cover the entire territory of 
the Federation of BiH and are located in Bihac, Busovaca, 
Gorazde, Livno, Mostar, Orasje, Sarajevo, Travnik, Tuzla,  
and Zepce. Capacity as at August 2019, included 11 demining 
teams with 95 employees, 8 UXO teams with a total of 
27 employees (solely responsible for removing UXOs in 
the Federation of BiH following reports from citizens and 
institutions), four MDD handlers with four dogs, a mechanical 
debris removal team that has one armoured excavator 
and two armoured trucks to remove UXO contaminated 
debris, and a demining team with two demining machines 
and four operators.109 FACP believes the training system for 
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) would benefit from being 
strengthened in BiH’s national standards, to make it in line 
with CWA 15464: 2005 system.110
The teams of the FACP are trained in fast response to 
remove injured persons (both civilians and deminers) from 
mined areas. The FACP believes that accident and incident 
investigation, which is currently only conducted by BHMAC 
staff, should be expanded to include representatives from 
the wider demining community, such as the entities civil 
protection authorities, the Armed Forces, and EUFOR, to 
help improve the safety and quality of operations.111 During 
2019, the FACP said it sent four reports to BHMAC of mines 
detected in locations not classified as suspected to contain 
mines. However, FACP did not receive feedback from BHMAC 
on what activities were undertaken as a consequence 
of the reports, which it believes highlights inadequate 
communication between BHMAC and FACP. The FACP 
thinks it is necessary “to establish two-way communication 
and exchange of information in order to treat the newly 
discovered mine contaminated area as efficiently as possible, 
without burdening the existing demining resources.”112
The Civil Protection of Brčko District only conducts removal 
and destruction of ERW, and not demining.
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The Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska 
conducts survey and clearance of mines, CMR, and other 
ERW. It deployed six manual teams, totalling thirty-six 
deminers, and two MDDs and dog handlers, for technical 
survey and clearance of mined areas in 2019. In terms of 
capacity development received, it reported that it used a 
demining machine from NPA and also that a number of its 
deminers were trained by the BiH Armed Forces.113
MAG received operational accreditation in April 2017 and 
began technical survey and clearance operations in mid-May 
2017.114 MAG deployed 6 manual teams, totalling 42 deminers, 
and 2 MDDs and dog handlers technical survey and clearance 
of mined areas in 2019.115
NPA is, according to the 2015 UNDP evaluation, well 
respected in BiH and is treated almost like a national 
asset, even though it is international and independently 
donor funded.116 NPA deployed 6 manual teams, totalling 
36 deminers, and 6 MDDs and dog handlers, and two 
machines.117 NPA uses MDD and SDDs for clearance and 
technical survey tasks, including targeted technical survey.118 
As mentioned above, since 2010, NPA has also focused on 
building the capacity of the Armed Forces Demining Battalion.
With the exception of MAG and NPA, clearance operators 
in BiH typically compete for international tenders in order 
to secure their funding. The UNDP evaluation suggested 
that this resulted in considerable capacity being underused 
and recommended alternative contracting models more 
appropriate for land release (either by having longer term 
contracts or being contracted for the clearance of larger 
areas), which could be more attractive to the demining 
organisations in terms of security and could also make best 
use of capacity in the long run.119 National demining NGOs, 
such as STOP Mines or PROVITA, which are registered in a 
similar way to companies, potentially have capacity to quickly 
mobilise additional resources and up-scale operations.120 
The Demining Commission is responsible for considering 
the periodic re-accreditation of field operators, following the 
recommendation from BHMAC. Any delay in the appointment 
of the Demining Commission can therefore impact the 
re-accreditation process and have a knock-on impact on 
survey and clearance operations.121 This was the case from 
late October 2019, when the previous Demining Commission’s 
term expired, until April 2020, when the new Demining 
Commission was put in place and accreditations could again 
be renewed or approved.
Quality control (QC) and QA is conducted by BHMAC.122
DEMINER SAFETY
In 2019, two demining accidents in BiH resulted in two deaths and four people injured. The first accident occurred in Goražde 
municipality in June 2019, injuring two MAG personnel, and the second accident was in Kupres municipality in August 2019, 
injuring two personnel from the association “Pazi Mine” and killing two others.123 The former accident involved clearance of a 
M60 HEAT rifle grenade (i.e. an item of ERW, not an anti-personnel mine), and the accident was investigated first by the police, 
then by BHMAC with a three-member board, and lessons learned were developed and shared by BHMAC with all operators 
in-country.124
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of at least 3.84km2 of mined area was released in 2019, of which almost 0.54km2 was cleared and 3.30km2 was reduced 
through technical survey. BHMAC did not report on the amount of land cancelled through non-technical survey in 2019.125 
However, the above figures reported by BiH in its Article 7 report covering 2019, are not in keeping with the land release output 
reported by BiH in its 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in June 2020, in which it reported that in 2018–19, 
a total of nearly 84.5km2 was cancelled though non-technical survey, over 8.3km2 was reduced through technical survey, and 
nearly 1.6km2 was released through clearance.126 
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, 3.30km2 was reported to have been reduced through technical survey,127 but no breakdown was provided by 
geographical region or operator. This is a decrease on the 5.03km2 reduced through technical survey in 2018.
According to data provided to Mine Action Review for 2019, the Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska reduced 
a total of 259,779m2 through technical survey in 2019; of which 227,109m2 was in the Republika Srpska and 32,670m2 in the 
Hercegovačko-Neretvanski Canton of FBiH.128 MAG reported reducing a total of 1,225,004m2 through technical survey in 2019, 
across four cantons.129 NPA reported reducing a total of 802,855m2 through technical survey in 2019, across four cantons.130
In its Article 7 report covering 2019, BHMAC did not report on the amount of land cancelled through non-technical survey 
in 2019.131 However, NPA reported to Mine Action Review, that as part of the EU-funded country assessment it conducted 
non-technical survey in 28 municipalities in 2019 over a total area of 179.95km2, of which 3.91km2 was cancelled, and 95 MSAs 
created.132 In addition, outside of the country assessment project, and jointly with BHMAC, NPA cancelled a further 3.55km2 
across three cantons (Unsko-Sanski, Hercegovacko-Neret and Zanicko-Dobojski).133





A total of almost nearly 0.54km2 was cleared in 2019, during which 963 anti-personnel mines, 19 anti-vehicle mines, and 
2,297 ERW were destroyed.134 However, there was a discrepancy in BiH’s Article 7 form covering 2019, in that the totals of 
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines listed in the table in the Article 5 form (580 anti-personnel mines and 28 anti-vehicle 
mines; see Table 2) were different to the totals listed in the text of the form (963 anti-personnel mines, 19 anti-vehicle mines, 
and 2,297 ERW destroyed). Mine Action Review has used the latter in the key data section.135 
The 2019 clearance output is a decrease on the 0.92km2 of mined area cleared and 12,101 anti-personnel mines destroyed  
in 2018. 
Table 2: Mine clearance in 2019136
Canton Areas cleared Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed
Unsko-Sanki 5 63,047 97 0
Posavski 1 55,931 12 0
Tuzlanski 3 40,028 27 0
Zanicko-Dobojski 1 3,791 20 0
Srednje-Bosanski 6 42,417 79 6
Hercegovačko-Neretvanski 2 8,584 23 0
Sarajevo 2 67,722 56 5
Bosansko-Podrinjski 1 11,343 1 0
Canton 10 1 1,820 97 1
Total BiH Federation 22 294,683 412 12
Total Republika Srpska 16 191,193 152 1
Total Brčko district 1 49,188 16 15
Sum totals 39 535,064 580 28
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle 
The Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska reported clearing a total of 51,782m2 in 2019; of which 48,981m2 was in 
the Republika Srpska and 2,801m2 in the Hercegovačko-Neretvanski Canton of FBiH, during which a total of 71 anti-personnel 
mines, 6 anti-vehicle mines, and 26 items of UXO were destroyed.137
MAG reported clearing a total of 431,603m2 through clearance in 2019 (134,621m2 during clearance tasks and the remainder as 
clearance during technical survey), across four cantons, with the destruction of a total of 528 anti-personnel mines and 66 items 
of UXO. It reported a 38% increase in area cleared in 2019 compared to the previous year, and a 71% increase in area reduced 
through technical survey, which it said was due to a 45% increase in “team-months” in 2019 and an increased use of MDDs.138
NPA reported releasing a total of 43,993m2 through clearance in 2019, across four cantons, with the destruction of a total of  
259 anti-personnel mines, 13 anti-vehicle mines, and 26 items of UXO. In NPA’s 2019 operations, only 1% of mined area was 
released through clearance, 19% was reduced through technical survey, and 80% was cancelled through non-technical survey. 
On average, NPA BiH found 62 mines per hectare (0.01km2) in 2019, broadly the same as the previous year.139
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR BIH: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (2YEAR INTERIM REQUEST): 1 MARCH 2021
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (6YEAR REQUEST): 1 MARCH 2027
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO (EXTENSION REQUESTED) 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC, BiH has requested a six-year 
extension to its Article 5 deadline up to 1 March 2027. The 
request is said to be for the purpose of non-technical and 
technical survey “to better define the precise perimeter of 
mined areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.140 It is, however, 
assumed that there was an accidental omission of land 
release through clearance, and that BiH intends to complete 
both survey and clearance of remaining mined areas by the 
requested deadline. Prior to this, BiH had been granted a 
second extension request in 2018, for an interim two-year 
extension to 1 March 2021, during which it conducted a 
“country assessment”, to better understand the remaining 
anti-personnel mine contamination and plan more effectively 
for its release.141
Over the last five years, BiH has released just over 5km2 
thorough clearance (see Table 3). Since the ten-year 
extension to its initial Article 5 deadline, granted in 2008,  
BiH has continuously fallen far short of its annual land 
release targets. The painfully slow pace of survey and 
clearance has resulted in lack of confidence in the national 
mine action programme from donors but also from people 
living in mine-affected communities, who felt disillusioned 
that the mines have not been cleared.142
In 2019, BiH cleared almost 0.54km2 of mined area, 
considerably less than the 1km2 planned for 2019, according 
to its 2018 interim Article 5 deadline extension request. In 
addition, the 3.3km2 reduced through technical survey in 2019 
was significantly less than the 13km2 planned. BHMAC did not 
include in its Article 7 report the amount of land cancelled 
through non-technical survey in 2019, although it did report in 
its 2020 extension request that nearly 84.7km2 was cancelled 
through non-technical survey in 2018–19.143 
In 2020, BiH planned to release 104km2 of mined area 
through non-technical methods; reduce 4km2 through 
technical survey, and clear 2km2.144 In order to achieve these 
2020 targets, land release output will need to increase 
substantially compared to 2019. Furthermore, as at June 
2020, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic to-date had 
hindered demining operations in March to June 2020, which 
will impact land release outputs.145 
Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







With the completion of the country assessment in 2020; a 
strong national mine action strategy; updates underway 
to the national mine action standards; migration to a new 
information management system; and the establishment of 
a country coalition, supported by Germany, to help assist 
coordination of mine action, BiH is well placed to fulfil its 
Article 5 commitments by the requested March 2027 deadline. 
However, along with continued funding, the element that will 
truly determine BiH’s success is political will and national 
ownership. Successful Article 5 implementation will require 
strong oversight and commitment from BHMAC, the Demining 
Commission, and their superiors in the government. 
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
The National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025 includes a section on management of residual contamination, which requires 
the development of a strategy for the management of residual contamination by 2022. 
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AP MINE  
CLEARANCE IN 2019
ANTIPERSONNEL (AP)  
MINE CONTAMINATION: 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
AP MINES  
DESTROYED IN 2019
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In November 2019, at the Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties, Cambodia was granted a second request to extend 
its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) clearance deadline, with a new end date set of 31 December 2025. While 
progress is being made in planning, prioritisation, and land release, the target of completing anti-personnel mine clearance  
by 2025 is highly ambitious and could only be achieved with significantly increased funding and capacity.
Cambodia continued to make good progress during 2019 in its ongoing baseline re-survey to more accurately determine the 
extent of remaining contamination and expected to complete the survey in the course 2020. However, while release through 
survey in 2019 remained broadly the same as in 2018, clearance output fell significantly compared to previous year. Although 
not entirely clear, multiple factors are thought to account for the decrease in clearance, including tasking of a larger proportion 
of difficult-to-access mined areas with more challenging terrain, compared to previous years; clearance of more mixed 
contamination; and decreased funding to some operators.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) should increase the number of quality assurance 
(QA) teams and train them to monitor survey activities of operators across the sector, including ensuring that all survey 
is evidence-based; that cancellation and/or reclassification of mined area is applied wherever appropriate; and that new, 
previously unrecorded mined areas are verified before entry onto the national database.
 ■ The CMAA should establish a clear timeframe and resource mobilisation strategy for equipping, training, and deployment 
of the proposed 2,000 additional deminers from the Cambodian Armed Forces. The CMAA could also consider upscaling 
the number of deminers through other national entities, such as Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC).
 ■ Cambodia should ensure that the pilot border clearance project with Thailand runs to schedule and should seek to 
conclude a bilateral cooperation mechanism that would enable both countries to survey and clear all mined areas 
along the shared border.
 ■ Cambodia should continue to improve its information management systems by eliminating discrepancies with operator 
data and ensuring synchronisation of reporting.
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 ■ Cambodia should provide regular progress updates on the implementation of its Gender Mainstreaming in Mine Action 
Plan for 2018–22. 








(20% of overall score)
7 6 The ongoing baseline re-survey (BLS), which has resulted in significant cancellation of 
uncontaminated land and release of reclaimed land, was planned to be completed by 
the end of 2020. However, some polygons identified through the BLS require further 
investigation to confirm that mines are actually present. Furthermore, along with the 
type of mine contamination (e.g. anti-personnel or anti-vehicle) based on Cambodia’s 
classification system, the BLS only classifies mined areas as suspected hazardous area 
(SHA) instead of disaggregating into confirmed hazardous area (CHA) and SHA in line 
with international best practice.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
8 8 There is strong national ownership of mine action in Cambodia and an enabling 
environment for mine action, with good oversight from the CMAA. The Cambodian 
government contributes to mine action and is seeking additional international 
assistance to help fund deployment of additional deminers from the Cambodian Army.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
8 7 Cambodia has in place a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine Action Plan (GMAP) 2018–22, 
which is embedded in both its national mine action strategy and implementation plan. 
Guidelines for gender mainstreaming in mine action were approved in December 
2019 and trainings were provided to Mine Action Planning Units (MAPU) and quality 
management team (QMT) staff on the new guidelines, as well as on implementation of 
the GMAP 2018–22. The CMAA also has a Gender Mainstreaming Team (GMT) that was 
established to coordinate with the technical reference group on gender (TRGG), one of 




(10% of overall score)
7 6 Strengthening information management is one of the goals of Cambodia’s national 
mine action strategy and the CMAA has made continued improvements in recent 
years, setting up a virtual private network to allow operators to input directly into 
the database. Cambodia’s Article 5 deadline extension request, granted in 2019, was 
detailed, but data inconsistencies remain.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
7 7 Cambodia has a comprehensive National Mine Action Strategy 2018–25 and a detailed 
three-year implementation plan 2018–20. The CMAA detailed updated annual clearance 
targets in its 2019 extension request, but only achieved two-thirds of its annual land 
release target for 2019, calling into question how realistic the annual targets are. 
Cambodia has clear criteria and processes for the prioritisation of tasks, involving 
consultation with key stakeholders.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
7 7 Cambodia’s mine action standards are consistent with the International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS). New standards on animal detection, mechanical demining, 
information management, and the environment were elaborated in 2019, in 
collaboration with clearance operators. The CMAA is looking to strengthen its quality 
management to help ensure mined areas entered into the Information Management 
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database contain mines, and that areas with no 
evidence of mines are cancelled or reclaimed. Cambodia has estimated an additional 
2,000 deminers will be needed to meet its land release targets.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
6 7 Clearance output in Cambodia fell significantly in 2019 compared to the previous year, 
while the amount of land released through technical survey and non-technical survey 
remained broadly the same. Cambodia’s annual land release targets are extremely 
ambitious and will only be possible with significant additional funding and demining 
capacity, and successful coordination with Thailand to address all mined areas along 
the border, including those in areas with unclear border demarcation.
Average Score 7.0 6.8 Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority 
(CMAA)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC)
 ■ Cambodian Self-help Demining (CSHD)
 ■ National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces Management, 
Mines and Explosive Remnants of War Clearance (NPMEC)
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ APOPO 
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)




UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at December 2019, Cambodia estimated remaining 
anti-personnel mine contamination as over 817km2 across 
9,539 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) (see Table 1).1  
This compared to December 2018, when contamination  
stood at over 890km2 across 9,804 suspected SHAs.2 
The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority 
(CMAA), which oversees the mine action database, operates 
its own classification system for anti-personnel (AP) mined 
area that disaggregates and categorises land as containing: 
A1 (dense concentration of AP mines); A2-1 (mixed dense 
AP + AV [anti-vehicle] mines); A2-2 (mixed scattered AP + 
AV mines); A3 (AV mines); and A4 (scattered or nuisance AP 
mines).3 Since the start of the BLS in 2009, the CMAA has 
only recorded mined areas as SHAs, and not disaggregated 
between confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and SHAs in line 
with best practice.4 CHAs are only stored in the databases of 
some clearance operators.5 
The CMAA planned to migrate CHA data resulting from the 
cluster munition remnant survey (CMRS) process into its 
national database,6 but had no plans to reclassify landmine 
data into CHAs and SHAs.7 In its decision on Cambodia’s 
2019 Extension Request, the APMBC Committee on Article 
5 Implementation highlighted “the importance of Cambodia 
reporting on its remaining challenge in a manner consistent 
with IMAS, namely disaggregating by suspect and confirmed 
hazardous area in order to ensure clarity regarding its 
remaining challenge.”8
The baseline survey (BLS) was originally conducted between 
2009 and 2012 across 124 districts. The CMAA and demining 
operators acknowledge that the BLS data are imprecise, 
with contamination being found outside BLS polygons 
and substantial areas identified by the BLS now under 
cultivation.9 The CMAA analysed land release data and found 
that, on average, 32% of land classified as A1 and 51% of land 
classified as A4 had been reclaimed.10 In 2015, the CMAA 
introduced the land reclamation non-technical survey and 
baseline survey (LRNTS+BLS) methodology, a stand-alone 
process to re-survey or re-verify SHAs identified during the 
BLS. The re-survey/re-verification efforts, which are nearly 
complete, have helped more accurately define the extent 
of remaining mine contamination and cancel those areas 
currently on the database that are found to have no evidence 
of mine contamination and/or which meet the CMAA criteria 
for reclamation. In 2015–18, the LRNTS+BLS led to release  
of more than 44.4km2 of anti-personnel mined area across 
1,076 SHAs.11 
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province (at end 2019)12
Province Districts SHAs Area (m2)
Banteay Meanchey 9 2,288 151,127,504
Battambang 13 1,683 166,166,139
Kampong Cham 4 11 979,586
Kampong Chhnang 6 54 4,179,772
Kampong Speu 7 417 47,280,072
Kampong Thom 7 503 49,837,143
Kampot 7 139 12,591,606
Kandal 3 3 64,543
Kep 2 6 641,691
Koh Kong 6 362 24,077,517
Kratie 5 266 33,849,541
Mondul Kiri 3 59 8,687,343
Oddar Meanchey 5 1,064 110,125,909
Pailin 2 476 26,650,537
Phnom Penh 2 14 1,252,348
Preah Sihanouk 1 23 1,737,010
Preah Vihear 8 522 36,100,878
Prey Veng 1 1 5,900
Pursat 5 503 43,312,999
Ratanak Kiri 3 20 2,690,487
Siemreap 12 737 69,644,116
Svay Rieng 6 138 12,384,525
Takeo 1 56 3,770,625
Tboung Khmum 2 194 9,929,596
Totals 120 9,539 817,087,387
The current baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination has been established through inclusive consultation with women, 
girls, boys, and men, including, where relevant, from minority groups.13
Fifty-three districts were surveyed in 2019 and as at June 2020 only nine districts remained to be surveyed.14 The re-survey 
was expected to be concluded by the end of the year.15 The majority of the remaining districts are in the eastern and southern 
parts of the country, where no significant anti-personnel mine contamination is expected.16 Therefore, the vast majority of 
Cambodia’s anti-personnel mined areas are now known and surveyed. 
However, while completion of the re-survey by the end of 2020 looked realistic, some of the hazardous areas added to the 
database are thought to be overestimated or lack evidence of mines. These will require further investigation, through desktop 
survey and field data verification, but also in many cases through physical survey to confirm or disregard the existence and 
size of contamination.17 The CMAA could also consider using updated satellite images to check which BLS polygons are already 
in use by communities, facilitating the CMAA to assign operators to investigate and cancel areas where there is no evidence of 
mines and helping gain a better picture of the remaining areas to be technically surveyed/cleared.18
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Duplication in records of contaminated areas resulted in an extra 144km2 being recorded in the database, which had largely 
been removed as at May 2020.19 In addition, a data backlog of non-technical survey and land release forms pending quality 
control (QC) and approval by the CMAA, and also in part because of delayed handover and submission of forms by the 
operators, impacts how up to date contamination figures are. 
Cambodia has extensive contamination from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) left by 30 years of conflict th at  
ended in the 1990s. It is estimated that four million anti-personnel mines were laid after the fall of the Khmer Rouge in 1979 
until the end of the armed conflict in 1998. Cambodia’s anti-personnel mine problem is concentrated in, but not limited to,  
21 north-western districts along the border with Thailand, which account for the large majority of mine casualties. The K5  
mine belt, which was installed along the border with Thailand in the mid 1980s in an effort to block infiltration by armed 
opposition groups, ranks among the densest mine contamination in the world.20 
Cambodia also has significant contamination from cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other ERW (see Mine Action Review’s 
Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report on Cambodia for further information).
NEW CONTAMINATION
The LRNTS+BLS has also led to the identification of 1,363 
SHAs of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine 
contamination, covering a total area of 117.9km2.21 In 2019, 
the LRNTS+BLS captured a total of 7.2km2 over 117 SHAs of 
additional contamination, see Table 2.22 This is a decrease 
on the 39.4km2 over 499 SHAs of additional contamination 
identified the previous year.23 The CMAA’s Database Unit 
(DBU) is working with operators to investigate all newly 
added mine contamination.24 The CMAA’s Department of 
Regulation and Monitoring and its quality management teams 
(QMTs) have been tasked with an increased focus on BLS 
operations to ensure that previously unrecorded mined areas 
added to the national database are supported by strong and 
clear evidence and are of an appropriate size. In addition, the 
DBU will review newly captured mined areas and verification 
will be conducted by the QMTs on any questionable 
polygons.25 International non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) operators fully support the CMAA deploying survey 
QA teams to verify hazardous areas before they are accepted 
onto the database.26
Table 2: Newly added anti-personnel mined area in 201927
Province Districts SHAs Area (m2)
Banteay Meanchey 3 4 230,783
Battambang 8 56 4,062,149
Kampong Cham 1 1 64,834
Kampong Chhnang 1 2 21,034
Kratie 1 1 58,066
Mondul Kiri 1 7 488,138
Oddar Meanchey 5 13 688,003
Pailin 1 1 39,645
Preah Vihear 1 20 1,114,964
Pursat 1 9 294,765
Siemreap 2 3 154,485
Totals  25 117 7,216,866
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The CMAA was established by royal decree in 2000 with 
the mandate to regulate, monitor and coordinate the mine 
action sector in Cambodia.28 It has been reported that the 
CMAA has strengthened over the recent years, with roles 
and responsibilities more clearly defined.29 The Cambodian 
Mine Action Centre (CMAC) was established in 1992. Before 
the existence of the CMAA, CMAC had the responsibilities 
to regulate and coordinate the sector as well as undertake 
clearance. Since 2000, CMAC’s activities have been limited 
to conducting demining, risk education, and training.30 CMAC 
conducts both humanitarian and commercial demining within 
Cambodia and is the country’s largest operator.31
Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMACs) and Mine Action 
Planning Units (MAPUs) were established in 2004, tasked 
with establishing clearance priorities in consultation with 
affected communities to ensure that clearance addresses 
their housing, agricultural, and infrastructure needs.32 MAPU 
planning and prioritisation units meet regularly with all mine 
action operators to plan annual mine action activities.33
The Cambodian government established the Technical 
Working Group on Mine Action (TWG-MA) as a consultative 
mechanism between the government and implementing 
partners.34 It meets on a bi-annual basis and is attended by 
the CMAA, relevant ministries, operators, and donors.35 The 
Mine Action Coordination Committee (MACC) and several 
Technical Reference Groups (TRGs) have been established 
by the CMAA to facilitate coordination and feedback at a 
strategic and technical level in areas such as survey and 
clearance, risk education, victim assistance, information 
management, gender, and capacity development.36 The TRG 
on survey and clearance meets on a quarterly basis.37 
The operating environment in Cambodia is permissive, 
with the Cambodian government open to the presence of 
international operators and supportive in administrative 
actions such as the granting of visas, approval of Memoranda 
of Understanding (MoUs), and importation procedures. The 
CMAA is open to the trialling and use of innovative clearance 
methods and tools to improve efficiency.38 




The UN Development Programme (UNDP), Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA), and the Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) all support capacity 
development of the CMAA. NPA, as part of a United Kingdom 
Department for International Development (DFID)-funded 
partnership that includes Mines Advisory Group (MAG) 
and The HALO Trust, focuses on information management, 
planning and prioritisation, gender mainstreaming, quality 
management, and strategic planning.39 
Since 2006, UNDP has been implementing its “Clearing for 
Results” (CfR) programme in Cambodia. Aspects of the project 
relating to capacity development include supporting the 
establishment of a Performance Monitoring System (PMS) that 
links human development to mine action and strengthening 
the CMAA’s international and national participation in 
relevant fora.40 The third phase of the CfR programme was 
completed at the end of March 2020. Under Phase Three, 
capacity development needs assessments of the CMAA and 
MAPUs were concluded and a management response to the 
recommendations was developed. The fourth phase (CfRIV), 
covering 2020–25, is underway, during which the management 
response from Phase Three will be presented to the CfRIV 
project board for endorsement. The CMAA, with UNDP 
support, will then address capacity issues from 2021.41 
The GICHD provides information management and risk 
management support to the CMAA. In 2019, GICHD support  
to capacity development included stakeholder workshops  
on the IMSMA Core migration; initial development of the  
new database; support on developing residual capacity in  
line with Cambodia’s mine action strategy; and workshops  
on risk management and NMAS development.42 
The Cambodian government contributes funding towards 
clearance and the management of the sector,43 which includes 
covering all expenses of the CMAA in 2019 and providing 
funds to support planning and prioritisation, QA/QC, database 
management, Cambodia mine victim information service 
(CMVIS), and risk education activities.44 From 2010 to 2018, 
the Cambodian government has reported contributing just 
under 30% of the total funding to the mine action sector 
(US$99.49 million of US$340.2 million).45 This includes 
US$110 million for mine clearance operations in support of 
public infrastructure projects such as hydropower plants, 
irrigation system, roads, and bridges. Cambodia has also 
provided funding to the institutions responsible for managing 
and delivering mine action in the country. Indirectly, tax 
exemptions on mine action equipment have contributed to 
humanitarian demining.46 
From 2020 to 2025, Cambodia has estimated it will require 
$372 million for mine action, of which $38 million is for sector 
management and $165 million for release of anti-personnel 
mined area. It is expected that the Cambodian government will 
continue to contribute towards clearance and the management 
of the sector. It will also settle the importation taxes for mine 
clearance equipment and provide a 10% in-kind contribution 
to any new donor funding, and a 10% in-cash contribution to 
the UNDP CfR programme.47 Cambodia funds mine and ERW 
clearance by CMAC and the National Centre for Peacekeeping 
Forces Management, Mines and Explosive Remnants of War 
Clearance (NPMEC) in support of infrastructure development.48 
Cambodia has a resource mobilisation strategy and intends to 
secure additional funding from the government, existing and 
emerging donors, and the private sector.49
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
The CMAA has developed a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine 
Action Plan (GMAP 2018–2022), an objective of the National 
Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, which consists of six goals. 
These include: 
 ■ Preparation of guidelines to aid gender mainstreaming 
across all mine action
 ■ Capacity building of relevant stakeholders to implement 
the GMAP 2018–2022
 ■ Female representation and participation in planning  
and prioritisation, risk education, and in mine action  
and advocacy at all levels.
The Three-Year Implementation Plan 2018–2020 sets out 
activities in support of these goals.50 NPA, as part of its 
capacity development, will support the CMAA with training 
on gender mainstreaming in mine action, on implementation 
of the GMAP 2018–22 and the development of associated 
guidelines, and on how to use gender- and age-disaggregated 
data in planning and prioritisation processes.51 Guidelines 
for gender mainstreaming in mine action were approved in 
December 2019. Trainings were provided to MAPU and QMT 
staff on the new guidelines, as well as on implementation of 
the GMAP 2018–22.52 Sex and age disaggregated data (SADD) 
has been integrated in all reporting forms, which can help 
inform planning, prioritisation, risk education, and advocacy.53 
Furthermore, the GICHD conducted a gender and diversity 
baseline assessment of the CMAA in 2019 and has a joint 
action plan to support gender and diversity mainstreaming 
efforts for the remainder of the GMMAP strategy period.54
A CMAA Gender Mainstreaming Team (GMT) was established 
to coordinate with the TRG on Gender (TRGG), one of five 
TRGs ensuring coordination of the sector. The TRGG is active 
and is composed of representatives from UNDP, Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs (MoWA), Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans 
and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSVY), MAPU, operators, and 
international and national organisations working in mine 
risk education (MRE) and victim assistance (VA).55 Of CMAA’s 
employees, 23% are female, but only 5% of managerial/
supervisory level positions are held by women. Overall in the 
mine action sector in Cambodia, 876 (25%) of the 3,446 staff 
are female, an increase from the 15% of female staff in 2015.56
Survey and community liaison teams (CL) are inclusive 
and mixed gender. Women are given access to job 
announcements and female candidates are given priority 
during the recruitment process. Women and children in 
affected communities are consulted during village meetings 
and community liaison activities, including regarding 
prioritisation. This commitment is reinforced by the demand 
for all reporting forms to have SADD and by the provision of 
training to MAPU and QMT staff.57
Of APOPO’s staff in Cambodia 40% are women and 10% 
of CMAC personnel working with APOPO are female. Two 
of eight (25%) of APOPO’s managerial/supervisory-level 
positions are held by women. APOPO disaggregates relevant 
mine action data by gender and age.58
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CMAC provides equal employment opportunities to both men 
and women. As at May 2020, women made up 12.5% of CMAC’s 
workforce. CMAC operates in accordance with Cambodian 
Labour Law and is actively recruiting women to reach 15% 
female employment. Women currently work across all levels 
of the organisation, including in managerial level/supervisory 
positions. Two of the six directors were women.59 
According to CMAA data, as at March 2019, Cambodian 
Self-help Demining (CSHD) had a total of 26 employees, of 
whom five of the nine office based staff were women as were 
four of the seventeen operations staff.60
The HALO Trust provides equal job opportunities and 
some 42% of operational staff in its Cambodia programme 
are female. While five of HALO’s ten senior managers 
in Cambodia are female, only 9% of HALO Trust’s staff 
in managerial level/supervisory positions across the 
programme were held by women. Due to low historical levels 
of women employed until recently, relatively few women have 
yet acquired the required experience and expertise to take up 
managerial/supervisory roles in HALO’s view. However, the 
proportion of women employed in senior roles is expected 
to increase considerably in the coming years as women gain 
more experience and rise up the junior ranks from deminer 
upwards. HALO deploys gender-balanced survey and 
clearance teams to help ensure access it consults all groups 
of the local community.61
During non-technical survey and pre-clearance impact 
assessments, MAG deploys mixed-gender community liaison 
teams to gather information on the suspected location of 
mines and the impact on the community. In its survey and 
clearance teams, 42% of staff are women as are 24% of their 
managerial level/supervisory positions.62 MAG planned 
to conduct a detailed gender analysis in 2020, at both the 
programming and organisational level, in order to promote 
meaningful gender equity and mainstreaming, and ensure an 
increased proportion of women in operational supervisory 
and management roles within the programme.63
According to CMAA data, as at March 2019, NPMEC had a total 
of 294 employees (290 operational), all of whom were men.64
All international operators in Cambodia disaggregate 
relevant mine action data by gender and age.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The CMAA upgraded to the Information Management System 
for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation in 2014. As at 
June 2020, the CMAA was in the process of upgrading its 
information management system to IMSMA Core.65 As part 
of this process, a significant backlog of data was resolved 
in 2019/20, before migration of existing data to IMSMA Core 
could begin in earnest. IMAS minimum data requirements  
will be incorporated as Cambodia migrates to IMSMA Core.66 
The CMAA’s DBU is responsible for collecting, storing, 
analysing and disseminating data in support of planning 
and prioritisation.67 Data relating to anti-personnel mine 
contamination, survey, and clearance in IMSMA are considered 
relatively accurate and up-to-date.68 Improvements to 
information management are ongoing in Cambodia,69 and 
include the development of tools to allow for mobile data 
collection in the field and which allow MAPU and QMTs to make 
online data entries and verify data submitted by operators.70
Strengthening the national information management 
system for mine action is an objective of the National 
Mine Action Strategy 2018–25.71 NPA has been conducting 
capacity development activities with the CMAA under 
a DFID consortium project.72 This included introduction 
of a web-based application for MAPUs to enable better 
prioritisation of the tasks for operators’ annual work-plans, 
which is expected to increase the effectiveness of mine 
clearance across the sector in Cambodia.73 It also included 
the development of a national mine action standard on 
Information Management. Regular TRG meetings are held 
with operators to share progress and challenges.74 As part 
of an information management capacity assessment of the 
CMAA’s DBU, operators (CMAC, HALO, and MAG) agreed that 
data collection forms are consistent and enable collection of 
the necessary AP mine data.75
The CMAA shares all available data with operators on a 
monthly basis. In 2018, the DBU set up a virtual private 
network (VPN), which allows operators to send their daily 
data input directly into the DBU IMSMA database. The DBU 
controls the quality of all submitted reports and approves 
them via this online network.76 According to NGO operators, 
the CMAA has issued clear directives on the submission of 
data via VPN into the CMAA IMSMA system.77
Cambodia submits timely Article 7 transparency reports and 
gives regular statements on progress at the meetings of 
States Parties to the APMBC. There have, though, been issues 
with the accuracy of information in Cambodia’s reporting in 
the past, evidenced by discrepancies between data submitted 
by operators and that offered by the CMAA. To reduce 
further discrepancies, as at September 2019, the CMAA has 
officially declared that all relevant mine action stakeholders 
should only report official mine action data from CMAA.78 The 
CMAA also reportedly still faces some issues with the late 
submission of reports by some operators, and also some 
technical challenges with the mapping of polygons, which it  
is working with operators to address.79 
In 2019, Cambodia submitted a detailed and well prepared 
six-year Article 5 deadline extension request from 1 January 
2020 to 31 December 2025, which was granted by States 
Parties in November 2019. 





Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025 was 
officially launched in May 2018 with eight goals for clearance 
of mines, CMR, and other ERW. The accompanying Three-Year 
Implementation Plan 2018–20 sets out the activities and 
indicators that will need to be completed in order to meet 
these goals and objectives. The first goal is to release all 
known mined areas by 2025 through planned land release  
of 110km2 a year in 2020.80 
In 2019, Cambodia submitted its Article 5 extension request 
with revised land release targets for 2019–25, as set out in 
Table 3, with predicted annual land release targets increasing 
over time as additional deminers are projected to come on 
board and become operational.81 The targets assume that 
significant additional international funding will be secured 
allowing for deployment of 2,000 additional Royal Cambodian 
Army (RCA) deminers. The annual targets also assume that 
no new contamination will be added to the database, a highly 
questionable supposition. In 2019, Cambodia released a total 
of nearly 55.5km2 through survey and clearance, well short 
of its target of nearly 84.25km2. As at February 2020, no 
additional RCA deminers had yet been deployed, suggesting 
there will be a significant gap between the predicted and 
actual land release output for 2020. Furthermore, many of 
the remaining mined areas are harder to reach minefields  
or mined areas which were not fully released previously. 
CMAC planned to release 62km2 of mined area in 2019.82











The CMAA maintains the annual national clearance work 
plan made up of all the provincial clearance work plans. 
MAPUs are responsible for developing their own work plans 
in accordance with the planning and prioritisation guidelines. 
The PMACs approve the MAPU’s work plans, which are then 
endorsed by the CMAA. The MAPUs use the provincial work 
plan to monitor clearance performance and report progress 
to the PMAC and the CMAA.84
The current planning and prioritisation practices in Cambodia 
follow a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. 
The top-down approach involves CMAA establishing a list 
of priority villages based on agreed criteria. The bottom-up 
approach involves MAPUs coordinating at the provincial level 
to develop a clearance list, again, using agreed criteria.85 
In accordance with objective three of goal one of Cambodia’s 
National Mine Action Strategy 2018−25, the CMAA is adopting 
a mine-free village policy, and has identified 500 priority 
villages from the most anti-personnel mine contaminated 
provinces, totalling a mined area of 220km2 that will be 
released by 2021, and the remainder by 2025.86 The defined 
criteria to determine the 500 priority villages was based on 
the size of the mine contamination in the village, the number 
of casualties in the village, the number of people in the 
village, and the levels of poverty of the village in accordance 
with the revised planning and prioritisation guidelines.87 At 
least 75% of funding and resources are allocated to these 
priority villages, leaving a maximum of 25% of resources 
to address clearance needs outside of the priority villages 
through the MAPU process.88 In addition, to maintain 
government and donor support to mine action by generating 
publicity and awareness, CMAA will also implement a 
complementary policy that will prioritise working to declare 
villages with very low contamination (defined as SHAs with 
less than 50,000m2) as mine-free.89
Within this bottom-up element of Cambodia’s approach, the 
MAPUs, in consultation with operators, then develop a list 
of priority minefields within the priority villages identified 
by the CMAA. The following criteria are used by MAPUs for 
prioritising minefields: BLS land classification; casualty data; 
intended beneficiaries; level of threat; development needs; 
and post-clearance land use.90 It is hoped that this process 
will be facilitated by the introduction of the web-based 
application for MAPUs. 
Operators have expressed some reservations about 
the “mine-free village” approach, with MAG advocating 
a province-by-province approach and The HALO Trust 
prioritising clearance of the highest impact, highest density 
minefields on the border between Cambodia and Thailand. The 
HALO Trust has expressed concern that the mine-free village 
approach will lead to clearance of low-impact, low-density 
minefields in order to declare the village mine-free, diverting 
resources from high impact areas.91 MAG’s concerns that 
impact should be taken into account in the prioritisation 
criteria have been noted by CMAA, which has stated there will 
be some flexibility in the planning and prioritisation process.92 
The CMAA has stated it does not believe that high-density 
minefields should be the deciding factor for prioritisation as 
they believe prioritisation should be based on addressing the 
needs of the affected communities.93
While following the CMAA prioritisation processes, HALO 
also includes the following in its planning and prioritisation 
matrix with MAPUs: proximity of mined areas to population; 
nature of threat (grade of type of mines); density of mine 
laying; accessibility (seasonal); accident history; poverty level 
of beneficiaries and surrounding area; and compatibility with 
development projects.94
According to NGO operators, the criteria and prioritisation 
processes in Cambodia are well established and survey and 
clearance task dossiers are issued in a timely and effective 
manner.95 There was, however, a suggestion that Cambodia 
should consider categorising infrastructural projects that 
require formal clearance prior to construction as stand-alone 
projects agreed between the implementer, mine action 
operator, and the donor (if applicable), rather than including 
such projects together with humanitarian mine action.96
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Mine action is conducted according to Cambodian Mine 
Action Standards (CMAS), which are broadly consistent with 
the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). HALO Trust 
believes the sector would benefit from a review of the CMAS 
on non-technical survey.97 In addition, NPA believes that 
quality management (QM) still needs to be strengthened  
and QM capacity developed.98
In 2019–21, the CMAA, with support from NPA with DFID 
funding and in consultation with other mine clearance 
operators, is in the process of developing new standards.99 
New standards on animal detection, mechanical demining, 
information management, and the environment were 
elaborated in 2019,100 although final copies had not yet been 
shared with operators as at April 2020.101 National standards 
on explosive ordnance risk education, accreditation of 
demining organisations and licensing of operations and on  
the monitoring of demining organisations were still in 
progress as at June 2020,102 as well as planned review of  
the BLS and land release chapters in 2021–22.103
National standards are reflected in operators’ standing 
operating procedures (SOPs).104 Updates to the SOPs are 
conducted as and when required, such as when a need is 
identified through the CMAA-led TRG. Reviews are conducted 
in consultation with all operators, and against IMAS and best 
practice.105 A comprehensive review of CMAS in 2020 has been 
mooted; this is also referenced in the National Strategy.106
The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–25 emphasises the 
need for more efficient use of demining assets. In a 2018 
monitoring visit to Pailin province it was found that one in 
three of the mined areas could have been released by LRNTS 
rather than full clearance. UNDP has now mandated that all 
minefields in its targeted villages will be assessed before 
clearance assets are deployed.107
The CMAA was planning to review the CMAS on baseline 
survey to strengthen the criteria on the evidence needed 
to capture polygons with new contamination, but no review 
had taken place yet as at June 2020. However, the CMAA 
reported that criteria had been strengthened by operators 
in the field.108 In addition, the CMAA will improve efficiency of 
the QMT to strengthen QA and QC of survey and clearance 
activities to ensure that any additional mined areas 
registered in the national database are supported by strong 
and clear evidence and are appropriately size.109 The CMAA 
also plans to organise annual meetings to discuss baseline 
survey and resurvey activity to ensure that national survey 
standards are consistently applied by all operators. For 
example, a mined area reclaimed for productive use must 
meet certain criteria to be released through non-technical 
survey without undertaking technical survey.110
HALO Trust believes that the CMAA should conduct 
more QA of survey reports and that operators should 
conduct pre-clearance technical verification assessments 
of previously surveyed minefields to ensure maximum 
efficiency. This includes releasing land reclaimed through 
cultivation or incorrectly recorded initially.111
The CMAA recognises that for Cambodia to complete 
clearance by 2025 the full toolbox of land release 
methodologies must be properly applied and encourages 
operational efficiency amongst operators.112 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Mine clearance is undertaken mainly by the national operator, 
CMAC, and two international mine action NGOs, MAG and 
The HALO Trust. To a lesser extent, mine clearance is also 
conducted by national operator the NPMEC, and by national 
NGO, CSHD. International operator APOPO also conducts 
clearance in partnership with CMAC.113
The HALO Trust deployed nine non-technical survey teams in 
2019, totalling 27 survey personnel. It planned to increase its 
non-technical survey and clearance capacity in 2020.114 HALO 
Trust considers technical survey equivalent to clearance 
so does not deploy separate personnel. MAG deployed five 
non-technical survey teams in 2019, totalling ten survey 
personnel, although these teams were also deployed to 
undertake other activities.115 
In 2018, CMAC deployed 25 non-technical survey personnel 
across five teams, but there had been no plans to deploy 
non-technical survey teams in 2019. CMAC also deployed 
a total of 202 technical survey personnel across 30 teams 
of between five and seven staff each. In 2019, the number 
of technical survey personnel was due to increase to 231 
across 37 teams.116 Data on CMAC’s capacity in 2019 was not 
provided upon request. APOPO provides CMAC with mine 
detection rats (MDR). 
MAG uses mine detection dogs (MDDs) subcontracted from 
CMAC to conduct survey and clearance. MAG also continues 
to trial advanced detection systems, provided by the United 
States Humanitarian Demining Research and Development 
programme, and uses drones to conduct non-technical 
survey, task planning, and post-impact monitoring.117
APOPO, in its partnership with CMAC, deployed a SMART 
technical Survey Dog (TSD) team for the first time in March 
2019 and is currently working under the GICHD Evaluation 
Project that was expected to end in July 2020. The 
methodology combines high-quality search dogs with the 
SMART system, GIS Online, and use of Drones. By the end of 
April 2020, more than 1km2 had already been surveyed by 
APOPO SMART TSD.118 
NPA Cambodia deployed two MDDs in neighbouring Thailand 
as part of technical survey in 2019 and 2020, as the long-lead 
MDD methodology has proven to be effective and efficient. In 
2019, a total of 56,021m2 was covered by the NPA Cambodia 
MDDs within a two-month period. NPA, in partnership with 
CMAC, planned to deploy MDDs in 2020 for technical survey on 
the Cambodia-Thai border, as well as for NPA’s own operations 
at the Cambodian border with Vietnam and Lao PDR.119




UNDP has supported the CMAA through the Clearing for 
Results (CfR) programme since 2006, awarding contracts 
funded by international donors through a process of 
competitive bidding. In 2018, the CFR programme issued 
four contracts worth a total of $1.5 million: three going to 
CMAC and the other to The HALO Trust. CMAC was also 
awarded land reclamation non-technical survey and baseline 
survey contracts worth about US$173,000. In 2019, CMAC 
was awarded three clearance contracts totalling $1.7 million 
dollars with clearance targeted in high-priority villages in 
Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, and Pailin provinces. Phase 
three of the CfR exceeded the land release target of 47km2, 
and upon completion Phase Three had released nearly 59km2 
of mined area from March 2016 to February 2020 .120 For 
2020, CfRIV aimed to release 7.9km2 with a total contract 
value of $1.13 million. Two clearance contracts were awarded 
to CMAC and one to HALO Trust, all for the seven-month 
period from June to December 2020.121
The CMAA has calculated that in order to meet its 2025 land 
release targets for anti-personnel mined area, an extra 
2,000 deminers and 100 support personnel will be needed. 
The CMAA proposes that these deminers will come from 
the RCA and that the Cambodian government will cover the 
salaries, insurance, uniforms, and operational costs, but that 
it will require funding from the international community for 
training, vehicles, and equipment.122 It was estimated that 
during the first year of deployment the deminers will be able 
to release 35km2, rising to 57km2 from the second year.123 
However, as at February 2020, none of the additional 2,000 
RCA deminers had yet been deployed. The CMMA is seeking 
international financial assistance for training (to be provided 
by CMAC) and equipment for the planned deminers,124 and in 
August 2020, the Indian government pledged $1.5 million to 
help increase the demining capacities of the RCA.125
The CMAA is responsible for quality management and 
since 2016 has deployed eight QMTs.126 In 2017, with UNDP 
support, it developed the PMS, which will track land 
use and socio-economic changes after release of mined 
area/ERW-contaminated land as well as monitor the 
implementation of NMAS as a management tool for the 
sector.127 The CMAA approved the PMS, which was launched 
in May 2018 and in late 2019 a pilot-test was conducted 
during which 124 completed minefields were visited and the 
associated beneficiaries were interviewed by MAPU staff 
in Banteay Meanchey province. The results of the test were 
expected to be made available mid-2020.128 









in partnership  
with CMAC)
3  14 16 handlers with 24 
rats and 4 dogs
Includes technical survey and 
clearance capacity.
Armed forces N/K  N/K N/K N/K
CMAC N/K *1,153 N/K N/K *Based on March 2019 data and 
includes both survey and clearance 
capacity for mines and ERW.
CSHD N/K *17 N/K N/K *Based on March 2019 data and 
includes both survey and clearance 
capacity for mines and ERW.
HALO Trust 73  657 0 3 Based on an average of 73 teams 
per month.
MAG 16  128 Three teams, totalling 







Clearance teams are also deployed 
to conduct technical survey.
Excludes MAG’s roving EOD capacity.
NPMEC N/K  290 N/K N/K *Based on March 2019 data and 
includes both survey and clearance 




N/K = Not known
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of more than 55.3km2 of mined area was reportedly released in 2019, of which more than 20.9km2 was cleared,  
more than 7.5km2 was reduced through technical survey, and over 26.9km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey.  
Over the course of the year, however, 7.2km2 of previously unrecorded mine contamination across 117 SHAs was added  
to the database.130
Clearance output in 2019 was half the 41km2 of clearance reported to Mine Action Review for 2018 (and also down massively 
compared to the 36.7km2 reported in Cambodia’s Article 7 report covering 2018). The amount of area reduced through 
technical survey and cancelled through non-technical survey in 2019 was broadly the same as the previous year when  
CMAA reported to Mine Action Review 23.8km2 as cancelled and 8.6km2 as reduced (Cambodia’s Article 7 report covering  
2018 reports 22.6km2 cancelled and 6.5km2 reduced).
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, over 34.4km2 was released through survey, of which 26.9km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey (see Table 5) 
and over 7.5km2 was reduced through technical survey (see Table 6).131 Compared to the previous year, survey output in 2019 
was an increase on the 23.8km2 cancelled and a small decrease on the 8.7km2 reduced in 2018.132 
Furthermore, in 2019 the LRNTS+BLS captured an additional total of 7.2km2 over 117 SHAs of additional contamination  
(see Table 2 above).133
HALO Trust reported cancelling nearly 22.84km2 of previously known mined area in 2019; an increase of more than 54% 
increase compared to 2018, which it explained was due to more land reaching the criteria for cancellation since mines were 
last encountered.134
Table 5: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2019135










Table 6: Reduction through technical survey in 2019136









In 2019, over 20.9km2 of mined area was cleared, with the destruction of 4,111 anti-personnel mines and 4,354 other items of 
explosive ordnance (see Table 7).137 This is a decrease on the 41km2 of mined area and 16,019 anti-personnel mines destroyed in 
2019 (including 4,301 destroyed during spot tasks).138 However, the 4,111 anti-personnel mines reported to have been destroyed 
in 2019 in Cambodia’s Article 7 report, appears to be under reported, as HALO and MAG alone reported clearing 5,439 
anti-personnel mines in 2019, excluding EOD call-outs.




Table 7: Mine clearance in 2019139
Province Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed UXO destroyed
Banteay Meanchey 4,895,519 232 1,778
Battambang 8,354,500 1,314 1,490
Kampong Thom 526,789 49 100
Koh Kong 16,769 12 0
Oddar Meanchey 1,263,747 196 103
Pailin 2,605,897 1,411 341
Preah Vihear 1,150,211 284 153
Pursat 768,044 527 112
Ratanak Kiri 4,209 0 0
Siemreap 744,253 82 192
Tboung Khmum 606,768 4 85
Totals 20,936,706 4,111 4,354
In 2019, during EOD spot tasks/call-outs, a further 4,365 anti-personnel mines were destroyed: 1,468 by CMAC; 543 by CSHD; 
1,219 by HALO Trust; 1,134 by MAG; and 1 by NPA.140
Of the total anti-personnel mined area cleared in 2019, 43 minefields totalling over 1.7km2 were cleared in which no 
anti-personnel mines were found.141 This is an improvement on the 3.8km2 that was cleared in 2018 without any anti-personnel 
mines being found.142
HALO Trust cleared over 5.63km2 of mined area in 2019, during which it destroyed a total of 3,562 anti-personnel mines 
(excluding EOD call-outs), 177 anti-vehicle mines; and 292 items of UXO; broadly comparable to the 6.82km2 cleared in 2018.143 
Of the 315 minefields cleared by HALO Trust in 2019, 50 did not contain anti-personnel mines (2 SHAs classified as A1, 40 as 
A2 minefields, and 8 as A4). According to HALO, the A1 and A4 minefields were released through area reduction, whereas A2 
minefields were primarily planned for anti-vehicle mine clearance using large-loop detectors (LLDs).144
MAG cleared nearly 1.42km2 of mined area in 2019, during which it destroyed a total of 1,877 anti-personnel mines, 1 
anti-vehicle mine; and 116 items of UXO, excluding EOD callouts.145 MAG’s clearance output increased in 2019, compared to  
the previous year, due to scaling up of operational capacity in mid-2018 of manual teams and the addition of an MDD team  
and one additional mechanical operations unit in mid 2019.146
APOPO’s clearance and technical survey output, in partnership with CMAC, increased in 2019, compared to the previous year. 
While APOPO aims to conduct technical survey whenever appropriate, many of the mined areas it worked on in 2019 contained 
scattered mines making technical survey challenging. All of the 24 mined areas cleared by APOPO in 2019, in partnership with 
CMAC, contained anti-personnel mines.147 In 2020, APOPO, in partnership with CMAC, commenced another technical survey/
clearance project with mine detection rats and technical survey dogs.148
In 2019, UNDP’s CfR project released 9.67km2 of mined land, during which 1,341 anti-personnel mines, 10 anti-vehicle mines, 
and 1,368 items of ERW were destroyed.149 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CAMBODIA: 1 JANUARY 2000
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2010
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (10YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2020
SECOND EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (5YEARS, 11 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the second extension, of 5 years and 11 months, granted by States 
Parties in 2019), Cambodia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon  
as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025.
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While Cambodia committed to clearing all anti-personnel 
mine contamination by the end of 2025 in its latest extension 
request, this is an extremely ambitious target, which relies 
on Cambodia bringing on board an additional 2,000 deminers. 
As at February 2020, no additional RCA capacity had been 
deployed and based on existing capacity and funding, the 
CMAA expected it will take 11 years to complete clearance.150
Cambodia planned to steadily increase annual land release 
(i.e. survey and clearance) output from 84km2 in 2019 (which 
it did not achieve) to 110km2 from 2020 to 2021, when 500 
priority villages will be declared mine free, to 146.5km2 
from 2022 to 2025. Between the Third Review Conference in 
2014 and the Fourth Review Conference in 2019, Cambodia 
released an average of 84km2 per year, so the land release 
targets it has set itself require additional funding and 
capacity as well as exceptional performance. In 2019, 
Cambodia released a total of nearly 55.5km2 through survey 
and clearance, which is well short of the nearly 84.3km2 is 
forecasted for the year in its 2019 extension request.151
Cambodia has stated it will require an average of US$62 
million for sector management and clearance of mines, 
CMR, and other ERW.152 From 2010 to 2018, Cambodia was 
averaging $42.5 million in funding from the government and 
donor community, which would mean a 45% annual increase 
in funding.153 While Cambodia expects to increase funding 
from domestic and private sources in the coming years 
there will still be a funding shortfall without increased donor 
support. In addition to the increased funding Cambodia has 
also calculated that it will need an extra 2,000 deminers 
to complete anti-personnel mine clearance by 2025. It is 
proposed that these deminers will come from the RCA, but 
will require international assistance in order to train and 
equip them.154 
Clearance output in 2019, was significantly lower than the 
previous year. Although not entirely clear, multiple factors  
are thought to account for the decrease in clearance, 
including: tasking of a larger proportion of difficult-to-access 
mined areas with more challenging terrain, compared to 
previous years; clearance of more mixed contamination;  
and decreased funding to some operators.155
Significant amounts of previously unrecorded contamination 
are still being added to the database, hampering efficient land 
release. It is vital that the CMAA has effective QM processes 
in place to ensure that only new mined areas with evidence of 
contamination are entered into IMSMA and that where there 
is no evidence of contamination, SHAs are cancelled.
Table 8: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







The high-density K5 minefield lies along the Cambodian-Thai 
border, including in areas where the border is not 
demarcated and where access is limited. In order to make 
progress towards its 2025 clearance deadline, Cambodia 
must ensure that it can release all contaminated land along 
its border with Thailand, which will require cross-border 
cooperation.156 Improved relations between Thailand and 
Cambodia have opened the way for increased border 
cooperation. The Cambodia-Thailand General Border 
Committee, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Defence from both countries, has agreed that 
CMAC and the Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) can 
cooperate to conduct demining along the Thai-Cambodian 
border.157 In September 2018, CMAC and TMAC met and 
agreed to find a task for a pilot border project: a small 
area that could be cleared within a month as a symbolic 
demonstration of two sides working together. In September 
2019, CMAC and TMAC agreed the respective mined areas on 
a demarcated section of the Thai-Cambodia border, distanced 
not too far apart.158 The selected area on the Cambodian 
side is Kilobuan village, Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey 
province. The selected pilot project area on the Thai side is in 
Sano-noi village, Aranyaprathet District, Sa Kaeo province.159 
TMAC and CMAC signed the agreement for the pilot site 
survey on 2 March 2020,160 after which operations were 
expected to start shortly thereafter and were expected to 
take no more than 50 days to complete.161 As at June 2020, 
around 10 CMAC clearance tasks were ongoing along the 
border; having started in April 2020, clearance was expected 
to be completed in July.162 Cambodia has said it will provide 
updates on clearance along border areas at forthcoming 
meetings of States Parties.163 
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Goal seven of Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025 is to establish a sustainable national capacity to address 
residual threats after 2025. Reference to the issue is also included in the foreword signed by the Cambodian Prime Minister 
and noted throughout the document. Objectives include reviewing by 2020 the legal, institutional and operational framework, 
strategy, and capacity needed to address the residual threats.164 
In Phase I (2018−22) of the national strategy Cambodia planned to “develop a comprehensive residual threats strategy; establish a 
residual threat legal and institutional framework; and establish residual threats regulatory and operational frameworks including 
coordination, planning and prioritization, and sustained information management system”. In Phase II (2023−25), Cambodia 
plans to “develop residual threat capacity in preparation to transition from the traditional mine action program; determine 
resource mobilisation schemes to support the development of residual threat capacity and its future activities; and to conduct 
post-programme evaluation of achievements and outcomes after the conclusion of the strategy in 2025 to evaluate performance, 
lessons learned, recommendations for efficiencies and improvements in any remaining mine action”.165
The CMAA have stated that it is likely that the RCA will be tasked with addressing explosive threats after 2025.166
In 2018, the GICHD presented a case study on the Management of Residual ERW in Cambodia, and hosted a Long Term Risk 
Management workshop and an exchange visit between the CMAA and the national mine action centre in Sri Lanka.167




1 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Point 4.
2 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Point 4.
3 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Annex 1.
4 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, undated 
but August 2019, p. 5.
5 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Point 4; and emails from Rebecca Letven, 
Country Director, MAG, 7 April 2020.
6 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Point 4.
7 Interview with Prum Sophakmonkol, Secretary General, CMAA, Geneva,  
11 February 2020.
8 Statement by the Chair of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation on  
the Analysis of the Request for extension submitted by Cambodia, Oslo,  
26 November 2019.
9 Interviews in Phnom Penh with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 24 April 2018; 
and Greg Crowther, MAG, and Matthew Hovell, HALO Trust, 26 April 2018; 
Su Yeon Yang, Conflict Prevention Officer, and Tong Try, National Mine 
Action Advisor, UNDP, 23 April 2019; and Heng Rattana, Director General, 
CMAC, 25 April 2019.
10 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025, p. 8.
11 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 21.
12 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Point 4. Remaining contamination 
data as at end of 2019 reported by the CMAA to Mine Action Review totalled 
nearly 768.31km2 of anti-personnel mined area across 8,720 hazardous 
areas and nearly 33.32km2 of anti-vehicle mined area across 613 hazardous 
areas. Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020.
13 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020.
14 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020.
15 Email from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020.
16 Email from Lasha Lomidze, Country Director, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020.
17 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, Programme Manager, NPA, 5 May 2020.
18 Email from Michael Heiman, Program Manager, APOPO, 4 May 2020.
19 Email from Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020.
20 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025, p. 1; and The HALO Trust, 
“Where we work: Cambodia”, accessed 10 July 2019, at: bit.ly/313jTKs.
21 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 21.
22 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form 4.
23 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form 4.
24 Interview with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 24 April 2019.
25 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, undated 
but August 2019, p. 2.
26 Email from Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020.
27 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form 4. HALO reported identifying almost 
1.8km2 of additional AP mine contaminated area in 2019. Email from Lasha 
Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020. MAG identified and added two additional 
SHAs in 2019, totalling 162,155m2. Email from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 
April 2020. Additional contamination data in 2019 reported by the CMAA 
to Mine Action Review totalled nearly 11.55km2 of previously unknown 
anti-personnel mined area across 179 hazardous areas (including 131 
SHAs totalling nearly 9.59km2 recorded by CMAC; 46 SHAs totalling nearly 
1.80km2 recorded by HALO Trust; and 2 SHAs totalling more than 0.16km2 
recorded by MAG. Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020.
28 CMAA, “Legal framework and mandate”, at: bit.ly/2W7r3dJ.
29 Interviews with Su Yeon Yang, and Tong Try, UNDP, 23 April 2019; and 
Rebecca Letven, MAG, Phnom Penh, 25 April 2019.
30 CMAC, “20 Years’ Achievement in Mine Action 1998-2018 and Path Ahead”, 2018.
31 Interview with Heng Rattana, CMAC, Phnom Penh, 25 April 2019.
32 GICHD, “Landmines and Land Rights in Cambodia”, December 2010,  
pp. 9 and 13.
33 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 5 May 2020.
34 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025, p. 24; and email from  
Tong Try, UNDP, 18 June 2019.
35 Emails from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020; Rebecca Letven, 
MAG, 7 April 2020; and Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 5 May 2020.
36 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025, p. 24; and email from  
Tong Try, UNDP, 18 June 2019.
37 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 5 May 2020.
38 Emails from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 4 April 2019; Rebecca Letven, MAG,  
9 May and 28 June 2019; and Damian O’Brien, HALO Trust, 10 April 2019.
39 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 4 April 2019.
40 UNDP, “Clearing for Results Phase III project document”, 17 December 2015; 
and interviews with Su Yeon Yang, Conflict Prevention Officer, and Tong Try, 
Senior National Project Officer, UNDP, 23 April 2019.
41 Email from Tong Try, UNDP, 19 June 2020.
42 Email from GICHD, 1 July 2020.
43 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.
44 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020.
45 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.
46 Emails from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 11 September 2019; Rebecca 
Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020; and Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020.
47 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 11 September 2019; and Statement 
of Cambodia on Second Extension Request, APMBC Fourth Review 
Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.
48 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020.
49 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 11 September 2019.
50 CMAA, Three-Year Implementation Plan 2018−2020, Phnom Penh, undated 
but 2018, p. 14.
51 DFID Capacity Development Report, Activity Detail Extract, 18 September 2018.
52 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020.
53 Ibid.
54 Email from Arianna Calza Bini, Head of GMAP division, GICHD, 7 September 
2020.
55 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025, p. 22.
56 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020.
57 Ibid.
58 Email from Michael Heiman, APOPO, 4 May 2020.
59 CMAC, “20 Years’ Achievement in Mine Action 1998-2018 and Path Ahead”, 
2018; interview with Heng Rattana, CMAC, Phnom Penh, 25 April 2019; and 
email from Oum Phumro, Deputy Director General, CMAC, 28 July 2020.
60 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, undated 
but August 2019, Annex 18.
61 Email from Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020.
62 Email from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020.
63 Ibid.
64 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, undated 
but August 2019, Annex 18.
65 Emails from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020; and GICHD, 1 July 2020.
66 Email from GICHD, 1 July 2020.
67 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025, p. 22.
68 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 5 May 2020.
69 Ibid.; and email from Michael Heiman, APOPO, 4 May 2020.
70 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020.
71 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025, pp. 14–15.
72 Emails from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020; and Lasha Lomidze,  
HALO Trust, 15 May 2020.
73 Email from Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020.
74 Email from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020.
75 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 5 May 2020.
76 Email from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 9 May 2019; and interview with Prum 
Sophakmonkol, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 24 April 2019.
77 Email from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020.
78 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 11 September 2019.
79 Email from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020.
80 Three-Year Implementation Plan 2018–20, p. 3.
81 Statement of Cambodia on Second Extension Request, APMBC Fourth 
Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.
82 CMAC, Integrated Work Plan 2019, p. 24.
83 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
84 Ibid., p. 5.
85 Ibid., p. 8; and interviews with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 
24 April 2018 and Geneva, 11 February 2020.
86 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7; Statement of Cambodia  
on Second Extension Request, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo,  
27 November 2019; and interview with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 
Geneva, 11 February 2020.
87 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 31; and 2019 Article 5 deadline 
Extension Request, Additional Information, undated but August 2019, p. 3.
88 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025, pp. 14–15.
89 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9; and interview with Prum 
Sophakmonkol, CMAA, Geneva, 11 February 2020.
68   Clearing the Mines 2020
90 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 30–31; and email from 
Damian O’Brien, HALO Trust, 10 April 2019.
91 Interview with Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 3 May 2019.
92 Email from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 9 September 2019.
93 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, undated 
but August 2019, p. 4.
94 Email from Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020.
95 Email from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020.
96 Email from Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020.
97 Ibid.
98 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 5 May 2020.
99 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 11 September 2019; and Zlatko 
Vezilic, NPA, 4 April 2019.
100 Emails from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 5 May 2020; and Lasha Lomidze, HALO 
Trust, 15 May 2020.
101 Email from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020.
102 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, undated 
but August 2019, p. 1; and email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 5 May 2020.
103 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, undated 
but August 2019, p. 1.
104 Emails from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 4 April 2019 and Rebecca Letven, MAG,  
9 May 2019.
105 Emails from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 9 May 2019; and Damian O’Brien,  
HALO Trust, 10 April 2019.
106 Email from GICHD, 1 July 2020.
107 UNDP, “Clearing for Results Phase III Annual Report”, 2018.
108 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020.
109 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 11 September 2019; and 2019 
Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, undated  
but August 2019, p. 2.
110 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information,  
undated but August 2019, p. 2.
111 Email from Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020.
112 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 43.
113 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p.48.
114 Email from Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020.
115 Email from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020.
116 Email from Prum Suonpraseth, CMAC, 21 June 2019.
117 Emails from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 28 June 2019 and 29 June 2020.
118 Email from Michael Heiman, APOPO, 4 May 2020.
119 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 5 May 2020.
120 Email from Tong Try, UNDP, 19 June 2020.
121 Email from Tong Try, UNDP, 19 June and 21 July 2020.
122 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
123 Ibid., p. 41.
124 Interview with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, Geneva, 11 February 2020.
125 “India Provides $1.5 million to Support Cambodia’s Demining Program”, 
Cambodianess, 10 August 2020.
126 Email from CMAA, 2 May 2017.
127 Interview with Edwin Faigmane, UNDP, Phnom Penh, 24 April 2018. 
128 Email from Tong Try, UNDP, 19 June 2020.
129 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, undated 
but August 2019, Annex 18; emails from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020; 
Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020; and Michael Heiman, APOPO,  
4 May 2020.
130 APMBC Article 7 Report submitted in 2020 (covering 2019), Point 4.
131 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 11 September 2019.
132 Ibid.
133 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form 4.
134 Email from Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020.
135 APMBC Article 7 Report submitted in 2020 (covering 2019), Point 4. HALO 
Trust reported that it cancelled over 22.8km2 of mined area. Email from 
Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020. MAG reported that it cancelled over 
4.58km2 through non-technical survey in 2019. Email from Rebecca Letven, 
MAG, 7 April 2020. The amount of mined area cancelled through non-technical 
survey in 2019 reported by the CMAA to Mine Action Review totalled over 
27.55km2 (nearly 0.70km2 cancelled by CMAC; nearly 22.74km2 by HALO; and 
nearly 4.12km2 by MAG. Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020.
136 APMBC Article 7 Report submitted in 2020 (covering 2019), Point 4. HALO 
Trust reported that it reduced 342,153m2 in 2019, as part of its clearance 
process. Email from Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020. MAG 
reported that it reduced over 2,151,349m2 through technical survey in 2019. 
Email from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020. In partnership with CMAC, 
APOPO reported that it reduced 1,047,100m2 in 2019 in three provinces. 
Email from Michael Heiman, APOPO, 4 May 2020. The amount of mined area 
reduced through technical survey in 2019 reported by the CMAA to Mine 
Action Review totalled over 7.80km2 (nearly 5.86km2 reduced by CMAC; 
more than 0.44km2 by HALO; and more than 1.50km2 by MAG. Email from 
Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020.
137 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Point 4.
138 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 11 September 2019.
139 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Point 4. The amount of mined area 
released through clearance in 2019 reported by the CMAA to Mine Action 
Review totalled over 28.26km2 (more than 15.43km2 cleared by CMAC; more 
than 0.45km2 by CSHS; nearly 8.52km2 by HALO Trust; nearly 1.38km2 by 
MAG; and more than 2.48km2 by NPMEC. Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, 
CMAA, 1 July 2020. According to data provided to Mine Action Review by the 
CMAA a total of 4,361 anti-personnel mines (1,394 by CMAC; 178 by CSHD; 
1,075 by HALO Trust; 13 by NPMEC; and 1,701 by MAG), 102 anti-vehicle mines 
(27 by CMAC; 0 by CSHD; 56 by HALO Trust; 3 by NPMEC; and 16 by MAG), 
and 4,599 item of UXO were destroyed in 2019. HALO Trust reported that it 
cleared nearly 5.63km2 in 2019, during which it destroyed a total of 3,562  
anti-personnel mines, 177 anti-vehicle mines; and 292 items of UXO. Email 
from Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020. MAG reported that it cleared 
nearly 1.42km2 in 2019, during which it destroyed a total of 1,877 AP mines,  
1 AV mine, and 116 other UXO. Email from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020. 
As part of its partnership with CMAC, APOPO reported that it cleared nearly 
1.29km2 in 2019, during which it destroyed a total of 331 AP mines, 1 AV mine, 
and 324 other UXO. Email from Michael Heiman, APOPO, 4 May 2020. UNDP 
reported that the CfR project released 9.67km2 of mined land, during which 
1,341 anti-personnel mines, 10 anti-vehicle mines, and 1,368 items of ERW 
were destroyed. Email from Tong Try, UNDP, 19 June 2020.
140 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020. HALO Trust itself 
reported destroying 1,169 anti-personnel mines during EOD callouts in 2019 
(email from Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020) and MAG reported 
destroying 1,124 (email from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020).
141 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020.
142 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 11 September 2019.
143 Email from Lasha Lomidze, HALO Trust, 15 May 2020.
144 Ibid.
145 Email from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020.
146 Ibid.
147 Emails from Michael Heiman, APOPO, 4 May and 23 June 2020.
148 Ibid.
149 Email from Tong Try, UNDP, 19 June 2020.
150 Interview with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, Geneva, 11 February 2020.
151 2019 Article deadline 5 Extension Request, p. 7.
152 Ibid., p. 55.
153 Ibid., p. 34.
154 Interview with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 24 April 2019.
155 Email from Eva Veble, on behalf of Samrithea Sron, NPA, 9 September 2020.
156 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 38.
157 Emails from Shushira Chonhenchob, NPA (on behalf of Lt-Gen. Sittipol 
Nimnuan, TMAC), 8 April 2019; and Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020.
158 ‘CMAC, Thais join forces to clear mines at border provinces’, The Phnom 
Penh Post, 24 September 2019, at: bit.ly/3ejuyrW.
159 Email from Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich, on behalf of Lt.-Gen. Sittipol 
Nimnuan, TMAC, on 27 February 2020.
160 Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), “A record of discussions signed 
between CMAC and TMAC”, 3 March 2020, available at: bit.ly/34yiUEW.
161 Email from Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich, on behalf of Lt.-Gen. Sittipol 
Nimnuan, TMAC, on 27 February 2020.
162 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 1 July 2020.
163 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
164 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025, p. 14.
165 Ibid., p. 16.
166 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, undated 
but August 2019, p. 5.
167 Email from Rob White, Advisor, Strategic Management & Residual 
Contamination, GICHD, 3 July 2019.





AP MINE  
CLEARANCE IN 2019
AP MINES   
DESTROYED IN 2019
ANTIPERSONNEL (AP)  
MINE CONTAMINATION: 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2013 
NEW EXTENDED DEADLINE NEEDED
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Mines of an improvised nature continued to claim casualties in 2019, particularly in Cameroon’s northern districts along the 
border with Nigeria amid escalating military activity by Boko Haram but also in other regions. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Cameroon should respect its obligations to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). 
 ■ Cameroon should inform States Parties to the APMBC of the discovery of any anti-personnel mine contamination, 
including mines of an improvised nature. It should report on the location of all suspected or confirmed mined  
areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status of programmes for their destruction in its Article 7 
transparency report.
 ■ Cameroon should request a new APMBC Article 5 deadline. 
 ■ As soon as security conditions permit, non-technical survey should start in the Extrême-Nord (Far North) region, 
which is reportedly the region most affected by conflict.
 ■ Cameroon should try to mobilise and facilitate assistance and expertise from humanitarian demining organisations  
for survey and clearance. 
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ No national mine action authority or national mine  
action centre
NATIONAL OPERATORS
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Cameroon faces a continuing threat from mines of an improvised nature and other explosive devices, mainly as a result of 
escalating Boko Haram insurgency spilling over from Nigeria into the Lake Chad region. The extent of contamination, which 
seemingly includes both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines, is unknown.
The threat appears to be concentrated in Cameroon’s Far North region between Nigeria and Chad where its armed forces 
continue to conduct counterinsurgency operations as part of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The government has 
also accused Anglophone separatists of responsibility for a mine incident that killed four police in the south-west in 2019.1
One member of Cameroon’s elite Rapid Intervention Battalion was killed and eleven others injured in February 2019 when their 
truck detonated a mine of an improvised nature in the vicinity of Kerawa on the border with Nigeria. The troops were returning 
from an operation in which soldiers reportedly destroyed four workshops which were producing improvised mines and found 
to hold hundreds of containers of explosives, batteries, and detonators. Two other detonations in the area in October 2018 
involving mines or improvised devices reportedly caused the deaths of three soldiers and injured six others. Seven soldiers 
were killed in two separate incidents in the same area in April 2019.2 Media also reported that two Cameroonian soldiers were 
killed after their truck drove over a mine near the town of Eyumedjock in an area of the South West region near the border with 
Nigeria where English-speaking separatists are active.3
A senior army officer commented in 2017 that some roads in areas bordering Nigeria were “riddled with mines.”4 A Cameroonian 
analyst commented that insurgents were using “homemade mines” with increasing frequency on roads as well as in houses and 
vehicles.5 The effect has been to reduce access for humanitarian organisations working in the area. International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) personnel who visited the Far North region in September 2018 were denied permission to visit a number of 
towns in Mayo-Tsanaga,6 a department bordering Nigeria, because of the presence of mines and reports of kidnappings.7
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Cameroon does not have a functioning mine action programme. Mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) are  
the responsibility of the Cameroon Military Engineer Corps. 
Cameroon informed the United Nations in 2019 that casualties from mines and improvised devices had increased 43% 
compared to the previous year, which required a change of approach by the government. It appealed for international 
assistance but provided no information about any action it had taken or was planning to address the issue.8
Over the past four years, the Army has received military training in demining and counter-IED [improvised explosive device] 
measures, mainly from the France and the United States.9 Cameroon received demining/EOD equipment from the United  
States and Russia in 2015, with armoured mine-detection vehicles being provided by the US Army Africa Command.10 The US 
also donated significant quantities of demining equipment, including metal detectors, to Cameroon in 2017.11 US Army Africa 
and the French Army’s French Elements in Gabon (EFG) provided further demining and EOD training up to Level 4 EOD in 
March–April 2018.12 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Cameroon did not report results of any clearance and EOD conducted by its Army engineers in 2019 or 2018. 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CAMEROON: 1 MARCH 2003 
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2013
NEW ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE REQUEST REQUIRED 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW




Cameroon is a State Party to the APMBC. Its Article 5 deadline to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under  
its jurisdiction or control expired on 1 March 2013.
Cameroon has not submitted an Article 7 report since August 2009 when it reported there were no areas of mine 
contamination under its jurisdiction or control. In view of the casualties reported by Cameroon from mines and/or 
victim-activated mines of an improvised nature, Cameroon needs to revise its position. 
Under the APMBC’s agreed framework, Cameroon should immediately inform all States Parties of any newly discovered 
anti-personnel mines since the expiry of its Article 5 deadline (in 2013) and ensure their destruction as soon as possible.  
It should also submit a request for a new Article 5 deadline, which should be as short as possible and not more than ten  
years. Cameroon must continue to fulfil its reporting obligations under the convention, including on the location of any 
suspected or confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status of programmes for the destruction  
of all anti-personnel mines within them.
1 “Cameroun: l’explosion d’une mine tue 4 policiers dans le Sud-ouest”, Journal du Cameroun, 17 June 2019, at: bit.ly/2YnZwte.
2 “Boko Haram landmines inflict heavy toll on Cameroon”, Latin American Herald Tribune, 30 May 2019, at: bit.ly/2XUT4ef; “Cameroon: Boko Haram mine kills four 
soldiers in Far North region”, Journal du Cameroun, 13 April 2019, at: bit.ly/2Z50o3u.
3 “Mine blast kills two Cameroon soldiers”, News24, 21 April 2018, at; bit.ly/2JRyDoR. 
4 P. Kum, “Landmine explosion kills two Cameroon soldiers”, Anadolu Agency, 28 September 2017, at: bit.ly/2LxKjQO.
5 “Boko Haram landmines inflict heavy toll on Cameroon”, Latin American Herald Tribune, 30 May 2019.
6 The towns were Talla-Katchi, Assighassia, Zéméné, and Cherif Moussari.
7 IOM, “Cameroon, Far North Region, Displacement Report, Round 15, 3−15 September 2018”, Report, p. 8. 
8 Cameroon statement to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 23 October 2019.
9 “Military Cooperation: mine clearing training (Sept. 19-30th 2016)”, French embassy in Yaoundé webpage at: bit.ly/2Z3ShnY; M. E. Kindzeka, “Cameroon Vigilantes 
Hunt for Boko Haram Landmines”, Voice of America News, 4 March 2016, at: bit.ly/2XZGxGM.
10 M. E. Kindzeka, “Land Mines Hamper Cameroon, Chad in Fight Against Boko Haram”, Voice of America News, 3 March 2015, at: bit.ly/2XXOfkD; and “US Helps 
Cameroon in Fight Against Boko Haram”, Voice of America News, 17 October 2015, at: bit.ly/2y1GeeR.
11 “US donates mine-clearing devices to Cameroon”, Journal du Cameroun, 24 April 2017; at: bit.ly/2Z3Hryl.
12 “Génie Militaire – Des démineurs formés”, Cameroon Tribune (Yaoundé), 23 April 2018, at: bit.ly/2M2uoJO.





AP MINE  
CLEARANCE IN 2019
AP MINES   
DESTROYED IN 2019
ANTIPERSONNEL (AP)  
MINE CONTAMINATION: 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2025 
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Chad reported a sharp increase in land release in 2019, including mine clearance for the first time in three years, although 
operations did not result in destruction of any anti-personnel mines. Mines Advisory Group (MAG), after delays caused  
by insecurity, began operating in Borkou province. Chad also secured a five-year extension of its Anti-Personnel Mine  
Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline for completing clearance to the beginning of 2025. Chad made progress in 
consolidating data to improve its understanding of mine contamination, sharply reducing the estimate of its remaining 
challenge in the process.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The National High Commission for Demining (HCND) should ensure operators focus clearance assets on areas with 
known mine contamination.
 ■ Chad needs to develop a resource mobilisation strategy to secure and diversify funding and attract international 
technical and operational support.
 ■ Chad should streamline bureaucratic procedures that currently delay operators seeking to conduct survey and clearance.
 ■ Chad should consider establishing an in-country platform bringing together the authorities, donors, and key 
stakeholders to help strengthen national coordination. 
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(20% of overall score)
5 4 Contamination estimates are based on outdated and incomplete data, underscoring 
the need for re-survey. Progress in cleaning up the national mine action database has 
provided greater clarity on contamination and areas where re-survey is required.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
4 4 Chad’s national mine action authority coordinates the sector and carried out  
further restructuring in 2019 to increase efficiency. Government pays salaries 




(10% of overall score)
4 3 Gender has not been a priority in a programme that has undergone significant 
downsizing and struggled to mobilise resources to implement survey or clearance. 
Women find employment, including in managerial- and supervisory-level positions, 
mainly in administrative roles, risk education, or victim assistance. Woman are 




(10% of overall score)
5 4 Upgrading of the HCND database by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) has 
significantly improved understanding of contamination and data quality. The HCND 
has started to report disaggregated data on land release but sustained training and 
capacity building will be essential to preserve the gains.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
4 4 Chad provides annual Article 7 reports and submitted a revised Article 5 extension 
request in August 2019, which was granted at the Fourth Review Conference in 
November 2019, but its contamination data was rendered obsolete by improvements 
in the database. It set only general goals for survey and clearance that need to be 
enhanced by detailed annual work plans. 
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
6 6 Chad has national standards in place, which were updated by Humanity and Inclusion 
(HI) in 2017. These are said to comply with the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS). HCND planned further updates and amendments in 2020.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
3 2 Chad released more land through survey and clearance in 2019 than in the 
previous five years combined but in the process it did not report clearing a single 
anti-personnel mine.
Average Score 4.5 3.9 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ National High Commission for Demining (HCND)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Armed Forces Combat Engineering Battalion
 ■ HCND
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Humanity and Inclusion (HI)
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) 
 ■ Secours Catholique et Développement (SECADEV)  
(Victim Assistance)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Chad estimated that its anti-personnel mine contamination covered some 42km2 at the end of 2019 (see Table 1),1 barely 
one-third of the nearly 118km2 reported a year earlier or even the 137 mined areas covering 111km2 identified in Chad’s revised 
Article 5 extension request from August 2019.2 Clean-up of the database eliminating duplicate entries accounted for close to 
90% of the reduction in the estimated area and cut the number of provinces thought to be mine affected from nine in 2019 to 
three in 2020. The HCND, however, has also acknowledged that the data is incomplete and it is unable to provide a precise 
estimate of total mine contamination.3
One region, Tibesti, alone accounted for 95% of the estimated 
remaining mined area.4 On the border between the Borkou 
region and Libya, Chad has reported the presence of 
anti-vehicle mines protected by lines of anti-personnel 
mines. Access for survey and clearance has been blocked 
by scattered “nuisance” minefields. The HCND says further 
survey is also required in southern provinces bordering the 
Central African Republic to confirm that mined areas have 
been eliminated.5 
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area (at end 2019)6






MAG reported identifying five new suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in 2019 totalling 3,341,600m2 in Borkou region, including 
one SHA which amounted to 3,400,000m2 and four SHAs recorded at 400m2 each.7 HI said non-technical survey in 2019 
identified one hazardous area in Borkou covering 35,379m2 and another in Ennedi West of 139,426m2 but recorded them as 
battle areas.8
In 2018, Chad cited insecurity in Tibesti and the probability that mines had been newly laid there as among the reasons for  
its failure to meet its extended third Article 5 deadline.9 It also contends with rising insurgency from Boko Haram and other 
armed groups in western areas around Lake Chad, which harvest explosives from explosive remnants of war (ERW) for 
improvised explosive devices. The HCND has not quantified the level of use or the extent to which the devices found qualify  
as anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature.10 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Chad’s mine action programme is coordinated by the National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National 
de Déminage, HCND) which comes under the Ministry of Economy and Development Planning.11 The National Demining Centre 
(Centre National de Déminage, CND), which earlier conducted clearance operations, appears to have been dissolved. The 
headquarters is supported by four regional centres and two sub-centres.12
The HCND is responsible for preparing a national demining strategy and annual work plans and proposing a budget to  
support their implementation.13 Chad’s latest Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in April 2019 and revised 
in August 2019, which was granted at the Fourth APMBC Review Conference in November, observed that its mine action 
programme had lacked a strategic vision, operational planning and effective coordination, weakening its credibility nationally 
and internationally.14
The HCND embarked on a process of restructuring three years ago involving a major reduction in staff. In July 2017, nine years 
after the government first ordered the HCND to restructure, a government decree reduced the number of personnel by more 
than half from 744 to 329. At the time Chad submitted its revised Article 5 extension request in August 2019, the HCND reported 
having 320 staff, a number unchanged at the end of the year.15 A June 2019 decree provided for re-organisation, resulting in 
four main divisions covering: Operations and Logistics, Planning, Administrative and Financial Affairs and Human Resources.16 
Operators say constant changes in coordination staff have hampered efficiency.17
Government funding for mine action is limited to payment of salaries for national staff. The HCND reported payment of up 
to approximately US$1.5 million in 2019.18 However, the government’s persistent non-payment of salaries has badly affected 
sector performance. A long-running strike by deminers that started in 2017 gave rise to threats by former deminers that have 
prevented operations in areas of Tibesti earmarked for survey and clearance.19 Operators also report lengthy delays obtaining 
the permits required to import equipment as well as in other bureaucratic procedures. 




GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
Gender is not discussed in Chad’s latest Article 5 deadline extension request and recruitment of female staff is not a priority 
for the HCND, which has undergone drastic downsizing in the past two years and still faces demands for back pay from staff. 
There were nine women among the 207 personnel working for the HCND in 2019; they were employed in a range of 
management, administrative and field roles. They included the HCND’s assistant director, the administration and finance 
assistant director, the head of risk education, a personnel officer, and two secretaries.20 
The lack of women in HCND’s operational staff limited options for international operators whose deminers are seconded from 
HCND. As a result, HI employed women in administrative roles including its country director, a human resources coordinator 
and assistant finance director.21 The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is advising HI’s 
programme in Chad on the mainstreaming of gender and diversity in their activities.22
In 2019, MAG employed Chad’s first female deminer as a team leader overseeing survey and clearance tasks, conducting 
on-site quality control and reporting data. She had been trained in Benin to EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] Level 3. MAG 
also employed women in community liaison and administrative functions.23 
Operators reported that risk education targeted all members of the community and that the resulting data was disaggregated 
by gender.24 MAG community liaison teams conduct focus group discussions with women, since they are better placed to 
provide information on contamination in some areas such as wadis where they collect water and firewood. Discussions led by  
a female community liaison officer identify women’s priorities for mine action interventions.25
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The HCND uses an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database but poor maintenance meant data 
available from it was unreliable because of lost reports and duplication. A clean-up of the database undertaken by the Swiss 
Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) under the European Union (EU)-funded PRODECO project that started in 2017 has now 
resulted in cancellation of large numbers of duplicate entries and a sharply reduced estimate of contamination. To support  
the clean-up, the HCND conducted two field operations in 2019 and one in the first three months of 2020 in order to verify 
survey results.26 
FSD also supported data entry and correction and the production of maps of SHAs, and helped to compile tables for Chad’s 
Article 5 deadline extension request. IMSMA forms were reviewed, updated, and approved at a workshop in 2019. With FSD 
support, the HCND also introduced standardised forms to be used by operators for weekly and monthly reporting.27 
PLANNING AND TASKING
Since September 2017, Chad’s mine action programme has focused mainly on implementing the four-year (2017–21) EU-funded 
mine action project (PRODECO), which is being implemented by a consortium of three international operators and one national 
operator.28 HI was due to focus on survey and clearance in the Borkou and Ennedi regions; MAG was to work in the Tibesti 
and Lake Chad regions; and FSD would provide training and support for information management, while Secours Catholique 
et Développement (SECADEV) would address victim assistance.29 Those objectives subsequently changed due to insecurity in 
Tibesti that prevented MAG from gaining access and forcing it to redirect its demining teams to the Lake Chad area in the west 
of the country. The HCND acknowledged in its 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request that mine action in Chad had lacked a 
strategic vision, operational planning, and effective coordination, resulting in a loss of confidence locally and internationally.30 
Chad’s extension request presents a “detailed” programme with targets for non-technical survey, technical survey, and 
clearance that avoid specifics for any category of activity:31
The HCND prioritises tasks according to requests from local authorities. It issues task orders to operators usually after 
receiving their input on technical and resource requirements of the task. Operators are also usually able to recce tasks  
with the HCND and local authorities prior to deploying staff.32 HI said it prioritised tasks according to local community 
development priorities.33
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Table 2: Planning for the Article 5 deadline extension period
Region Activities Areas to be addressed Timeline
Borkou NTS, TS, clearance 39 January 2020 – September 2021
Chagri NTS, TS, clearance 1 January 2020 – September 2021
Ennedi NTS, TS, clearance 7 July 2020 – December 2024
Moyen-Chari NTS, TS, clearance 1 January 2020 – September 2021
Tibesti NTS, TS, clearance 89 January 2020 – December 2024
NTS = non-technical survey TS = technical survey
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Chad’s national mine action standards are believed to be consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). 
HI started a review of Chad’s standards in 2016 and reported in September 2017 that 11 national mine action standards had 
been updated and issued, following HCND approval.34 HCND said it planned to update national standards for land release, 
supervision of organisations, and quality assurance, but gave no details.35
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The HCND is Chad’s biggest operator employing a total 
staff of 320 people in 2019, of whom 113 were seconded to 
HI and MAG.36 The HCND informed Mine Action Review that 
operational capacity at the end of 2019 amounted to four 
manual demining teams with 72 personnel, two non-technical 
survey teams with six personnel, and two teams operating 
two mechanical assets with a total of seven personnel. 
Other capacity included two EOD teams with 16 technicians.37 
Additional national EOD capacity is available from the Chad 
armed forces’ combat engineering battalion, which received 
training on demining and IED clearance in May 2019 from two 
French army engineers.38 
The mine action component of the PRODECO programme 
funded by the EU and implemented by a consortium of three 
international demining organisations was the only operation 
active in Chad in 2019. HI, the PRODECO consortium lead 
agency, operated with a total staff of 76 people. These 
included 35 deminers in three multi-task teams and a survey 
team of five people who conducted survey and clearance 
of mined areas in the Kirdimi and Faya districts of Borkou 
province.39 The HCND said it would remain in the province 
in the first half of 2020 and work in Ennedi throughout the 
year.40 HI is understood to have used drones fitted with 
infrared cameras to conduct survey41 but provided no details.
MAG worked with three 12-strong teams of manual deminers, 
four community liaison staff, and 24 support staff focused 
on clearance and risk education in northern Chad’s Borkou 
region, including road clearance to enable communications 
between towns in the north. MAG was supposed to have 
operated in Tibesti but was prevented from doing so by local 
conflicts. In consultation with the HCND and HI, it identified 
alternative areas and carried out an exploratory mission to 
Borkou in March 2019 before starting operations in June. In 
2020, MAG expected to shift operations to Ennedi region.42 
As part of the PRODECO programme, 10 HCND deminers 
were sent to the Centre de Formation au Déminage 
Humanitaire (CPADD) in Benin for training. Of those, nine 
qualified for EOD Level 3, the first time Chadian deminers 
have qualified at this level. Two other HCND staff qualified  
as quality assurance officers.43
FSD, working with four international and five national staff in 
2019, focused on building capacity in the national authority 
with particular attention to information management, 
operations management, quality assurance, logistics, and 
administration. In 2019, FSD also supported production of 
maps, tables, and analysis for Chad’s Article 5 deadline 
extension request.44 The HCND’s work plan for 2020 also 
called for FSD support for non-technical survey and technical 
survey in Salamat, Sila, and Wadi Fira.




LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
The HCND reported release of a total of 4.7km2 in 2019, mostly through non-technical survey. The results marked a significant 
acceleration after two years in which Chad did not release any mined land but the operations in 2019 did not result in 
destruction of any anti-personnel mines.45 
SURVEY IN 2019
The HCND reported that HI and MAG together cancelled a 
total of 3.5km2 through non-technical survey in 2019 (see 
Table 3)46 although there discrepancies in reported results.47 
Around 80% of the released area was accounted for by 
non-technical survey conducted by MAG along a 167km road 
between Chicha and Kouba Olanga in the Borkou region. 
Interviews with local inhabitants along the road, together 
with reviewing old reports and the IMSMA database over 
a period of approximately three months, enabled MAG 
to conclude that rumours of mine contamination were 
groundless. MAG conducted technical survey on one specific 
area (see Table 4) that a former rebel commander had 
reported as mined but no mines were found, only 16 items  
of small arms ammunition.48 
CLEARANCE IN 2019
The HCND reported that HI cleared 423,934m2 of mined 
area in Borkou region in 2019, the first land release through 
clearance in three years. The HCND said 87 anti-vehicle 
mines and 1,559 items of ERW were destroyed, but no 
anti-personnel mines.49 
Table 3: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201950





Wadi Fira HCND 504
Moyen Chari HCND 49,239
Salamat HCND 350
Chari Barguimi HCND 4,591
Total 3,528,155
Table 4: Reduction through technical survey in 201951




ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CHAD: 1 NOVEMBER 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2009
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (1YEAR, 2MONTH): 1 JANUARY 2011
SECOND EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (3YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2014
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (6YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2020
FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (5YEAR EXTENSION) 1 JANUARY 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC and in line with the fourth extension (for five years) of its clearance deadline, Chad is required to 
destroy all anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2025. 
Chad’s deadline extension request provided welcome evidence of continued engagement with the APMBC machinery but not 
clarity about prospects for achieving completion within the five years requested. In their decision on the application, States 
Parties described the request as “ambitious” but called for regular updates on progress, communicated in language consistent 
with IMAS, and noted that the request lacked a detailed annual work plan for survey and clean-up of the database.52 
Within months of submitting the request in August 2019, Chad’s national authority had lowered its estimate of remaining 
anti-personnel mine contamination by almost two-thirds, the most significant step towards completion in years, but it resulted 
largely from database clean-up. The outlook for survey and clearance needed to fulfil Chad’s obligations is less clear. 
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The land release reported in 2019 also represented a 
significant step forward but at the end of 2019, more than two 
years after the launch of the PRODECO programme, operators 
had yet to clear a single anti-personnel mine. Operations 
remain constrained by insecurity, which has blocked access 
to the Tibesti region, which accounts for close to 95% of 
known contamination and by lack of funding. Operations came 
to a halt in 2020 as a result of measures taken to deal with 
the COVID-19 pandemic, presenting an additional financial 
challenge for operators needing to extend existing funding 
agreements or attract new sources of funds.53 
Under the plan set out in its extension request, the HCND has 
estimated the cost of completion at US$34 million. Chad would 
provide a little over half a million dollars of this to pay salaries 
while the remainder is dependent on international donors.54 
The only international funding available to Chad at present is 
the €23 million provided by the EU for the PRODECO project, 
which expires in 2021. Sustained progress will depend on new 
commitments of international donor funding. 
Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







* A total of 423,934m2 of anti-vehicle mined area was cleared in 2019.  
** Combined clearance and technical survey.
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ANTIPERSONNEL (AP)  
MINE CONTAMINATION: 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2020 
CLEARANCE REPORTED COMPLETED
AP MINES  
DESTROYED IN 2019
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Chile ended its formal mine clearance operations on 27 February 2020 and declared that it has addressed all known minefields 
within its territory, meeting its 1 March 2020 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Chile should ensure that sufficient capacity is maintained to address any residual contamination that may be 
discovered in the future. 
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(20% of overall score)
9 7 It is understood that Chile has no known anti-personnel mine contamination 
remaining in the country since the end of February 2020.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
8 8 There is strong national ownership in Chile with effective leadership of the programme 
from the National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional de Desminado, CNAD) and 
demining operations were fully funded by the Chilean government. 
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
6 6 In previous years Chile has taken steps to mainstream gender across the armed 
forces with women working at all levels of the mine action programme. However,  




(10% of overall score)
8 6 Chile uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. 
Chile submits timely Article 7 transparency reports and provides regular updates  
on progress in Article 5 implementation at the annual meetings of States Parties.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
7 6 Chile has had a National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2016–2020; it submitted 
updated clearance plans in 2019. Chile did not meet its land release target for 2019 
but then far exceeded its target for 2020. As at May 2020, Chile had not provided 
information on its plan for residual risk post-completion.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
7 7 Chile is guided by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and the 
Humanitarian Demining Manual of the Chilean Army. All survey and clearance are 
undertaken by the military with both machines and dogs used during operations.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
10 5 Chile released almost 1.8km2 in 2019 and 2.8km2 in 2020, totalling a highly 
impressive 4.6km2 over just 14 months in order to meet its Article 5 deadline. Chile’s 
survey output increased in 2019. Its clearance output fell in 2019 (0.56km2) compared 
to the previous year but then rose rapidly in 2020 when Chile reportedly cleared 
0.7km2 in just two months.
Average Score 8.1 6.4 Overall Programme Performance: VERY GOOD
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional de 
Desminado, CNAD) 
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Army Corps of Engineers (Arica, Calama, Punta Arenas), 
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at 27 February 2020, Chile declared that it had addressed all known minefields and was now free of known anti-personnel 
mine contamination.1 At the end of 2018, Chile had 4.45km2 of anti-personnel mined area in five regions across 18 confirmed 
hazardous areas (CHAs) covering a total of 1.16km2 and 4 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) with a total size of 3.29km2.2 At 
the end of 2019, Chile reported seven hazardous areas totalling 2.70km2 remaining across three regions (see Table 1), which 
it went on to fully release in January and February 2020. In addition, Chile added 4,430m2 of previously unrecorded mine 
contamination in the regions of Valparaíso and Magallanes y Antártica Chilena to the database in 2019. In 2020, Chile added 
102,902m2 of previously unrecorded mine contamination in the regions of Arica y Parinacota, and Tarapacá to the database.3
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2019)4
Region CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total SHA/CHA Total area (m2)
Arica y Parinacota 2 179,981 1 145,297 3 325,278
Tarapacá 2 30,383 0 0 2 30,383
Antofagasta 1 62,591 1 2,279,112 2 2,341,703
Totals 5 272,955 2 2,424,409 7 2,697,364
The mines were all laid during the Pinochet regime in the 1970s on Chile’s borders with Argentina in the south, and with 
Bolivia and Peru in the north. The mined areas, which typically contained both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines, were 
generally difficult to access and mostly in unpopulated regions. The regions of both Antofagasta and Arica y Parinacota were 
contaminated with anti-vehicle as well as anti-personnel mines while the region of Tarapacá was contaminated only with 
anti-personnel mines.5 The vast majority of the mines were laid in the northern region, with some minefields located as high  
as 5,000m above sea level.6 Of the seven mined areas identified in Table 1 two contained only anti-personnel mines.7 
Chile is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants (currently estimated to cover 65km2, although actual contamination 
is likely to be considerably lower) and to a limited extent other unexploded ordnance (UXO) (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing 
Cluster Munition Remnants 2020 report on Chile for further information).
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by the National Demining Commission (CNAD), which is chaired by the 
Minister of Defence. In 2002, Supreme Decree No. 79 created CNAD as an advisory body to the President of the Republic and 
interministerial coordinating body to support the fulfilment of Chile’s obligations under the APMBC.8 Its main functions are to 
advise the President, mobilise resources, coordinate demining with state agencies, and develop plans for implementing the 
APMBC. Demining operations are all funded by the Government of Chile. 
Mine clearance operations were fully funded by the Chilean government.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
While there is no specific gender policy within CNAD, Chile’s policy of integrating women into the armed forces has been in 
place since 2000. As at May 2019, 14.4% of total armed forces personnel were female. In 2016, restrictions on the type of 
military positions a woman could hold were lifted and legislation was adopted to modify the military grading system, allowing 
women to be promoted in the same way as men. Women have been working in demining in Chile since 2004 across all types  
of roles, including as deminers and in managerial/supervisory roles. 
In 2007, the first woman was appointed as Manual Demining Section Commander in Arica. In May 2018, a woman was appointed 
as Demining Company Commander in Arica. Chile has made it easier for women to work in the sector by, for example, adapting 
demining equipment to better suit female specifications, providing childcare, and eliminating the gender wage gap.9 Chile 
reported that in 2019, of the 246 personnel carrying out roles within the demining units, only 10 (4%) were women. They 
included two demining section commanders and four women in support roles (one medic, two nurses, and one paramedic).10
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Since 2003, Chile has been using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). During 2017, Chile upgraded 
to Version 6 of IMSMA after starting the MARS (Mine Action Reporting System) application that replaced IMSMA Mobile. This 
application has equipped Chile with high-quality geographic information to support decision-making around clearance.11 
Chile has submitted its Article 7 reports almost every year since its accession to the convention in 2002 and makes regular 
Article 5 statements at meetings of States Parties, although there have been some problems with the accuracy of the 
information presented. In previous years, Chile submitted clearance plans that contained estimates that were more than  
the amount of area that had been indicated as remaining.12
PLANNING AND TASKING
The National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2016–2020 
was formulated in accordance with the request of the 
Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties (11MSP) that Chile 
provide updates relative to the timelines presented in its 
2011 extension request.13 The main objective of the plan was 
to eliminate all existing anti-personnel mines on national 
territory by the March 2020 clearance deadline.14 
As at April 2019, Chile had cleared three mined areas totalling 
26,603m2 since January and planned to clear an additional 18 
mined areas by the end of the year, leaving one mined area to 
clear in 2020 (see Table 2).15 In fact, Chile released 15 mined 
areas in 2019 totalling 1.76km2, of which 0.56km2 was cleared, 
0.35km2 was reduced through technical survey, and 0.85km2 
was cancelled through non-technical survey. Then in January 
and February 2020, Chile released a further 2.8km2 of mined 
area, of which 2.09km2 was reduced through technical survey 
and 0.71km2 was cleared.16
Table 2: Updated demining plan (2019–20)17




Annually, CNAD issues a National Directive on the Execution 
of Demining Activities from the Government of Chile, which 
contains a set of provisions and tasks to support the planning 
of demining activities.18 Clearance was prioritised according 
to proximity to populated areas, impact on land that has been 
designated a national park or is a historical site of touristic 
interest, and impact on land that obstructs development.19
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Chile is guided by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).20 In addition to the IMAS Chile also follows the provisions 
and regulations as set out in the “Humanitarian Demining Manual of the Chilean Army”.21
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Mine clearance in Chile is conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers, the Navy Landmine Operations Squad, and the  
Air Force.22
In 2019, there were four non-technical survey teams deployed totalling 11 personnel. In addition, there were 14 technical 
survey teams totalling 121 personnel. In 2020, there were two non-technical survey teams deployed totalling six personnel  
and eight technical survey teams totalling fifty-five personnel.23
Table 3: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 201924
Operator Manual teams Total deminers* Dogs and handlers Machines**
Arica 6 69 2 3
Calama 2 45 0 3
Punta Arenas 2 26 0 0
POMTA 2 28 0 0
CEDDEX 2 12 0 0
Totals 14 180 2 6
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
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Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 202025
Operator Manual teams Total deminers* Dogs and handlers Machines**
Arica 6 69 0 3
Calama 2 45 0 3
Totals 8 114 0 6
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
Since 2008, mechanical assets have been used to support manual demining in Chile. During 2019, machines were deployed to 
conduct clearance in the regions of Arica y Parinacota and Antofagasta.26 Chile also used explosive detection dogs for the first 
time in 2018 to carry out quality control of an area that had been cleared using machines.27
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019 AND 2020
Chile released a total of 4.56km2 from 1 January 2019 to 27 February 2020, of which 1.27km2 was cleared, 2.44km2 was 
reduced through technical survey, and 0.85km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey. A total of 16,619 anti-personnel 
mines and 11,357 anti-vehicle mines were found and destroyed. The clearance figures include 107,332m2 of previously 
unrecorded mine contamination in the regions of Arica y Parinacota, Magallanes y Antártica Chilena, Tarapacá, and Valparaíso 
which was added to the database in 2019 and 2020 and cleared during that period.
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, Chile released a total of 1.20km2 through survey across four regions, of which almost 0.85km2 was cancelled through 
non-technical survey (see Table 5) and 0.35km2 was reduced through technical survey (see Table 6).28 This is a huge increase 
from 2018 when no mined area was cancelled or reduced through survey.29
Table 5: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201930
Region Area cancelled (m²)
Arica y Parinacota 121,104
Tarapacá 4,216
Antofagasta 613,615
Magallanes y Antártica Chilena 108,930
Total 847,865
Table 6: Reduction through technical survey in 201931
Province Area reduced (m2)
Arica y Parinacota 312,873
Tarapacá 1,272
Antofagasta 11,306
Magallanes y Antártica Chilena 26,039
Total 351,490
SURVEY IN 2020
In 2020, Chile reduced a massive 2.09km2 through technical 
survey in just two months (see Table 7), almost six times the 
amount reduced through technical survey throughout the 
whole of 2019. The contaminated area of Seilao in Antofagasta 
province was estimated to cover 2.28km2 when technical 
survey was carried out in 2017 based on the information 
from manual and mechanical demining conducted in the area 
since 2010.32 This area was then partially reduced by survey 
in 2019. No mined area was cancelled through non-technical 
survey in 2020.33
Table 7: Reduction through technical survey in 202034
Province Area reduced (m2)




84   Clearing the Mines 2020
CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, a total of 0.56km2 was released through clearance in five regions with 4,093 anti-personnel mines and 1,187 
anti-vehicle mines found and destroyed (see Table 8).35 This is a 42% decrease from the 0.96km2 cleared in 2018, although  
an increase from the 3,908 anti-personnel mines and 1,117 anti-vehicle mines that were found and destroyed.36
Table 8: Mine clearance in 201937
Region Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed
Arica y Parinacota 183,399 886 663
Tarapacá 13,328 167 0
Antofagasta 321,542 1,553 524
Valparaíso 15,787 0 0
Magallanes y Antártica Chilena 25,306 1,487 0
Totals 559,362 4,093 1,187
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle 
CLEARANCE IN 2020
In 2020, over two months, Chile cleared 0.71km2 across three regions, finding and destroying 12,526 anti-personnel mines and 
10,170 anti-vehicle mines (see Table 9).38 This is a 27% increase in the amount cleared over the whole of 2019 and a threefold 
increase in the number of anti-personnel mines found and destroyed. According to Chile, it managed to achieve this amount of 
clearance as the climatic conditions were optimal. In addition, the mechanical demining units were reorganised allowing them 
to work up to three shifts per day, thereby significantly increasing clearance output.39
Table 9: Mine clearance in 202040
Region Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed
Arica y Parinacota 265,786 11,176 9,934
Tarapacá 7,600 212 0
Antofagasta 436,018 1,138 236
Totals 709,404 12,526 10,170
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CHILE: 1 MARCH 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2012 
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2020
REPORTED COMPLETION OF ARTICLE 5: 27 FEBRUARY 2020
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
eight-year extension request granted by States Parties in 
2012), Chile was required to destroy all anti-personnel mines 
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible, but not later than 1 March 2020. Chile reported 
in its Article 7 report covering 2019 that it had completed 
clearance on 27 February 2020. As at 29 February 2020, 
Chile had destroyed a total of 177,725 emplaced landmines 
since it became a State Party to the APMBC.41 Chile fulfilled 
its obligations by releasing an impressive 4.56km2 in 
just 14 months while facing considerable challenges to 
implementation from the climate and topology.
Table 10: Six-year summary of AP mine clearance








* January and February 2020
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1 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form G.
2 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form C.
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
4 Ibid., Form C.
5 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form C.
6 Article 7 Report (covering 2009), Form I.
7 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form C.
8 Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Form A3.
9 Statement from Chile during the Thematic Discussion on Integrating Gender 
into Mine Action, Intersessional Meetings, 23 May 2019; and emails from Col. 
Juan José López Demuth, Executive Secretary, CNAD, 22 and 27 June 2019.
10 Email from Carlos Rivera Bugueño, Senior Sub-Officer, CNAD, 6 August 2020.
11 Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018.
12 Conclusions on the implementation of Article 5, 16th Meeting of States 
Parties, 18–21 December 2017.
13 Decisions on the request submitted by Chile for an extension of the deadline 
for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with 
Article 5 of the Convention, 11MSP, 2 December 2011.
14 Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018.
15 Statement of Chile, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva,  
22 May 2019.
16 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
17 Statement of Chile, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva,  
22 May 2019.
18 Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018; and Article 7 
Report (covering 2019), Form A.
19 Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018.
20 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form F.
21 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.





27 CNAD, “Desminado Canino”, 27 December 2018, at: bit.ly/2VCpHwb.
28 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
29 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form F.
30 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
31 Ibid.
32 Email from Carlos Rivera Bugueño, CNAD, 6 August 2020.
33 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form F.
37 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
38 Ibid.
39 Email from Carlos Rivera Bugueño, CNAD, 6 August 2020.
40 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F .
41 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form G.
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
As at May 2020, Chile had not provided information on whether it had a plan in place for dealing with residual risk since 
completion. It is expected that this capacity will come from the Chilean military, which it plans to redeploy to conduct survey 
and clearance of the remaining cluster munition remnant contamination.





AP MINE  
CLEARANCE IN 2019
AP MINES   
DESTROYED IN 2019
ANTIPERSONNEL (AP)  
MINE CONTAMINATION: 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021 
EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 31 DECEMBER 2025
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Colombia is not on track to meet its current Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline of March 2021 
and has requested a second extension to 2025. In response to comments by the Article 5 Committee, Colombia submitted 
additional information on its extension request in August 2020, but this added little new detail to what was already known. 
While some improvements have been made to the mine action programme, such as the shift towards a more evidence-based 
estimate of contamination, numerous challenges impede the effectiveness and efficiency of land release. Continued insecurity 
affects access to contaminated areas but the approach to land release is neither cost effective nor efficient. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Colombia should further endeavour to conduct a baseline survey to elaborate a more meaningful and evidence-based 
understanding of contamination.
 ■ Colombia should prioritise non-technical survey with integrated explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity in 
accessible areas and continue to review and clean the data on “events” in the Information Management System for 
Mine Action (IMSMA) database.
 ■ Colombia should complete the review of national mine action standard (NMAS), finalise and apply its land release 
NMAS, and correctly implement its technical survey standards. Operators should be supported to use the full toolbox 
of land release methodologies.
 ■ Colombia should engage more positively and collaboratively with civilian operators and task them in a manner that 
ensures the best use of resources and prioritises the highest impact areas in response to humanitarian, community, 
and development needs.
 ■ Quality management of operations should be streamlined and applied equally to all operators, including the military.
 ■ Colombia should provide an updated work plan through to 2025, taking into account the impact of the COVID-19 
outbreak and including realistic targets for land release. 
 ■ Colombia should provide more detailed information on how it will mainstream gender and diversity considerations  
in its mine action programme, including with targets and timeframes.
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 ■ Colombia should establish a National Mine Action Platform (NMAP) for regular dialogue among all stakeholders, as 
recommended by the APMBC´s Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance, develop resource 
mobilisation plans, and use all mechanisms within the Convention to disseminate information on challenges and 
requirements for assistance. 








(20% of overall score)
4 3 The precise extent of anti-personnel mine contamination remains unknown. While a 
nationwide baseline survey has yet to be conducted, non-technical survey is taking 
place in accessible areas. Colombia is now presenting a more evidence-based estimate 
of remaining contamination that is at least partially based on survey. Insecurity 
remains an obstacle to access of suspected mined areas and new mines are being 
emplaced in some areas.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
6 6 In early 2019, Descontamina Colombia was reallocated to the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Peace and a new leadership installed. However, there have been  
no regulatory changes in the management structure and most decisions related  
to mine clearance remain with the Instancia de Desminado, led by the Ministry of 
Defence. Roles and responsibilities at national level are generally clear but operators 
reported significant delays to approval and decision-making and said consultation  




(10% of overall score)
6 6 In 2019, Colombia developed the Gender Guidelines for Mine Action and gender is 
included within the framework of the new Strategic Plan for 2020–25. The needs 
of different groups must be taken into account during community liaison with 
gender-balanced teams but this is not required by the non-technical survey national 
mine action standard (NMAS). A woman heads the national authority and women make 





(10% of overall score)
4 4 Improvements have been made to information management in Colombia following 
a review of the IMSMA database. However, Colombia continues to rely on “events” 
where more recent survey data is unavailable as the main indicator of contamination 
even though these are beset with errors and are often cancelled or discarded 
once investigated. Discrepancies between operator data and figures from the 
national authority are also frequent due to delays in information processing and 
quality control. Colombia submitted its 2020 Article 5 extension request, which 
fails to address longstanding issues around land release, task prioritisation and 




(10% of overall score)
4 4 In 2019, Colombia developed a new five-year strategic plan and an operational plan 
for demining which includes land release targets although it is unclear how much will 
be released by survey and how much by clearance. A continuing issue within the mine 
action programme is prioritisation and task allocation, which has led to operators 
being locked into inaccessible tasks or which do not allow for an efficient deployment of 
resources. The Armed Forces, as the largest operator, has been tasked with more than 
it can manage while civil society operators stand idle due to a lack of feasible tasks. A 
new prioritisation model has been developed but it is as yet unclear whether this has 
improved task allocation. This continuing issue can be attributed to operators’ priorities 
not being meaningfully considered and included in either the plan or the model.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
5 5 Colombia has 15 NMAS in place, but no defined land release concept. In 2019, a 
participatory review was conducted of all the NMAS. The land release NMAS has 
been in development for over five years and, as at May 2020, had still to be finalised. 
Despite contamination being characterised as low density, the approach to land release 
is very risk averse, which results in over-clearance of areas (meaning clearance of 
considerable area without contamination being found). The national authority reported 
that no contamination was found in 58% of tasks cleared.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
4 4 Colombia’s land release output fell in 2019 and again there are discrepancies between 
the figures from operators and those provided by the national authority. Colombia has 
submitted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline to 31 December 2025. Significant 
challenges exist to meeting this second extended deadline, particularly as a result of 
the security situation and ongoing problems with effective and efficient land release.
Average Score 4.6 4.4 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
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DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP)  
– Descontamina Colombia
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Humanitarian Demining Brigade (Brigada de Desminado 
Humanitario (BRDEH))
 ■ Marine Corps Explosives and Demining Association 
(Agrupación de Explosivos y Desminado de Infantería  
de Marina (AEDIM)
 ■ Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM)
 ■ Asociación Colombiana de Técnicos y Expertos en 
Explosivos e Investigadores de Incendios y NBQR 
(ATEXX) (not operational in 2019 and closing its 
programme in 2020)
 ■ Humanicemos DH (not operational in 2019)
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Danish Demining Group (DDG)
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Humanity and Inclusion (HI)
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)  
(closing its programme in 2020)
 ■ Perigeo (closing its programme in 2020)
 ■ Polus Colombia (not operational in 2019)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) 
 ■ Organization of American States (OAS)
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The precise extent of anti-personnel mine contamination in 
Colombia remains unknown. As at December 2019, it was 
reported that 3221 municipalities have both suspected and 
confirmed mine contamination. Of this total, 156 municipalities 
have been assigned to clearance operators and 166 
municipalities have “known unknowns” and are awaiting 
intervention.2 In figures reported by the national authority 
between 2016 and 2019, 212 municipalities have been released 
through clearance and 179 have been released through the 
qualification of information bringing the total to 713.3
This is an increase from the 673 municipalities that were 
estimated to have anti-personnel mine contamination in 
Colombia’s strategic plan for 2016–21. This estimate was 
based on a calculation that takes 15% of the number of IMSMA 
“events” from 1990 to 2009 and adds them to 24% of the 
number IMSMA events from 2010 to 2015, with a further 20% 
added for both periods. These percentages were calculated 
based on information from historic humanitarian demining 
operations. The figure it generates is then multiplied by 
an estimated average confirmed hazardous area (CHA) of 
5,000m2, which generated the “baseline” contamination figure 
for the country.4
While a nationwide baseline survey has yet to be conducted 
in Colombia, operators are conducting non-technical 
surveys to investigate IMSMA reports and collect additional 
information from affected communities. This has provided 
an initial mapping of contamination in the municipalities 
that have been assigned for demining.5 IMSMA events are 
notoriously unreliable and are frequently not directly related 
to a hazardous area.6 At least Colombia is now presenting a 
more evidence-based estimate of remaining contamination 
in its official reporting – one that is partially based on 
non-technical survey.
In the 156 municipalities assigned to operators as at 
December 2019, 2,202 areas have had survey or clearance.7 
A total of 2,723 non-technical surveys have been carried out 
in the 156 municipalities, which has provided information on 
1,344 suspected and confirmed hazardous areas (SHAs and 
CHAs) covering an estimated total size of 7.49km2. Of this,  
877 SHAs and CHAs covering 4.16km2 have been released, 
leaving 467 mined areas totalling 3.33km2.8
Colombia has projected a further 4.95km2 of contaminated 
area exists across 2,843 areas within the 156 affected 
municipalities that have not yet been surveyed. This projection 
was calculated using an average contaminated area of 4,700m2 
per area plus a 5% margin. An additional 166 municipalities 
where neither survey nor clearance has been conducted have 
reported “events” related to anti-personnel mines, but have 
not yet been assigned to demining operators.9 As at July 2020, 
access to 147 of these municipalities was restricted due to lack 
of security, with no plan on promoting and thus potentially 
opening humanitarian spaces in these areas.10
During 2019, 133 SHAs with a size of 624,843m2 and 137 
CHAs with a size of 698,058m2 of previously unrecorded 
anti-personnel mine contamination in 13 departments were 
identified and added to the database.11 Of this, Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA) reported adding 103,178m2; The HALO 
Trust 109,185m2; Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM) 
125,006m2; Danish Demining Group (DDG) 50,712m2; and 
Humanity and Inclusion (HI) 60,788m2.12 None of this newly 
recorded contamination corresponds to new or recent use  
of anti-personnel mines; security still restricts access to 
areas where new mines are being laid.13
All the landmines remaining in Colombia are said to have 
been laid by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and all are of 
an improvised nature. According to The HALO Trust, mined 
areas in Colombia are low-density, nuisance minefields with 
the average size of minefields identified by the organisation 
in 2019 as approximately 2,200m2 in size.14 The average 
size of minefields in 2019, according to figures reported by 
the national authority, was 4,574m2.15 Mines were planted 
in isolated rural areas to protect strategic positions; often 
coca cultivations whose crops were used by NSAGs to fund 
operations. When the groups moved on, the mines were left 
behind, blocking access to roads, paths, schools, and other 
civilian infrastructure, preventing productive use of land.16 As 
there was little, if any, mapping of mined areas by NSAGs and 
the intended victims were the military or paramilitaries, local 
communities were often informed that certain areas were 
mined, though no specifics were typically given. This has led 
to a widespread belief that mines are everywhere and local 
people are afraid to use vast areas of land for fear of mines, 
despite scant firm evidence of their presence.17




In many areas where the FARC-EP (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army) demobilised, the government has 
yet to arrive in force, with other NSAGs now struggling for power.18 This includes FARC-EP dissidents,19 the National Liberation 
Army (ELN), and drug-trafficking groups, especially the largest among them, the Gaitán Self-Defence Forces. Most of the fight  
for control is concentrated in about one-quarter of the country’s municipalities. Mine action operations will only be undertaken 
with the local community’s agreement, often in areas where mistrust of the state is high and community members are 
sceptical of the operator’s intentions due to the perception that operators are linked to the military, which is often exacerbated 
by the proximity of the demining brigade´s operations to civilian operators’ areas of intervention. This negatively affects the 
ability of humanitarian demining organisations to conduct survey and clearance and to determine an accurate estimate of 
contamination in these areas.20
NEW CONTAMINATION
In 2019, there were 111 civilian and military casualties from anti-personnel mines in Colombia, a 38% decrease from the 178 
victims recorded in 2018.21 Over half of the victims come from three departments: Antioquia, Arauca, and Norte de Santander; 
areas traditionally the most affected by armed groups.22 Other departments with high numbers of victims include Bolívar, 
Cauca, Chocó, Meta, and Nariño.23 All these territories coincide with drug production and trafficking routes, both for cocaine 
and marijuana.24 Despite President Duque’s governments aggressive approach to coca plant eradication, with 100,000 hectares 
destroyed in 2019, the amount of land used for coca leaf production rose by 2% over 2018.25 New mines are said to be emplaced 
to protect these plantations. According to Miguel Ceballos, the High Commissioner for Peace, the government is particularly 
concerned about the resurgence of this practice in the northern Chocó region, an ELN stronghold.26
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In April 2017, following the adoption of a Presidential Decree, 
the Directorate for Comprehensive Mine Action (Dirección para 
la Acción Integral contra minas Antipersonal, DAICMA) became 
Dirección para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal 
– Descontamina Colombia. Descontamina Colombia was 
ostensibly made Colombia’s national mine action authority, with 
responsibility for formulating the strategic direction of mine 
action, coordinating and monitoring mine action at national and 
local level, applying technical guidance and regulating state and 
non-state operators, and elaborating and implementing national 
standards. In practice, it also serves as the national mine action 
centre.27 In February 2019, responsibility for Descontamina 
Colombia was reallocated to the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Peace along with the appointment of a new Director, the 
Commissioner for Peace.28 In turn, coordination of the sector has 
been delegated to the Deputy Commissioner.29 Decrees 179 and 
1784, both ratified in 2019, elevated decision-making on AICMA 
to the presidential level and established its functions at national 
and local level.30 However, in this process AICMA has been 
disconnected from the Office of the Presidential Counsellor for 
Stabilization, limiting access for the sector to stabilisation and 
development funds.31
In 2011, Decree 3750 created the Instancia Interinstitucional 
de Desminado Humanitario (IIDH – Interinstitutional 
Tribunal for Humanitarian Demining) which is composed 
of a representative from the Ministry of National Defence, 
the General Inspectorate of the Military Forces, and 
Descontamina Colombia. It is responsible for recommending 
or suspending the certification of humanitarian demining 
organisations to the Ministry of National Defence and, 
determining and assigning demining tasks.32 In addition, 
Decree 3750 called for the elaboration of National Standards 
for Humanitarian Demining and regulates the quality 
management of demining operations.33 Promulgated in 
July 2017, Decree 1195 outlines mitigation and correction 
measures that must be applied by operators when demining 
in National Parks and other areas of ecological value.34 
Operators are currently expected to reforest in protected 
areas after clearance to mitigate environmental impact.35 
However, the extent of reforestation often exceeds any 
estimated impact from manual clearance.36
While roles and responsibilities at a national level are 
generally clear, operators often experience costly delays due 
to slow approval and lengthy decision-making processes.37 
HI and DDG both reported difficulties obtaining accreditation 
for international staff with an EOD 2 qualification or above.38 
Operators also reported delays in tax exemptions being 
granted for new contracts. In 2019, operators had to wait for 
several months as the national authority was involved in a 
judicial inquiry within the Colombian administration to clarify 
this process.39
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) has been supporting Colombia in a number of key 
areas for several years, including support for information 
management, gender and diversity, non-technical survey 
training for trainers, operational analysis, and through a 
study on the effect of ageing on improvised anti-personnel 
mines.40 This study is particularly pertinent to the Colombian 
context due to the large proportion of non-functional mines 
found. As of writing, however, it appeared that the process 
had stalled and, as at August 2020, no results have been 
published.41 The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) 
has been helping Descontamina Colombia to develop, 
review, and implement national standards and to improve 
their information management capacities, albeit with mixed 
success. In July 2019, following the start of FSD’s new 
contract, an additional information management advisor was 
hired to support Descontamina Colombia with data analysis 
and evidence-based decision making.42 The United Nations 
Mine Action Service (UNMAS) provides technical assistance 
to the national authority as well as training and capacity 
building with a focus on national operators. In 2019, UNMAS 
worked closely with Humanicemos DH to support capacity 
development with the ultimate aim of it becoming a fully 
self-sufficient operator and, in March 2020, UNMAS was 
designated as responsible for the quality management  
of Humanicemos DH.43 
Colombia has estimated the total cost of the mine action 
programme in 2020–25 will be almost US$250 million, 
of which the government will fund 30%. Colombia plans 
to seek funding from the international community to 
cover the remaining 70%.44 Of this, the projected cost of 
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demining activities is estimated at $183 million of which the 
government will fund $55 million.45 For demining, Colombia is 
seeking almost $128 million from the international community 
to build the quality management capacity within the national 
authority, in funding for civilian operators, and equipment 
servicing and replacement for the national military.46 In 2019, 
Colombia received $37.62 million in international funding 
for mine action an increase from the $35.84 million received 
in 2018.47 For 2019–21, the OACP’s new investment project 
has increased national allocation of resources to mine 
action by 134% from approximately US$500,000 in 2018 to 
approximately US$1.4 million in 2019, with a further expected 
37% increase in 2020. 48 However, this funding is only being 
allocated to the OACP and there is still a funding shortfall 
within the mine action sector.
There is no established coordination mechanism to convene 
stakeholders on a regular basis to discuss and address 
issues with Article 5 implementation.49 A number of 
workshops were held in 2019 on the new National Strategy 
for Mine Action 2020–25 and the accompanying Operational 
Plan, and on Colombia’s 2020 extension request. Operators 
were invited and then asked to provide comment, though it 
was widely felt that this was not a meaningful consultation 
with very short timeframes provided for comment, no 
feedback given by the national authority, and no revisions 
made, based on the comments given.50
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
In 2019, Colombia, with the support of the GICHD, developed 
Gender Guidelines for Mine Action and reports that gender 
is mainstreamed within the framework of the new Strategic 
Plan 2020–25 and in its national standards, although the 
gender and diversity provisions in IMAS are not reflected 
throughout all the relevant national standards.51 Data are 
disaggregated by gender, age, and ethnicity. According to the 
mine risk education NMAS it is stipulated that the approach 
must take into account the needs capacities and strengths 
of men, women, youth, boys and girls of all ethnic groups, 
and that teams must be gender balanced.52 Operators 
often conduct non-technical survey in communities that 
were previously inaccessible due to lack of security. All the 
operators stressed the importance of community liaison 
and of working with local people, including by employing 
“local guides”, as a way of both building relationships with 
the community and as a source of accurate information 
about the existence of contamination.53 The CCCM, DDG, 
The HALO Trust, HI, and NPA, all reported consulting 
women and children as well as men during non-technical 
survey and community liaison and employing women in 
their non-technical survey teams, but this is not done 
systematically nor is it required by the non-technical survey 
NMAS although FSD report that it will be in the updated 
version and it is a requirement of the risk education NMAS.54
Colombia has a significant indigenous and ethnic minority 
group population at 13.7%, which are afforded their own 
constitutional protections and therefore require a specific 
approach during demining tasks. Indigenous communities 
are said to have been disproportionately affected by 
anti-personnel mine contamination.55 In the Implementation 
Framework Plan 2017–2032 and the National Development 
Plan there are commitments to clear anti-personnel mines 
from ethnic minority communities.56 However, there is no 
information or associated actions on how the needs of ethnic 
and minority groups are being taken into account during 
community liaison, survey, and clearance activities in the 
extension request, despite the commitments made in the 
2017 Peace Deal and the Implementation Framework Plan. 
In order to gain access to indigenous reserves, special 
permission must be granted and operators work closely 
with communities to build trust by employing community 
liaison officers, deminers and non-technical survey personnel 
directly from those communities. Operators involve local 
ethnic minority communities in the liaison process ahead of 
any field operations, working with them to map contamination 
and prioritise tasks.57 The involvement of local indigenous 
communities during the community liaison process also gives 
operators an understanding of the necessary preparations 
that must take place before survey or clearance can be 
conducted on sacred land.58
Colombia has a female head of its national mine action authority, 
one of the few women who hold this position in the world. In the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, of the 30 officials 
dedicated to mine action 19 (63%) are women. However, from 
the 4,566 accredited deminers in Colombia, only 194 (4.2%) are 
female deminers.59 As reported in the 2020 Article 5 deadline 
extension request, BRDEH, the largest operator in Colombia, had 
no female deminers operational in 2019 and nor did AEDIM, the 
smaller military operator.60 As at August 2020, no information 
had been provided by the BRDEH or AEDIM to Mine Action 
Review on whether there is equal access to employment within 
these organisations for qualified women and men or whether 
any measures have been put in place to achieve this.
The HALO Trust has an organisational gender and diversity 
policy. Open recruitment for jobs such as deminers 
specifically encourages women to apply because manual 
labour is often seen as not appropriate for women in some 
rural regions of Colombia.61 In 2019, an average of 480 staff 
were employed across the programme each month, of whom 
33% were women. Operations staff consisted of an average 
of 310 staff per month, of whom 22% were women. In 2019, 
23% of all managerial and senior positions were held by 
women, including survey and demining supervisors, location 
managers and the deputy programme manager.62
NPA set gender and diversity as an internal Key Performance 
Indicator for 2019. During the year, NPA established 
the country’s first all-female clearance team. NPA also 
recruited indigenous and staff with disabilities during a 
recruitment drive when the programme opened in Caquetá 
department in April 2019. NPA set a target of 50% for new 
female recruitment which it was not able to meet due to the 
proportionately lower number of applications from women, 
though it did reach 35%. Of the 87 operational staff employed 
by NPA in 2019, 19 were women (22%). NPA in Colombia in 
2019 had four women in its nine-strong Country Management 
Team, amounting to 44% of the total.63




HI has an organisational disability, gender, and age policy 
which specifies that HI Colombia will need to elaborate an 
implementation plan. HI actively recruits women and offers 
gender-appropriate working conditions, such as separate 
living quarters in the field. In 2019, within operational and 
supervisory positions there were 35% women on average.  
At managerial level this rose to 60%.64 Ethnic minority groups 
made up 11% of staff employed in operational roles in HI 
anti-personnel mine survey and clearance teams and 2% 
of them were employed in managerial level/supervisory 
positions. In addition, 88 people from local communities were 
employed by HI on anti-personnel mine survey and clearance 
teams, and 10 of them were from ethnic minority groups.65
CCCM has a gender and diversity policy and implementation 
plan. In 2019, CCCM conducted gender equality training to 
equip teams with an understanding of gender inequalities to 
better mainstream gender in their operational work. It sought 
to raise awareness of discrimination and violence against 
women and create reporting channels within the organisation; 
to ensure women were promoted to leadership positions; 
that all of the organisations policies have been reviewed and 
updated; and that workshops have been conducted with local 
communities on violence against women and the recognition 
of rights. A pilot project was also initiated on the inclusion of 
LGBTQ+ communities and the creation of safe spaces. 
In 2019, the CCCM Gender Advisor enrolled in the GICHD 
Gender Focal Point Capacity Development programme, 
an 18-month programme comprising of an introduction 
to gender and diversity in mine action e-Learning; 10-day 
face-to-face training; assignments to put knowledge and 
skills acquired into practice; participation in an online 
community of practice. This further strengthened CCCCM’s 
capacity on gender and diversity.66 Gender focal points 
were also appointed within community liaison, survey 
and clearance teams to ensure that gender is being 
mainstreamed throughout the organisation. CCCM has 
reviewed its hiring processes to make roles more accessible 
to women both at the operational and managerial level, 
but despite these efforts the inclusion of women remains 
a challenge. In 2019, 29% of clearance teams and 31% of 
non-technical survey teams were women and 50% of the 
national management team and 31% of the operational 
management team are female.67
In 2019, DDG reported that its staff team was gender and 
LGTQBI+ inclusive composed of 52 individuals, of which  
31% were female and 71% were from local communities  
and indigenous groups. Within operational teams, 58%  
of staff were by local people from San José del Fragua.68
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Government Decree 1649 of 2014 assigned Descontamina 
Colombia responsibility for the IMSMA database and mandated 
it to “compile, systematise, centralise, and update relevant 
information” to serve as a basis for programme planning.69 
Descontamina Colombia uses the IMSMA database and its own 
Periferico database. Poor information management has been 
a feature of the mine action programme since its inception. In 
2018, an evaluation of information management was conducted 
and as a result the national authority, in partnership with 
FSD, elaborated an Improvement Plan 2018–19. According to 
the national authority this has led to a review of the IMSMA 
database, increased data sharing with external parties, 
increased information management capacity, and improved 
reporting procedures and data management.70 
The GICHD have also noted improvements since 2017 in data 
sharing and data quality following a significant review and 
correction of IMSMA data.71 Access to data has improved 
with IMSMA now available online and licences are granted to 
the operators for access to the Periferico database. Training 
has also been provided for operators in the management of 
the online platforms that are required to submit demining 
outputs.72 In addition, new data collection, analysis and 
processing tools have been introduced and promoted by 
the NMAA, UNMAS, and the GICHD with the support of ESRI 
Colombia (Survey 1,2,3, Collector, Dashboard, and Historical 
Maps, among others).73 HI says Descontamina are willing to 
listen and provide support in solving problems.74
Since 1990, Colombia has collected and reported on “events” 
related to anti-personnel mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), 
and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This data has 
been the main indicator of contamination and has formed 
the basis of demining planning and prioritisation.75 IMSMA 
“events” are the main source of contamination information in 
areas that have not yet been surveyed and form the starting 
point for non-technical surveys carried out by operators.76 
Operators have found these IMSMA events are beset with 
errors, including duplications and inaccuracies. Despite some 
improvements to the registration of events and a clean-up 
of the database, when operators are assigned a task and 
investigate each event they are still finding that most do 
not contain either mines or UXO.77 As a result, most of the 
investigated events are cancelled or discarded. The national 
authority conducted an analysis of IMSMA events in the 
database and found that 59% of the total number of hazardous 
areas that had been identified corresponded with sectors 
where IMSMA events had been found and investigated and 
that 30% of hazardous areas identified had an IMSMA event 
within 200m of the polygon.78 Once non-technical survey has 
been carried out, there is a much clearer understanding of 
contamination and the data in the national information system 
for these areas become reliable.79
There are frequent discrepancies between operators’ data 
and the figures from the national authority. While the national 
authority provide a weekly update of all demining statistics, 
there is often a delay in information processing, which means 
that the publicly available figures are not always accurate 
or up to date.80 Administrative delays between the National 
Authority, the external monitoring system (the Organization 
of American States; OAS) and operators contribute to delays 
with approvals taking time between various parties.81 
Article 7 reports are submitted on a timely basis, and in 
March 2020, Colombia submitted its Article 5 deadline 
extension request which while there are some positives in 
that it presents an estimate of contamination that is at least 
partially based on non-technical survey, it fails to address 
longstanding issues around land release, task prioritisation, 
and quality management; contains data inconsistencies; and 
lacks clear and achievable targets for land release of all the 
contaminated land remaining to be addressed.82
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PLANNING AND TASKING
In 2019, Colombia developed a new Strategic Plan 2020–25 
“Towards a Colombia free of the suspicion of anti-personnel 
mines for all Colombians”, which formed the basis of Colombia’s 
2020 extension request. In March 2019, a participatory review 
of the mine action sector began. Operators and other sector 
stakeholders including UNMAS and FSD were asked to help 
redesign the mine action strategy through workshops, but 
these ceased in June 2019 as did feedback or progress updates 
from Descontamina.83 According to operators, the consultation 
process was tokenistic and going forward the role of civil 
society is very unclear and nebulous with little indication the 
government intends to continue collaboration beyond 2021.84 
Some operators also reported concerns that the framework for 
the strategy lacks specific detail in addressing some key issues, 
such as prioritisation, technical survey, insecurity, and lack of 
capacity at the national authority.85 
Colombia included an operational plan for demining in 
its extension request and latest Article 7 report and has 
provided annual land release/clearance targets for 2020–23 
for the 3.33km2 of suspected and confirmed hazardous area 
that has been identified through non-technical survey in 156 
municipalities (see Table 1). These tasks have already been 
assigned to operators, the majority of which at 64%, has been 
assigned to the Humanitarian Demining Brigade (Brigada de 
Desminado Humanitario, BRDEH).86 It is not clear from the 
extension request how much of this will be released through 
survey and how much through clearance.
Table 1: Annual land release projections87






According to the plan, the additional 166 municipalities with 
reported anti-personnel mine contamination, but no ongoing 
operations, will be surveyed and cleared in 2024–25 although 
this is obviously heavily dependent on security conditions 
allowing for access to these areas and the amount of 
contamination that is found once access is granted. As at July 
2020, access to 147 of these municipalities was restricted due 
to insecurity with 19 municipalities now accessible and ready 
to be assigned to operators.88 Colombia plans to implement 
a micro-targeting methodology in these municipalities which 
will involve convening working groups to assess the available 
information about inaccessible areas that have suspected 
mine contamination.89 Although not included in the annual 
targets, Colombia reports elsewhere in its 2020 Extension 
Request that an estimated 4.95km2 of mined area located in 
areas where non-technical survey has yet to be completed 
in the 156 municipalities already assigned to operators will 
also require clearance.90 Colombia projected it would release 
80 municipalities with a total area of 1.62km2 in 2019.91 It did 
not meet that goal, releasing just 1.40km2. In 2020, Colombia 
plans to release 1.02km2, however, in light of the outbreak 
of COVID-19 and the resultant lockdown it is unclear how 
realistic this target was. As at the beginning of July, demining 
operations had already been stood down for more than three 
months. Taking this into account the national authority is in 
the process of updating its Operational Plan for Humanitiarian 
Demining 2020-2025 which it will present at the APMBC 18th 
Meeting of States Parties. In response to the outbreak, new 
safety protocols have been implemented and, as at September 
2020, operations had been restarted in 102 municipalities.92
Colombia prioritised its task allocation according to the IIDH 
and the Strategic Plan for Comprehensive Action against 
Antipersonnel Mines 2016–2021. The IIDH takes into account 
information provided by local bodies, the Early Warning 
System of the Ombudsman’s Office, and the General Command 
of the Military Forces, and Descontamina Colombia.93 The 
Strategic Plan 2016–21 categorised municipalities in Type 
(Priority) I, II, and III, which are then proposed for task 
allocation to the demining organisations without a given 
order, hindering a systemic approach to demining. Of the 
156 municipalities assigned to operators for land release in 
2020–23, 53% are Type I and 40% are Type II.94 Type I areas, 
which correspond to municipalities with human casualties from 
anti-personnel mines between January 2010 and December 
2015, tend to have the highest levels of anti-personnel mine 
contamination and the most security issues. In these areas, 
contaminated territories are often inaccessible to operators 
or operators are forced to suspend survey and clearance 
operations due to security concerns. These suspensions 
can last anywhere from a few days to an indefinite period 
depending on how severely the situation disrupts operations.95
In Colombia’s 2020 extension request information was included 
on a new model for prioritisation was alluded to but no detailed 
information was provided.96 According to Colombia, this new 
model integrates IMSMA data with more than 40 indicators 
that take into account security conditions, public policy, and 
bids from demining operators.97 However, there was no 
consultation with operators on this new model nor was this 
model discussed in the strategic review workshops.98
Descontamina Colombia’s ability to coordinate has come 
under scrutiny, as it has been locking in operators to tasks 
before the extent of the challenge is known and without a 
clear appreciation of operators’ future capacities. In the 
view of UNMAS, in Descontamina Colombia’s push to assign 
tasks demonstrating the peace accord’s new opportunities, 
operators are often deployed into new areas disconnected 
from their existing areas of operation and without prior 
consideration of their capacity. This is not an efficient use of 
resources.99 Under Article 6(8) of the APMBC, States Parties 
receiving international assistance are obligated to cooperate 
with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation 
of agreed assistance programmes. In 2019, operators bid for 
municipalities of which all but one was assigned to the BRDEH 
despite a number of civil society operators having funding and 
teams in place ready to conduct clearance. According to NPA, 
the criteria for selection are biased towards the Demining 
Brigade without good reason.100 In the operational plan, 
included in the extension request, Colombia indicates that in 
2020–25 it will review the method for assigning tasks and it 
will reassign tasks where operations are not possible as part 
of the forthcoming land release NMAS.101
Within municipalities, operators prioritise tasks in agreement 
with municipal authorities, local leaders and the national 
mine action authority.102 There are no specific criteria for  
task prioritisation within municipalities and operators are  
at liberty to follow their own priorities.103





STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Colombia has 15 NMAS in place, including a glossary of mine 
action terms, up from just three when the 2016–21 strategic 
plan was launched.104 In October 2019, a participatory 
review of every national standard began and workshops 
were held with all mine action stakeholders, with technical 
support provided by FSD, to discuss how the NMAS could 
be improved. It is planned that by the end of 2020 all 
current NMAS would be updated and new NMAS, including 
for land release and information management, would be 
implemented.105 The information management NMAS is key 
to establishing consistent and meaningful procedures for 
collecting, analysing, reporting, and sharing information 
across and outside the sector.106
In localities where security allows operators to conduct 
survey and clearance, contaminated areas are characterised 
as being low density and “low functionality”. The HALO Trust 
estimated that at least 90% of the ordnance they have found 
has degraded due to water ingression and is non-functional. 
However, the NMAS have not adapted to this context and are 
more appropriate to contamination that is high density and 
high functionality. This makes clearance extremely inefficient 
and expensive. Furthermore, the government has adopted an 
extremely conservative approach to risk management, with 
an over-reliance on full clearance.107 The land release NMAS, 
which has been under development for over five years, was 
sent to the OACP for review as at May 2020.108
The NMAS on technical survey was approved by 
Descontamina Colombia in December 2017 but is not yet 
implemented by all operators, as according to the standard 
if any contamination is found during survey full clearance 
must be carried out, negating the efficiencies of technical 
survey.109 A revised technical survey NMAS was expected to 
be approved by the end of 2019.110 As at April 2020, the NMAS 
had still to be approved.111
There is also is a lack of clarity about the destruction of 
items found by non-technical survey teams. If a non-technical 
survey team finds a mine, there are “open-for-interpretation” 
statements in the NMAS that may or may not allow the team 
to eliminate that immediate risk, dependent on whether the 
OAS gives the go-ahead. In some cases, the team needs to 
investigate further – if it was an isolated mine in a footpath 
for instance – or if they should report it as a hazardous 
area. In addition, there are restrictions on immediate 
investigation of possible isolated items using technical tools 
during non-technical survey operations, which may result in 
reporting areas for clearance when what is found is actually 
an isolated item of ordnance.112
In 2019, of the 14 tasks cleared by NPA, half were found to 
have no contamination.113 The HALO Trust cleared 44 areas 
with no mines found: approximately 60% of all minefields 
cleared in 2019.114 For HI, of the 19 areas cleared in 2019, no 
contamination was found in nine (42%).115 And for CCCM, of the 
27 areas cleared in 2019, 14 had no contamination (52%).116 The 
national authority reported that, in 2019, no contamination was 
found in 58% of tasks cleared.117 According to Colombia’s 2020 
Article 5 extension request the high proportion of clearance 
conducted on areas with no mine contamination was in part 
due to the high perception of risk from anti-personnel mines 
by affected communities.118
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Colombia has a large operational clearance capacity at its disposal with a total of 11 operators accredited to carry out 
demining operations, although Humanicemos DH and ATEXX did not conduct any operations in 2019.119 By far the largest 
clearance operator is the National Army’s Humanitarian Demining Brigade (Brigada de Desminado Humanitario (BRDEH). The 
Marine Corps Explosives and Demining Association (AEDIM), a smaller military operator, conducts clearance and destruction  
of anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in areas under the jurisdiction of the National Navy.120 Demining 
is also conducted by international mine action NGOs. The HALO Trust, NPA and HI are the largest of these operators, while DDG 
and  Perigeo also conduct limited survey and clearance. National NGOs CCCM and ATEXX were also active in 2019.








BRDEH N/R 3,276 24 dogs 3 36 Increase from 2018
AEDIM N/R 78 0 1 76 Increase from 2018
CCCM 6 24 0 0 2 Increase from 2018
HALO 31 228 0 1 9 No change from 2018
NPA 3 28 6 dogs 5 0 Reduction from 2018
HI 5 55 0 0 16 Reduction from 2018
DDG 3 27 0 0 10 Increase from 2018
Perigeo N/R 7 0 0 7 N/K
Totals N/K (48) 3,723 30 dogs 10 156
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters. 
N/R = Not reported  N/K = Not known
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The HALO Trust’s clearance capacity remained approximately 
the same from 2018 to 2019. But the number of non-technical 
survey teams dropped by 70% (from 26 to 9 teams) as 
there was insufficient area assigned to continue their 
deployment. In 2020, the number of clearance teams will 
remain approximately the same. The number of non-technical 
survey teams is likely to continue shrinking unless new 
areas are assigned.122 In 2019, the HALO Trust had four 
dog teams consisting of five dogs, five handlers, and three 
supervisors. However, the dog teams were being trialled 
and were never operationally deployed. The teams were 
subsequently dissolved once the trials came to an end. In 
2019, the HALO Trust increased operational efficiency through 
the accreditation and roll-out of a linear clearance method 
as well as the accreditation and deployment of its first 
mechanical asset that is used for vegetation removal and 
ground preparation in support of manual clearance.123
HI’s clearance capacity decreased in 2019 because operations 
were suspended due to lack of security in two municipalities 
in Cauca; there was a reduction in funding and focus on 
non-technical survey rather than clearance in Meta; and there 
was a reduction of funding for Caquetá. In 2020, there will be a 
further reduction in Caquetá due to security conditions; there 
will be an increase in Cauca of five new non-technical survey 
teams due to new task assignments; and a mechanical team 
is likely to start operations in Meta. The machine will be used 
for ground preparation, which is expected to be highly useful 
for supporting efficient operations in the Colombian context 
thanks to its small size and weight that allow easier mobility.124
NPA’s clearance capacity reduced by approximately 50% 
from 2018 to 2019 due to termination of funding from the 
United States. In 2018, NPA had two incidents where mines 
were found after clearance had been conducted by mine 
detection dog (MDD) teams. After thorough investigation it 
was concluded it was the way MDDs were used and not the 
effectiveness of the assets as such that was the problem. 
NPA developed detailed plans to correct the problems 
identified and is confident that MDDs are an effective asset 
for Colombia when used correctly.125 NPA uses a toolbox 
comprising manual deminers, MDDs, and machines. In 2019, 
these assets were rebalanced to achieve optimal output, 
which was found to be a ratio of, three manual teams, three 
MDD teams, and two mechanical teams. Mechanical teams 
undertake ground preparation.126 NPA decided to close its 
programme in Colombia as it was decided that the resources 
could be better deployed elsewhere. Survey and clearance 
operations ceased at the end of February 2020.127
CCCM reported an increase in the amount of clearance 
personnel deployed in 2019 from 2018 as more contaminated 
areas had been reported in the municipalities which had been 
assigned so a larger number of clearance personnel was 
needed. CCCM also deployed 12 non-technical survey teams 
totalling 48 personnel in 2019 and plans to increase this by 
four teams totalling 16 personnel in 2020.128
In 2019, DDG trained non-technical survey, clearance, and  
QA/QC teams, but due to long delays ascribed to the OAS they 
were only able to deploy their non-technical survey capacity.129
Humanicemos DH, the demining organisation comprised 
of ex-fighters from the FARC-EP, was accredited in 
August 2017.130 In March 2020, the United Nations and the 
Government of Colombia, with the support of the European 
Union, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
facilitating the demining operations of Humanicemos DH. 
The MoU designated UNMAS as the responsible agency 
for external quality management and monitoring of 
Humanicemos DH.131
The OAS serves as the body for accreditation and monitoring 
of humanitarian demining in Colombia, for all operators with 
the exception of Humanicemos DH. It has been criticised for 
being too focused on compliance rather than on supporting 
the operators to run effective demining operations. This 
has manifested itself in non-critical conformities being 
determined by rigid application and varied interpretation 
of national standards and/or SOPs, leading to delays 
in operations.132 Operators are most frequently given 
non-conformities based on excessive administrative scrutiny, 
with HALO reporting 140 of 231 (61%) of all non-conformities 
in 2019 coming from administrative errors. The impact 
of excessive oversight can often disrupt the continuity 
of operations, causing the shut-down of tasks for minor 
non-safety related issues.133 
At the request of Descontamina Colombia, FSD has 
been seeking to build capacity in the OAS, including by 
refocusing monitoring on QA and QC, rather than on minor 
administrative non-conformities.134 In 2018, a new system 
of confidence levels was introduced into the revised quality 
management standard which was hoped would improve 
these processes. Each operator would be assigned a 
confidence level and an operator with good confidence levels 
would be subject to less frequent visits from OAS, allowing 
them to focus on operators that need more support.135 In 
2019, a pilot phase for this new system was in development.136 
However, as at August 2020, the revised quality management 
standard had stalled and the pilot programme had not 
been implemented.137 According to FSD, in general, the OAS 
has been very resistant to external support and very little 
capacity building has been carried out.138
There have also been long waiting times after paperwork 
has been submitted, which has also delayed operations. The 
HALO Trust reported that once a non-technical survey report 
has been submitted to the OAS, there can be a significant 
delay before the report gets approved.139 NPA waited 127 
days for approval to use its mechanical assets, with MDD 
assets standing idle as a result, despite the dog teams having 
already been accredited.140 In 2019, NPA had major issues 
with reaccreditation of its MDD teams with 3 MDDs waiting 
six months to be reaccredited by the national authority and 
the OAS at great cost.141





In February 2019, NPA staff were threatened at gunpoint and had a vehicle set alight in Puerto Lleras, Meta, and were informed 
that they should leave the area. The area where the incident happened was close to coca production and distribution routes.  
As a result, NPA suspended all demining activities in the Meta department until security conditions improved.142
In August 2019, a HALO Trust non-technical survey team was held at gunpoint and their vehicle was stolen. No staff were 
injured in the incident.143
In October 2019, in the department of Cauca, a team from HI were instructed at gunpoint to leave their vehicle which was taken. 
This led to the suspension of activities in the municipalities of Caloto and Corinto. In Caquetá, at the end of 2019, personnel 
received threats by phone-call, leading to the evacuation of the personnel from the operational camp and the suspension of 
operations in the municipality of San Vicente del Caguan. In March 2020, two staff members were attacked in their homes  
in the urban area of San Vicente del Caguan and a third one was also sought out, but was not at home; fortunately, no one  
was injured.144
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of nearly 1.40km2 of mined area was released in 
2019,145 of which 0.79km2 was cleared, 0.57km2 was reduced 
through technical survey, and 0.03km2 was cancelled through 
non-technical survey.
In addition, a total of 1.32km2 of previously unrecorded 
anti-personnel mine contamination was identified and added 
to the database.146
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, 33,644m2 was cancelled through non-technical 
survey (see Table 3), a 30% decrease from the 48,405m2 
cancelled in 2017. Operators’ figures differ significantly from 
those reported by Colombia in its latest Article 7 report.147 
According to operators, areas cancelled through non-technical 
survey are either cancelled during clearance but recorded 
through non-technical survey teams or are the values of 
the IMSMA events with the equivalent size of the area per 
cancelled event as defined by the national authority.148
A total of 574,473m2 was reported as reduced through 
technical survey in 2019 (see Table 4), a slight increase from 
the 524,936m2 reduced in 2018. As in previous years, neither 
the HALO Trust, CCCM, HI, NPA, nor DDG, reported reducing 
any mined areas through technical survey, as the activity  
had not been properly implemented in the country.149
Table 3: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 
2019150








Valle Del Cauca N/R 831
Total 33,644
N/R = Not reported
Table 4: Reduction through technical survey in 2019151











Valle del Cauca N/R 43,187
Total 574,473
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CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, a total of 791,078m2 was cleared and 268 anti-personnel mines destroyed (see Table 5), a 18% decrease from 
the 962,232m2 cleared in 2018 (and 322 anti-personnel mines destroyed). In addition, seven municipalities across seven 
departments were declared free of contamination through qualification of information in 2019.152
Table 5: Mine clearance in 2019153
Province Operator Areas cleared Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed UXO destroyed
Antioquia N/K N/K 155,368 89 9
Bolivar N/K N/K 11,778 5 3
Caldas N/K N/K 43,832 10 0
Caqueta N/K N/K 156,146 67 8
Cauca N/K N/K 4,344 0 44
Huila N/K N/K 48,957 3 6
Meta N/K N/K 83,090 32 158
Nariño N/K N/K 59,914 3 0
Putumayo N/K N/K 44,767 36 4
Santander N/K N/K 17,389 2 2
Sucre N/K N/K 11,666 2 0
Tolima N/K N/K 71,822 10 72
Valle del Cauca N/K N/K 82,005 9 1
Totals 791,078 268 307
AP = Anti-personnel 
An additional 57 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed during spot tasks in 2019: 16 by HI; 24 by CCCM; 11 by DDG 
and 6 by HALO.154
NPA clearance output rose slightly from 106,235m2 in 2018 to 107,308m2 in 2019. These figures include some re-clearance 
which NPA carried out following the missed mines incident with the MDDs. The clearance output in 2019 was achieved with 
an approximately 50% reduction in operational assets.155 In 2019, HALO cleared 21,843m2 more than the previous year. This is 
largely attributed to a slight increase in the number of teams deployed in 2019.156 HI’s clearance output fell in 2019 because it 
focused on non-technical survey and deployed its resources accordingly.157 CCCM reported that in 2019 while the overall area 
cleared fell from 2018 to 2019 the number of areas increased: in 2018, the average area cleared was 1,902m2 while in 2019 it 
was 1,203m2.158
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR COLOMBIA: 1 MARCH 2001
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2011
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2021
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (4YEAR, 9MONTH EXTENSION REQUESTED): 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO (EXTENSION REQUESTED) 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW




Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Colombia is required to 
destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its 
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 
1 March 2021. It will not meet this deadline and has submitted 
a request for a second extension of its Article 5 deadline in 
March 2020, for a period of four years and nine months, until 
31 December 2025. It is unlikely that Colombia will be able  
to meet this new deadline given the numerous challenges 
it will have to overcome, some of which are outside of the 
control of the mine action programme (though some are  
of its own making).
It is also difficult to conduct an accurate assessment of 
whether it is feasible for Colombia to achieve completion 
of Article 5 during the requested extension as it is unclear 
how much contamination remains in the country. Based on 
the reported figures of 3.33km2 of SHAs/CHAs identified 
through non-technical survey and an additional 4.95km2 of 
projected contamination in areas yet to be surveyed, this 
would give a total of approximately 8.28km2 of land to release 
from 2020 to 2025, in the 156 municipalities accessible to 
operators. From 2011 to 2019, Colombia released 5.95km2, 
which averaging 0.74km2 per year.159 Although land release 
has increased in the past two years, with 1.54km2 released 
in 2018 and 1.40km2 released in 2019, Colombia would need 
to release an average of at least 1.66km2 per year for the 
next five years. According to its extension request Colombia 
is aiming to release just over 1.02km2 in 2020. However, on 
18 March, President Duque announced a state of emergency 
and nationwide isolation measures that restrict movement to 
essential activities, which will undoubtably have a significant 
impact on survey and clearance outputs for the year.160
In addition, there are 166 municipalities where survey or 
clearance has yet to take place and which are currently 
inaccessible due to security problems. The extent of 
contamination in these 166 municipalities is not estimated 
in the extension request. Ongoing issues with security, with 
FARC-EP dissidents, the ELN, the EPL and paramilitary groups 
such as Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia fighting for 
control in certain areas, mean it is unlikely humanitarian 
demining organisations will be able to gain access any time 
soon. Focus for demining operations should remain on the 
high impact areas that can be accessed while ensuring that 
these operations are effectively and efficiently planned.
Non-technical and technical survey is vital to efficient 
demining operations and both are particularly important 
in Colombia when the initial information given at the task 
allocation stage has been found to be so unreliable. Despite 
the NMAS being under review, as at May 2020, the land 
release NMAS had yet to be finalised and the technical 
survey NMAS was still not implemented effectively. A high 
percentage of mined areas are being cleared without any 
mines found and, according to findings from The HALO Trust, 
up to 90% of mines that are found are non-functioning. 
The challenging terrain and climatic conditions along with 
an over-reliance on full clearance means that demining 
in Colombia is very expensive and, in this context, it is 
especially important that demining is conducted in the most 
effective and efficient way possible. Furthermore, Colombia 
should ensure that operators are tasked and deployed 
efficiently with ability to adapt to the changing security 
environment so that operators are not standing idle with  
no tasks to complete.
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
There is an indication that Colombia will make substantial changes to residual risk management and post-clearance monitoring 
as part of its new land release NMAS. They planned to make it obligatory for an operator to be responsible for addressing 
any residual contamination in an assigned municipality for two years post-handover. Although subsequently this period was 
reduced to six months,161 this would still put operators in a difficult position as they would have to assume the cost of returning 
to a municipality and would be difficult to justify with donors.162
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AP MINE  
CLEARANCE IN 2019
AP MINES   
DESTROYED IN 2019
ANTIPERSONNEL (AP)  
MINE CONTAMINATION: 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026 
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2019, Croatia cleared 39.16km2 of mined area. While this was a 20% decrease on the 49km2 cleared in 2018, Croatia achieved 
the clearance target in its annual plan for 2019 and exceeded the annual clearance target set in its 2018 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request. However, annual mine clearance of military areas by the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) in 2019 fell well short the extension request target, as it did the year before, which is of continued concern.
Furthermore, survey output in 2019 was well below both the projected 2019 annual action plan forecast and the extension 
request target for the year. More worrying still is that rather than increase much needed non-technical and technical survey 
capacity, the number of survey personnel went down significantly in 2019, compared to the previous year. This was a result of 
the incorporation of the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) into the Civil Protection Directorate of the Ministry of Interior 
(MoI), effective from the start of 2019. Many survey personnel previously employed by CROMAC were not taken on by the MoI 
under the new structure, and were either made redundant or retired. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC should increase its survey capacity in order to meet the targets outlined in its 
2018 Article 5 deadline extension request.
 ■ In addition to survey of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC should also review 
the basis on which confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) are established. In particular, it should conduct survey to 
confirm evidence of mine contamination before embarking on full clearance.
 ■ The MoD should ensure sufficient capacity is in place and should significantly increase clearance to release mined 
areas on military land, in line with Croatia’s revised work plan 2020–26. 
 ■ Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC should fulfil the pledge in Croatia’s 2018 extension request to explore the 
potential for mine detection dogs (MDDs) to enhance the efficiency of technical survey. The 2015 demining law,  
which only allows use of MDDs in clearance, should be amended if necessary. 
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(20% of overall score)
6 6 While Croatia considers its current baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination 
to be reasonably accurate, evidence-based and complete, a high proportion (nearly 
30%) of remaining mined area is SHA, indicating the need for evidence-based survey 
prior to clearance.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
8 8 There is strong national ownership of mine action in Croatia, with political will to 
implement Article 5. In January 2019, CROMAC and the Office for Mine Action (OMA) 
were integrated within the MoI.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
4 5 Gender policies and implementation regarding mine action in Croatia are addressed 
under the national Gender Equality Act, which includes guidelines of gender equality 
and regulates against gender-based discrimination. However, the proportion of 
women employed in mine action, both at Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC and 




(10% of overall score)
8 8 Croatia has an information management system that is compliant with the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and which allows disaggregation of 
contamination by type and land release by method. Croatia provides regular updates 
on its progress in Article 5 implementation at APMBC meetings.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
7 7 Croatia has elaborated a new national mine action strategy 2020–26, which it 
expected to adopt by the end of 2020 to replace the previous strategy that expired in 
2019. In addition, Croatia has elaborated a revised multi-year work plan 2020–26 and 
has annual operational work plans for mine survey and clearance, as well as annual 
targets in its Article 5 deadline extension request. 
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
5 6 The 2015 law on mine action encompasses national mine action standards. However, 
there is a continued need for robust evidence-based survey prior to any clearance, to 
avoid clearance of CHAs where no contamination was found. Unfortunately, though, 
rather than increasing survey capacity to meet this need, the survey capacity of the 
Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC dropped significantly in 2019, in the context of 
the incorporation of CROMAC within the MoI.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
7 8 While clearance output in 2019 met Croatia’s annual work plan target and the Article 
5 deadline extension request target for 2019, survey output fell well short of targets. 
Furthermore, with regards to mined area under military control, the MoD cleared 
less than 6% of the 2019 output foreseen in Croatia’s 2018 extension request. 
Average Score 6.3 6.8 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Ministry of Interior (MoI), in which CROMAC and OMA 
were integrated within the Civil Protection Directorate, 
effective as of January 2019.
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Forty-five demining companies are accredited for mine 
clearance, of which 18 conducted clearance in 2019.





 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Croatia is affected by mines and, to a much lesser extent, explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition 
remnants (CMR), a legacy of four years of armed conflict associated with the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in the early 
1990s (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report on Croatia for further information on cluster 
munition remnants). 
At the end of 2019, Croatia reported a total of more than 309.7km2 of mined area, excluding military areas. Of this more than 
189.98km2 was CHA, while mines were suspected to cover a further 119.72km2 of SHA (see Table 1).1 This represents a roughly 
10% decrease in estimated contamination compared to the 220km2 of CHA and 135km2 of SHA, as at the end of the previous year.2
A further 31.4km2 of confirmed mined area exists in areas under military control as at the end of 2019.3 More than 90% of this 
mined area is across three military training sites, but a barracks and three storage sites are also believed to be contaminated.4 
The Demining Battalion of the Engineering Regiment is responsible for clearing all military facilities.5
A total of nearly 38.9km2 was released through clearance (plus an additional 0.3km2 cleared at military sites) and more than 
7.2km2 through survey in 2019.6 In addition, survey in 2019 added 0.2km2 of previously unrecorded mined areas to Croatia’s 
information management database.7
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by county (at end 2019)*8
County CHA (m2) SHA (m2) Total mined area (m2)
Karlovac 13,629,641 30,695,574 44,325,215
Lika-Senj 80,206,093 29,187,113 109,393,206
Osijek-Baranja 17,988,472 14,460,885 32,449,357
Požega-Slavonia 9,132,358 5,484,776 14,617,134
Split-Dalmatia 15,974,276 3,348,229 19,322,505
Sisak-Moslavina 29,065,905 24,357,010 54,422,915
Šibenik-Knin 12,009,009 3,717,123 15,726,132
Zadar 11,977,660 8,466,893 20,444,553
Totals 189,983,414 119,717,603 309,701,017
* A further 31.4km2 of mined area exists in areas under military control.9
Eight of Croatia’s twenty-one counties are still mine-affected. Sisak-Moslavina and Lika-Senj are the most heavily contaminated 
with anti-personnel mines, containing an estimated 12,479 and 11,129 mines, respectively, and accounting for 74% of the total 
number recorded as having been emplaced.10
At the end of 2019, 98.6% of mine contamination was on forested land, 1.1% was on agricultural land, and 0.3% was on other 
areas (e.g. water, marshland).11 Of the total 309km2 of estimated mined area (combined SHA and CHA), approximately 60%  
is defined as Nature 2000 protected area.12 Much of the remaining mined area is in mountains and has not been accessed for  
20 years, so the terrain and conditions will pose challenges to demining.13 
According to Croatia’s Civil Protection Directorate, the baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination has been established 
through inclusive consultation with women, girls, boys, and men, including, where relevant, with minority groups. Croatia 
considers its current baseline of contamination to be evidence-based and reasonably accurate, following the completion of 
a baseline survey.14 However, the high ratio of SHAs to CHAs and the fact that mined areas continue to be cleared without 
contamination being encountered, calls this into question.
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In August 2018, the Croatian government formally concluded 
that some 54 government agencies, including CROMAC 
and the Office for Mine Action (OMA), were to be integrated 
within existing state administration bodies. This was formally 
concluded through two pieces of legislation enacted in 
December 2018 and which entered into force on 1 January 
2019.15 As a consequence of these laws, CROMAC and OMA 
ceased to exist as separate government entities and CROMAC 
became an “operational sector” within the Civil Protection 
Directorate, under the MoI.16 The main rationale for this was 
“the establishment of a more relevant and operationally 
wider national institution (Civil Protection Directorate) that 
could more efficiently and effectively tackle all of the aspects 
of civil protection in the Republic of Croatia, including mine 
action activities”.17
Prior to 2019, both CROMAC (established in 1998 as the 
umbrella organisation for mine action coordination),18 and  
the OMA (created in 2012 as a government focal point for 
mine action),19 had operated as independent entities. 
A new law on mine action was adopted by the Croatian 
Parliament on 21 October 2015.20 While the 2015 Law, which 
was initiated by the OMA with the text drafted by the MoI, 
marked an improvement in certain respects (for instance, 
by permitting land release through technical survey), there 
were concerns that the new law would impede efficient and 
effective mine action.21 
Regarding accreditation, the MoI now provides three separate 
permits: approval for manual mine detection; approval for 
mechanical mine detection; and approval for operations by 
mine and explosive detection dogs (EDDs). This replaces the 
former unified accreditation licence.22
Since becoming a State Party to the APMBC, more than 
€727 million has been invested in humanitarian demining in 
Croatia, of which the national budget has accounted for the 
majority (€417 million) for the Article 5 implementation.23 
Croatia estimates that the fulfilment of its Article 5 
obligations will cost a further €459 million in total.24 Funding 
for the remainder of demining under the extension request 
is expected to come from, respectively, the national budget 
(52.3%); European Union (EU)/European structural and 
investment (ESI) funds (21.8%); EU/cross-border cooperation 
with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (15.3%); state budget 
of forest management positions (10.2%); and from private 
donations (0.4%).25 
In 2019, implementation of the annual Mine Action Plan, 
which amounted to costs of almost HRK 400 million 
(approximately €53 million), was realised using funding from 
the State budget (60.8%), EU funds (38.9%), and donations 
(0.3%). The large financial contribution from the State 
budget demonstrates a high level of national ownership and 
commitment by Croatia towards completing mine clearance.26 
Funds from the EU have steadily increased over the last few 
years. For 2020, Croatia reported that roughly half of the costs 
would be met from EU/ESI Funds (€28.47 million) with the other 
half coming from the general State budget (€22.97 million) and 
the State budget for forestry management (€5.41 million).27 
Croatia does not have a resource mobilisation strategy 
in place for Article 5 implementation.28 There is also no 
formalised in-country platform for dialogue, to bring 
stakeholders together on a regular basis. Instead, the 
obligations of key stakeholder and their mutual dialogue are 
said to be regulated by legal provisions, such as the Act on 
Mine Action, and through the National Mine Action Strategy.29
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
As an integral part of the MoI, the Civil Protection Directorate 
implements the Gender Equality Act (Official Gazette 82/08 
and 69/17), which establishes national guidelines for gender 
equality, regulates against gender-based discrimination, and 
creates equal opportunities for men and women, including 
with regards to employment.30
According to the national authorities, women, men, boys 
and girls are all effectively consulted during survey and 
community liaison.31 CROMAC survey data is not, however, 
disaggregated by sex and age.32
Within the Civil Protection Directorate of the MoI, CROMAC 
employs 91 people, of whom 12 (13.2%) are women. As at April 
2020, no women were employed in managerial or supervisory 
level positions in CROMAC. Furthermore, CROMAC’s 27 
deminers and 2 auxiliary workers were all men.33
As at 30 March 2020, there were 45 accredited commercial 
demining companies, employing 443 deminers. Only six 
deminers (1.4%) were female and of the 131 work-site 
leaders/deminers, just one was a woman. Of the 78 auxiliary 
workers, 6 (7.7%) were female.34 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
For the purpose of information management, CROMAC established a mine information system (MIS), which is said to be 
compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and customised to meet CROMAC’s needs. The MIS uses 
databases and a geographic information system (GIS) to deliver a fully integrated information management system.35 There are 
ongoing efforts to improve the quality of mine-related data, as a part of the regular activities of CROMAC’s survey personnel.36
Croatia submits annual Article 7 transparency reports and reports on its progress in Article 5 implementation at the APMBC 
intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties.
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PLANNING AND TASKING
Croatia’s national mine action strategy for 2009–19 was 
drafted by CROMAC with the agreement of concerned 
ministries, the OMA, the National Protection and Rescue 
Directorate, and local administration and self-administration 
bodies whose responsibility covers regions with hazardous 
areas.37 The strategy, which was adopted by the Croatian 
Parliament, included among its main goals the completion  
of mine clearance by 2019, which was not achieved.38 
The MoI has elaborated a new strategy, covering 2020–26 
which it expected to be adopted by the Croatian Parliament by 
the end of 2020, assuming no unforeseen events.39 In addition, 
a revised multi-year work plan for 2020–26 had also been 
elaborated, with projections of the number of areas and the 
amount of area to be addressed annually to achieve completion 
(see Table 6), and was expected to be adopted by the Croatian 
Parliament and presented at the Eighteenth Meeting of States 
Parties in November 2020.40
In 2018, Croatia submitted and was granted a seven-year 
request to extend its APMBC Article 5 deadline from 1 March 
2019 to 1 March 2026. In its 2018 Article 5 deadline extension 
request, Croatia stated it has prioritised the remaining mined 
areas according to those which affect safety; pose barriers to 
socio-economic development; and impact the environment in 
other ways. Priorities at the operative level are elaborated in 
annual demining action plans.41 
Based on approved funding, the Civil Protection Directorate 
– CROMAC drafts annual work plans, which are submitted 
to the responsible ministries and other state bodies for 
comment and approval.42 According to its 2019 annual mine 
action plan, the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC 
planned to release a total of 54.8km2 in 2019: 39km2 through 
clearance; 9.7km2 through technical survey; and 6.1km2 
through non-technical survey.43 
In its 2020 annual mine action plan, the Civil Protection 
Directorate – CROMAC planned to release a total of 65.1km2 
in 2020: 51.1km2 through clearance, approximately 5km2 
through technical survey; and approximately 9km2 through 
non-technical survey.44 According to a revised work plan 
the total land release target for 2020 was subsequently 
increased to 70.1km2.45 However, it is unclear the extent to 
which the COVID-19 pandemic will affect implementation  
of the plan.
The Demining Battalion of the Engineering Regiment is 
responsible for clearance of all military facilities. The MoD 
submits its demining plan for military facilities to the Civil 
Protection Directorate – CROMAC annually.46
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
A new law on mine action was adopted by the Croatian Parliament on 21 October 2015, incorporating developments from the 
IMAS agreed upon at that time, and specifically those relating to the use of technical survey to confirm the presence or absence 
of contamination.47 The 2015 law introduces a new procedure for “supplementary general survey” (a form of non-technical 
survey) and enables “exclusion” (i.e. reduction) of SHAs through technical survey, which was not possible under the previous 
law.48 The 2015 law has eliminated the need for standing operating procedures (SOPs), as all aspects of mine action are now 
clearly defined.49 National mine action standards are also encompassed within it.50
In recent years, a significant number of CHAs were cleared in which were found to have no contamination. Furthermore,  
other large, inflated CHAs were cleared with very few anti-personnel mines discovered. This calls into question the efficiency  
of the demining and strongly suggests the need for better use of pre-clearance evidence-based survey to confirm 
contamination before time- and cost-intensive full clearance is undertaken on mined areas recorded by the Civil Protection 
Directorate – CROMAC as “confirmed”.
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Non-technical survey and technical survey in Croatia are conducted by the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC. In 2019,  
it had one non-technical survey team with two personnel and two technical survey teams totalling twenty-two personnel.51 
This is a considerable decrease compared to 2018, when nine personnel were deployed for non-technical survey and 
approximately 40 deminers for technical survey (of whom 21 were previously employed by state-owned enterprise, MUNGOS 
which was dissolved in 2018, but from which the Croatian government decided to transfer MUNGOS employees to CROMAC  
to enhance quality control (QC) activities and increase survey capacity).52 
But, as noted, rather than increasing capacity, survey capacity at the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC subsequently 
decreased in 2019.53 This is the result of technical survey and non-technical survey personnel employed by CROMAC not 
being taken on by the MoI following CROMAC’s integration within the Civil Protection Directorate at the start of 2019. Some 
of the survey personnel previously employed by CROMAC were retired or moved to other companies.54 The Civil Protection 
Directorate did not expect any further changes to survey capacity in 2020.55
As a result of conditions for earlier World Bank funding, Croatia has an unusually commercialised mine action sector, with 
almost all civil clearance conducted by local companies competing for tenders. Much foreign donor funding is tendered by  
ITF Enhancing Human Security, while CROMAC manages tendering for the Croatian Government and European Union (EU) 
money in accordance with the Law on Public Procurement. The trust fund, “Croatia without Mines”, raises money from  
private sources.56 
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In 2019, 44 commercial companies were accredited to conduct 
mine and CMR clearance.57 Of this, 18 companies were 
engaged in mine clearance operations in 2019 (see Table 2).58 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are barred from 
competing for commercial tenders as CROMAC views their 
subsidy by other funds as unfair.59 The Demining Battalion 
of the Engineering Regiment is responsible for clearing all 
military facilities.60
Clearance operations in Croatia are conducted manually  
as well as with mechanical assets and with the support of 
MDDs. In accordance with the 2015 Act on Mine Action and  
its prescribed demining methodologies, MDDs are used only 
for clearance and not technical survey.61 





Mine detection dogs 108
Demining machines 42
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2014 
needs assessment observed that in the preceding years 
the number of demining companies in Croatia had grown, 
but capacity overall had decreased.63 A representative of 
the Croatian Employers’ Association (CEA) – Humanitarian 
Demining Association – reported that the 2015 Mine Action 
Law had resulted in an increase in the number of demining 
organisations in Croatia.64 This rise is in part due to deminers 
leaving employment and starting new firms, with the 
2015 Law requiring a minimum of only five deminers per 
company.65 The current number of demining companies is 
disproportionate to the number of deminers, and according 
to a representative from CROMAC, it would be better to 
have half the number of companies, but with each one being 
properly managed.66 
In 2014, CROMAC reported it had started issuing larger 
value tenders, to allow companies to reduce the cost of their 
operations, saying that this had provided an incentive for 
companies to do better planning and to cooperate with each 
other.67 A CROMAC representative claimed that although 
prices were lower, the larger tenders allowed continual 
work, resulted in fewer stoppages, and enabled companies 
to negotiate on better terms with hotels and services in their 
project areas.68 
The 2014 UNDP needs assessment recommended that 
CROMAC consider longer-term contracting to maximise use 
of operational assets in Croatia for both technical survey and 
clearance.69 However, operations are planned on a yearly 
basis, in accordance with the annual and three-year demining 
plans set by the Government.70 
UNDP also noted that the current contracting of defined 
polygons is suitable for mine clearance but would not be 
conducive to effective technical survey, and called for a 
new procedure to be drafted once the law is changed.71 
The Humanitarian Demining Association said it would be 
preferable if, where possible, technical survey was already 
undertaken on project tasks prior to tendering them, so that 
commercial companies have as much information as possible 
to accurately plan for the tender.72 
With the adoption of the new law, which enables use of 
technical survey, CROMAC planned to target demining on 
CHAs and to conduct technical survey on the remaining 
SHAs.73 Croatia also reported previously that it planned  
to research and develop methods and techniques for the  
use of MDDs, especially for technical survey operations,  
as a potentially more effective tool to address mined areas 
in mountainous terrain.74 However, this would require 
amendment to the 2015 demining law, which does not 
currently permit use of MDDs for technical survey.
DEMINER SAFETY
There was one demining accident in 2019, in which one person was injured by a PROM-1 mine during DOK-ing operations 
in Lika-Senj county in July. The accident was investigated by the Lika-Senj police department while the Civil Protection 
Directorate – CROMAC QC department produced a detailed mine incident report. While demining companies are aware  
of a demining incident, no formalised lessons were shared between clearance organisations in-country.75 
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
More than 46km2 of mined area was released in 2019, of which nearly 39km2 was cleared by commercial demining companies, 
a further 0.3km2 was cleared by the Croatian army on military sites, and over 7km2 was released by CROMAC through survey 
(3.3km2 reduced through technical survey and almost 3.9km2 cancelled through non-technical survey).76 
SURVEY IN 2019
CROMAC released a total of 7.23km2 through survey in 2019, of which nearly 3.34km2 was cancelled through non-technical 
survey and almost 3.89km2 was reduced through technical survey (see Tables 3 and 4).77 Compared to 2018, this is a  
slight increase on the 2.3km2 cancelled through non-technical survey and a decrease on the 4.9km2 was reduced through 
technical survey.78
No data were available on survey by the MoD.
Table 3: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201979
County Operator Area cancelled (m2)
Lika-Senj Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC 198,522
Osijek-Baranja Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC 1,407,133
Šibenik-Knin Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC 493,666
Sisak-Moslavina Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC 1,236,673
Total 3,335,994
Table 4: Reduction through technical survey in 201980
County Operator Area reduced (m2)
Lika-Senj Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC 691,412
Osijek-Baranja Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC 1,010,290
Požega-Slavonia Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC 438,642
Šibenik-Knin Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC 430,229
Sisak-Moslavina Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC 191,180
Zadar Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC 1,132,690
Total 3,894,443
In addition, survey in 2019 resulted in the addition of 0.2km2 of previously unrecorded mined areas to Croatia’s estimated mine 
contamination in its national information management database.81
CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, nearly 39.16km2 of mined area was released through clearance (nearly 38.86km2 by operators working under the 
direction of the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC (see Table 5) and a further 0.3km2 by the Croatian army). During land 
release, a total of 2,530 anti-personnel mines were destroyed (2,415 by the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC; 12 by the 
MoD; and 103 by the MoI (as part of the “less arms, fewer tragedies” programme)); and 2,902 anti-vehicle mines (2,846 by the 
Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC and 38 by the MoI (again as part of the “less arms, fewer tragedies” programme)).82
The 39km2 of total mined area cleared in 2019 is a 20% decrease on 2018, when 49km2 of mined area was released through 
clearance (48.8km2 by operators working under the direction of CROMAC and a further 0.2km2 by the Croatian army).83
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Capsula Interna Lika-Senj 1,067,442 8 0 4
Cor Lika-Senj/Osijek-Baranja/Split-Dalmatia/
Sisak-Moslavina/Zadar
2,711,617 558 361 54
Detektor Lika-Senj 201,017 13 0 0
Dok-ing 
Razminiranje
Osijek-Baranja/Sisak-Moslavina/Zadar 6,653,371 91 54 796
Fas Lika-Senj/Šibenik-Knin/Sisak-Moslavina 1,115,674 18 0 188
Harpija Lika-Senj/Split-Dalmatia/Šibenik-Knin/
Sisak-Moslavina/Zadar
1,986,362 55 0 8
Heksogen Karlovac/Lika-Senj/Zadar 1,628,944 101 0 910
Istraživač Lika-Senj/Osijek-Baranja 9,834,671 266 83 165
Kripton Zadar 7,135 0 0 7
Maper Lika-Senj/Zadar 863,139 15 0 1
Mina Plus Sisak-Moslavina 548,059 32 0 84
Orkan Lika-Senj 38,025 3 0 0
Piper Lika-Senj/Požega-Slavonia/
Split-Dalmatia/Sisak-Moslavina/ Zadar
1,744,161 131 0 41
Piton Karlovac 602,471 59 3 7
Rumital Karlovac/Osijek-Baranja/
Sisak-Moslavina/Zadar
6,451,226 937 2,363 56
Tetrazen Lika-Senj/Sisak-Moslavina 409,544 20 0 41
Titan Karlovac/Lika-Senj/Zadar 674,110 85 0 102
Zeleni kvadrat Lika-Senj/Šibenik-Knin/
Sisak-Moslavina/ Zadar
2,322,700 23 0 542
Totals 38,859,668 2,415 2,864 3,006
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle 
Clearance output equates to one anti-personnel mine destroyed for every 16,000 square metres of cleared area, indicating 
either very low density of contamination or poor targeting or clearance (or both). Even when anti-vehicle mines are added  
into the calculation, this still equates to one mine destroyed for every 7,000 square metres of cleared area.
In addition, the Demining Battalion of the Engineering Regiment of the Croatian army cleared 298,880m2 of military facilities 
in 2019, during which 12 anti-personnel mines and 929 items of UXO were found and destroyed.85 This is an increase on the 
185,416m2 of military facilities cleared in 2018.86 As part of EOD spot tasks and the continued “less arms, fewer tragedies” 
programme, the Croatian Police (under the MoI), and in partnership with the UNDP, also collected 103 anti-personnel mines 
and 38 anti-vehicle mines, along with items of UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance, which were subsequently transported 
to Croatian military facilities and destroyed.87
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CROATIA: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (7YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2026
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the second extension (for seven years) granted by States Parties  
in 2018), Croatia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon  
as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026. Croatia is not currently on track to meet this deadline based on current land 
release output, with clearance of military facilities in particular falling way behind schedule.
Croatia’s 2018 request for a further seven-year extension to its Article 5 deadline was submitted on “the basis that this is a 
realistic but not unambitious amount of time given the extent of the remaining problem and the human, material and financial 
resources available or expected, and the demining and survey capacities currently available.”88 All relevant stakeholders in 
the Croatian mine action system are reported to have been involved in the analysis conducted as part of extension request 
process, and the request has also been “verified by the Croatian Government, which adopted the text of the 2nd Request thus 
giving it much needed political weight.”89 
While Croatia has requested an extended deadline of 1 March 2026, it foresees that survey and clearance operations will be 
completed by the end of 2025, leaving only administrative/paperwork issues to be settled in the beginning of 2026.90
As at the time of its 2018 extension request, remaining mined area during the period of Croatia’s second extension (1 March 
2019 to 1 March 2026) covered 387.3km2. Implementing the extension request will require clearance of CHA (with minefield 
records), totalling 173.9 km2 (including 32km2 of mined area on MoD land); clearance of CHA (with no minefield records, but  
for which there is evidence of contamination), totalling 79.5km2; and survey and release of SHA totalling 133.9km2.91 Survey  
will take place between 2019 and 2025, but any resulting clearance required, expected to be completed by the end of 2025.92
In 2019, Croatia prepared an updated work plan for release of the 341km2 of mined area remaining as at the end of 2019 
(309.7km2 under the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC and 31.4km2 under the MoD’s jurisdiction). In its revised work plan, 
Croatia planned to release 70.1km2 in 2020; 58.6km2 in 2021; 61.1km2 in 2022; 151.6km2 in 2023; 63.1km2 in 2024; and 18.8km2 
in 2025 (see Table 6).93 The vision of the plan remains to achieve fulfilment of Article 5 by 1 March 2026, and it envisages 
accelerated release of military sites.94
Table 6: Planned land release output in km2 (2020–26)95
Area Totals 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Clearance 210.4 51.1 39.1 37.1 38.3 35.0 9.8 0
Technical Survey 48.0 5.0 7.6 8.9 11.1 10.4 5.0 0
Non-Technical Survey 51.3 9.0 6.2 9.2 14.3 12.6 0.0 0
Sub Totals 309.7 65.1 52.9 55.2 63.7 58.0 14.8 0
Croatian Army (MoD area) 31.4 5 5.4 6.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 0
Sum totals 341.1 70.1 58.3 61.2 69.7 63 18.8 0
Considering that most of the remaining mined area is in more challenging terrain, which will significantly reduce the potential 
to use demining machinery, the 341.1km2 of land release forecast by the end of 2025 is very ambitious, at the least without 
increased capacity or improved efficiency.
Demining of military facilities/MoD area is conducted by the Demining Battalion of the Engineering Regiment, according to an 
MoD plan.96 The 4km2 to 6km2 per year planned for in Croatia’s revised work plan 2020–26, is substantially more than what the 
armed forces have cleared in recent years, and in 2018 and 2019, the MoD cleared less than 0.3km2 per annum.
Based on existing capacity, Croatia claimed in April 2020 that it was still on track to meet its Article 5 mine clearance deadline 
of 1 March 2026.97 However, Croatia did not reach its planned survey output in 2019, calling into serious question whether it has 
sufficient (and sufficiently capable) survey capacity to meet its annual targets.
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The remaining areas to be released are mainly forested 
(98.6%), therefore there will be a significant reduction in  
the use of demining machinery, especially medium and  
heavy machines.98 Croatia foresees that more use will be 
made of small, mobile machines that can be efficiently 
transported and used in affected areas, and that the resulting 
increase in manual demining will reduce productivity and 
increase the cost of clearance and technical survey. Use of 
mechanical assets is also further restricted in the Nature 
2000 protected area.99 A total of more than 198km2 of mined 
area in Croatia has been cleared over the last five years  
(see Table 7). 
However, while annual clearance output exceeds the annual 
targets in Croatia’s 2009–19 mine action strategy100 and in 
Croatia’s 2018 Article 5 Extension Request, the amount of land 
released through survey each year has fallen well behind 
the yearly targets. Likewise, with respect to its 2019 Annual 
Mine Action Plan, CROMAC met the planned clearance target 
(39km2), but fell short of the technical survey and non-technical 
survey targets of 9.7km2 and 6.1km2, respectively.101 
In order to ensure Croatia meets its Article 5 obligation by  
1 March 2026, the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC will 
need to significantly increase its capacity and implementation 
of survey operations to more accurately determine the size 
and location of contamination before starting clearance, 
and to cancel and reduce areas in which no evidence of 
contamination is found.
Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
In 2019, the Civil Protection Directorate continued research cooperation and discussions with the Geneva Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), on the issue of national survey and clearance capacity to address explosive ordnance 
discovered after the release of contaminated areas or post completion (i.e. residual contamination). In August 2019, a joint 
study entitled “national capacities and residual contamination in Croatia” was published, documenting the progress made on 
this issue so far and highlighting the importance of a participatory and transparent long-term strategic planning progress.102 
The integration of CROMAC within the MoI, which took effect from January 2019, is reported to be one of the first steps to 
deal with residual risk and liability, and it is believed that this will elevate the importance of the issue within the MoI.103 
The integration also means that the challenge of residual risk will be handled within the responsibilities of the MoI – Police 
Directorate EOD teams and the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC.104
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JULY 2022 
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Cyprus released 18 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), nine on each side of the buffer zone and totalling 0.2km2. The release 
was according to confidence-building measures agreed by the Republic and the authorities in the north in February 2019, 
with the work being completed in December 2019. In addition, Turkish forces released 13,000m2 to facilitate restoration of two 
churches located in the Buffer Zone. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot authorities in northern Cyprus should comply with the UN Security 
Council’s renewed call for access to all remaining mined areas within and outside the buffer zone.1
 ■ Both sides should collaborate with the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in developing a work plan to 
complete clearance of all known mined areas. 
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY




 ■ None (Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and DOK-ING were 
last active in 2017)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ United Nations (UN)-supported mine action in Cyprus 
is coordinated by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
on behalf of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2019, Cyprus had an estimated total of 1.5km2 of area contaminated by mines (including mixed anti-personnel and 
anti-vehicle mined area and anti-vehicle mined area), representing the first reduction recorded in three years. The number and 
size of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) remains unchanged at 18, affecting 1.3km2 but non-technical survey conducted as 
part of confidence-building measures resulted in a sharp drop in the number of hazardous areas from 47 to 29 and the estimate 
of suspected mined area by 44% to 0.24km2 (see Table 1).2
Table 1: Mined area (at December 2019)3
Location CHAs Contamination Area (m2) SHAs Contamination Area (m2) Total area (m2)
South of buffer zone 
(controlled by Cyprus)
13 AV mines 418,543 6 AV mines 174,014 592,557




703,581 0 N/A N/A 703,581
North of buffer zone 
(controlled by Turkish 
Cypriot authorities)
1 Mixed 170,493 5 Mixed 65,281 235,774
Totals 18 1,292,617 11 239,295 1,531,912
Cyprus has been divided geographically and politically since 1974 by what was once a heavily mined, 180km-long buffer zone, 
following Turkish Forces’ operations in the north of the island. Minefields were laid by both the Greek Cypriot National Guard 
and the Turkish Armed Forces. The exact extent of the remaining mine contamination across the island is not known, and 
permission for UNFICYP to access areas within and outside the buffer zone remains limited.4 
TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS 
The last Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 transparency report Cyprus submitted (covering 2019)  
stated that no anti-personnel mines remained in the minefields laid by the National Guard that are in territory under its 
effective control.5 In total, between becoming a State Party on 1 July 2003 and its original Article 5 deadline of 1 July 2013, 
Cyprus released all 20 mined areas under its effective control.6 
BUFFER ZONE
Four mined areas remained in the Buffer Zone at the end of 2019, three of which belong to the National Guard and are 
contaminated with anti-vehicle mines. The fourth belongs to Turkish Forces and the mine type is unknown.7 The Government  
of Cyprus considers the three minefields contaminated with anti-vehicle mines to be under its control and not within the  
buffer zone.8
TURKISH CYPRIOT-CONTROLLED TERRITORY IN NORTHERN CYPRUS
The extent of mine contamination in areas controlled by Turkish Forces is not known. However, Cyprus claimed in its latest 
Article 7 transparency report (covering 2019) 21 minefields laid and maintained in the occupied areas by Turkish Forces remain 
to be cleared of anti-personnel mines, of which one is situated within the buffer zone near the vicinity of the village of Deryneia. 
According to Cyprus, these are overwhelmingly situated adjacent to the buffer zone.9
In addition, there is a minefield just north of the buffer zone in Mammari, where heavy rains led to mines being washed into 
the buffer zone in 2014 and 2015. UNFICYP has raised the issue of clearance of this minefield with the Turkish forces and 
has offered assistance in this regard.10 In 2017, a small area of the Mammari minefield was cleared by a Croatian commercial 
operator contracted by the Turkish Armed Forces.11
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
UN-supported mine action operations in Cyprus are coordinated by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) on behalf of 
UNFICYP.12 In July 2016, UNMAS became an integral component of UNFICYP, providing expertise in mine action planning and 
coordination, quality assurance (QA) oversight, and management of mine action information.13 UNMAS also provides assistance 
to the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) to ensure safe access to areas in which it conducts activities and to UNFICYP for 
explosive ordnance disposal call-out tasks.14
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
UNFICYP uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. In 2017, a review and reconciliation  
of all electronic and hardcopy minefield database documentation revealed that a number of SHAs had already been cleared 
and/or cancelled. Due to “capacity limitations” between 2011 and 2016, the information had not been removed from the 
database. The review resulted in the removal of seven SHAs (totalling more than 950,000m2) from the database.15 The  
database is due to be updated but as of July 2020 no date had been set for doing so.16
Cyprus has submitted annual Article 7 reports since acceding to the APMBC in July 2003 but as of 1 August 2020 had not 
submitted a report covering 2019. Cyprus has submitted three Article 5 deadline extension requests: in 2012, 2015, and 2018. 
Cyprus submitted most of the reports in a timely manner but provided only limited information due to it not having effective 
control over the remaining anti-personnel mined areas.
PLANNING AND TASKING
Neither the Republic of Cyprus nor the authorities in Turkish Cypriot-controlled northern Cyprus have disclosed plans to 
survey and/or clear remaining mine contamination. 
Non-technical survey conducted in 2019 was initiated as a confidence building measure agreed in February 2019 by the 
President of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, and the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) Mustafa Akinci 
in the context of long-running discussions on a political settlement and “with a view to working towards a mine-free Cyprus”.17
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
All UN-supported mine action operations in Cyprus are said to be conducted in accordance with the International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS).18 In 2016, UNMAS updated the national technical standards and guidelines that are used in UNFICYP to 
reflect current best practice and to ensure the highest standards are applied for UNFICYP clearance operations.19
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
UNMAS conducts non-technical and technical survey in cooperation with representatives of the National Guard and Turkish 
Cypriot Security Force.20 No clearance has been conducted since 2017 when the Turkish Armed Forces contracted DOK-ING  
to conduct clearance, and MAG to conduct QA of demining in the Mammari minefield.21
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
UNFICYP announced the release of 18 SHAs covering 210,882m2 in December 2019 under confidence building measures agreed 
in February 2019.22 The SHAs (nine on each side of the dividing line on the island) were selected by UNMAS in cooperation with 
the National Guard and forces in the north. The respective militaries conducted non-technical survey and UNMAS and UNFICYP 
then visited one site in the north and one site in the south to receive documentation certifying completion of the tasks. Some 
of the sites were located in military areas and respective military forces took the opportunity to conduct training resulting in 
some area reduction but no items were found.23
Turkey’s Aegean Army Command PMKI Team conducted confidence clearance of two churches, St. George and St. Jacobs, 
located in the disputed area of the buffer zone, to facilitate restoration work and released 13,000m2. The operation was 
conducted between May and June 2019 but no explosive items were cleared.24 Reporting of the operation conformed to 
international standards but as the sites were not listed as hazardous the release did not result in any adjustment to UNFICYP 
contamination estimates.25 
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release, 9 December 2019. 
23 Emails from Mark Connelly, UNMAS, 26 June and 3 July 2020.
24 Turkey Ministry of National Defence Mine Action Centre, Strategic Plan 
2020–2025, undated but 2020, p. 3.
25 Email from Mark Connelly, UNMAS, 3 July 2020.
26 2012 Article 5 deadline Extension Request.
27 Permanent Mission of Cyprus in Geneva, “Disarmament and  
Non-proliferation” webpage, accessed 22 July 2019, at: bit.ly/2SAhPGP.
28 Turkey’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013. On the 
issue of Turkish jurisdiction, see, e.g., European Court of Human Rights, 
Güzelyurtlu and others v. Cyprus and Turkey, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 
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29 UN Security Council Resolution 2453 (2019), operative para. 17; and 
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 ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CYPRUS: 1 JULY 2003
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JULY 2013
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JULY 2016
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JULY 2019
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (3YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JULY 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): UNCLEAR
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
third extension (of three years) granted by States Parties in 
2018), Cyprus is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines 
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible, but not later than 1 July 2022. 
Cyprus reported clearing all anti-personnel mines in mined 
areas that it accepted were under its control within ten years 
of becoming a State Party, namely by 1 July 2013. In 2012, 
Cyprus submitted the first of its three Article 5 deadline 
extension requests, on the grounds that Cyprus does not 
have effective control over remaining contaminated areas. 
Cyprus has cited the same reason ever since.26 Cyprus 
has stated: “Once Turkey ceases the military occupation 
of Cyprus and returns control of the occupied areas under 
proper conditions to the authorities of the Republic, they [the 
Republic of Cyprus] will be able to assume full responsibility 
and compliance with the provisions of Article 5 for the entire 
sovereign territory of the Republic of Cyprus.”27
Turkey received an eight-year extension of its Article 5 
clearance deadline until 1 March 2022 but did not request 
additional time for clearance of the areas it controls in 
northern Cyprus.28 
The UN Security Council observed with regret in January 
2019 “that the sides are withholding access to the remaining 
minefields in the buffer zone, and that demining in Cyprus 
must continue.” It called on both sides to allow access to 
deminers and to facilitate the removal of the remaining mines 
within the buffer zone. In 2019 and most recently in January 
2020 it urged both sides in Cyprus to agree and implement  
a plan of work to achieve a mine-free Cyprus.29 
Following the release of 18 SHAs in 2019, UNFICYP and 
UNMAS were reportedly working on another phase of 
confidence-building proposals but no agreement on further 
action had yet been reached as of July 2020.30
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2021 
EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 1 JULY 2022
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) informed the Fourth Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) in November 2019 that it had “no intention” of requesting an extension to its Article 5 deadline. Ten months later, 
however, the DRC requested an extension of 18 months to complete clearance of anti-personnel mines in mined areas,  
for consideration at the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2020. Survey in 2019 and early 2020 cancelled  
many suspected hazards that proved to have no mines, leading to a much reduced and more realistic estimate of  
remaining mine contamination. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The DRC should add details to its 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request, including a timeline for survey of remaining 
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and the operational capacity currently available for survey and clearance.
 ■ The Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines (CCLAM) should provide a detailed report on the scope and outcomes of 
survey and clearance in 2019.
 ■ The DRC should submit prompt, comprehensive Article 7 transparency reports.
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(20% of overall score)
6 5 The DRC’s estimates of contamination have for years looked inflated by explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) hazards misreported as mine contamination or included in 
the database without evidence, but survey conducted by DanChurchAid (DCA) and 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in 2019 and early 2020 sharply reduced the estimate.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
6 6 The Congolese Mine Action Centre coordinates mine action with financial support 
from the government but it relies on UNMAS and other international organisations 
for technical support and on international donors to fund operations.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
6 6 CCLAM recognised the significance of gender in mine action by including a section on 
it in the 2018–19 national mine action strategy. All activities, especially risk education 
and victim assistance, are required to take account of the needs of different age 





(10% of overall score)
3 4 The DRC has been inconsistent in submitting Article 7 reports, providing only three 
in the last eight years. As of 1 August 2020, it had provided no account of mine action 
results in 2019. In 2019, CCLAM continued to receive support from the United Nations 
Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and NPA for information management but operators 
say the quality of data from the database is poor and they are still being deployed for 
survey and clearance to tasks that have no mine contamination.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
4 5 As late as November 2019, the DRC said it would meet its Article 5 deadline of 
1 January 2021 but in September 2020 it submitted a request for an 18-month 
extension, leaving scant time for the APMBC to consider its request ahead of 
the Eighteenth meeting of States Parties in November. The request lacked detail 
on available survey and clearance capacity and resources needed for a clear 
understanding of the DRC’s prospects of completing its Article 5 obligations within 
the extension requested. 
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
5 5 CCLAM has 24 chapters of National Technical Standards and Guidelines which it 
reportedly revised in 2018, making amendments to standards dealing with demining 
techniques and deminer safety. CCLAM still required support from UNMAS for 
quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC). 
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
5 4 CCLAM did not report details of land release but significant amounts of resurvey  
and cancellation in 2019 sharply reduced the estimate of remaining contamination  
to a level that appears to put completion well within reach. 
Average Score 5.1 4.9 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines (CCLAM) 
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ National NGOs conduct non-technical survey and mine 
risk education
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ DanChurchAid (DCA)
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)  
(ceased DRC operations in the first quarter of 2020)
 ■ The Development Initiative (TDI)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The DRC is affected by anti-personnel mines and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW), a result of armed conflict involving 
neighbouring states, militias, and armed opposition groups, 
which have increased since the late 1990s. DRC’s estimates 
of mine contamination have fluctuated in recent years as 
a result of weak coordination between key mine action 
stakeholders and persistent information management 
challenges but fresh survey and data analysis in 2019 and 
2020 have sharply reduced the extent of anti-personnel mine 
contamination estimated to remain.
DRC informed the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in July 
2020 that it has 33 mined areas affecting a total of 128,842m² 
in nine provinces: Ituri, Kasaï, Maniema, North Kivu, North 
Ubangi, South Kivu, Tanganyika, Tshopo, and Tshuapa. 
Hazardous areas ranged in size from one of 50m2 in Beni 
province’s Bulese village to one of 19,200m2 in Tshopo 
province’s Batiapoli area, but averaged 3,904m2. The DRC 
statement and subsequent Article 5 deadline extension 
request added that further survey of possible mine hazards 
was still needed in the Dungu area of Haut-Uele province 
and the Aru area of Ituri province.1 Earlier surveys have 
found suspected mined areas already in use or other ERW 
misreported as anti-personnel mines, and on the basis of  
that experience operators believe it is likely that some of  
the remaining hazards will be cancelled.2
Resurvey leading to cancellation has already contributed to a 
sharp fall in DRC’s estimate of outstanding contamination in 
the past year. The DRC reported in November 2019 it had 49 
hazardous areas in 11 provinces covering 469,338m2 affecting 
11 provinces.3 Half a year earlier, at the end of April 2019, DRC’s 
Article 7 Report estimated that it had 53 remaining mined 
areas with a total size of 741,559m2 in 12 provinces.4 In the 
national strategy for 2018–19 issued in November 2017, the 
DRC had identified 48 dangerous areas affecting 978,563m2.5
The shrinking assessment of anti-personnel mine 
contamination underscores that DRC contends with a much 
larger threat from ERW left by years of conflict, including  
a small amount of cluster munition remnant contamination  
(see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition 
Remnants 2020 report). Successive conflicts have also  
left the country with significant quantities of abandoned 
explosive ordnance (AXO).












NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The mine action sector is overseen by the Commission Nationale de Lutte Antimines (CNLAM), a multi-sectoral body which is 
supposed to meet twice a year and is composed of deputies from both parliamentary chambers, officials from four ministries 
and representatives of five civil society organisations linked to mine action.7 
Management of the sector is under the Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines (CCLAM), which was established in 2012 with support 
from the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).8 It is responsible 
for setting strategy, accrediting operators, information management, budgeting, and resource mobilisation. Law 11/007 of 9 July 
2011 underpins the national mine action programme.9 CCLAM took over from UNMAS as the national focal point for demining in 
early 2016 overseeing accreditation, issuing task orders, conducting quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) and managing the 
national database but lack of capacity remained a concern for operators.10 The government has provided funding for CCLAM’s 
operating expenses, amounting to US$530,000 in 2018, but has not provided funding for operations.11
UNMACC, established in 2002 by UNMAS, previously coordinated mine action through offices in the capital, Kinshasa, and 
in Goma, Kalemie, Kananga, Kisangani, and Mbandaka. UNMACC was part of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo 
(MONUSCO). In 2014, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 2147 (2014), humanitarian mine action was removed from 
MONUSCO’s mandate.12 UNMAS, working in 2019 with 18 international and 18 national staff, has continued to support CCLAM 
in planning, aiding the development of CCLAM’s 2018–19 mine action strategy and capacity building CCLAM’s information 
management department.13 
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Strategic goals set out in DRC’s 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request included the protection of civilians, facilitating the 
return of refugees and internally displaced persons, clearing arable land to support a revival of cultivation and economic 
activity and to provide secure humanitarian access to communities for UN agencies and non-government organisations.14 
CCLAM’s priorities for the national programme in 2019 were improving the national database, conducting a new national 
contamination survey, organising a workshop to develop an annual work plan, and capacity building of operational staff.15  
Key challenges, it said, included a lack of funding, the withdrawal of mine action operators from the country, the availability  
of good training of CCLAM staff to ensure coordination and quality management, a lack of adequate training for surveyors,  
and the absence of state budget to cover salaries of CCLAM staff.16
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
The DRC’s national mine action strategy for 2018–19 stipulated that all mine action activities, particularly those related 
to risk education and victim assistance, must reflect the different needs of individuals according to age and gender, in a 
non-discriminatory manner. It also stated that the principles of non-discrimination against women as set out in the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) are 
to be respected, ensuring that women are involved in all essential stages of mine action (planning, implementation, monitoring, 
and evaluation), and that activities take into account the special needs of women and girls.17 
CCLAM reported that approximately 30% of operational staff in survey and clearance teams were female in 2019, but only 
around 7% of managerial or supervisory positions were held by women, reportedly due in part to barriers presented by local 
customs about the employment roles appropriate for women. CCLAM reported that mine action survey teams are gender 
balanced and that efforts are undertaken to ensure that all community groups, including women and children, are consulted. 
It also noted, however, the need to continue raising awareness on gender equality in certain communities as local customs can 
discriminate against women undertaking certain categories of work.18
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
CCLAM took over responsibility for information management from UNMAS in 2016 but has lacked the capacity and resources 
to manage data and operate effectively the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. The 
2018–19 national strategy acknowledged a need to build staff capacity, improve data collection, update the database on a 
regular basis, and provide data disaggregated by age and gender.19 Continuing issues in 2019 included gaps in data, lack of 
maintenance, reporting on land release that did not comply with international terminology, misreporting items of unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) as mines which resulted in new areas of contamination being incorrectly added to the database as mined 
areas, and a lack of verification of incoming reports.20
UNMAS continued its long-running support to the database in 2019, assisting monthly updates of data to improve operational 
coordination, collaborating on developing an information management work plan, and providing a range of hardware, including 
computers, printers, GPS and other equipment.21 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) has also provided refresher training for 
CCLAM staff in use of IMSMA and the geographic information system.22 
DRC’s reporting to the APMBC has been inconsistent. It informed the Oslo Review Conference it would start implementing a 
new work plan in the first quarter of 2020 and so did not intend to request an extension to its Article 5 deadline.23 CCLAM did 
not disclose a new work plan in the first quarter and it informed the July 2020 Intersessional Meetings that it would request 
an Article 5 deadline extension of 18 months until 1 July 2022.24 DRC subsequently submitted its deadline extension request 
in September 2020. The DRC has submitted three Article 7 reports in the past eight years and as at 1 October 2020, had not 
provided a report covering 2019. 
PLANNING AND TASKING
The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–19, prepared with support from UNMAS and the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), focused on fulfilling the DRC’s APMBC Article 5 obligations by 2020, one year ahead of its 
extended 2021 deadline.25 The strategy identified three strategic pillars: effective and efficient management of the explosive 
threat; ensuring the national programme had the capacity to manage residual contamination in a sustainable manner; 
and that the legal framework of the mine action programme was strengthened through the adoption of national laws and 
other implementing measures and adherence to relevant treaties.26 Despite requests from the Committee on Article 5 
implementation, the DRC did not produce work plans with clear milestones for addressing remaining contamination.27 
In announcing in July 2020 that it would apply for an extension of 18 months to its Article 5 deadline, CCLAM said capacity 
available from DanChurchAid (DCA), The Development Initiative (TDI), the national non-government organisation Afrilam28  
and the Armed Forces was sufficient to complete clearance of mined areas but it faced challenges including insecurity, lack  
of access, and disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.29 
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The Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in September 2020 sets out a monthly clearance schedule which provides 
for clearance of a total of 112,927m2 in 2021 and 15,915m2 in the first five months of 202230 but gives no details of a timeline for 
the survey or clearance of remaining areas of suspected contamination in Dungu, Haut-Uele province, and Aru, Ituri province. 
It projects the total cost of completion at around US$3.9 million, of which US$3,316,474 is intended to come from international 
sources and US$564,221 is due to come from the government to cover costs of coordination and administration. International 
funding includes US$1,868,205 for clearance, US$568,270 for survey in Aru and Dungu, and US$880,000 for risk education.31 
Tasking continues to be challenged by the remote location of many mined areas and database weaknesses, including 
misidentification of ERW as mine contamination and the addition of hazards to the database without robust evidence of the 
presence of mines. Instead of prioritising tasks, NPA adopted a province-by-province approach as a more efficient way to  
deal with the logistical challenges and costs of tackling tasks separated by big distances.32
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The DRC has 24 national standards developed with support from the GICHD33 and the national strategy for 2018–19 called 
for revision of the standards and awareness raising of their content through training.34 CCLAM reported in June 2019 it had 
revised the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) during 2018, amending mainly the standards relating to 
demining techniques and safety of deminers in the workplace.35
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The number of operators active in the DRC has fallen in the 
past two years to the point where DCA, NPA, and TDI were 
the only international organisations active in survey and 
clearance in 2019. Of those, NPA closed its operations in the 
first quarter of 2020. 
Until 2018, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) had operated in 
North and South Ubangi provinces with two multi-task teams 
and two community liaison teams. When it halted its demining 
operations in August 2018, it was agreed among operators 
that NPA would continue survey and clearance in the north 
and north-west of the country, while DCA would continue to 
operate in central-eastern areas.36 NPA operated with three 
teams conducting non-technical survey and manual mine 
clearance as well as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
spot tasks in 2019.37 NPA continued survey in early 2020, 
but operations ended in February 2020 and the programme 
officially closed at the end of March 2020.38
TDI continued operating in 2019 under contract to UNMAS, 
working with two teams and a total of 24 deminers. It 
carried out surveys in Ituri and Tanganyika provinces. It also 
conducted spot EOD and risk education in support of the UN 
peacekeeping operation, MONUSCO, working in the territories 
of Aru (Ituri province), Kalemie (Tanganyika province), and 
Shabunda town (South Kivu province).39 
UNMAS contracted three national NGOs—Afrique pour 
la Lutte Antimines (AFRILAM), Bureau des Actions de 
Développement et des Urgences (BADU), and Groupe Africain 
de Déminage, Développement et Environnement (GADDE) 
to conduct non-technical survey and explosive ordnance 
risk education in Ituri (Irumu, Djugu, Aru), and South Kivu 
(Kabare, Shabunda), Tanganyika (Kalemie, Moba).40
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
As at 1 October 2020, DRC had not released comprehensive data on land release in 2019. 
CCLAM informed the Intersessional Meetings in July 2020 that operators had cleared 119 dangerous areas covering 
1,692,601m2 by December 2019 but did not clarify over what period of time this had occurred.41 
SURVEY IN 2019
Operators are believed to have conducted extensive survey in 2019 but CCLAM did not provide details of the work or  
its results.
NPA re-surveyed a series of tasks in South Ubangi province between May and the end of July 2019 resulting in cancellation  
of 326,752m2.42 Further re-survey conducted by NPA between November and mid-December 2019 led to removal of many  
tasks from the database and to cancellation of another approximately 150,000m2.43 CCLAM said NPA and DCA had reassessed 
12 tasks between December 2019 and February 2020, resulting in cancellation of three tasks, but gave no further details.44
UNMAS reported that three national NGOs AFRILAM, BADU, and GADDE conducted non-technical survey at 49 locations and 
TDI surveyed 42 tasks, which together resulted in cancelling 57,750m2 and reduction of 9,361m2.45
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CLEARANCE IN 2019
CCLAM reported clearance of a total of 422,461m2 of mined area between January 2018 and the end of March 2019, of which 
146,761m2 was cleared in the first quarter of 2019. A total of 13 mines were destroyed in the 15-month period (11 PMA2 
anti-personnel mines and 2 anti-vehicle mines), along with a total of 7,295 items of ERW. Results for the rest of 2019 were  
not immediately available.46
TDI, working under contract to UNMAS, cleared three tasks affecting a total of 6,073m2, two of them in Ituri province and 
one a 306m2 task in Tanganyika. The operations resulted in destruction of one anti-personnel mine in Tanganyika, and one 
anti-vehicle mine and three items of UXO in Ituri.47
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR THE DRC: 1 NOVEMBER 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2012
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2015
SECOND EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (6-YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2021
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO (EXTENSION REQUESTED) 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): HIGH
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
six-year extension granted by States Parties in June 2014), 
the DRC is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in 
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible, but not later than 1 January 2021. 
As recently as November 2019, the DRC said it intended 
to complete clearance by the start of 2021 and would not 
seek an extension,48 but in July 2020 the DRC informed the 
Intersessionals meeting it would require an extension and 
in September 2020 it submitted its third extension request 
seeking an additional 18 months pushing back its deadline  
to 1 July 2022.49 
The DRC’s first Article 5 deadline extension request in 2011 
blamed poor survey by demining operators in particular for 
the failure to meet its deadline, though poor management 
and insufficient national ownership of the programme were 
also major factors.50 The DRC’s second extension starting 
in January 2015 called for six years in which to “(a) conduct 
technical surveys and clear the 130 identified mined areas; 
and (b) conduct non-technical and technical surveys as well 
as clear and/or release areas in the territories of Aru and 
Dungu in the Orientale province”.51 The extension request 
estimated that on average 0.21km2 would be cleared each 
year.52 Operators have largely met that clearance target  
(see Table 2) but poor survey, bad data, and weak coordination 
between key stakeholders are among the major factors 
holding back completion.
Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







N/R = Not reported
There appear to be few reasons why the DRC will fail to  
meet its 1 January 2021 deadline. Progress cancelling 
suspected hazards in the past two years has narrowed the 
remaining area of contamination to a size that could have 
been addressed by its deadline. Moreover, operators  
believed a significant part of the 128,842m² still identified  
as contaminated can be released through non-technical 
survey and without requiring full clearance.53 
However, the extension request submitted in September 
2020 leaves out details needed to clarify how the DRC plans 
to achieve completion within the requested extension. It 
does not present a timeline for survey of remaining SHAs 
or details of the recent annual clearance results. CCLAM’s 
brief statement to the 2020 Intersessionals affirmed that the 
capacity of operators now working in DRC will suffice to meet 
the new July 2022 target.54 The extension request says “five 
or six” army and police teams will support clearance55 but it 
gives no details of what national or international operating 
capacity is available. A table linking areas of contamination to 
clearance by particular operators shows CCLAM had planned 
for clearance of North Ubangi province, representing more 
than a quarter of the remaining contamination, would be 
conducted by NPA, which ceased work in DRC in 2020.56 
The request does not indicate if donors have committed or 
pledged funding towards the estimated US$3.9 million cost  
of completion. It says resource mobilisation will focus on 
efforts to try to raise the level of government funding for 
mine action, organising quarterly meetings with donors in 
collaboration with UNMAS and presentations at side-events  
to international meetings.57 
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The DRC extension request attributes the need for an extension mainly to a decline in funding, a reduction in the number of 
demining operators, the lack of minefield maps, persistent conflicts, recurring epidemics, and the COVID-19 pandemic. It also 
draws attention to persistent insecurity and conflict.58 The DRC statement to the 2020 Intersessionals meeting also identified 
the obstacles that could hold back progress: hazardous areas in North Ubangi, Tanganyika and Tshuapa are remote and 
difficult to access; access to Ituri and North Kivu provinces is limited by violent insecurity; and survey is still required of parts 
of Aru area in Ituri province and Dungu in Haut-Ulele province.59 Such issues serve to underscore the need for the DRC to 
ensure sustainable national capacity for tackling residual mine hazards identified after completion. 
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Despite the obvious need, as of July 2020, no formal planning had been undertaken for how to deal with mines found after 
fulfilment of DRC’s Article 5 obligations. The national strategy for 2018–19 acknowledged the need to develop capacity 
for responding to residual mine and ERW contamination. It called for improved coordination between government and 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) mine action organisations; the creation of a joint army-police EOD rapid response  
team accredited by CCLAM; and the opening of a dedicated telephone number to report any discoveries of contamination. 
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Ecuador’s clearance output fell for the third consecutive year and, in 2019, it managed only a paltry 2,899m2 putting its 
compliance with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in doubt. At the same time, its estimate of remaining 
contamination has more than halved: Ecuador has reported this is due to land being reassigned to Peru. However, this is  
not consistent with the figures provided in previous years. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Ecuador should clarify the extent of remaining contamination.
 ■ Ecuador should ensure it deploys its limited resources in the most efficient manner and that it conducts both  
non-technical and technical survey, as appropriate, before full clearance.
 ■ Ecuador should provide clarity on the resources it is able to provide going forward and what, if any, additional support 
is required from the international community.
 ■ Ecuador should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and mine action data should be systematically disaggregated 
by sex and age.
 ■ Ecuador should develop a strategy for managing residual contamination post completion. 
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(20% of overall score)
5 6 Ecuador’s estimate of outstanding mine contamination more than halved in 2019.  
This difference cannot be fully accounted for by land release or by the reassigning  
of a suspected hazardous area (SHA) to Peru.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
5 5 There is clarity of roles and responsibilities at a national level and Ecuador has 
necessary demining infrastructure in place. Ecuador had a funding shortfall in 2019 
and support has been offered by the international community. It is, though, unclear 
whether Ecuador will commit sufficient resources to complete clearance by 2022.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
3 4 Ecuador does not have a gender and diversity policy or plan and does not employ any 
women in its mine action programme. Women, children, and ethnic minorities are 





(10% of overall score)
5 4 Ecuador’s Article 7 report covering 2019 generally shows an improvement in the 
consistency and accuracy of the data within the report, something which has been  
an issue in previous years reports.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
6 6 Ecuador provided an updated plan for clearance based on the revised estimate of 
remaining mine contamination. It did not meet the land release targets for 2019 and 
has set itself a target for 2020 that should be achievable provided that sufficient 
resources are available.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
6 6 Ecuador claims to conduct survey and clearance according to the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS). All clearance is conducted manually and demining capacity 
is reported to have remained the same since 2018.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
2 3 Ecuador’s land release output fell again in 2019 and the country is not on track 
to meet its Article 5 deadline even with the very small amount of remaining 
contamination it is now reporting.
Average Score 4.5 4.9 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ National Centre for Humanitarian Demining (CENDESMI)
 ■ Army Corps of Engineers (CEE) 
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ CEE Battalion No. 68 “COTOPAXI”
 ■ General Command for Demining and EOD (CGDEOD)
 ■ Joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining 
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Ecuador reported that, as at December 2019, 40,056m2 of anti-personnel mine contamination remained across 27 confirmed 
hazardous areas (CHAs) and 26 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) across four districts in Zamora Chinchipe province  
(see Table 1). This is less than half the amount of anti-personnel mine contamination reported at the end of 2018, despite 
Ecuador releasing only 2,899m2 of contaminated land in 2019.1 This is also wildly different from the contamination figures 
reported in Ecuador’s Article 5 statement at the Fourth APMBC Review Conference at the end of November 2019 when  
Ecuador had 79,030m2 of contamination and 3,233 anti-personnel mines to destroy in four mined areas.2 
Ecuador reported that in June 2019 Peru conducted an analysis of the PV_La Media minefield and concluded that it is in 
Peruvian territory which reduced the amount of anti-personnel mine contaminated area within Ecuador.3 In Peru’s Article 7 
report covering 2018, the PV_La Media minefield was listed as being an SHA of 68,000m2.4 The difference between Ecuador’s 
2018 and 2019 contamination figures is in the number and amount of CHAs: down from 34 CHAs to 27 (an unexplained reduction 
of 7) and from a total area of 72,717m2 to 32,535m2 (an unexplained reduction of 40,182m2). Despite these very significant 
discrepancies, Ecuador considers its current estimate of contamination to be accurate as it is based on evidence from field 
reports and technical records of mine laying in the border area between Ecuador and Peru. Affected communities, including 
women, were consulted during survey.5
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province (at end 2019)6
Province District CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total CHA/SHA Total area (m2)
Zamora 
Chinchipe
Chinchipe 1 7,009 0 0 1 7,009
Yanzatza 3 6,565 0 0 3 6,565
Nangaritza 14 4,577 0 0 14 4,577
El Pangui 9 14,384 26 7,521 35 21,905
Totals 27 32,535 26 7,521 53 40,056
Ecuador’s contamination results from its 1995 border conflict with Peru. The most heavily mined section of the border is the 
Condor mountain range (Cordillera del Condor) which was at the centre of the dispute.
NEW CONTAMINATION
Ecuador reported that during 2019 a CHA of previously unregistered anti-personnel mine contamination covering 350m2 in 
the Condor Mirador district of Zamora Chinchipe province was added to the database and then released through clearance. 
In addition, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were found during 2019 in the border between Ecuador and Colombia, but 
according to Ecuador, none of these meets the APMBC definition of an anti-personnel mine.7
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by the National Centre for Humanitarian Demining (CENDESMI). The 
Ecuadorian government created CENDESMI by an Executive Decree in 1999.8 It is an interministerial body chaired by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility and is made up of the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Public 
Health, and the Army Corps of Engineers (CEE) through the Engineers Battalion No. 68 “COTOPAXI” and the General Command 
for Demining and EOD (CGDEOD).9 CENDESMI is responsible for overseeing compliance with the APMBC, while the CEE is 
responsible for coordinating the planning of demining and COTOPAXI is tasked with conducting land release operations.10
Ecuador currently funds all of its demining operations. It has allocated almost US$21 million for demining personnel, materials, 
and equipment for 2014–22.11 This amounts to around $2 million per year from 2019 to 2022. However, only $821,953 was 
actually provided to the demining programme in 2019.12
Ecuador participated in the APMBC Individualised Approach, in 2019, in the course of which it claimed that it requires just over 
US$8 million dollars to complete clearance. This will be used to replace personal protective equipment and other demining 
tools which are no longer usable, as well as for vehicles, training, food, and shelter for the deminers.13 
At the Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Ecuador and Peru made a joint statement calling on the international community 
to support their mine clearance efforts.14 In response, the Organization of American States (OAS) has called upon its Member 
States and other international donors and partners to provide technical and financial assistance for both Ecuador and Peru.15 
Ecuador reported that additional support has been offered by the United States of America and Italy in order to strengthen  
the capacity of its deminers and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel.16




The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility, which chairs CENDESMI, has a gender and diversity policy but no similar 
policy exists that is specific to CENDESMI.17
Ecuador has stated that it considers all populations affected by mines, without discrimination, in the planning and execution 
of demining operations.18 Women, children, and ethnic minorities are targeted during risk education campaigns, which are 
conducted in Spanish as well as in native languages. Risk education teams are said to include indigenous people. During risk 
education activities, affected communities are also informed of planned demining operations, the prioritisation of operations, 
and the different land release activities being conducted.19
Mine action data is not disaggregated by sex or age.20
Ecuador has trained women in both demining and the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.21 
Since 2014, Ecuador has employed three female deminers, 3% of the total trained, however none is currently engaged in 
survey, clearance, managerial or administrative positions.22 Ecuador has reported that it will continue to include and train 
female personnel “according to their availability” (“de acuerdo a la disponibilidad de dicho personal”).23
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Ecuador uses the IMSMA database, which is said to be updated regularly.24
Ecuador submitted its Article 7 report covering 2019 several months after the deadline, however, there is an improvement  
in the quality of the data with information presented consistently and accurately within the report, something which has been 
an issue across Ecuador’s reports and statements in previous years. 
PLANNING AND TASKING
Ecuador submitted an updated work plan for implementation of Article 5 in May 2019, as requested by the Sixteenth Meeting  
of States Parties.25 This included planned mine clearance in the last remaining contaminated province of Zamora Chinchipe  
for 2019 to 2022 (see Table 2). However, this action plan was based on an estimate of anti-personnel mine contamination that  
is now understood to be out of date.
Table 2: Planned mine clearance in Zamora Chinchipe in 2019–22 (Action Plan)26 
Year District Mined areas Area (m2)
2019 El Pangui 12 23,383
2020 Yanzatza; Centinela del Condor; Nangaritza 12 18,299
2021 Chinchipe; Nangaritza 10 20,688
2022 El Pangui 26 17,868
Totals 60 80,238
Ecuador presented a revised plan for mine clearance for  
2020 to 2022 in its latest Article 7 report, based on the 
updated estimate of contamination as at end 2019.27 
Ecuador did not meet its land release targets for 2019 when 
it planned to clear 23,383m2 of contamination from the El 
Pangui and expected to find and destroy 478 anti-personnel 
mines. Clearance was expected to take place in August and 
September with 12 demining teams.28 In its Article 7 report 
covering 2019 Ecuador stated that due to lack of budget only 
two days of clearance operations took place in 2019. In 2020, 
clearance was planned of 11,285m2 (with expected discovery 
of 1,362 mines) in El Oro and Loja in Zamora Chinchipe with 
seven demining teams working between June and August.29
Ecuador prioritises contaminated areas for clearance 
according to the proximity of the local population and the 
impact on socio-economic development.30
Table 3: Planned mine clearance in Zamora Chinchipe in 
2020–22 (Article 7)31 
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The process of humanitarian demining in Ecuador is carried out in accordance with the Binational Manual for Humanitarian 
Demining (Manual Binacional de Desminado Humanitario), developed under the Binational Cooperation Programme with Peru, 
and the Manual of Humanitarian Demining Procedures of Ecuador. These are said to be based on the International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS), but adapted to the Ecuadorian context.32 Ecuador has adopted the national mine action standards (NMAS)  
for land release, non-technical survey, technical survey, clearance requirements, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).33  
No updates were made in 2019 or early 2020.34
In granting Ecuador’s 2017 Article 5 deadline extension request, the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties noted that Ecuador 
should use the most relevant land release standards, policies, and methodologies, in line with IMAS, and encouraged it to 
continue seeking improved land release and certification techniques, which could lead to Ecuador fulfilling its obligations 
more quickly.35 Ecuador stated in its 2017 extension request that non-technical and technical survey would be carried out 
to determine the location, size, and other characteristic of the mined areas before operations begin using records of mined 
areas.36 No non-technical survey or technical survey was reported to have occurred in 2019. 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Demining is conducted by Battalion No. 68 COTOPAXI and, in 2019, only manual clearance took place.37 In the additional 
information provided alongside its 2017 extension request, Ecuador stated that the remaining clearance will be carried out only 
by manual deminers, due to the unsuitability of terrain for its machinery.38 Mine detection dogs (MDDs) are used only for quality 
control (QC) following clearance.39 Ecuador expected to maintain the same number of personnel in 2020.40 As at July 2020, it is 
not known if this has changed due to the outbreak of COVID-19 in the country.
Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 201941
Operator Manual teams Total deminers*
Non-technical 
survey teams NTS personnel Comments
Battalion No. 68 
“COTOPAXI”
10 107 1 5 No change in the number of 
personnel from 2018 to 2019
Totals 10 107 1 5
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
The joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining Unit is deployed to areas that were at the centre of the conflict 
between the two nations but did not carry out any demining operations in 2019. In November 2019 in the “Tumbes Declaration” 
the presidents of Ecuador and Peru agreed to continue their binational cooperation and committed to assign the necessary 
resources to continue demining operations in both territories, but no further details were provided.42
CENDESMI is responsible for observing and monitoring compliance of the demining, including QC and certification of clearance 
operations.43 In 2018, QC was carried out in El Oro and Loja provinces.44
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of 2,899m2 of anti-personnel mined area was released in 2019, all of which was cleared.45
SURVEY IN 2019
No non-technical or technical survey took place in 2019. In 2018, a total of 2,539m2 was reduced through technical survey in  
the Tiwinza square kilometre by the Binational Humanitarian Demining Unit.46
CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, only 2,899m2 was cleared and 62 anti-personnel mines destroyed. No additional mines were destroyed during  
spot tasks.47 This is a sharp reduction from the already meagre 14,068m2 that was cleared in 2018 with 247 anti-personnel 
mines destroyed.48
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Table 5: Mine clearance in 201949







Zamora Chinchipe  Battalion No. 68 “COTOPAXI” 1 2,899 62 0
Totals 1 2,899 62 0
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle 
Ecuador reported that 350m2 of this clearance was of an area of newly discovered contamination that was added to the 
database in 2019. During this clearance, 20 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed.50
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ECUADOR: 1 OCTOBER 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 OCTOBER 2017
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2017
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (5YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): MEDIUM
Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







Ecuador has submitted three extension requests since the 
2014 Maputo Review Conference. In May 2016, Ecuador 
announced that, of the remaining 0.13km2 of contamination, 
0.08km2 would be cleared in 2016 and the remaining 0.05km2 
in 2017 prior to its October 2017 deadline.51 This did not 
happen. Instead, on 28 November 2016, Ecuador unexpectedly 
submitted a request to extend its mine clearance deadline to 
31 December 2017. At the time of the request, Ecuador stated 
that “the technical survey and clearance in the provinces 
of Zamora Chinchipe and Morona Santiago (Tiwinza square 
kilometre) is about to conclude, pending the destruction 
of 5,478 anti-personnel mines in an area of 137,653 square 
metres.” Ecuador explained that the failure to meet the 1 
October 2017 deadline was due to a serious earthquake on 
16 April 2016, which required the diversion of the armed 
forces away from demining, as well as to the physical 
characteristics of the land and climate conditions in the  
areas requiring clearance.52 
In its Article 7 report covering 2016, Ecuador suddenly and 
without explanation determined that it would need a further 
five years to fulfil its Article 5 obligations. It submitted 
another Article 5 deadline extension request in March 2017 
and was granted a deadline extension to 31 December 2022. 
Survey and clearance outputs fell from 16,607m2 in 2018 to 
just 2,899m2 in 2019, with just under half of output in 2018 
from the Binational Humanitarian Demining Unit that has 
now completed operations in the Tiwinza square kilometre. 
Despite having 107 trained deminers, Ecuador failed to meet 
its land release target for 2019 as it had planned for only 
two days of clearance operations.53 If, as has been reported, 
the amount of remaining anti-personnel mine is now only 
40,056m2, Ecuador should be able to meet its Article 5 
deadline with its existing capacity. 
Ecuador maintained that, in order to meet its 2022 deadline, it 
requires financial support from the international community.54 
Ecuador has since reported that additional support has been 
offered by the United States and Italy to strengthen the 
capacity of its deminers and EOD personnel and it believes 
it can now meet its Article 5 deadline.55 However, this will 
not be possible without an accurate estimate of remaining 
contamination, a clear plan for completion, and a significant 
increase in land release output.
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Ecuador does not have a strategy in place for managing residual risk post completion but has stated that it will use its current 
capacity to address areas of residual contamination.56
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Eritrea’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline expires on 31 December 2020 after it was granted an 
interim extension in November 2019. Eritrea was expected to submit a more detailed extension request by 31 March 2020 but, 
as at June 2020, had not done so. Nor has it submitted an Article 7 transparency report since 2014 or responded to repeated 
requests for updated information from Mine Action Review, most recently in 2020.
Eritrea is failing to comply with its obligation under Article 5 of the APMBC to complete clearance as soon as possible. There  
is no indication of any demining since the end of 2013, which would amount to a violation of the Convention. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Eritrea needs to return to compliance with its obligations under the APMBC. The authorities should ensure that 
demining is undertaken for humanitarian and developmental purposes as a matter of urgency.
 ■ Eritrea should urgently submit an extension request for its Article 5 deadline, which includes an up-to-date list of all 
known or suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) with anti-personnel mines and a detailed timeline of activities planned 
for the extension period sought.
 ■ Eritrea must urgently submit its outstanding annual Article 7 reports, the latest of which was due by 30 April 2020. 
 ■ Eritrea should reconsider its policy of excluding international technical assistance in mine action, which would support 
efficient land release and re-open international funding paths.
 ■ Eritrea should cooperate with Ethiopia in cross-border mine action activities, which will also help to consolidate peace 
with its neighbour. 
 ■ Eritrea should develop and make public a resource mobilisation strategy on the basis of a clear understanding of 
remaining contamination. 


















































(MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE)
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2020 
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE AND MUST SEEK NEW EXTENDED DEADLINE 
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION
ERITREA
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(20% of overall score)
4 4 The last estimate of mine contamination in Eritrea dates back to the end of 2013, 
when Eritrea reported that 434 mined areas remained with a size of 33.4km2. All 
area is reportedly suspected hazardous area. Mine Action Review is unaware of 
any indication of progress in land release or updated information on the extent of 
contamination since this time.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
4 4 Eritrea’s mine action programme is entirely nationally managed. The Eritrean 
Demining Agency (EDA) is responsible for mine clearance. 
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)




(10% of overall score)
1 1 Details on Eritrea’s current information management system are not known. 
However, its lack of submissions of Article 7 reports over the past six years is a 
violation of the Convention. It has failed to provide any updates on the status of  
its mine action obligations in recent years. 
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
1 1 Recent details on Eritrea’s planning and tasking system are not available.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
4 4 Eritrea is reported to have National Mine Action Standards dating back to 2012. The 
EDA was responsible for the implementation of quality management activities.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
1 1 Eritrea has made little, if any, progress in land release to meet its obligations under 
its second Article 5 extension period. In 2014, Eritrea reported it expected to require 
a third extension. Eritrea submitted an interim request for a third extension in 
November 2019 with the intention of providing a more detailed request by 31 March 
2020. As at July 2020, no such request is forthcoming and it remains in violation 
of the Convention for failing to complete mine survey and clearance as soon as 
possible, and for not respecting other procedural provisions of the Convention.
Average Score 2.7 2.7 Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Eritrea Demining Agency (EDA)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Engineering units of the Eritrean Armed Forces
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ None
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Eritrea is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war 
(ERW) dating back to World War II, but largely as the result 
of the struggle for independence in 1962–91 and its armed 
conflict with Ethiopia in 1998–2000. 
In May 2015, in response to Mine Action Review’s request for 
updated information on the state of contamination and mine 
action activities in Eritrea, the Deputy General Manager of 
the Eritrea Demining Agency (EDA) reported “no significant 
progress registered by the EDA currently”. He claimed, 
though, that the EDA was being reorganised in an effort 
to make “better progress”.1 Since then, the EDA has not 
responded to repeated requests from Mine Action Review for 
further information, most recently in the first half of 2020. 
The last estimate of mine contamination in Eritrea dates 
back to the end of 2013, when Eritrea reported 434 mined 
areas covering an estimated 33.4km.2 This was a two-thirds 
reduction on the earlier estimate of 99km2 of June 2011,3 and 
significantly lower than the 129km2 identified by the 2004 
landmine impact survey.4
Table 1: Mined area by region (at end 2013)5
Zoba (region) SHAs Estimated area (m2)
Semienawi Keih Bahri 166 9,462,537
Anseba 144 10,230,940
Gash Barka 63 6,252,951
Debub 29 3,894,036
Maakel 24 2,423,325
Debubawi Keih Bahri 8 1,169,029
Totals 434 33,432,818
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Eritrea mine action programme is entirely nationally managed. The EDA, established in July 2002, is responsible for policy 
development, regulation of mine action, and the conduct of mine clearance operations. The EDA reports directly to the Office of 
the President.
Eritrea projected that costs for its Article 5 extension period to 1 February 2020 would amount to more than US$7 million, all 
to be raised nationally.6 In 2011–13, Eritrea managed to raise only $257,000 annually. Eritrea acknowledged at the time that 
its progress in clearing mines would be slow due to its lack of resources, but it has never been clear how Eritrea intended to 
secure the funding necessary for its survey and clearance activities, particularly in light of its regrettable policy not to accept 
international technical assistance.7
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Eritrea did not respond to Mine Action Review’s inquiries in 2020 about the national mine action programme’s policies relating 
to gender.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Details on Eritrea’s current information management system are not known. However, its lack of submissions of Article 7 
reporting over the past six years is a violation of the Convention and as at 1 August 2020, Eritrea had yet to submit its latest 
Article 7 report covering 2019 (or any earlier years). It has also failed to provide an updated Article 5 work plan or detailed 
extension request.
PLANNING AND TASKING
There is no apparent recent information on how Eritrea plans its demining operations. Re-survey during the second extension 
period was planned to involve both technical and non-technical survey of all remaining mined areas across six regions, and to 
run concurrently with clearance in priority areas in the Anseba, Maakel, and Semienawi Keih Bahri regions.8
Eritrea submitted an interim Article 5 deadline extension request on 11 November 2019, which was granted at the Fourth 
Review Conference of the APMBC (25–29 November 2019), but the request did not contain any updated information on the 
extent of remaining mined area or on Eritrea’s plans to address it. Eritrea committed to submit a detailed follow-on extension 
request by 31 March 2020, but as at July 2020 had still to submit it.9
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Eritrea reportedly has National Mine Action Standards that date back at least to 2012. It is not known if any updates to the 
standards have been made in the eight years since. It was reported that the EDA was responsible for the implementation  
of quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) activities.10
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In the past, demining has been primarily conducted by the engineering units of the Eritrean defence forces under the 
supervision of the EDA.11 According to its 2014 Article 5 deadline extension request, Eritrea planned to deploy “at least”  
five demining teams during its second extension period.12 
Since the expulsion of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 2005, the authorities do not allow international 
operators to conduct survey or clearance in Eritrea. 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Under its 2014 extension request, Eritrea projected that up to 15.4km2 of mined area could be cleared within five years. It 
reported that 67.3km2 of contaminated area had been cancelled through non-technical survey and that 5.7km2 was cleared  
over 38 mined areas in 2011–13.13
Eritrea has not provided any updates to States Parties to the APMBC, nor responded to Mine Action Review requests for 
information on any mine action activities (including survey) undertaken in since 2014. In 2013, Eritrea had reported release  
of 157 SHAs totalling 33.5km2, leaving 385 mined areas of close to 24.5km2 to be surveyed.14 Forty-nine new mined areas with  
a total size of 9km2 were discovered in five of the country’s six regions during non-technical survey in 2013: Anseba, Debub, 
Gash Barka, Maakel, and Semienawi Keih Bahri.15
Likewise, Eritrea has not made public any information on any mine clearance undertaken in 2019 or recent years. In 2013, 
Eritrea seemingly cleared approx. 2.26km2 of mined area, almost twice the amount cleared in 2012 (1.2km2).16 The number  
of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines destroyed in 2013 was not reported. 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
As stated, no land release output, including survey or clearance, was reported in 2019. 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ERITREA: 1 FEBRUARY 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2012
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 FEBRUARY 2015
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 FEBRUARY 2020
INTERIM THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (11MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2020
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
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Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







N/R = Not Reported
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
three-year extension granted by States Parties in 2011, 
a five-year extension granted in 2014, and an interim 
11-month extension in 2019), Eritrea is required to destroy all 
anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or 
control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 
2020. It is not on track to meet this deadline, is failing to 
comply with its Article 5 obligations, and as at June 2020 
had not submitted a detailed request for an extension to 
its Article 5 deadline. Eritrea submitted its last extension 
request in November 2019, just before the Fourth APMBC 
Review Conference.
In January 2014, Eritrea submitted a second Article 5 
deadline extension request seeking a further five years to 
continue clearance and complete re-survey of SHAs, but not 
to fulfil its clearance obligations under the treaty. In June 
2014, however, States Parties granted Eritrea its extension 
request until 2020, but noted that five additional years beyond 
Eritrea’s previous February 2015 deadline “appeared to be a 
long period of time to meet this objective”.17
Based on a predicted clearance rate of 0.384km2 per team 
per year and 1.92km2 per five teams per year, Eritrea 
estimated that five teams operating at this pace could clear 
almost 15.4km2 in the five-year period.18 It acknowledged, 
though, that this was “ambitious” and the amount projected 
still accounted for less than half of the total area Eritrea 
estimated as requiring either clearance or re-survey 
(33.5km2), leaving some 18km2 unaccounted for.19
In April 2014, at the APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Eritrea 
stated that the extension period was designed to gain 
greater clarity about its mine problem, at which point Eritrea 
“could plan and think about the financial resources to be 
allocated for mine action”.20 It was further stated that Eritrea 
“won’t complete clearance in the next five years”, and will 
likely require a third extension.21 Eritrea did not submit an 
updated Article 5 deadline extension request or work plan  
as requested. 
In the interim extension request submitted on 11 November 
2019, just two weeks before the start of the Fourth 
APMBC Review Conference, Eritrea reported that it had 
not gained any clarity on the remaining anti-personnel 
mine contamination during the second extension period 
as Eritrea’s demining capacity had been diverted to 
other government development programmes, such as 
construction and agriculture, and that mine action had faced 
financial and resource shortfalls and required external 
assistance to continue operations. Eritrea believes that it 
has the necessary experience and expertise to address the 
challenges but will require international support. 
As at November 2019, the EDA was said to be in the process 
of restructuring and an interim request was submitted as no 
information could be provided on outstanding contamination, 
survey or clearance. Eritrea claimed it was planning to submit 
a more detailed extension request by 31 March 2020 with 
information on remaining mine contamination, progress made 
and a detailed work plan for implementation.22 As at July 2020, 
however, no additional extension request had been submitted 
with Eritrea remaining in violation of the Convention.
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
As at June 2020, Eritrea had not provided any information on whether it has made any provision for a sustainable capacity to 
address previously unknown mined areas following completion.
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In 2019, Ethiopia submitted and was granted a second extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 
5 deadline. Ethiopia’s land release output rose massively in 2019 to a total of 330km2 of mined area, most by cancellation, but 
which included a 60% increase in clearance compared to the previous year. It is still unclear whether Ethiopia will meet its land 
release targets going forward as obstacles include the remoteness of certain mined areas, technical and logistical challenges, 
a lack of basic infrastructure, and a critical lack of funding. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Ethiopia should conduct a re-survey of the Somali region to establish an up-to-date and accurate baseline.
 ■ Ethiopia should ensure the re-established national mine action authority has sufficient resources to sustain an 
effective mine action programme and to ensure the mobilisation of resources to complete clearance. 
 ■ Ethiopia should clarify its ability to meet the annual land release targets in its extension request and provide more 
information on the size of the demining capacity it requires to address the remaining challenge. 
 ■ Ethiopia should produce an updated work plan by 30 April 2021, with revised estimates of contamination, annual 
survey and clearance targets, and a detailed budget, in accordance with the terms of its latest extension.
 ■ Ethiopia should cooperate with Eritrea in cross-border mine action activities, which will also help to consolidate peace 
with its neighbour. 
 ■ Ethiopia should reconsider use of mine detection dogs (MDDs) to help cancel suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). 
 ■ Ethiopia should re-establish conditions that would allow international demining organisations to return. 
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(20% of overall score)
5 5 Ethiopia has an inflated baseline of mine contamination, 99% of which are SHAs in 
the Somali region. Ethiopia estimates that only 2% of the total mined area actually 
contains mines. In 2019, Ethiopia requested international assistance for a baseline 
survey to revise contamination data from the 2001–04 landmine impact survey.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
5 5 In 2019, it was announced that the national programme would report directly to the 
Ministry of Defence, with a view to raising the profile of mine action, and improve the 
efficiency of operations and availability of national resources. As at June 2020, it was 
not known if this has taken place.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
3 3 Ethiopia claimed to have a gender policy in place for its mine action centre and 
reflected in its national mine action standards. It reported that, according to the 
policy, there is equal access for employment for qualified men and women in survey 
and clearance teams, including for managerial positions. As at June 2020, it was not 




(10% of overall score)
5 4 Ethiopia’s reporting improved in its 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request and 
Article 7 report covering 2019, although a lack of detail persists and there are 
inconsistencies in the use of land release terminology.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
5 5 Ethiopia’s second Article 5 deadline extension request (2019) contained annual 
targets for survey and clearance. It greatly exceeded its survey target for 2019 
but fell short of its clearance target. According to the work plan Ethiopia will need 
to more than double its clearance output in 2020. Whether the work plan to 2025 
is realistic and achievable, based on the demining capacity and rates of clearance 
projected, is questionable.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
6 6 An update to the National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) is long overdue and, as at 
June 2020, Ethiopia had not reported on whether this has happened. All clearance is 
conducted manually, but Ethiopia should consider expanding to re-employ MDDs if it 
is to meet its ambitious land release targets.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
6 5 In 2019, Ethiopia was granted a second Article 5 deadline extension until the end 
of 2025. Land release output rose dramatically in 2019 largely due to a massive 
increase in cancellation through non-technical survey though clearance output 
also increased compared to 2018. Ethiopia could still meet its 2025 deadline, but 
challenges remain around capacity, funding, and access (due to insecurity).
Average Score 5.2 4.9 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Head Office of the Ministry of Defence
 ■ Ethiopia Mine Action Office (EMAO)
NATIONAL OPERATORS




 ■ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at 30 April 2020, Ethiopia reported that it had a total of 152 suspected and confirmed hazardous areas with a size of 726km2 
remaining, see Table 1.1 Almost all of the anti-personnel mine contamination is in SHAs, with just under 99% of the total 
estimate located in the Somali region. Ethiopia stated in its 2019 extension request that only 2% of the SHA are expected to 
contain mines.2 As such, as at the end of 2018, the request projected a total of 27.3km2 (6.3km2 of existing CHA and 21km2 of  
the SHA reported) will require clearance, while 1,029km2 will be cancelled or reduced.3 
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end April 2020)4
Region CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total SHA/CHA Total Area (m2)
Somali 18 1,027,500 82 718,769,532 100 719,797,032
Gambela 0 0 20 838,000 20 838,000
Afar 6 1,755,049 8 1,915,300 14 3,670,349
Tigray 3 691,989 0 0 3 691,989
Oromia 0  0 13 1,026,105 13 1,026,105
Benishangule Gumuze 2 45,000 0 0 2 45,000
Totals 29 3,519,538 123 722,548,937 152 726,068,475
The estimate of mine contamination does not include the contaminated area along the border with Eritrea as this area has not 
been surveyed due to lack of access and delineation between the two countries.5 It is expected that survey of the buffer zone 
will be undertaken once demarcation of the border area is completed.6 Positively, the second extension request predicted 
negotiations through a joint border commission would allow mine action in previously inaccessible areas to begin. Specifically, 
new “military humanitarian demining” operations were expected to start in the Tigray border minefield.7 The 2019 extension 
request also states that access to mined areas in Afar and Somali regions continued to present a challenge for operations due 
to insecurity and their remoteness, while technical and logistical challenges and a lack of infrastructure continued to hamper 
access to Gambela and Benishangule regions.8
In 2001–04, a landmine impact survey (LIS) identified mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in 10 of 
Ethiopia’s 11 regions, with 1,916 SHAs across more than 2,000km2 impacting more than 1,492 communities.9 The Ethiopian 
Mine Action Office (EMAO) stated that the LIS overestimated the number of both SHAs and impacted communities, citing lack 
of military expertise among the survey teams as the major reason for the overestimate.10 Since 2002, EMAO, with support from 
donors and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), have carried out efforts to confirm the results of the LIS and conduct mine clearance 
throughout the country.11 In November 2019, Ethiopia requested international assistance to conduct a new baseline survey.12
Ethiopia’s mine problem is a result of internal and international armed conflicts dating back to 1935, including the Italian 
occupation and subsequent East Africa campaigns (1935–41), a border war with Sudan (1980), the Ogaden war with Somalia 
(1997–98), internal conflict (1974–2000), and the Ethiopian-Eritrean war (1998–2000). 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In 2001, following the end of the conflict with Eritrea, Ethiopia’s Council of Ministers established EMAO as an autonomous 
civilian body responsible for mine clearance and mine risk education reporting to the Office of the Prime Minister’.13 EMAO 
developed its operational capacities with technical assistance from NPA, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the  
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).14 In 2011, however, EMAO’s governing board decided that the Ministry of Defence was better 
suited to clear the remaining mines. It was claimed that a civilian entity such as EMAO would struggle to access the unstable 
Somali region.15 
In response to the decision to close EMAO and transfer demining responsibility to the army’s Combat Engineers Division,  
NPA ended its direct funding support and had completed the transfer of its remaining 49 MDDs to EMAO and the federal  
police by the end of April 2012. The Combat Engineers Division took over management of the MDD Training Centre at Entoto 
in early 2012. The transition of EMAO to the Ministry of National Defence appeared to be in limbo until September 2015, when 
Ethiopia reported that oversight of national mine action activities had been re-established as “one Independent Mine Action 
Office” under the Combat Engineers Main Department.16 In 2017, Ethiopia confirmed that this “autonomous legal entity” had 
been re-named EMAO, and was responsible for survey, clearance, and risk education.17
In 2019, however, Ethiopia reported that the responsibility for the national mine action programme had been transferred 
back to the headquarters of the Ministry of Defence. This was, it said, to enable the Ministry to directly manage resources 
and activities; to improve access to remaining CHAs; and to raise the profile of mine action at a time when resources are 
increasingly limited.18
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According to Ethiopia’s second extension request (2019), just under US$41 million is required to fulfil its Article 5 obligations 
by 2025, a decrease from the $46 million reported in its 2017–20 work plan, which it said was due to progress made in land 
release in 2016–18. The request includes a breakdown of the budget required: $28.7 million for demining, $6.1 million for 
coordination and administration, $4.1 million for training and equipment to manage “residual issues”; and $2 million for  
quality assurance and information management.19 Of the total $41 million sought, the government pledged to cover 20%  
($8.2 million).20 
Ethiopia’s 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request notes the availability of trained and highly experienced demining teams.21 
In 2018, the Ethiopian government was the sole funder of mine action operations.22 EMAO had informed Mine Action Review 
that it expected to receive increased funding in 2019.23 As at June 2020, Ethiopia has not reported on whether this happened. 
Ethiopia has also made numerous requests for international assistance, most recently, for vehicles, detectors, and personal 
protective equipment (PPE); assistance to conduct a baseline survey; and for Information Management System for Mine Action 
(IMSMA) training for staff.24
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
In August 2019, EMAO claimed to have a gender and diversity plan in place and to have mainstreamed gender in the national 
standards. It stated that all groups affected by anti-personnel mines are consulted during survey and community liaison 
through face-to-face interviews and using elders to disseminate information to local communities. It also noted, though, that 
no female deminers were employed in the demining companies. It claimed that, according to EMAO’s policy, there is equal 
access for employment for qualified men and women in survey and clearance teams, including for managerial positions, but 
acknowledged that in practice no women had been engaged in survey or clearance in 2018.25 As at June 2020, Ethiopia had  
not provided information on whether women were involved in survey or clearance activities in 2019.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Although a version of the IMSMA database software was installed and customised by EMAO prior to 2015, in 2019, Ethiopia 
continued to report it was still using an “alternative data processing package” alongside the IMSMA database, due to a “gap” 
in the IMSMA system’s installation. It reported that efforts to upgrade capacity and data processing had been ongoing under 
EMAO, and that it requested additional IMSMA training and assistance from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) to finalise the transfer of the database.26 The GICHD, however, has no record of a request for such assistance 
nor for any application by Ethiopia for its mine action personnel to attend any training courses.27
Ethiopia’s 2019 Article 5 extension request contains a number of discrepancies in reporting, possibly due in part to previous 
inconsistencies in reporting on area remaining in its 2017 updated work plan and first Article 5 extension request.28 The figures 
in Ethiopia’s latest Article 7 report, covering April 2019 to April 2020, are accurate but the report lacks detail on survey and 
clearance capacity and land release methodology, and reporting would benefit from an updated work plan and detailed budget. 
However, both documents are evidence of significant improvements in reporting compared to previous years.
PLANNING AND TASKING
Ethiopia’s second Article 5 extension request for the period 2020–25 aims to achieve the following:
 ■ Address the remaining 1,065km2 of mine contamination
 ■ Complete survey of the buffer zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea once demarcation is completed
 ■ Obtain the support of donors and international advisors
 ■ Fully equip and train the demining companies, Rapid Response Teams (RRTs), and explosive ordnance  
disposal (EOD) teams
 ■ Implement risk education in affected communities and mark SHAs
 ■ Finish the building of the demining training centre.29 
In 2019, Ethiopia planned a “rearrangement” of the RRTs and demining companies in the Somali region, and to release 171.5km2 
through survey and 1.9km2 through clearance.30 As at June 2020, Ethiopia has not reported on whether it restructured its 
demining capacity in the Somali region. Ethiopia far exceed its survey target, releasing nearly 329km2, but did not quite meet 
its clearance target of 1.9 km2, clearing only 1.76km2.31 In 2020, Ethiopia planned to continue demining in the Somali region and 
expected to release 171.5km2 through survey and to clear 4.3km2 (see Table 2).32
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The work plan raises a number of critical questions as to 
whether it is realistic and achievable. For example, Ethiopia 
does not provide detail on how the significant jump in 
projections for clearance from 1.9km2 in 2019 to 4.3km2 
in 2020 is to be realised. The request indicates that one 
additional “demining company” will be added during the 
extension period, but does not specify at what time this  
will occur or the number of deminers who will form the 
company. EMAO informed Mine Action Review that it was 
90 deminers.33 The request also foresees that one deminer 
will clear on average 40–50 square metres per day, 22 days 
a month, 10 months a year; projections which would seem 
improbably high.34
Ethiopia is due to submit to the States Parties, by 30 April 
2021 and then a second time by 30 April 2023, updated work 
plans for the remaining period covered by the extension 
request. The Review Conference requested that these work 
plans contain an updated list of all areas known or suspected 
to contain anti-personnel mines, annual projections of 
which areas would be dealt with each year and by which 
organisations during the remaining period covered by the 
request, and a revised detailed budget.35
Table 2: Planned land release in 2019–25
Year
Area to be 
reduced/
cancelled (m2)
Area to be 
cleared (m2) Totals
2019 171,507,352 1,905,438 173,412,790
2020 171,507,352 4,300,000 175,807,352
2021 171,507,352 4,300,000 175,807,352
2022 171,507,353 4,300,000 175,807,353
2023 171,507,352 4,300,000 175,807,352
2024 171,507,352 4,300,000 175,807,352
2025 0 3,900,000 3,900,000
Totals 1,029,044,113 27,305,438 1,056,349,551
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Ethiopia previously reported in 2017 that its NMAS would be “developed and updated” and that standing operating procedures 
(SOPs) for mine clearance and other land release would be revised according to the IMAS. It had also reported that this would 
happen in 2015, according to its extension request targets.36 As at June 2020, Ethiopia had not reported that the revisions had 
been completed. 
Ethiopia’s second extension request details the land release methodology it intends to employ in demining operations.37 The 
request claims that manual demining is the most efficient and least costly method of clearance, and states that machines 
cannot be used due to the terrain of the remaining contaminated areas.38 However, with such large projections for cancellation 
and reduction of SHA, Ethiopia should consider other options beyond manual clearance, particularly MDDs for technical survey.
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
All survey and clearance in Ethiopia are conducted by the national demining companies of the Ethiopian Armed Forces. 
Ethiopia’s second extension request foresees that following a “rearrangement” of its four demining companies and four RRTs, 
which included two technical survey/RRTs and two specialist EOD teams in 2019, these four demining companies and four RRTs 
will be deployed each year through to the end of its Article 5 extension period in 2025.39 According to EMAO, two companies 
were deployed for clearance in 2018, along with two technical survey teams, and one EOD team.40 As at June 2020, Ethiopia had 
not reported on operational capacity deployed in 2019.
The request claims that the manual clearance, technical survey, and EOD teams have carried out extensive trainings and “are 
enough capable to implement the activities mentioned in the detailed work plan”.41 Ethiopia has reported that while it has six 
ground preparation machines, these were not in use as all remaining hazardous areas are located in remote areas, which it 
claims are only suitable for manual clearance.42
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of 330.28km2 of mined area was released between end-April 2019 and end-April 2020 across 128 hazardous areas, 
of which 1.76km2 was cleared, 10.31km2 was reduced through technical survey, and 318.22km2 was cancelled through 
non-technical survey. A total of 128 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed.




From end-April 2019 to end-April 2020, a total of 328.52km2 was released through survey all in the Somali region, of which 
the vast majority was cancelled through non-technical survey at 318.22km2 compared to 10.31km2 reduced through technical 
survey.43 This is a massive increase over 2018 when a total of 94.3km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey and there 
was no reduction through technical survey.44
Table 3: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201945





Table 4: Reduction through technical survey in 201946






From end-April 2019 to end-April 2020, a total of 1.76km2 was cleared in the Somali region with 128 anti-personnel mines 
and 5,812 items of UXO found and destroyed. All the areas were released through manual clearance because the area is 
mountainous and remote.47 This is an increase from the just under 1.1km2 cleared in 2018, when 582 anti-personnel mines,  
3 anti-vehicle mines, and 7,265 items of UXO were destroyed.48
Table 5: Mine clearance in 201949
Province District Areas cleared Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed UXO destroyed
Somali Kebribeyah N/K 534,132 28 1,779
Gerbo N/K 472,112 23 1,124
Sagiagi N/K 751,703 77 2,909
Totals 1,757,947 128 5,812
AP = Anti-personnel 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ETHIOPIA: 1 JUNE 2005
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2015
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JUNE 2020
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5YEAR, 7MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2025
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Ethiopia is required to 
destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its 
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 
31 December 2025.50 In its 2019 Article 5 deadline extension 
request, Ethiopia listed the following reasons for its inability 
to comply with its Article 5 obligations: insecurity in and 
around some mined areas; the lack of basic social services 
and infrastructure necessary for operations in rural areas; 
continuous redeployment of demining teams in scattered 
mined areas; lack of funding; the identification of additional 
hazardous areas; climate (such as a three-month rainy 
season); and a lack of precise information on the number  
and location of mined areas.51 
Ethiopia has been at best, overly ambitious, or at worst, 
negligent in its projections and estimations for completion 
of survey and clearance in recent years. Its 2017–20 work 
plan, submitted in October 2017, stated that it was “realistic” 
that all 314 areas then remaining could be addressed 
using “all available demining assets in Ethiopia” within the 
extension time period, and that donor funding will enable 
it “successfully to complete the clearance of contaminated 
areas from land mines and fulfil the legal obligations of the 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention by 2020”.52 This did  
not occur.
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The second extension request clearly sets out primary 
assumptions and risk factors in implementing its targets: 
that donor funding will increase steadily; that old demining 
equipment is replaced by “licensed” demining equipment; 
that one deminer will clear on average as much as 50 square 
metres per day, 22 days a month, and 10 months a year; 
and that one additional demining company will be added, 
for a total of five deployed. As noted, however, the average 
clearance average per deminer appears unrealistically high.53
Ethiopia’s clearance output rose by 60% from 2018 to 2019 
to 1.76km2 and though this was short of its clearance target 
for the year it exceeded its land release through survey 
target by 91%. This is, however, for the period April 2019 
to April 2020 rather than calendar year 2019. Ethiopia has 
not reported on its deployed operational capacity during 
this period, so it is unclear how these massive increases in 
productivity were achieved and its annual clearance targets 
still seem very ambitious. While Ethiopia has reported 
improvements in border security and greater access for mine 
action operations, discussions with Eritrea are still ongoing 
and clearance cannot be completed until these issues are 
resolved. It is not impossible for Ethiopia to meet its Article 5 
deadline, but it would benefit from providing an updated work 
plan with realistic and costed annual targets for land release. 
Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







* Estimated clearance based on report for 2016–18 
**Reporting year is 31 April 2019–31 April 2020
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
The scope of residual contamination remains unknown in Ethiopia. Ethiopia acknowledges that landmines may have been 
left because of lack of information during clearance operations, because of ground movements, or exposure to rain. It is also 
possible that more mines have been laid in recent armed conflicts.54 As at June 2020, Ethiopia had not reported on whether  
it has a strategy for managing residual risk post-completion.
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The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) appointed a new acting director in June 2019, who took steps to address delays in the 
issuance of task orders while the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) ceased issuing task orders and came under 
DMA tasking authority. A transfer of responsibility within the government for issuing permits for movement between Federal 
Iraq’s governorates in November 2019 resulted in severe bottlenecks that left some operators unable to deploy survey and 
clearance teams to their area of operations for months, causing a serious loss of productivity. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Iraq should resolve as a matter of urgency delays in issuing movement permission and visas resulting in prolonged 
stand down of operational assets. 
 ■ The Iraqi government should provide the DMA with the legal authority, funding, equipment, and training for staff to 
enable it to discharge its responsibilities. 
 ■ International donors should address the severely limited capacity and resources in the national mine action structures.
 ■ Iraq should explicitly recognise mines of an improvised nature as part of its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) treaty obligation and both national mine action authorities should amend reporting forms to allow recording 
of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, rather than recording them as improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
 ■ The DMA should tackle the persistent inability of its information management system to provide comprehensive, 
disaggregated data on the results of survey and clearance, detailing the contribution of every active organisation. 
 ■ The DMA should review and revise information management procedures to ensure timely entry of survey and 
clearance results into the database. 
 ■ Iraq’s two national mine action authorities should adopt a common format for reporting results of survey and 
clearance consistent with the International Mine Action Standard (IMAS).
 ■ Iraq should consider establishing an in-country platform bringing together the authorities, donors, and key 
stakeholders to help strengthen national coordination. 
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(20% of overall score)
6 6 Iraq has a broad understanding of the location of legacy mined areas and is keen to 
conduct further survey to determine more precisely the extent – when resources are 
available. In the meantime, it continues to make progress surveying areas liberated 
from Islamic State and which are heavily contaminated with improvised mines.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
4 4 Federal Iraq has not provided the DMA with the legal status and institutional 
authority to effectively manage the mine action activities of key ministries. Transfer 
of authority for issuing movement permits for demining operators to the NGO 
Directorate in late 2019 resulted in paralysis and loss of months of operations by 
internationally funded survey and clearance teams. 
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
5 4 The DMA has engaged with UNMAS and other international organisations to 
strengthen gender diversity in mine action but progress remains slow in a 
male-dominated society. While demining operators employ women in administrative 
and support roles and community liaison, their employment in demining operations 




(10% of overall score)
4 4 Iraq presented a timely and much improved Article 7 transparency report covering 
2019 but information management continues to be a major challenge. The DMA 
introduced an online tasking system to promote efficiency but delays in uploading 
results left operators without access to timely, accurate information and gaps in 
official data made it difficult to determine progress in mine action. 
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
4 3 Operators experienced major delays in issuance of task orders by the DMA in early 
2019. Discussions between the DMA, UNMAS, and other stakeholders eased tensions 
over the issue but out-of-date data accompanying task orders remained a concern 
for operators.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
5 5 Iraq’s national mine action standards are old, exist only in Arabic, and do not address 
contemporary challenges such as clearance of improvised mines or search and 
clearance of buildings. The DMA has started discussions on updating standards with 
international partners but so far without result. 
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
6 6 Iraq appears to have released significant amounts of land through survey and 
clearance in 2019 but the weakness of data prevents precise determination of how 
much. Iraq will find it difficult to sustain this level of clearance in the face of shrinking 
international donor support and the impact of COVID-19 lockdowns.
Average Score 5.1 4.9 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Federal Iraq:
 ■ Ministry of Health and Environment
 ■ Directorate of Mine Action (DMA)
 ■ Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI):
 ■ Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Ministry of Defence
 ■ Ministry of Interior: Civil Defence, EOD Directorate
 ■ IKMAA
 ■ Akad International Co. for Mines
 ■ Al Danube
 ■ Al Fahad Co. for Demining
 ■ Al Khebra Co. for Demining
 ■ Al Safsafa 
 ■ Alsiraj Almudhia for Mine Removal
 ■ Arabian Gulf Mine Action Co.
 ■ Al Waha
 ■ Eagle Eye
 ■ Nabaa Al-Hurya
 ■ Ta’az Demining
 ■ Wtorplast Demining
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Danish Demining Group (DDG) 
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Humanity & Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap 
International) 
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG) 
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
 ■ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) 
 ■ G4S 
 ■ Optima
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Iraq remains the world’s most mine-contaminated country but lacks a credible baseline estimate of the extent of mined area. 
Iraq’s mine action authorities estimated total mine contamination at the end of 2019 at 1,866km2. Federal Iraq accounted for 
close to 90% of the total or about 1,652km2, but the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) also ranked on its own among the world’s 
most heavily affected areas with 214km2 of anti-personnel mined area.1 
The estimated total for end 2019 was almost 10% more than a year earlier, partly as a result of a higher estimate of the extent 
of improvised mine contamination in Federal Iraq and also due to the inclusion of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in the KRI, 
not cited in the previous Article 7 transparency report. 
FEDERAL IRAQ
Most of Federal Iraq’s AP mine contamination consists of “legacy” mined areas heavily concentrated in southern governorates, 
which date back to the 1980–88 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion by the United States (US)-led coalition 
(see Tables 1 and 2). They include major barrier minefields on the border with Iran stretching from Basrah to Missan and 
Wassit governorates. The estimate of these mined areas remains largely unchanged since the previous year but is based on 
rapid survey conducted more than a decade ago. 
The DMA is confident that re-survey of these minefields would result in cancellation of significant areas.2 Iraq, however, 
has also reported discovery of previously unrecorded minefields totalling 31.9km2 almost entirely located in the southern 
governorates of Basrah, Missan and Muthanna. More than three-quarters of this was made up of a single mined in Muthanna 
reported to cover more 25km2. It also included 0.39km2 in Ninewa governorate’s Sinjar district and two small hazardous areas 
in Salah al-Din’s Baiji district.3
Table 1: Mined area in Federal Iraq (at end 2019)4
Contamination type CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total area (m2)
Anti-personnel mines 293 1,008,304,514 48 17,290,546 1,025,595,060
Improvised devices* 752 344,500,329 352 281,781,708 626,282,037
Totals 1,045 1,352,804,843 400 299,072,254 1,651,877,097
* The area attributed to mines of an improvised nature
Table 2: Legacy AP mined area in Federal Iraq by governorate (at end 2019)5
Governorate CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total area (m2)
Anbar 0 0 1 1,580 1,580
Basrah 55 882,104,181 1 962,731 883,066,912
Diyala 1 0 28 15,791,646 15,791,646
Missan 200 47,204,517 3 400,183 47,604,700
Muthanna 4 38,978,577 0 0 38,978,577
Ninewa 2 390,786 9 132,792 523,578
Salah al-Din 1 43,274 6 1,614 44,888
Wassit 30 39,583,179 0 0 39,583,179
Totals 293 1,008,304,514 48 17,290,546 1,025,595,060
Since 2017, demining operations have focused on clearing liberated areas resulting in release of large areas in the past two 
years but the estimated area of improvised mine contamination increased slightly in 2019 to 626km2 at the end of 2019, up  
from 611km2 a year earlier (see Table 3).6 Estimated contamination rose particularly in Anbar governorate where operators 
only started systematic non-technical survey in 2019; and in Nineveh, one of the governorates most densely contaminated  
by Islamic State improvised mines and also the subject of comprehensive non-technical survey in 2019. 




Table 3: IED/Improvised mined area (at end 2019)7
Province CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total area (m2)
Anbar 261 17,634,929 70 131,972,120 149,607,049
Baghdad 0 0 1 3,577,320 3,577,320
Diyala 6 206,540,876 12 47,617,198 254,158,074
Kirkuk 29 62,489,538 13 804,591 63,294,129
Ninewa 372 49,725,284 246 97,243,165 146,968,449
Salah al Din 84 8,109,702 10 567,314 8,677,016
Totals 752 344,500,329 352 281,781,708 626,282,037
Iraq continues to report contamination in areas liberated from Islamic State as IEDs, but confirms that the vast majority of 
devices cleared are victim-activated making them anti-personnel mines. Of 9,726 improvised devices that the DMA reported 
were destroyed in Federal Iraq in 2019, just two were command detonated.8 International operators have encountered a wide 
variety of improvised devices left by Islamic State but report particularly common variants are initiated by a pressure plate  
or “crush necklace” wires sufficiently sensitive to be detonated by the weight of a child and connected to an explosive charge  
of ammonium nitrate and fuel. The size of the charge typically ranges from 3kg to 100kg.9 
KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ
The KRI recorded confirmed mine contamination of 182km2 at the end of 2019, and SHAs amounting to a further 31.5km2.10 
Although the total is higher than shown in 2019 it represents a 5% drop from the amount recorded at the end of 2017.11 The KRI 
has recorded very little contamination by IEDs or improvised mines, reporting only 6 CHAs affecting 161,722m2 and 14 SHAs 
affecting 1,141,539m2.12 KRI data do not include areas on the border with Turkey which have never been surveyed because of 
continuing fighting and Turkish airstrikes.13
Table 4: KRI Mined area by province (at end 2019)14
Province CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total area (m2)
Dohuk 401 20,303,678 0 0 20,303,678
Erbil 336 48,503,023 0 0 48,503,023
Halabja 0 0 9 1,988,806 1,988,806
Slemani 2,374 113,287,594 120 29,506,016 142,793,610
Totals 3,111 182,094,295 129 31,494,822 213,589,117
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The mine action programme in Iraq is managed along regional lines. The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) represents 
Iraq internationally and oversees mine action for humanitarian purposes in Federal Iraq covering 15 of the country’s 19 
governorates.15 Mine action in the KRI’s four governorates is overseen by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), 
which reports to the Council of Ministers and is led by a director general who has ministerial rank.
FEDERAL IRAQ
The inter-ministerial Higher Council of Mine Action,16 which reports to the Prime Minister, oversees and approves mine action 
strategy, policies, and plans. The DMA “plans, coordinates, supervises, monitors and follows up all the activities of mine 
action.” It draws up the national strategy and is responsible for setting national standards, accrediting, and approving the 
standing operating procedures (SOPs) of demining organisations and certifying completion of clearance tasks.17 
The DMA said it asked the government for $30.6 million a year for survey and clearance18 but it has not reported how much it 
received or provided any details of government expenditure on any aspect of mine action.
Coordinating the planning, tasking, and information management among all the actors has remained a significant challenge.  
As a department of the Ministry of Health and Environment, the DMA has less authority than the politically powerful Ministries 
of Defence and Interior, which manage significant explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and mine clearance capacity, as well as 
the Ministry of Oil. Additionally, the DMA’s status is not formally established by law.19
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Rapid turnover of directors has also hampered management 
and policy continuity. Essa al-Fayadh, who was at least the 
tenth director since 2003, was transferred to a different office 
in February 2019. Deputy Minister of Health and Environment 
Kamran Ali took over as acting director of the DMA until 
June 2019 when Khaled Rashad Jabar al-Khaqani, a former 
DMA director, was reappointed to the position. As of June 
2020, his appointment had still not been confirmed. The 
DMA, meanwhile, appointed a new operations manager in the 
second half of 2019 and changes in Iraq’s political leadership 
in 2020 raised the possibility of further management changes. 
The DMA oversees three Regional Mine Action Centres 
(RMACs): 
 ■ North: covering the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, 
Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah ad-Din;
 ■ Middle Euphrates (MEU): Babylon, Baghdad, Karbala, 
Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wassit; 
 ■ South: Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar. 
RMAC South, located in Basra City, maintained its own 
database and was responsible for tasking operators in its 
area of operations. RMAC North and MEU were located in 
Baghdad but RMAC North also opened a satellite office in 
Mosul in August 2019.20
Federal Iraq’s spending on the DMA and mine action 
is unknown. The sector remains heavily dependent on 
international donor funding, most of it channelled through 
UNMAS and bilateral funding to clearance operators. In 
the past two years, the Iraqi government and donors have 
given priority to tackling massive contamination by mines 
of an improvised nature in areas liberated from Islamic 
State, leaving scant resources for tackling contamination 
by explosive remnants of war (ERW) in others areas of Iraq, 
including the substantial cluster munition remnant threat 
concentrated in the south. 
Iraq has taken steps to streamline procedures for operators 
who are required to register with the NGO Directorate or the 
Ministry of Trade before they can be accredited by the DMA, a 
process that in the past could take years. Operators reported 
that frequently changing bureaucratic procedures governing 
tasking, reporting, team deployments, and residency 
consumed considerable time and energy, significantly 
hampering productivity. DMA management changes in 2019 
reportedly smoothed relations between the DMA and UNMAS 
and appeared to pave the way for some internal restructuring 
within the DMA.21 
However, operators reported another major setback 
in November 2019 when the government transferred 
responsibility for issuing the permissions to move between 
governorates, which operators are required to renew monthly, 
from the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Centre to the NGO 
Directorate. The transfer appears to have taken place without 
adequate preparation, resulting in procedures for issuing 
the permits coming to a halt. Some operators were able to 
obtain movement permits from local authorities in some 
governorates but many demining teams were left unable to 
access their area of operations forcing them to halt work for a 
period of months. The NGO Directorate reportedly issued some 
movement permits in mid-March 2020, but they arrived just 
before a COVID-19 lockdown came into effect, leaving affected 
operators no opportunity to restore operations.22 
KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ
IKMAA functions as a regulator and operator in the KRI. 
It reports directly to the Kurdish Regional Government’s 
Council of Ministers and coordinates four directorates in 
Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Sulimaniya (Slemani). Financial 
constraints halved salaries for all staff for the last three 
years and resulted in a number of posts being left vacant,  
but in 2019 payment of salaries resumed and IKMAA planned 
to fill vacant posts.23 
IKMAA did not respond to requests for information about its 
capacity, priorities, and operating results. 
OTHER ACTORS
UNMAS established a presence in Iraq in mid 2015 to assess 
the explosive ordnance hazard threat in liberated areas 
and set three priorities: explosive threat management to 
support stabilisation and recovery, including the return of 
people displaced by conflict; deliver risk education, nationally 
and locally; and build capacity of government entities to 
manage, regulate and coordinate Iraq’s response to explosive 
contamination. In 2019, it employed 100 staff, of whom 43 
were internationals.24 
Funding through UNMAS has declined sharply since 
2017 when international donors mobilised to tackle the 
humanitarian emergency arising from Islamic State 
occupation and the threat from massive improvised mine 
contamination left in areas liberated from its control. UNMAS 
received US$76.9 million in 2019, some of it for activities in 
2019–20. In 2019, it received US$31.15 million, some of it for 
2020 and 2021. By May 2020, it had received pledges of an 
additional US$11.9 million. UNMAS total expenditure on mine 
clearance operations in 2019 amounted to US$37.8 million.25 
As part of its technical support to national mine action 
authorities in 2019, UNMAS, in close collaboration with the 
DMA, assessed DMA capacities by co-locating mine action 
technical advisors at the joint mine action coordination 
committee. Other activities included gender mainstreaming 
externally and internally, providing explosive hazard 
management support and risk education in areas retaken 
from Islamic State; and training the Ministry of Interior’s  
EOD capacity.26 




GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
The Iraq National Strategic Mine Action Plan specifically 
refers to gender equality and gender mainstreaming 
within mine action activities as objectives of an effective 
programmatic response.27 
The DMA has had a Gender Unit since 2017. It was led in 
2019 by the deputy head of the Planning Department28 and 
is said to encourage women to apply for employment in 
mine action.29 UNMAS developed terms of reference for the 
Gender Unit and designed and implemented a training plan. 
It also developed the Gender Unit’s first Action Plan laying 
out activities designed to mainstream gender throughout 
the DMA. Additional support provided by UNMAS included 
two training workshops for risk education, planning 
teams on developing gender-sensitive indicators and 
mainstreaming gender issues in their activities. IKMAA also 
reportedly established a Gender Committee in 2019 and 
UNMAS reported developing terms of reference setting out 
responsibilities and a reporting structure. 30 
UNMAS conducted a baseline assessment of the DMA’s 
gender policy and practice in 2019, which concluded it had 
succeeded in raising awareness of gender both internally 
and in other government institutions engaged in explosive 
hazard management. Despite that progress, UNMAS 
observed challenges remained for recruitment, promotion 
and involving women in all levels of decision-making. UNMAS 
observed that “a highly patriarchal society, male dominated 
work force and general misunderstanding of what exactly 
‘gender in mine action’ means in the day to day practical 
application of activities, continues to hinder widespread 
changes in mind sets and behaviours”.31 
International operators and their national partners recruit 
women for a variety of roles, subject to cultural sensitivities 
that vary in different parts of the country. Most operators 
employ women in administrative office roles; many also 
have a significant representation of women in community 
liaison and risk education functions; while some also employ 
women in clearance teams, including as team leaders. 
The possibilities for employing women depend on cultural 
sensitivities that varied between regions.32 Most international 
NGOs reported having a 50-50 balance between women and 
men in community liaison teams but recruitment of women 
in clearance operations is more problematic as a result of 
cultural barriers and the social unacceptability of women 
working alone or outnumbered by men. 
The proportion of women engaged in operational roles 
ranged from around 6% for HALO Trust (12% across all roles), 
which hired women to join non-technical survey teams since 
2018,33 to 17% for Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which had 
mixed gender teams working in the north and west of Iraq 
in 2019. It planned to set up an all-woman multitask team 
in 2020 that would allow women to develop technical and 
leadership skills before moving on to become team leaders of 
mixed gender teams.34 The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action 
(FSD) recruited and trained an all-female clearance team 
in 2019 supervised by a male team leader but planned on 
training a woman team leader in 2020.35 
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) employed 105 women making 
up 10% of its total staff in 2019, 87 of them in operational 
roles representing 6% of operations personnel. These 
included 26 deminers, 4 team leaders, and 4 deputy team 
leaders, as well as one mechanical operator and five medics. 
In Sinjar district’s Yazidi community, MAG employed women 
for manual clearance and as mine detection dog handlers. 
All community liaison teams consisted of one woman and one 
man. As teams are recruited locally, they also represented 
the ethnic composition in those areas.36
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The DMA and IKMAA maintain databases using Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New 
Generation with technical support from iMMAP, a commercial 
service provider based in Erbil and working under contract to 
the US Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement (WRA).
Federal Iraq’s mine action database is located at the  
DMA’s Baghdad headquarters. RMAC South (RMAC-S) 
maintains a database in Basrah, receiving reports from 
demining organisations in its area of operations, which is 
synchronised with Baghdad’s at intervals determined by  
the volume of data to be uploaded.37 
Operators are required to submit results to DMA in hard 
copy in Arabic delivered by hand every month. DMA then 
uploads results manually into the database. The procedure 
meets Iraqi legal requirements, which do not recognise 
electronic copies, but can cause delays of several months 
before results of survey and clearance are uploaded. As a 
result, operators say task orders issued by the DMA have 
often lacked the most up-to date information.38 The fact 
that task orders and completion reports are not permitted 
electronically and are not archived complicates the process 
of tracking communications.39 Operators working on projects 
funded through UNMAS report in English directly to UNMAS 
from the field through a UN reporting system, Survey123. 
UNMAS-approved data is then submitted to the DMA. 
Although iMMAP coordinates data on behalf of the DMA and 
IKMAA, operators report the extent to which information  
was shared by all national actors is unclear.40
The DMA gave operators access to an online dashboard 
presenting mine action data and in 2019 introduced an Online 
Task Management System which it claimed as the first in the 
world and through which operators can request IMSMA data 
relating to specific tasks. Operators said the utility of these 
tools was limited by the slow entry of operating results into 
the database, the variable quality of data, depending on the 
source, and the patchy availability of information on land use 
and livelihoods, which is useful for planning and prioritisation 
but is not shared systematically.41
148   Clearing the Mines 2020
Since 2019, the DMA regularly convened meetings of an Information Management technical working group involving all 
demining organisations but proceedings and decisions reached were mostly unrecorded and were not followed up. As a  
result, operators said personnel changes in the DMA often resulted in changes to procedures. Reporting forms enable 
collection of the necessary data but provide little guidance on how they should be completed and what data can be reported 
under different activities.42 
Iraq has submitted Article 7 reports annually. Its report covering 2019 was one of the earliest submitted in 2020 and a major 
step forward in the breadth and depth of information provided. But it continued to report mines of an improvised nature as IEDs, 
underscoring shortcomings in IMSMA reporting forms which do give operators an option to record anti-personnel mines of an 
improvised nature as separate from other IEDs that are not victim-activated and which therefore do not meet the definition of an 
anti-personnel mine. 
PLANNING AND TASKING
Iraq submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request in 
April 2017 that laid out a general direction for mine action 
and issued a national strategic plan for 2017–21 that defined 
roles of national institutions and summarised the findings of 
previous surveys. Both documents were largely superseded 
by the emergency response to address massive contamination 
by mines of an improvised nature and ERW in areas occupied 
by Islamic State between 2014 and 2017 in order to facilitate 
the return of internally displaced persons, rehabilitation of 
public services, and restoration of the economy. 
The scale of that challenge, which is concentrated in north 
and west Iraq, largely marginalised efforts to address legacy 
minefields and cluster munitions contamination in southern 
governorates.43 Iraq informed the Oslo Review Conference 
in November 2019 it had formed a committee to prepare an 
updated national strategic plan covering the period up to its 
next Article 5 deadline in February 2028.44 
In the KRI, IKMAA started work on a five-year strategy 
in the last quarter of 2017, which focused on clearance of 
legacy minefields. IKMAA’s priorities remain unchanged and 
include clearing agricultural land, infrastructure, tackling 
CHAs close to populated areas as well as areas reporting 
most mine incidents and casualties.45 Population return from 
cities and big towns to rural areas as a result of changing 
socio-economic conditions has increased pressure for rural 
area clearance.46
In Federal Iraq, tasking and reporting requirements proved a 
source of tension between the DMA, UNMAS, and international 
operators in 2018 and 2019, prompting action to try to resolve 
problems arising from weak coordination and frequent shifts 
in official procedures. The DMA had reported that operators 
requested task orders for survey or clearance of areas that 
had already been surveyed or cleared and failed to follow 
up some task orders issued by the DMA.47 International 
actors reported multiple concerns, including long delays in 
receiving DMA responses to task order requests, holding 
back productive use of survey and clearance assets, the poor 
quality of data accompanying task orders, and lack of clarity  
or consistency in reporting requirements.48 
Before February 2019, UNMAS had issued task orders 
unilaterally for projects funded through the UN, a significant 
irritant for the DMA. After February, UNMAS came under 
DMA tasking authority and a “dual key” system was 
introduced according to which implementing partners needed 
both a DMA task order and an UNMAS work order before 
starting work on UNMAS-funded contracts. The DMA, IKMAA, 
and UNMAS agreed a new Task Order Process in July 2019, 
clarifying the roles of national mine action authorities and 
government entities, including the ministries of defence and 
interior, and reportedly resulting in more efficient tasking. 
From late 2019, UNMAS reported engaging in regular task 
coordination meetings at the DMA.49 





STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Iraq has national mine action standards for mine and battle area clearance, non-technical survey, and technical survey that 
were written in 2004–05. The standards exist in Arabic only and operators report even that version has been hard to locate. 
Some standards have been updated, but standards on land release reportedly have not kept up with amendments to the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) or developments in the threat environment in Iraq.50 No standards exist for survey 
and clearance of improvised mines and operators have followed internal SOPs which are reviewed and approved by the DMA 
in the course of accreditation.
Iraq also lacks standards for search and clearance of buildings and operators conducting building clearance either worked 
according to their own SOPs or UNMAS’s Standard Working Practices (SWP) for implementing partners.51 UNMAS produced 
a revised SWP on Residential Area Clearance including new tasking procedure aligned with the DMA’s, guidance on housing, 
land, and property due diligence and standardised handover forms.52
The DMA set up a committee in October 2019 to review and update standards with the intention of producing draft revisions 
by the end of the year. The DMA consulted a number of stakeholders, including international demining organisations and the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) but as of mid 2020, the process was still a work in progress.53 
The DMA acknowledged in 2019 that its quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) capacity had struggled to keep up with the 
sharp growth in mine action and to back up its six two-person QA teams it accredited five commercial companies and six NGOs 
for QA.54 UNMAS had limited capacity to QA work by organisations it contracted early in 2018, but in the course of the year 
hired additional QA staff.55
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The DMA reported a total of 61 organisations accredited for 
some aspect of mine action in 2019 but identified only 17 
as active in mine survey or clearance: Al-Waha, Al-Danube, 
Al-Fahad Co. for Demining, Alsiraj Almudhia for Mine 
Removal, Arabian Gulf Co., Civil Defence, Danish Demining 
Group (DDG), HALO Trust, HI, MAG, Ministry of Defence,  
Nabaa al-Hurya Co., NPA, RMAC-South, FSD, TAAZ, and 
Wtorplast Demining Co.56 
The Ministry of Defence reported in 2019 that it had twelve 
600-strong engineer battalions conducting EOD and clearance 
of mines of an improvised nature in which approximately 
half the personnel (equating to several thousand men) were 
operators. Army engineers worked on tasks identified as 
priorities by local government authorities.57 In Federal Iraq, 
the Army remained the only organisation authorised to 
conduct demolitions.58 The Ministry of Interior’s Civil Defence 
units employed 494 personnel divided into teams deployed in 
every governorate tackling unexploded ordnance and other 
ERW but were not systematically clearing IEDs or mines 
of an improvised nature.59 The DMA said it was working 
with Ministry of Defence, Border Guard Forces, and the 
Directorate of Energy police on setting up additional capacity 
for survey and clearance operations.60
IKMAA remains the biggest mine action operator in the  
KRI focused on clearance of legacy mined areas. IKMAA 
reported in 2018 that it had 37 demining teams employing  
444 personnel, 7 mechanical teams, 3 EOD teams, 5 survey 
teams, 37 QA teams, and 10 risk education teams61 but has 
not since responded to requests for information. 
Six international humanitarian demining organisations 
continued in 2019 to focus on survey and clearance of 
areas liberated from Islamic State. DDG employed around 
164 people, including 104 EOD/clearance staff operating in 
Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, and Basrah governorates, but it was 
forced to downsize after Iraq’s NGO Directorate suspended 
its registration on a technicality in May 2019. This blocked 
renewal of its accreditation with the DMA and led to a 
suspension of all operations for a period of several months. 
As a result, DDG closed offices in Tikrit and Kirkuk while 
retaining an operational presence in Erbil, Mosul, and Basrah. 
In 2020, it focused operations on Ninewa (Mosul) and Basrah 
but planned, subject to availability of funding, to return to 
Salah al-Din.62 
FSD underwent significant expansion in 2019, adding four 
clearance teams to bring total clearance capacity to 12 teams 
with 93 deminers, as well as creating three risk education/
non-technical survey teams and starting up a mechanical 
clearance team equipped with an armoured front-end loader 
and front-end excavator. All assets operated in Ninewa 
governorate’s Al Hamdaniyia, South Mosul and Makhmur 
districts clearing improvised mines.63
HALO Trust had a total staff of 65 working at the end of 2019, 
slightly smaller than a year earlier, operating in Salah al-Din 
and Anbar governorates, starting an UNMAS-funded project 
in Ramadi in July 2019. HALO’s capacity included two manual 
demining teams and a higher proportion of mechanical than 
most other operators with three teams operating front end 
loaders, tracked excavators as well as tipper trucks. Despite 
the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, it believed 
additional funding in 2020 would allow expansion in 2020.64
MAG, which has worked in Iraq for 28 years, remained the 
biggest international operator in 2019 with 1,071 employees 
and 81 operational teams. MAG expected some funding to  
end in 2020 and was preparing to stand down around 300 
people in the course of the year.65 In Federal Iraq, MAG’s 
capacity included 42 demining and 22 survey/community 
liaison teams supported by five mechanical teams and 
three MDD teams. Its mechanical assets included 11 front 
end loaders, 8 excavators and seven Backhoes. MAG’s 
IED Disposal dogs received accreditation in 2019 although 
difficulties obtaining movement permissions hindered their 
use. In the KRI, MAG had a further 21 teams, of which 12 were 
multi-task demining and BAC/EOD teams, 5 survey teams,  
3 MDD and 1 mechanical.66 
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After a second successive year of significant growth, NPA had a total staff of 208 at the end of 2019, including 90 deminers 
working in 14 teams, another 57 staff in six EOD/battle area clearance teams and 54 people deployed in 11 survey teams. It 
also doubled the number of mechanical teams from two to four, operating two armoured front-end loaders, a Bobcat backhoe 
which has proved particularly useful lifting improvised mines and a Komatsu. Since 2018, NPA’s clearance operations have 
focused mainly on Ninewa governorate but in 2018 it opened a project office in Ramadi to support operations in Anbar, in 2019 
it opened a sub-office in Anbar’s Haditha district and in 2020 it will halt land release operations in Ninewa, shifting its focus to 
Anbar. Two of its eight Ninewa teams have been trained for QC and will continue in Ninewa providing QC support to the DMA’s 
RMAC North.67 








Army 12 est. 3,000 0 0
IKMAA 37 444 0 7 teams
DDG N/R 104 0 DDG closed offices in Tikrit and Kirkuk while retaining 
an operational presence in Basrah, Erbil, and Mosul.
FSD 12 93 0 1 team
HALO 2 49 0 3 teams
MAG  
(Federal Iraq)
42 518 Personnel 13 5 teams
MAG (KRI) 12 207 21 1 team
NPA 14 90 0 4 teams NPA doubled its mechanical teams in 2019.
Totals 131 4,505 21 dogs 21 teams
* Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
FSD, HALO Trust, and MAG prepared to add drones to their inventories for use particularly in building searches but security 
services have yet to authorise their use in operations.68 NPA has also applied for permission to use drones and planned to 
conduct a research project using drones for survey in southern Iraq on minefields and cluster munition strikes.69 
MAG and NPA are also exploring use of mine detection dogs (MDDs) for tackling improvised mine contamination. MAG,  
which has already received accreditation for its dogs, prepared to deploy them in Sinjar district, using them for land release  
of low- and medium-risk areas and planned to conduct a pilot programme using MDD in non-technical survey and building 
search.70 NPA took delivery of its first dogs in Iraq in February 2020 and was preparing to accredit three teams for use 
on improvised mine belts, particularly in areas where machines cannot work, and searching building perimeter and 
checking rubble. NPA saw the deployment as an opportunity to test the dogs’ capacity for use in other improvised mine-rich 
environments such as Yemen.71
DEMINER SAFETY
FSD reported the death of an international staff member in September 2019 as he was dealing with an improvised mine in 
a mine belt in Erbil governorate’s Makhmur district. The device is believed to have been a VS500 type but the cause of the 
detonation is not known. None of the other devices in the belt had anti-lift devices but FSD changed its render-safe procedure 
to have the area around VS500s cleared and the device removed by a remote pull.72 
The army acknowledged in 2019 it had “sacrificed a lot of people” in clearance operations but gave no details73 and the DMA 
and IKMAA did not respond to requests for information.




LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Operating results reported by Iraq in its Article 7 report suggest it released significant amounts of confirmed or suspected 
hazardous areas for the second successive year in 2019, but the gaps in Iraq’s data and major inconsistencies with operating 
results reported by international operators continue to prevent a clear determination of the progress achieved. 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Iraq reported release of a total of 87.15km2 of mine and improvised mine contamination in 2019, including 46.13km2 through 
clearance. The total figure was less than two-thirds of the amount Iraq reported in 2018. Of the total area released, 81.7km2 
was attributed to Federal Iraq and 5.45km2 to the KRI.74 
Federal Iraq said it released 75.38km2 of “IED area” referring to land contaminated by mines of an improvised nature. Of this 
total, it reported 35.13km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey, and 40.24km2 released by clearance. Additionally, it 
released 6.33km2 of “legacy” mined area, 85% of it or 5.43km2 reduced through technical survey and the remaining 898,022m2 
by clearance.75 
IKMAA said the KRI released 2.27km2 of mined area, including 439,919m2 that was reduced and the remaining 1.83km2 was 
released through clearance. It also released a further 3.18km2 of area affected by improvised mines.76
Survey and clearance by military, humanitarian and commercial operators continued to concentrate on liberated areas heavily 
contaminated by Islamic State improvised mines, leaving minimal resources or capacity available for Federal Iraq’s legacy 
mined areas. Ninewa governorate was a particular focus of operations, accounting for nearly 90% of land cancelled and 58%  
of land cleared, according to official data,77 although operators recorded significant activity in areas where official data showed 
little land released.78 
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2018, Federal Iraq reported minimal amounts of land 
cancelled through non-technical survey and very large areas 
reduced through technical survey. In 2019, the DMA data 
reversed those outputs. In liberated areas that were the main 
area of operation for the military and international operators 
it showed no area reduction and recorded 35.13km2 as having 
been cancelled through non-technical survey (see Table 6). 
Iraq also reported in 2019 that non-technical survey had 
established that three governorates—Baghdad, Babylon,  
and Karbala—had no (legacy) mine contamination.79
International operators, however, recorded substantially 
higher levels of land release through non-technical survey, 
reporting cancellation of nearly 49km2 in 2019, together with 
area reduction through technical survey of 5.1km2. NPA 
recorded cancelling 23.9km2 in Anbar governorate and DDG 
reported 11.2km2 in Salah al-Din, both governorates in which 
official data showed almost no cancellation.80 Similarly, MAG 
said it cancelled 5km2 in Ninewa and released more than 
3km2 through area reduction.81 
No non-technical survey or cancellation occurred in Federal 
Iraq’s southern legacy minefields where clearance operations 
are believed to have been conducted largely by the military, 
civil defence, or commercial companies working under 
contract to the Ministry of Oil. But 85% of the 6.33km2 land 
that the DMA said was released in 2019 was reduced through 
technical survey.82 
The KRI did not record any cancellation through 
non-technical survey in 2019 but reported 439,919m2 was 
area reduced, of which 40% was in Erbil governorate.83
Table 6: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 
Federal Iraq in 201984







Table 7: Reduction through technical survey in Federal Iraq 
in 201985
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CLEARANCE IN 2019
FEDERAL IRAQ
Federal Iraq’s official results indicated that around 41km2 
was released through clearance in 2019 (see Table 8), 
approximately half the area said to have been cleared in 2018, 
but the limited and poor quality of official data available in both 
years prevented a clear determination of what was achieved 
and the claim was not credible. The DMA did not disaggregate 
the results of clearance by operator, including the Army’s 
demining teams, the Ministry of Interior’s Civil Defence teams, 
commercial companies, and international NGOs.
In addition to the clearance in areas liberated from Islamic 
State, which targets mainly improvised mines, the DMA said 
0.9km2 was cleared in Basrah and Missan governorates, 
resulting in clearance of 2,941 anti-personnel mines. 
Five of the six international humanitarian operators working 
in Federal Iraq reported clearing 10.6km2 in 2019, more than 
double the amount they cleared in 2018 (see Table 9).  
The area clearance by these INGOs represented barely 
one-quarter of the total recorded by the DMA in liberated 
northern governorates, yet their results shows they cleared 
more improvised mines in 2019 than the total reported by 
the DMA for all operators.86 Clearance conducted in tasks 
funded through UNMAS, which included tasks undertaken 
by commercial company G4S in Ninewa governorate’s Mosul 
and Sinjar districts, amounted to 5,272,670m2 and resulted in 
clearance of 52 structures and the destruction of 571 IEDs as 
well as 80 anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature.87


















Table 9: International NGO clearance in Federal Iraq in 201989
Operator Governorate Area cleared (m2) AP mines, including improvised mines, cleared
DDG Salah al-Din, Kirkuk 64,170 9
FSD Ninewa 3,989,293 3,185
HALO Salah al-Din, Anbar 355,110 528
HI N/R N/R N/R
MAG Ninewa 5,340,306 3,758
NPA Anbar, Ninewa 824,363 1,967
Totals 10,573,242 9,447
N/R = Not reported
KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ
The KRI reported clearance of 1,827,821m2 in 2019 mostly in Duhok, Erbil, and Slemani governorates, resulting in destruction 
of 1,768 anti-personnel mines and 19 anti-vehicle mines as well as 6,815 items of UXO. IKMAA accounted for about two-thirds 
of the cleared area but reported that MAG cleared 586,804m2 in Duhok and Slemani, about one quarter more than the area that 
MAG reported clearing in the KRI.90 
IKMAA also reported release of 90 areas covering 3.17km2 resulting in clearance of 45 devices identified as IEDs together with 
17 anti-personnel mines and 133 items of UXO, but it did not identify the location or operators involved.91
MINE ACTION REVIEW CONSOLIDATED CLEARANCE FIGURES
Table 10 sets out the basis for Mine Action Review’s figure for clearance in Iraq in 2019, including the means by which figures 
were estimated. This undoubtedly understates total clearance in Iraq in 2019. The Army, Ministry of Interior Civil Defence and 
police conducted some clearance in all governorates but results were not reported for security reasons. Mine Action Review 
prefers a conservative approach given the weaknesses of both the data and of Iraq’s information management processes  
and reporting.








AP mines, including 
improvised mines, cleared Comments
DDG, FSD, HALO 
Trust, MAG, NPA
Anbar, Basrah, Kirkuk, 
Ninewa, and Salah al-Din
10,573,242 9,447
DMA Basrah and Missan 898,022 2,941
Army Anbar and Ninewa 2,400,000 Estimate based on 2,000 men 
working for 120 days, clearing 
an average of 10m2 a day.
IKMAA, MAG Duhok, Erbil, and 
Slemani
1,827,821 1,768




ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR IRAQ: 1 FEBRUARY 2008
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2018
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (10YEARS): 1 FEBRUARY 2028
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
ten-year extension granted by States Parties in 2017), Iraq is 
required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas 
under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not 
later than 1 February 2028. Iraq will not meet the deadline 
given the sheer scale of the contamination remaining. 
Iraq has the potential to achieve major reductions in 
estimates of remaining contamination in the course of 
its extension period. The DMA is confident that estimates 
of the extent of legacy contamination, now in excess of 
1,000km2, can be reduced by at least a quarter in the course 
of re-survey.92 With heavy donor investment in mitigating 
the impact of Islamic State’s occupation, Iraq appears to 
have released large amounts of land in the last three years. 
Available data does not make it possible to provide a clear 
statement of results but suggests operators may have 
released at least 50km2 through survey and clearance in 
2019. Operators believe clearance of Ninewa governorate’s 
Hamdaniya district is in sight of completion.93 Survey and 
clearance are also gaining momentum in Anbar governorate. 
It looks doubtful, however, that Iraq will be able to sustain 
the pace of the past two years. Poor coordination between 
government institutions and complex bureaucratic 
procedures continue to present serious obstacle to efficient 
use of assets. A bottleneck in issuing movement permits to 
operators from November 2019 cost months of operations 
that may have tested donor patience even before the onset 
of COVID-19 pandemic which resulted in a lockdown in March 
2020, pausing most demining operations for additional 
months. These setbacks came at a time when international 
donor support was already on a downward trajectory, as 
indicated by the sharp fall in funding channelled through 
UNMAS in 2019, and some operators expected to make 
significant cuts in capacity in 2020. 
Political uncertainty fuelled by street protests and changes 
in government leadership have slowed decision-making 
in the mine action sector. Continuing activity by Islamic 
State cells did not hold back mine action in 2019 but caused 
interruptions to work on some tasks and also adds a degree 
of uncertainty to mine action’s future prospects. 
Table 11: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance*







* These figures significantly understate the true extent of clearance but some of the 
figures provided by the Government of Iraq are not credible.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Mali should resume active engagement with the machinery of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).
 ■ In order to return to compliance with the APMBC, Mali should submit an Article 7 transparency report as a matter 
of urgency and provide other States Parties with an updated assessment of anti-personnel mine contamination and 
action to address it.
 ■ Mali should set up a national mine action centre with UN support to coordinate a systematic humanitarian response  
to explosive hazards.
 ■ Mali should develop capacity for explosive threat mitigation that is outside the context of military counter-improvised 
explosive device (IED) operations and responsive to humanitarian imperatives.
 ■ Mali’s mine action sector should apply International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) relating to survey and distinguish 
between non-technical survey and community visits. 
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ No national mine action authority or mine action centre
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Army, police
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
 ■ Operation Barkhane
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009 
NEW EXTENDED DEADLINE NEEDED
MALI
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION 
Mali faces a rising threat from improvised explosive devices, including mines of an improvised nature, as a result of escalating 
conflict involving multiple armed non-state actors. The upsurge in conflict since 2012 resulted in what UNMAS described as 
“targeted” use of anti-vehicle mines by armed groups1 and later in use of improvised explosive devices including many that  
are victim activated and qualify as anti-personnel mines under the APMBC. There is no estimate of the area affected.
The UN recorded 194 explosive incidents in 2019 of which 99 were reported to involve victim-activated devices. The 194 
incidents caused in total 229 casualties, of whom 61 people were killed. The number of incidents involving improvised mines 
was an increase on the 76 reported the previous year. The great majority of incidents occurred in the central Mopti region and 
in Kidal (see Table 1).2 A further 35 incidents were recorded in the first two months of 2020.3 The UN said nearly two-thirds 
of explosive incidents and 96% of civilian casualties occurred in the central region.4 Many casualties are victims of devices 
targeting major roads used by civilians as well as military and other security forces.5
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Table 1: Mine incidents recorded by UNMAS (2014–19)6
Region 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Gao 4 16 9 8 12 8
Kidal 28 26 25 19 29 27
Timbuktu 0 2 2 4 3 6
Mopti 0 0 0 2 27 53
Segou 0 0 0 0 5 5
Totals 32 44 36 33 76 99
The presence or extent of other mined areas is unclear. In its last Article 7 report, submitted in 2005, Mali had stated it had no 
areas affected by anti-personnel mines.7 DanChurchAid (DCA) and Association Mixte Belhadi reported the presence of three 
suspected mined areas in the Kidal region’s Tinzawatène district in 2016 but they were in insecure areas, located far from 
inhabited areas and the areas were never investigated. UNMAS says it has no evidence confirming the existence of these  
areas and has not recorded the presence of any minefields.8 
Around two-thirds of known IED incidents are victim-activated, typically equipped with an explosive charge of 6kg to 30kg, 
while the remaining one-third involve command-operated devices. Some improvised devices are constructed with Belgian  
PRB M3 minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines, which armed groups also employ individually to target vehicle traffic.9
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
Mali does not have a national mine action authority or 
programme. The government has agreed in principle to 
establish an authority within the Secrétariat permanent 
de la Lutte contre la prolifération des Armes Légères et 
Petits Calibres (ALPC). UNMAS said “it is supporting this 
endeavour.”10 Mine action observers have questioned  
whether the ALPC has sufficient seniority within the 
government to provide an effective platform.
UNMAS first deployed to Mali in January 2013 to conduct 
an emergency assessment of explosive threats. Since April 
2013, UNMAS has been referred to in UN Security Council 
resolutions that define the mandate for MINUSMA, acting 
as the focal point for mine action pending the creation of a 
national authority. 
Mali has no programme of systematic mine survey and 
clearance. UNMAS comments that “strategic planning will  
be linked to the establishment of a national authority.”11
UNMAS co-chairs the Humanitarian Mine Action Working 
Group (Groupe de travail sur la lutte antimines humanitaire 
– GT-LAMH) reportedly involving United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF) and international and national mine 
action non-government organisations. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) participate as 
observers. UNMAS reported the group usually convenes 
once a month in Bamako. Sub-national working groups are 
also convened when needed, for instance in Mopti region, 
Timbuktu or Gao involving actors working in the area.12
UNMAS operates an Information Management System for 
Mine Action (IMSMA) database for Mali (IMSMA NG Version 6). 
Since July 2013, UNMAS has recorded all known explosions 
and verified mine or IED incidents, providing data for maps 
that detail the explosive hazard threat and facilitate planning 
in affected areas. UNMAS said it shares technical data with all 
mine partners engaged in explosive threat mitigation.13 The 
Mine Action Working Group agreed in early 2020 that it would 
classify and report victim-activated devices as landmines.14
The UN humanitarian response plan for Mali in 2019 called 
for collection and analysis of information relating to explosive 
incidents, risk education, and non-technical survey to 
better understand the extent of contamination.15 The UN 
humanitarian response plan for 2020 called for:16 
 ■ Increased risk education with a view to lowering 
casualties from explosive hazards and light weapons.
 ■ Facilitating the safe return of internally displaced 
persons by clearance of explosive hazards and providing  
information on contamination levels.
 ■ Collection of information on explosive hazards and  
their clearance.




LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Malian and international security forces serving with MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane, led by French forces, are the only 
organisations clearing mines and IEDs.17 Clearance is limited to counter-IED operations and largely restricted to areas where 
they have security.18 Operators do not employ any mechanical assets or mine detection dogs.19
UNMAS did not provide details of results of EOD activities in 2019. The UN said 13,380 explosive remnants of war were cleared 
in 2019.20 However, communities are reportedly reluctant to take the risk of reporting the presence of IEDs as there is little 
likelihood EOD teams will deploy to areas of insecurity to clear them.21 
Mali has no national mine action standards. Malian defence and security forces are reportedly in the process of developing 
national EOD standards consistent with international standards. MINUSMA forces are governed by UN IED Disposal standards, 
the UN Guidelines on IED Threat Mitigation in Mission Settings, and the UN Peacekeeping Missions Military EOD Unit Manual.22
The UN reported that surveys were conducted in 152 locations as part of explosive threat assessment efforts in 2019 but gave 
no details of who conducted them or the affected areas. It said risk education activities had reached more than 62,580 people.23 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR MALI: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
NEW EXTENDED ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE NEEDED
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Mali was required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction 
or control not later than 1 December 2008. Since the expiry of this deadline Mali has encountered new anti-personnel mine 
contamination, in particular of an improvised nature, laid by non-state armed groups. 
Under the Convention’s agreed framework, in the event mined areas are discovered after the expiry of a State Party’s Article 5 
clearance deadline, it should immediately inform all other States Parties of this discovery and undertake to destroy or ensure the 
destruction of all anti-personnel mines as soon as possible. Mali has not submitted an Article 7 transparency report since 2012.
Given the extent of apparent contamination from mines of an improvised nature, Mali should request a new extended Article 
5 deadline, which should be no more than two years, affording it the opportunity to conduct the requisite assessment and, if 
necessary, survey. It must also fulfil its reporting obligations under the APMBC, including by reporting on the location of all 
suspected or confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status of programmes for the destruction of  
all anti-personnel mines therein.24
1 Email from Emily Kathleen Zeidler, Desk Officer for Iraq and Syria, UNMAS, 
New York, 3 September 2020.
2 Email from Marta Farres Rodrigues, Programme Officer, UNMAS, Bamako, 
26 May 2020.
3 UNMAS, “Mali: Explosive threat overview”, 29 February 2020.
4 “Mali, Plan de réponse humanitaire 2020”, UN Office for the Coordination  
of Humanitarian Affairs, March 2020, p. 89.
5 Email from Marta Farres Rodrigues, UNMAS, Bamako, 26 May 2020.
6 These include mines of an improvised nature recorded as victim-activated 
IEDs.
7 Article 7 Report (covering 2014), Form D.






14 Email from Benoit Poirier, Country Director, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 
11 March 2020.
15 “Plan de réponse humanitaire, Janvier à decembre 2019”, OCHA,  
December 2018, p. 41.
16 “Mali, Plan de réponse humanitaire 2020”, OCHA, March 2020, p. 89.
17 Email from Marta Farres Rodrigues, UNMAS, Bamako, 26 May 2020.
18 Skype interview with Sebastian Kasack, Senior Community Liaison Adviser, 
MAG, Bamako, 27 May 2020.
19 Email from Marta Farres Rodrigues, UNMAS, Bamako, 26 May 2020.
20 “Mali, Plan de réponse humanitaire 2020”, OCHA, March 2020, p. 89.
21 Skype interview with Sebastian Kasack, MAG, Bamako, 27 May 2020.
22 Email from Marta Farres Rodrigues, UNMAS, Bamako, 26 May 2020.
23 “Mali, Plan de réponse humanitaire 2020”, OCHA, March 2020, p. 89.
24 Final Report of the APMBC 12th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva,  
21 January 2013, p. 10.
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2021 
EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 1 JANUARY 2022
MAURITANIA
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Having previously declared fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in 
November 2018, Mauritania submitted a request in June 2020 to extend its Article 5 deadline by one year having discovered 
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. During the requested extension period, and once circumstances regarding 
the COVID-19 pandemic permit, the National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (Programme National de 
Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD) plans to conduct an assessment of suspected and confirmed mined 
areas, with the support of Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Mauritania should clarify whether the mined areas in question are currently under Mauritania’s effective control.  
If so, and they are also under its jurisdiction, they should proceed with all speed to undertake an assessment 
mission with NPA, as soon as funding and restrictions regarding COVID-19 permit. If, however, the areas are under 
Mauritania’s effective control but not under its jurisdiction, discussions need to be held as a matter of urgency with 
others concerned, in particular Morocco and the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic.
 ■ Mauritania should confirm whether the mined areas identified are newly discovered or if any of the areas were  
already recorded as mined but were previously thought to be not under Mauritania’s jurisdiction or its control.
 ■ Mauritania should report more accurately and consistently on the extent of anti-personnel mine contamination, 
including using the classification of suspected hazardous area (SHA) and confirmed hazardous area (CHA) in a  
manner consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). 
00KM2
TO BE DETERMINED







 ■ National Humanitarian Demining Programme for 
Development (Programme National de Déminage 
Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD)
NATIONAL OPERATORS




 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
In June 2020, after having declared fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations on 29 November 2018 at the Seventeenth Meeting of 
States Parties to the APMBC, Mauritania reported the discovery of mined areas (or “Zones”, as Mauritania refers to them). 1 
Mauritania has requested a one-year extension to its Article 5 deadline, during which the PNDHD, in collaboration with NPA, 
plans to investigate the mined areas and “possibly discover other areas not currently known”.2 One reported mine accident 
occurred in 2019, in the Nouadhibou region.3
Mauritania has now reported a total of over 8km2 of mined area (4.7km2 of CHA and nearly 3.4km2 of SHA) (see Tables 1 and 2).4 
However, it is unclear how the size and location of the 32 “zones” has been determined, and estimates of the size of mined 
areas is only provided for the region of Tiris Zemmour (in the north of the country), but not the other three provinces affected. 














Adrar (central) N/K 2 2 N/K N/K N/K
Dakhlet Nouadhibou (west) 11 4 15 N/K N/K N/K
Tagant (central) N/K N/K 1 N/K N/K N/K
Tiris Zemmour (in the north) 10 4 14 4,710,666 3,375,000 8,085,666
Totals 21 10 32 4,710,666 3,375,000 8,085,666
* N/K = Not known
It is also unclear whether all of the mined areas identified 
in Mauritania’s 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request 
are currently under Mauritania’s effective control, and, if 
so, whether they are also under its jurisdiction. If the areas 
are under Mauritania’s effective control but not under its 
jurisdiction, Mauritania will need to discuss this as a matter 
of urgency with others concerned, in particular Morocco and 
the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. It is also unclear to 
what extent the mined areas identified in its 2020 Article 5 
extension request are newly discovered or if any of the mined 
areas were already known but were previously thought to be 
not under Mauritania’s jurisdiction or its control.
Table 2: Anti-personnel mined area by zone (at end 2019)6
















* The table sums to 4,878,610.9m2, but in Mauritania’s extension request and its 
Article 7 report, the total is stated to be 4,710,666.2m2. 
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Mauritania previously declared completion of its Article 5 
obligations in November 2018, at the Seventeenth Meeting of 
States Parties.7 Prior to this, at the end of 2015, Mauritania 
had reported that it had released all known areas of 
anti-personnel mine contamination (which had totalled 40 
mined areas covering 67km2),8 but that other contaminated 
areas were thought to exist close to Western Sahara, which 
depending on the demarcation of the border, could be inside 
Mauritanian territory and thus within its jurisdiction.9 In its 
2015 request for a second extension to its Article 5 clearance 
deadline, Mauritania stated that it “suspects that the security 
system along the border with Western Sahara, which 
comprises fortifications and minefields, crosses Mauritanian 
territory, especially since there is no natural border 
between the two”. It also said that border markers from the 
colonial period were unclear, non-existent and/or found at 
intervals of between 115 and 175 kilometres.10 At the end 
of 2017, Mauritania reported no known or suspected areas 
containing anti-personnel mines following technical survey 
and clearance of an area with an estimated size of 1km2, in 
Ain Bintilli district, Tiris Zemmour region.11 The area had 
contained both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.12 
In its 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request, Mauritania 
reported release of a total of 130km2 of area since becoming 
a State Party to the APMBC in January 2001, with the 
destruction of 8,078 anti-personnel mines, 890 anti-vehicle 
mines, and 14,960 explosive remnants of war (ERW).13 This 
figure looks to include release of all contaminated areas, 
including those with ERW and not only mines.
Mauritania’s mine contamination was a legacy of the conflict 
over Western Sahara in 1976–78.14 A 2006 Landmine Impact 
Survey (LIS) had found a total of 65 SHAs covering 76km2 
and affecting 60 communities. This proved to be a significant 
overestimate of the actual extent of the mine threat. In 2010, 
Morocco provided detailed maps of minefields laid during the 
Western Sahara conflict. The minefields had been partially 
cleared using military procedures prior to the entry into force 
of the APMBC.15 In its 2020 extension request, Mauritania said 
that the large-scale use of mines in Mauritania was typically 
haphazard and without the use of plans or maps.16
Mauritania has also reported discovering cluster munition 
remnant contamination.17 Please see Mine Action Review’s 
Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report on Mauritania  
for more information.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour 
le Développement, PNDHD), which was created in 2000, coordinates mine action operations in Mauritania.18 Since 2007, the 
programme has been the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior and Decentralisation, with oversight from an interministerial 
steering committee.19 The PNDHD has its headquarters in the capital, Nouakchott, and a regional mine action centre (RMAC)  
in Nouadhibou. 
Mauritania estimates that it requires a total five-year budget of US$5.5 million, including $3 million to be provided by the 
PNDHD and the remaining US$2.5 million to be mobilised from other sources. PNDHD’s national contribution reportedly 
represents 54% of the total cost of its programme and, according to Mauritania, demonstrates its political will. Mauritania’s 
national contribution will include the provision of demining teams, support for deminers, the setting up of regional offices, 
assistance to victims, and logistical support.20
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
It is not known if the PNDHD has policies in place relating to gender and diversity in its mine action programme, and gender 
and diversity are not referenced in Mauritania’s 2020 Article 5 Extension Request or its Article 7 report covering 2019.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The national mine action database is held at the PNDHD. As at December 2017, Mauritania had strengthened its information 
management capacity by providing additional training to an information management specialist and migrating to Version 6  
of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) software.21






In March 2017, Mauritania reported that a new national mine action strategic plan for 2016–20 had been developed with 
primary aims and targets, including verification of Mauritania’s borders and clearance of any newly identified contamination 
by 2020; continuing risk education and victim assistance; and maintenance of national mine clearance capacities.22 According 
to its latest Article 7 report, submitted in 2020, part of the international cooperation and assistance sought by Mauritania is to 
support its efforts to draft a new mine action strategy.23
The main aims of Mauritania’s work plan for 2017–20 were to complete clearance of the remaining contaminated areas, 
establish a strategy for residual contamination, and declare their compliance with Article 5 before 1 January 2021.24 Mauritania 
declared compliance with Article 5 at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2018,25 but then subsequently 
submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request in June 2020, having newly discovered mined areas.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Survey and clearance operations are conducted in accordance with the Mauritanian National Mine Action Standards (NMAM), 
which are said to accord with IMAS. The NMAM include standards on non-technical survey, technical survey, mine clearance, 
and quality control (QC). The NMAM, which were adopted in 2007, were elaborated with the support of the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and in partnership with operators, most notably NPA.26 The NMAM are supposed to 
be reviewed once every three years,27 but have not been revised since 2006.28
Mauritania reports that non-technical survey is used to identify each CHA (“Zone Dangereuse Confirmée” or “ZDC”) and to 
cancel areas in which there is no evidence of mine contamination; and technical survey is then typically used to identify a  
“Zone Dangereuse Définie” (defined hazardous area or “DDZ”).29
In December 2019, Mauritania attended the Arab Regional Cooperation Programme 7th Annual Conference, which was 
organised by the GICHD in Jordan. In the conference, the PNDHD, along with other national authorities from the region, 
discussed and approved recently translated IMAS into Arabic and shared experiences of their own national standards.30
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In accordance with a 2006 decree, all clearance activities were conducted by the Army Engineer Corps operating under the 
PNDHD. In 2011, NPA signed a memorandum of understanding with Mauritania to provide support for mine and battle area 
clearance (BAC) in the country. NPA subsequently worked in Mauritania both as an operator and in a capacity-building role  
as a technical advisor for PNDHD until the end of 2015.31
The PNDHD has requested NPA’s support in 2020 to conduct an assessment mission to determine the details of mined areas 
discovered since its declaration of Article 5 completion in November 2018.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Mauritania did not release any mined area in 2019.
SURVEY IN 2019
Mauritania did not release any mined area through survey in 2019, but it did report that PNDHD teams and “foreign experts” 
conducting non-technical survey to confirm new mined areas.32 Non-technical survey was reportedly conducted by the  
PNDHD following information from shepherds and nomads in the region of Tires Zemmour (in the north of the country), and  
by fishermen in the region of Dakhlet Nouadhibou (in the west of the country).33 
According to Annex II of Mauritania’s latest Article 7 Transparency report submitted under the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions (CCM), an international organisation, GEODE, conducted a needs assessment of Mauritania’s demining programme 
on 3–7 January 2020. The assessment mission took place in Nouakchott, then in Noadhibou, where several mined areas were 
assessed by GEODE. According to GEODE’s report (incorporated as Annex II to Mauritania’s CCM Article 7 report covering 
2019), four mined zones were identified in the Noadhibou peninsular with a total estimated size of over 13km2 (“PK24”, 0.9km2 in 
size; “Guerguerat”, 0.3km2; “Zire Zargue”, 7.35km2; and “PK55”, 4.5km2). Photographs of mines at these four sites were included 
in GEODE’s needs assessment report for Mauritania.34 It is not possible to reconcile two of these minefield names with data 
reported by Mauritania under the APMBC (see Table 2 above), and the sizes of the mined areas do not seem consistent with the 
other information provided by the authorities.
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CLEARANCE IN 2019
Mauritania did not release any mined area through clearance in 2019.35
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR MAURITANIA: 1 JANUARY 2001
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2011
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2016
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2021
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (1YEAR INTERIM EXTENSION REQUESTED): 1 JANUARY 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET REQUESTED ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO (EXTENSION REQUESTED) 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): HIGH
Mauritania’s original Article 5 deadline of 1 January 2011 was previously extended twice and currently ends on 1 January 
2021. Mauritania had previously declared fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in 
November 2018, but in June 2020, Mauritania submitted a third interim extension request to its Article 5 deadline, reporting 
that it had discovered new mined areas in the regions of Dakhlet Nouadhibou, Tiris Zemmour, and Adrar.36 
Mauritania has requested a one-year extension of its deadline until 1 January 2022, in order to clarify the mined areas and 
confirm they are in Mauritanian territory.37 According to the request, the size of the suspected and confirmed mined areas 
totals over 8km2,38 but it is unclear how this figure has been determined and whether it only includes mined area or cluster 
munition remnant contamination too. 
Mauritania plans to conduct an assessment mission, with the support of NPA, as soon as restrictions due to COVID-19 
permit, in order to obtain additional information on the mined areas and inform its Article 5 planning.39 The PNDHD requires 
international funding and cooperation to finalise its work plan in northern Mauritania.40
Mauritania is requesting financial support for logistics (replacement of IT equipment; PNDHD offices and vehicles, and 
demining equipment and personal protective equipment (PPE)); organisational support (establishment of a functioning working 
environment for PNDHD; updating frameworks, including the drafting of a new national mine action strategy; updating of 
national mine action standards and operating procedures; and training of PNDHD staff); capacity building of PNDHD staff 
(including in planning, conducting, and supervising mine action activities); training (in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), 
reporting, and quality management); and operational support for planned actions in the provinces of Dakhlet Nouadhibou and 
Tires Zemour (including technical survey and hazard marking; quality management); and risk education.41
Mauritania has committed to keeping States Parties informed of developments at treaty meetings and through its Article 7 
reporting. 42 
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Mauritania has reported that it “will remain committed to dealing with any residual contamination”,43 although no details have 
been provided on its plans to establish a long-term sustainable national capacity to address previously unknown mined areas 
following completion (i.e. residual contamination).
Previously PNDHD had reported that one of the main aims of Mauritania’s work plan for 2017–20 was to establish a strategy for 
residual contamination.44
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Niger reported conducting its first mine clearance in three years and although very limited in extent it was funded nationally. 
In May 2020, Niger requested a four-year extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline in 
order to address less than 200,000m2 of anti-personnel mine contamination. Niger experienced a surge in attacks by non-state 
armed groups employing mines and other explosive devices of an improvised nature in 2018 which appears to have continued 
into 2019 and 2020. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Niger should submit a revised and comprehensive extension request with details of past survey and clearance, an 
updated list of mined areas requiring clearance, and a detailed work plan for meeting its international legal obligations.
 ■ Niger should submit annual Article 7 reports detailing the progress of mine action as the APMBC requires.
 ■ Niger should develop and implement a fundraising strategy to ensure it fulfils commitments made in its earlier  
Article 5 deadline extension request. 
 ■ Niger should seek and facilitate engagement of international demining organisations.
 ■ Niger should ensure its national mine action standards accord with international standards and that a quality 
management system is in place to safeguard the quality of demining operations. 
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(20% of overall score)
6 6 Niger has identified limited anti-personnel mine contamination in the Agadez region 
but it lacks clarity on the extent. It also now faces escalating attacks by non-state 
armed groups and new contamination from mines of an improvised nature. 
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
5 5 Limited mine action in the past five years was funded by Niger’s limited resources 
and Niger has not yet been successful in securing the international funding it 
requires to fulfil its Article 5 obligations. 
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
3 2 Niger reported at the Fourth APMBC Review Conference in November 2019 that 
women made up eight of the forty deminers deployed in June 2019 in the resumption 
of clearance operations. However, no reference to gender or diversity is made in 




(10% of overall score)
2 3 Inconsistent reporting on mine clearance points to weak information management. 
Niger has submitted only one Article 7 transparency report since 2012 (in 2018). 
Reporting is an obligation under the APMBC.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
3 3 Niger lacks a strategic plan for mine action or detailed work plans. A request to 
extend its Article 5 deadline by four years submitted in May 2020 left out key details 
including proposed timelines for clearance and available demining capacity. 
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
4 4 Niger has reported that it has national standards that are compliant with the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) but it is not known if they have been 
formally adopted. 
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
4 2 Niger said it released a tiny amount of mined area in 2019 after two years in which 
no land was released but its 2020 Article 5 extension request lacks clarity about the 
extent of clearance since 2014 and what remains to be done to achieve completion.
Average Score 4.1 3.7 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle  
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Niger reported in November 2019 that its remaining anti-personnel mine contamination amounted to 187,172m2 in the 
vicinity of Madama, a military base in the north-eastern Agadez region of the country, but Niger’s varying statements about 
contamination and clearance in recent years leave uncertainty about the precise extent of contamination remaining.1 A request 
submitted by Niger six months later in May 2020 for an extension of its Article 5 deadline did not clarify the issue. It said the 
remaining contamination amounted to 177,760m2 but supporting data is not consistent. It said the area was surrounded by 
barbed wire and monitored by sentries.2
Niger had previously reported in 2018 that it had two mined areas totalling 235,557m2 near Madama, consisting of a confirmed 
hazardous area (CHA) of 39,304m2 containing French M51 minimum-metal anti-personnel mines and a suspected hazardous 
area (SHA) of 196,253m2 with mixed AP and anti-vehicle mines.3 Nigerien army engineers, conducting earlier clearance 
operations, had found the mines buried in sand at depths of up to one metre.4 
Niger had previously identified five additional SHAs in the Agadez region (in Achouloulouma, Blaka, Enneri, Orida, 
and Zouzoudinga) but said non-technical and technical survey in 2014 had determined they were not contaminated by 
anti-personnel mines and that communities in the area had reported accidents only involving anti-vehicle mines.5 A PRB M3 
anti-vehicle mine was also discovered in March 2019 near the central town of Intikane, also in the Agadez region.6 The areas 
are all located in a remote desert area, 450km from the rural community of Dirkou in Bilma department and reported to 
contain mines that date back to the French colonial era.7 
NEW CONTAMINATION
Starting in the second half of 2018, Niger experienced a surge in attacks by non-state armed groups affiliated with Islamic State 
or al-Qaida, adding a new challenge in the form of mines of an improvised nature. Attacks were concentrated in the western 
Tillabery and Tahoua regions, employing a range of artisanal explosive devices, including anti-vehicle mines, victim-activated 
pressure plate devices that appear to meet the APMBC definition of anti-personnel mines; and command-detonated devices 
(which are not mines under international law).8
A mine or improvised explosive device (IED) detonation in January 2019 injured four Niger soldiers near Titahoune (Tillabery 
region)9 and an improvised device detonated under a convoy of vehicles in an ambush by insurgents in Tillabery in May 2019 
during which 28 soldiers were killed.10 A 12-ton armoured US Army vehicle was disabled in June 2019 by an improvised mine 
on the outskirts of Ouallem town (Tillabery region). The device was activated by a pressure plate linked to an 81mm mortar.  
Its explosion detonated a main charge consisting of nearly a dozen 60mm mortar shells.11 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons 
(Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites, CNCCAI), which reports directly to the President. 
All demining has been carried out by the Nigerien army. In 2015, Niger said it had 60 deminers but lacked sufficient equipment 
for them to be able to work at the same time.12 In its May 2020 extension request it noted the need for personal protective 
equipment, detectors, and transportation.13
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted evaluation missions to Niger in May 2015 and December 2017 to assess the possibility 
of assisting Niger to meet its Article 5 deadline. Contacts continued in 2019, exploring the possibility of NPA setting up a 
programme to support CNCCAI clearance operations, but in the end the support did not proceed in 2019 or 2020.14 
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Niger’s third Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in 2016, had made no reference to gender. Niger reported at the 
Fourth APMBC Review Conference, however, that women made up eight of the forty deminers deployed in June 2019 in the 
resumption of clearance operations.15 It did not address the issue in its fourth Article 5 deadline extension request in 2020.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Niger submitted an Article 7 report in 2018, the first report since 2012, covering the period 1 January 2013 through end April 
2018, but has not done so since. It delivered statements to the Intersessional Meetings and the Meeting of States Parties in 
2018 and the Fourth Review Conference in Oslo in 2019.




Niger does not have a strategic plan for mine action. Its third Article 5 deadline extension request in 2016 did not set out  
a work plan or benchmarks for survey or clearance as requested by the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation. 
Niger’s submitted its fourth Article 5 deadline extension request in May 2020 calling for four additional years to complete 
clearance of 177,760m2, but it does not set annual clearance targets or provide a detailed work plan for the extension period. 
The plan includes a graphic which indicates CNCCAI will deploy teams for clearance between 2020 and 202416 but does not 
identify what operating capacity is available for survey and clearance. It projects the costs of completion at US$1,143,750,  
of which US$400,000 is to come from national sources.17
Niger’s Article 7 Report for 2013–18 set out a rudimentary operational timeline providing for clearance of 196,253m2 by  
2020: 56,000m2 in 2018, 100,253m2 in 2019, and 40,000m2 in 2020.18 It has not met any of these targets so far.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In its Third Article 5 Extension Request (2016), Niger reported that it had drafted national mine action standards (NMAS) in 
accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and standard operating procedures.19 No information has been 
provided on whether Niger’s NMAS have been finalised and adopted.
An NPA team’s visit to Madama in December 2017 noted that manual clearance was the main tool of demining by Niger’s army 
engineers but highlighted the operational challenges. The M-51 mines mostly found in the area contained no metal components 
and were largely undetectable by conventional detectors and sufficiently small as to make detection by GPR-based detectors 
unreliable. This means that full manual excavation may be the only effective methodology. The process is slow and the sandy 
environment, prone to subsidence and back-filling, makes it difficult to maintain consistent excavation depths. Mechanical 
excavation using sifting and screening equipment would dramatically improve the speed of technical survey and clearance but 
faced severe logistical challenges because of the long distances, absence of roads, limited provisions for maintenance and cost. 
Mine detection dogs have also been deemed unsuitable because of the extreme climate and the potential for deep-buried mines.20
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
CLEARANCE IN 2019
It appears from data incorporated in Niger’s 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request that 11,500m2 of land was cleared 
between July and end 2019 with the destruction of 199 anti-personnel mines.21 CNCCAI reported to the Oslo Review Conference 
that it had deployed 40 deminers in mid-June 2019 to conduct mine clearance in Madama and that by the time of the conference 
in November it had cleared 9,080m2, destroying 183 anti-personnel mines. It said the operation was continuing and that it was 
funded by Niger from national resources.22 In its Article 5 deadline extension request, it reported total clearance between July 
2019 and March 2020 of 18,483m2 with the destruction of 323 mines.23 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR NIGER: 1 SEPTEMBER 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 SEPTEMBER 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR, 4-MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2015
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (1-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2016
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (4-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2020
FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (4YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED): 31 DECEMBER 2024
ON TRACK TO MEET REQUESTED ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO (EXTENSION REQUESTED) 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): MEDIUM
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Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
four-year extension request granted by States Parties in 
2016), Niger is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines 
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible, but not later than 31 December 2020. It is not on 
track to meet this deadline. 
In May 2020, Niger requested an Article 5 deadline extension 
of four years until 31 December 2024. The amount of 
time looks more than sufficient for the modest amount 
of contamination of contamination remaining but Niger 
has demonstrated only very modest progress or effort to 
comply with the APMBC and the request does little to build 
confidence in prospects for completion. The request does 
not provide detailed annual targets for clearance despite 
repeated requests for such planning by the other States 
Parties and vaguely asserts clearance will be conducted 
between 2020 and 2024.24 The request also does not address 
the emerging threat of mines of an improvised nature, 
and does not identify what preparation it is making for 
sustainable capacity to tackle contamination emplaced or 
found after completion. 
The request cites a number of difficulties confronting mine 
action in Niger, including environmental factors, (extremes 
of heat and cold, sandstorms, the remoteness of affected 
areas), insecurity in border areas, and competing priorities 
for funding (including counter-terrorist activities and 
measures to check the proliferation of illegal weapons). It 
states, however, that the only issue hindering clearance is 
the lack of funding. It estimates the total cost of completion 
at US$1,143,750 and says Niger will provide US$400,000, 
appealing to international donors for the balance of 
US$743,750. It also states that it cannot guarantee clearance 
without support from donors.25 
The extent of Niger’s progress since the Maputo Review 
Conference is uncertain because the results it reported for 
2014 to 2016 varied from 17,000m2 and 750 mines to 39,304m2 
and 1,075 mines.26 The Article 7 report Niger submitted in 
2018, covering 2013 to April 2018, set annual targets for 
achieving completion by the end of 2020 but it came nowhere 
near achieving them. Niger did not conduct any clearance in 
2018, attributing the inaction to a lack of financial resources, 
the higher priority given to counterterrorism activities, and 
the “failure” of unspecified international organisations to 
respect their commitments.27
Niger submitted a second request for an extension to its 
Article 5 deadline on 12 November 2015, less than two 
months before the expiry of its first extended deadline. States 
Parties observed this did not conform to procedure and left 
insufficient time for analysis and discussion. The decision 
also observed that the plan presented by Niger in the request 
was “workable but lacks ambition”. States Parties agreed 
to give Niger a one-year extension and requested that it 
provide, in its revised submission, information on the areas 
already released disaggregated by the method of release and 
an updated work plan listing all areas known or suspected 
to contain anti-personnel mines and annual clearance 
projections during the period covered by the request.28 The 
third extension request Niger submitted in 2016 did not 
include such a work plan and a request from the Committee 
on Article 5 Implementation for additional information 
received no reply.29 
Niger’s third extension request in 2020 said it needed more 
than US$3.2 million in funding to fulfil its remaining Article 
5 obligations, including $1 million for the CNCCAI from the 
national budget over the five-year period, and $2.2 million 
to be mobilised from external donors.30 Niger has made 
repeated appeals for international assistance for mine action 
and claimed receiving no external support for its activities, 
save for assistance from France for medical evacuation in the 
case of demining accidents.31 
Table 1: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Niger did not report having a strategy in place for managing residual risk post completion.
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Nigeria informed States Parties in May 2019 that non-technical survey and clearance of mines and improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) would start “as soon as security conditions permit”. Continuing deterioration in security obstructed fulfilment  
of that objective but Nigeria declared its intention to submit an Article 7 report and an application for a new Article 5 deadline. 
As at 1 October 2020, it had done neither. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Nigeria should expedite preparation and submission 
of a request for a new Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline. 
 ■ Nigeria should urgently implement its stated intention 
of developing a national strategy harnessing the 
resources of security forces and humanitarian 
organisations to clear anti-personnel mines, including 
those of an improvised nature. 
 ■ Nigeria should establish a national mine action 
authority to set policy and coordinate implementation 
of a national mine action strategy.
 ■ Nigeria should encourage and facilitate the provision 
of assistance and expertise from humanitarian 
demining organisations and continue to provide risk 
education to the civilian population.
 ■ Nigeria should submit an Article 7 report to inform 
States Parties to the APMBC of the discovery of any 
contamination from anti-personnel mines, including 
those of an improvised nature, and report on the 




 ■ No national mine action authority or mine action centre
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Army, police
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Danish Demining Group (DDG)
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
















































ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2012 
NEW EXTENDED DEADLINE NEEDED
NIGERIA
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Nigeria experiences heavy casualties from widespread use of IEDs, including improvised mines, by Boko Haram and other 
jihadist groups in the north eastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. The extent of contamination is not known.
Deteriorating security has prevented systematic survey of contamination and there is no record kept of hazardous areas.  
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) recorded 140 incidents involving explosive devices placed on roads in 
Nigeria in 2019, of which 67 detonated. UNMAS determined that at least 103 of these devices were victim activated, including 
by pressure plates. The few pressure-plate devices that were inspected were capable of being detonated by the weight of a 
person, meaning that they are covered by the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).1
The findings were consistent with the results of a scoping mission by UNMAS to assess explosive threats in Adamawa, 
Borno, and Yobe states in 2017. It noted widespread use of pressure-plate devices along the main supply routes which were 
configured to detonate from the weight of a person and function as very large anti-personnel mines.2 Borno state was the  
most severely impacted. Civilians reported the presence of victim-activated devices in 76% of Local Government Areas (LGAs) 
in Borno; 59% of LGAs in Yobe; and 52% of LGAs in Adamawa.3 
Improvised devices, whether body-borne, vehicle-borne, command-detonated, or victim-activated, continue to pose the main 
explosive threat. UNMAS determined there was no evidence of the use of industrially manufactured anti-personnel mines.4 
Boko Haram and other armed groups emplace improvised mines and other devices on an ad hoc basis particularly targeting 
key roads such as the Maiduguri-Konduga-Bama axis and the Bama-Banki or Bama-Pulka-Gwoza roads as well as some 
villages and water points.5 An explosive ordnance incident map has been compiled by national and international organisations 
outlines the area of conflict but insecurity has prevented any comprehensive non-technical survey.
The United Nations said 230 people were killed and more than 300 injured by improvised devices in north-east Nigeria in 2019.6
 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Nigeria does not have a formal mine action programme. The Nigerian army and police conduct explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) operations coordinated by the Theatre Commander to respond to operational priorities. The army’s clearance of 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) is primarily focused on facilitating military operations and clearing roads and areas to 
facilitate access for troops to carry out attacks on Boko Haram and keep military supply routes open.7 The army and the police 
also respond frequently to civilians’ request for ERW clearance when they report presence of explosive ordnance and some 
road clearance is conducted to facilitate civilian traffic.8 The police have seconded units to the military to conduct clearance  
in newly-secured areas and deployed EOD teams to Maiduguri and a number of other towns.9
Nigeria stated at the Oslo Conference in November 2019 that it had formed an inter-ministerial committee to develop a mine 
action strategy and prepare a work plan for survey and clearance in the north-east. The committee includes the ministries of 
Defence and Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management as well as the North-East Development Commission, the National 
Emergency Management Agency and the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and IDPs.10
The humanitarian response programme for the north-east has a Mine Action Sub-sector co-chaired by the Ministry of 
Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement and UNMAS. At the request of the UN humanitarian coordinator, in July 2018 
UNMAS deployed a team to Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, to provide planning, coordination and technical advice notably 
to support plans for return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and for the delivery of risk education, survey, and clearance.11 
UNMAS expected to recruit additional staff in 2020 to support new projects.12
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Nigeria, lacking a mine action programme, has not taken up gender in the context of mine action. 
The UN humanitarian response programme for 2019–21 unveiled in December 2018 said women, girls, boys, and men living 
in, or potentially returning to, areas suspected or known to be contaminated with mines or other explosive devices would 
be involved in all stages of mine action programming. It called for “age and gender appropriate risk education activities 
to minimize loss of life and injuries as a result of explosive remnants of war”, targeting 200,000 girls, 178,000 boys, 51,000 
women, and 45,000 men.13
International organisations are said to be gender sensitive. UNMAS’s seven-person team in Nigeria comprises five women and 
two men.14 Danish Demining Group (DDG) has a woman specialist leading its explosive ordnance risk education teams which 
has four women staff, and it has three female officers employed on non-technical survey and community liaison who also 
consult women and children in the community.15 Mines Advisory Group (MAG) employed a woman as operations manager in 
Maiduguri overseeing operations in the north-east of the country and its community liaison teams comprised one man and one 
woman. They also included one Hausa speaker and one Kanuri speaker and, where possible, one Muslim and one Christian to 
try to reach all parts of the community in the north-east.16 
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Nigeria does not have a mine action information management 
system and does not keep any database recording hazardous 
areas or explosive incidents.
MAG has maintained a database of different incidents related 
to mines and other explosive ordnance for several years, 
as well as collecting information on casualties.17 UNMAS 
said it also started to collect data on explosive incidents 
in 2018 and had developed a methodology to assess which 
explosive ordnance fall under the APMBC based on available 
information and field visits. Information was gathered mainly 
from open sources, including the Armed Conflict Location & 
Event Data Project (ACLED), as well as security information 
provided by the UN, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
and the Multinational Joint Task Force. Information was also 
provided by the Nigerian army and police EOD units, but not 
on a systematic basis.18 
Nigeria last submitted an Article 7 report in 2012. It informed 
the Oslo Review Conference that it intended to provide an 
Article 7 report in 2020 but as at 1 October had not done so.19
UNMAS worked on standardising reporting and information 
management in consultation with MAG and DDG.20 DDG and 
MAG share information with UNMAS on a monthly basis 
using agreed reporting forms.21 MAG reported that some 
non-technical survey outcomes were submitted to the Mine 
Action sub-Working Group.22 
PLANNING AND TASKING
Nigeria does not have an institutional framework for mine action, a strategic plan, or annual work plans for the humanitarian 
organisations responding to emergency needs in the north-east. 
The UN humanitarian response programme for 2020 determined that 1.5 million people were in need of mine action support23 
and the multi-year strategy for 2019–2124 provided for mine action activities focusing on:
 ■ Risk education on the dangers posed by explosive threats, with the aim of reducing the risk to a level where people can 
live safely. Priority locations were identified and divided between mine action organisations. 
 ■ Non-technical surveys to collect and analyse data on the presence, type, and level of contamination, in order to support 
land release and the prioritisation of any subsequent clearance; and
 ■ Clearance of contaminated areas.
In the absence of a national authority, DDG developed an intervention plan based on information such as reported explosive 
ordnance incidents and casualties and security updates.25 MAG determined its activities prioritising communities most at risk 
and conducting some surveys at the request of stakeholders. MAG coordinated its activities and operational areas with the 
Mine Action sub-Working Group.26
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Nigeria has no national mine action standards. UNMAS was working on preparation of mine action standards as of 2020.27 In the 
meantime, international organisations reported following their own technical standards and standing operating procedures.28
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS 
All clearance is conducted by the Nigerian army and police with support from paramilitary groups. UNMAS developed a project 
to be implemented in 2020 to provide police EOD training, including victim-activated devices.29
DDG, with five international and twenty-five national staff, deployed two teams in Borno state and one team in Adamawa, 
conducting non-technical surveys that are based on community liaison assessments as well as explosive ordnance risk 
education and EOD training for police bomb squad teams. Non-technical survey teams worked in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe 
states. In addition to its mine action work it runs an armed violence reduction programme.30 
MAG has worked in Nigeria since 2016, initially in arms management and destruction. In 2017, it opened an office in Maiduguri 
and started providing risk education to the internally displaced, refugees, and host communities affected by the conflict. In 
2019, MAG worked with five international and thirty national staff conducting non-technical survey and contamination baseline 
assessments as well as delivering risk education in camps for the internally displaced and training in explosive ordnance 
awareness to aid workers, government personnel, teachers, and other service providers.31
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
SURVEY IN 2019
MAG community liaison teams, funded through UNMAS, carried out 20 local non-technical surveys and six explosive ordnance 
assessments, mainly in secured urban areas in Borno state focusing on areas designated for the creation or expansion of IDP 
camps.32 DDG’s survey teams identified three confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in Adamawa state’s Betso community but 
mostly recorded spot tasks.33
CLEARANCE IN 2019
Nigeria has no record of results of clearance by security forces. 
Priorities include clearing areas to support resettlement of IDPs and keep open communications. To counter the regular mining 
of roads, security forces are checking and clearing some roads on a daily basis as well as spot clearance of devices reported 
by humanitarian agencies and communities.34
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR NIGERIA: 1 MARCH 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2012
NEW ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE REQUEST REQUIRED 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
Under Nigeria’s original Article 5 deadline, Nigeria was required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under 
its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2012. At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in 
November 2011, Nigeria declared it had cleared all known anti-personnel mines from its territory.35 
Under the Convention’s agreed framework, in the event mined areas are discovered after the expiry of a State Party’s Article 5 
clearance deadline, it should immediately inform all other States Parties of this discovery and undertake to destroy or ensure 
the destruction of all anti-personnel mines as soon as possible. 
Nigeria has acknowledged it has contamination by victim-activated mines of an improvised nature that meet the APMBC’s 
definition of anti-personnel mines and informed the Oslo Review Conference in November 2019 that it would prepare an  
Article 5 extension request with a view to completing its treaty obligations by 2025.36 The Ministry of Defence informed a 
meeting in July 2020 it would first submit a general request to be followed by a detailed request that it would submit not  
later than 31 March 2021.37 Nigeria had yet to submit its Article 5 extension request as at 1 October 2020. 
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Oman is making continued progress in conducting “re-clearance” of certain suspected mined areas and plans to complete 
release of these areas ahead of its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline in February 2025. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Oman should establish a mine action centre to oversee its national programme as soon as possible. 
 ■ Oman should ensure the release of all mined areas as soon as possible but not later than its Article 5 deadline  
in 2025.
 ■ Oman should ensure it conducts land release operations according to international standards, applying non-technical 
and technical survey to confirm contamination prior to clearance, whenever possible. 
































0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LIGHT
130,100M2 0
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2025 
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
OMAN












(20% of overall score)
7 7 Oman does not have any confirmed mined areas, but does have suspected 
contamination resulting from mined use during the 1960s and 1970s. Oman reported 
that it has cleared most of the suspected mined areas in accordance with available 
resources, but that it is now “re-clearing” certain areas to make sure they are free 
from anti-personnel mine contamination.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
7 7 The Army is the only institution involved in mine action. In 2018, Oman informed 
States Parties to the APMBC that it was considering setting up a mine action centre, 
but no subsequent updates have been provided with respect to this.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
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(10% of overall score)
6 6 In its Article 7 transparency report submitted in 2019, Oman included a work plan  
to release all remaining suspected mined areas before its 2025 Article 5 deadline. 
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
3 3 In 2019, as in previous years, Oman conducted clearance/re-clearance of mined 
areas, during which no anti-personnel mines were discovered. It is not known if 
Oman conducts evidence-based non-technical survey or technical survey prior  
to clearance, to better target its efforts.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
6 5 Oman cleared/re-cleared 130,100m2 of suspected mined area in 2020; a slight 
increase on the previous year. As at the end of 2019, Oman had completed 38% of the 
total area identified for re-clearance and was on track to complete re-clearance by 
its February 2025 Article 5 deadline.
Average Score 5.3 5.0 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ No national mine action authority or mine action centre
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Royal Army of Oman
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ None
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Oman is suspected to be contaminated by mines, though the precise location and extent of any residual threat is not known.  
In its initial Article 7 report, submitted in 2015, Oman declared that there were no areas in the Sultanate confirmed to be mined, 
but reported “many” suspected mined areas in the south, particularly in the Dhofar region.1 In a statement to the APMBC 
Intersessional Meetings in Geneva in June 2018, and in its Article 7 reports submitted in 2019 and 2020, Oman repeated there 
were no confirmed mined areas and no record of any mine casualties for more than 20 years, but referenced the previously 
mentioned suspected mines areas requiring “re-search”/re-clearance.2 
According to its 2015 report, during the mid 1960s to mid 1970s, the presence of rebel movements in Dhofar led to “vast” areas 
being affected by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. There was small-scale use of mines by militants without maps or 
records of where contamination was laid. Friendly forces reportedly cleared their own contaminated area directly after the 
end of actions in 1976 and the Armed Sultan’s Engineering Unit Forces initiated clearance of the areas suspected to have been 
mined by the militants.3
However, Oman has reported that it is impossible to be sure that the areas have been fully cleared, and therefore re-clearance 
of certain areas is required to ensure no anti-personnel mines remain.4 This is for three reasons: the size of the region (about 
99,000km²); the lack of maps or marking; and the terrain (which includes mountains and valleys), with many mined areas 
located on steep slopes. In addition, the rain over the years may have scattered the mines.5
In 2001, it had been reported that the Royal Army of Oman had mapped seven zones of suspected mined areas based on 
historical records of battlefield areas, unit positions, and mine incident reports.6
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Oman has not had a functioning mine action programme. Clearance is being performed by its army engineers.7 
Oman stated in June 2018 that it began implementing a national programme in 2017 and was planning to set up a national  
mine action centre and would then appeal for supply of equipment but it did not specify when this would occur.8 
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Details are not available on the extent to which gender is considered and reflected in Oman’s national mine action efforts.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
After becoming a State Party to the APMBC in 2015, Oman has submitted annual Article 7 reports covering progress in the 
previous calendar year.
PLANNING AND TASKING
In its Article 7 report submitted in August 2019, Oman provided a work plan for the release of all remaining suspected mined 
area before its Article 5 deadline in 2025.9 In 2020, Oman reported that it had completed 38% of total planned re-clearance  
and expected to complete clearance by its February 2025 deadline.10




1 Initial Article 7 Report, 2015, pp. 4–5.
2 Oman statement to the APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7−8 June 
2018; and Article 7 Reports (covering 2018 and 2019, respectively).
3 Initial Article 7 Report, submitted in 2015. 
4 Article 7 Reports submitted in 2015, in 2019 (covering 2018), and 2020 
(covering 2019). 
5 Initial Article 7 Report, submitted in 2015, pp. 4–5.
6 “Humanitarian Demining”, Journal of Mine Action, 2001, p. 49.
7 Article 7 Report (covering 2018).
8 Statement of Oman to the Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7−8 June 2018.
9 Article 7 Report (covering 2018).
10 Article 7 Report (covering 2019).
11 Article 7 Report (covering 2018).
12 Article 7 Report (covering 2019).
13 Ibid.; and Preliminary observations of the Committee on Article 5 
implementation, Intersessional Meetings, 30 June–2 July 2020.
14 Preliminary observations of the Committee on Article 5 implementation, 
Intersessional Meetings, 30 June–2 July 2020.
15 Article 7 Report (covering 2018).
16 Ibid.
17 Article 7 Report (covering 2019).
18 Statement of Oman, 17th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 29 November 2018. 
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Standards applied by the army are not known. Oman reported that mined areas were earlier cleared “in accordance with  
the resources available”.11
In 2019, as in the previous two years, no anti-personnel mines were discovered during re-clearance. Oman said the absence of 
anti-personnel mines “confirms the areas are cleared”.12 It is not known to what, if any, extent Oman has explored the possibility 
of conducting evidenced-based survey to confirm anti-personnel mine contamination, prior to conducting full clearance. 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS 
Oman’s army engineers are responsible for mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) clearance.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Between February and December 2019, Oman cleared 11 suspected mined areas totalling 130,100m2 in the Magseel region, 
during which no anti-personnel mines were discovered. During clearance operations in July 2019, however, a number of 
unexploded 81mm mortar shells were found and destroyed.13 Oman also reported that it had “re-inspected” suspected mined 
areas in Dhafar and verified that these areas are free from anti-personnel land mines.14
Clearance output in 2019 was a significant increase compared to the 79,200m2 of mined area cleared between July and 
December 2018.15 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR OMAN: 1 FEBRUARY 2015
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: YES 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): MEDIUM
Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Oman is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or 
control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2025. 
In its Article 7 report submitted in 2018, Oman presented a plan to complete clearance of remaining suspected mined areas by 
its Article 5 deadline.16 As at the start of 2020, Oman reported that it had completed 38% of the total planned re-clearance and 
expected to complete clearance by its February 2025 deadline.17
Oman has cited the challenges it faces in locating and clearing mines in large and remote areas of desert.18 
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
It is not known whether or not the Oman has made provision for a sustainable long-term national capacity to address 
previously unknown mined areas discovered following completion (i.e. residual contamination).





ANTIPERSONNEL (AP)  
MINE CONTAMINATION: 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
AP MINES  
DESTROYED IN 2019
AP MINE  
CLEARANCE IN 2019
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
All mined areas are located in territory under Israeli control. To date, Israel has not authorised demining operations to be 
conducted by or on behalf of the Palestinian Mine Action Centre (PMAC), but progress is being made in clearance of mine 
contamination in the West Bank by The HALO Trust. Clearance of Arraba minefield, in the governorate of Jenin, was completed 
by HALO in October 2019. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ PMAC should report accurately and consistently on the extent of mined area and annual clearance. 
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Higher Committee for Mine Action




 ■ The HALO Trust
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
In its initial Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 transparency report, submitted in November 2018, 
Palestine reported 69 areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines on the border with Jordan, covering a total area of 
18.51km2. All of the mined areas were said to be under Israeli control.1 Palestine also reported that it is not in a position to 
know whether there are further mined areas in East Jerusalem or in other areas of Palestine under Israeli control, including  
in the region of Israeli settlements or closed military zones.2
A HALO Trust survey of the West Bank in 2012 identified 90 minefields, 13 of which were laid by the Jordanian military in 
1948–67, while the remaining 77 were laid by the Israeli military along the Jordan River after the 1967 war. All minefields, 
including those laid by the Jordanian military, are under Israeli military control.3 Clearance operations must therefore be 
coordinated with the Israeli authorities, in addition to PMAC. In addition, in 2019 HALO Trust reported being made aware of 
three other anti-personnel mined areas in the Jordan Valley, namely at Shademot Mehola (65,000m2) and Sokot (228,000m2), 
containing mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine contamination; and at Taysir (5,500m2), which contains only anti-vehicle 
mines. Sokot is an Israeli-laid minefield while the other two minefields were laid by Jordanian forces.4 As at April 2020, these 
three minefields had yet to be formally surveyed by HALO, but they have a potential humanitarian impact.5
As at end of 2019, there was nearly 0.28km2 of confirmed mined area (excluding the Jordan Valley) across three minefields in 
Palestine and two minefields in no-man’s-land between the West Bank and Israel (see Table 1).6 All five minefields had been  
laid by the Jordanian army.
Table 1: Mined area (excluding the Jordan Valley) (at end 2019)7
Governorate Minefield Task Contamination CHAs Area (m2)
Jenin Qabatiya AV and AP mines 1 8,212
Yabad AV and AP mines 1 40,032
Tul Kareem Nur a-Shams AV and AP mines 1 37,810
Ramallah No Man’s Land Yalo AV and AP mines 1 104,226
No Man’s Land - Canada Park AV and AP mines 1 85,708
 Totals 5 275,988
CHA = Confirmed hazardous area  AV = Anti-vehicle  AP = Anti-personnel
This is a reduction of one minefield, compared to mine contamination at the end of 2018, as clearance of Arraba minefield in 
Jenin governorate was completed by HALO Trust in October 2019.8
Mine action is subject to the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, commonly known as the Oslo II 
accord, under which the West Bank is divided into three areas: Area A is under full Palestinian civil and security control;  
Area B is under full Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control; and Area C refers to areas where 
Israel has full civil and security control.9
Most mined areas are located in Area C of the West Bank, along the border with Jordan. Area C covers approximately 60%  
of the West Bank.10 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
PMAC was established in accordance with Palestinian Minister of Interior decision on 25 March 2012,11 which appointed a 
director and created a Higher Committee for Mine Action as an interministerial body, with 27 members representing the 
ministries of education, foreign affairs, health, intelligence, interior, justice, and military liaison, as well as the police and the 
Palestinian Red Crescent Society. The Higher Committee for Mine Action, which serves as the national mine action authority,  
is tasked with developing mine action legislation and allocating resources for the sector.12
PMAC, which is located in the Ministry of Interior in Ramallah, is mandated to coordinate all aspects of mine action in the  
West Bank. It receives technical advice from the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS).13 The committee has established a number 
of sub-committees to deal with technical issues, risk education, legal affairs, foreign affairs, and health and safety.14
In November 2016, Palestine announced that it was seeking to adopt and enact a mine action law. Palestine was hopeful of 
completing the legal procedures within a year and then presenting the draft law to the legislative council for endorsement, 
followed by signature by the President.15 As at June 2020, however, the process of developing and adopting the legislation  
was still ongoing.16
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PMAC, which has 10 employees,17 is staffed with personnel from the Palestinian National Security Forces, Civil Police, and Civil 
Defence. In 2013, 36 PMAC personnel were trained by UNMAS for demining but were not subsequently authorised by Israel to 
conduct clearance.18 The Civil Police have an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit with 42 personnel in Bethlehem, Hebron, 
Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Tulkarm, who conduct rapid response to locate and remove items of unexploded 
ordnance (UXO). The EOD unit is only permitted to work in Area A of the West Bank.19 
PMAC does not have its own budget, and the Palestinian authority only provides funding for the salaries of PMAC employees 
and the costs of the PMAC office.20 Israel does not grant Palestine authorisation to conduct mine clearance operations.21 
The Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA), provided funding for the last two months of HALO’s quality assurance 
(QA) costs at the Arraba minefield and for the full cost of QA at the Baptism Site Project in 2018 and 2019. In addition, since 
November 2019, the Israeli Ministry of Defence (MoD) has covered HALO’s clearance costs at the Baptism Site Project.22  
PMAC does not provide direct funding for HALO Trust’s clearance operations.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
PMAC has said it has a gender policy and implementation plan and that it disaggregates data by sex and age.23 There is 
reported to be equal access to employment for qualified women and men at PMAC, and two of PMAC’s ten employees (20%)  
are women, both holding managerial/supervisory positions.24
The HALO Trust has a global policy on gender and diversity. HALO Trust’s operations team works and lives within the 
Palestinian communities and is all male. During 2019, The HALO Trust deployed a female finance officer. For managerial 
positions within HALO’s West Bank office team, however, there is said to be equal access to employment for qualified women 
and men.25
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
PMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, Level 1.26 
The HALO Trust follows the INMAA’s national standards and provides daily and weekly reports as well as completion reports 
for every task. The information is shared with PMAC weekly, as well as sharing completion reports and GIS information for 
every completed task.27 As a result, all three entities are in possession of HALO Trust survey and clearance data relating to 
demining operations in the West Bank.
Palestine submitted an initial Article 7 report in November 2018, as required by the APMBC.28 However, Palestine’s Article 7 
report covering calendar year 2018 (submitted in 2019), did not contain any further details, including the amount of mined area 
cleared in 201829 and as at 1 August 2020, Palestine had yet to submit its Article 7 report covering 2019. 
PLANNING AND TASKING
PMAC has a Strategic Plan for 2017–20, in which primary objectives are the clearance of the Nur a-Shams, Qabatiya, and Yabad 
minefields.30 According to PMAC, there was an annual work plan in place for 2020.31
HALO Trust’s survey and clearance schedule in the West Bank is set in agreement with PMAC, INMAA, and its international 
donors.32 
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The HALO Trust’s standing operating procedures (SOPs), which are based on its international standards and which also comply 
with national standards, are approved by the INMAA. Once a year, The HALO Trust submits its SOPs, including any necessary 
amendments, to INMAA for approval.33
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OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
To date, Israel has not authorised demining operations to be conducted by or on behalf of PMAC. In September 2013, however, 
the INMAA gave formal authorisation for The HALO Trust to clear two minefields in the West Bank deemed high priority by 
PMAC. Following INMAA authorisation, HALO Trust began mine clearance in the West Bank in April 2014,34 and continues to 
conduct clearance operations in the West Bank. 
The HALO Trust works under the auspices of both INMAA and PMAC. Its manual clearance team in the West Bank is composed 
of deminers from Georgia with capacity varying between 15 and 22 deminers according to the task/work cycle. In addition, 
during 2019, HALO Trust deployed up to three armoured CASE721 wheeled medium loaders, two armoured tracked excavators, 
one industrial rock crusher, and two industrial screeners. The machines were operated by a Palestinian team.35 
The HALO Trust’s work in the West Bank complies with the Israeli Standard Institute for Standards, in particular ISO 9001, 
14001, and 18001. The HALO Trust carries out its own internal quality control (QC), which is conducted by senior programme 
staff, and which complies with the ISO standards and HALO Trust’s own SOPs.36 In addition, as required by INMAA, 4CI Security, 
an external INMAA-certified QA/QC company, is contracted to monitor HALO Trust’s clearance in accordance with Israeli 
National Mine Action Standards. QA at the Baptism Site Project and two months of QA at Arraba minefield were funded by the 
INMAA. The remaining QA costs in Jenin governorate were funded through private donations.37
The HALO Trust conducts both manual and mechanical clearance in the West Bank. It also uses a drone for survey and 
mapping purposes, and maps generated are shared with all parties involved for planning and follow up.38 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
The HALO Trust released 13,976m2 through clearance in 2019 and did not release any land through survey.39
Under Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II, Israel reported that INMAA had overseen 
clearance of approximately 577,000m2 in 2019, destroying 1,200 mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). In addition, the 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s Engineering Corps was reported to have cleared 106,000m2, destroying 911 mines and ERW.40 
However, there was no disaggregation on what proportion of this land release was of mined area (as opposed to battle area)  
or whether it also includes land released in Palestinian territory in the West Bank.
SURVEY IN 2019
No land was reduced through technical survey in 2019 or cancelled through non-technical survey.41 HALO Trust performs 
survey as part of its clearance operations of the Jordanian-laid minefields in Area C of the West Bank. It is part of 
pre-clearance task preparation and is of CHAs already recorded in PMAC’s database and on maps.42
CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, The HALO Trust cleared a total of 13,976m2 across Arraba and Yabad minefields in Jenin governorate, during which a 
total of 106 anti-personnel mines, 81 anti-vehicle mines, 1 other item of UXO, and 23 “danger remnants” (i.e. mine parts such  
as fuzes) were destroyed. Clearance of Arraba minefield was completed in October 2019.43 









destroyed UXO destroyed 
HALO Trust Jenin Arraba 11,179 94 81 1
HALO Trust Jenin Yabad 2,797 12 0 0
Total 13,976 106 81 1
This is a funding-related increase compared to 2018, when HALO Trust cleared 5,221m2.45 
In 2019, HALO’s clearance operations in Jenin governorate continued to be influenced by availability of funding for the external 
QA. Clearance in Jenin District was suspended January to April 2019 in the absence of QA funding. Operations were then 
resumed between 5 May and 18 December 2019 in Arraba and Yabad minefields where the clearance output in each task was 
as forecast.46
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The HALO Trust also commenced clearance of the West Bank minefield at Qaser al-Yahud (the Baptism Site Project), in the 
Jordan Valley, in March 2018,47 with both funding from international donors and Israel.48 Since November 2019, HALO Trust 
clearance of the Baptism Site Project has been entirely funded by the Israeli MoD.49 The project aimed to remove mines 
and explosive ordnance in the area of the Baptism Site, which covers a total estimated area of 870,000m².50 Approximately 
90,000m2 was thought to potentially contain anti-personnel mines, including those of an improvised nature.51 IDF minefield 
records provided to The HALO Trust separate the land for clearance outside of the church compounds into eleven areas, all 
of which contain a potential UXO threat. Six of the eleven areas were known to contain significant numbers of M15 anti-vehicle 
mines in multiple lines and more than 2,600 anti-vehicle mines in total. The land and buildings inside the seven church 
compounds are suspected to contain mines and booby-traps, but no official records exist regarding this contamination.52 
Clearance at the Baptism Site continued through 2019 and HALO Trust completed clearance of the seven churchyards and their 
compound buildings at the Baptism Site by mid-July 2019.53 
In November 2019, Palestine reported that 136 dunums (acres) in the Baptism Site and the Church’s land and building had been 
cleared, and the second section on 500 dunums (acres) of mined area adjacent to the church land had been started.54
Clearance at the Baptism Site continued as planned until 31 December 2019, along the valley floor, the battle area clearance 
(BAC) areas, and anti-vehicle mine lines.55 
PROGRESS IN 2020
The HALO Trust completed clearance at the Baptism Site on 23 April 2020. During January to April 2020, HALO completed BAC, 
located/destroyed the final 663 anti-vehicle mines, and cleared 12,200m² of anti-personnel minefield located on the southern 
side of the site main entrance and destroyed 502 anti-personnel mines. The Israeli MoD provided the funding HALO’s clearance 
operations at the Baptism Site from November 2019 to April 2020.56 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR PALESTINE: 1 JUNE 2018
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE. COMPLETION IS CONTINGENT ON POLITICAL FACTORS AND DEMINING PROGRESS MADE BY 
ISRAEL AND THE HALO TRUST, AS PALESTINE DOES NOT HAVE CONTROL OF MINED AREAS UNDER ITS JURISDICTION.
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
Clearance in the West Bank is constrained by available 
funding57 and is impacted by political factors, including  
the lack of authorisation granted by Israel for Palestine  
to conduct mine clearance operations.58 
It is, however, a positive development that The HALO Trust 
was permitted to begin mine clearance operations in April 
2014, and, as at the end of 2019, HALO had completed 
clearance of six minefields in Area C of the West Bank.59  
As at the end of 2019, three Jordanian-laid minefields in the 
governorates of Jenin and Tul Kareem, which fall within 
HALO Trust’s donor agreement, remained to be cleared. 
Funds permitting, HALO plans to complete clearance of Yabad 
minefield in 2020, followed by Nur a-Shams minefield during 
winter 2020/21, and then clearance of Qabatiya minefield.60
The COVID-19 pandemic did not affect HALO’s operations at 
the Baptism Site Project, but since 24 April 2020 operations 
had been suspended due to the lack of funding for QA. As 
at June 2020, HALO was trying to secure QA funding for the 
remaining minefields in Jenin and Tul Karem Districts.61
After completion of the three priority Jordanian-laid 
minefields, HALO Trust plans to look into clearance of  
certain mined areas in the Jordan Valley, a third of which  
are Israeli-laid.62 
In February 2019, INMAA hoped that clearance of mined areas 
in the West Bank would be finished in two years. According 
to INMAA, the Yalo and Canada Park minefield will both be 
cleared, but according to humanitarian prioritisation, noting 
that minefields are fenced and marked, and claiming that they 
have little humanitarian impact.63 
Furthermore, INMAA began survey of the Jordan Valley 
minefields in the West Bank in 2017, using Israeli national 
budget and operating with Israeli companies. INMAA sees 
significant potential for cancellation and reduction of land 
in the Jordan Valley, and is using various technologies 
and scientific tools to assess the likelihood of mine drift. 
INMAA planned to invest around ILS 900,000 (approximately 
US$250,000) on this project in 2017–19.64
Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Peru reported a massive increase in land release in 2019 compared to 2018 with its highest clearance output of the past five 
years. Its estimate of outstanding mine contamination continues to be unreliable with contradictory figures that cannot be 
reconciled by the amount of land released. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Peru should survey its outstanding mined areas to develop a more accurate baseline of anti-personnel mine 
contamination and report the resultant data.
 ■ Peru should develop and implement new policies for land release to ensure that targeted clearance is being conducted 
as part of a comprehensive land release methodology.
 ■ Peru should include in its annual Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 transparency reports details 
of progress in implementing its “Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024”. This should include 
an updated plan to completion with clear annual targets for land release. 
 ■ Peru should develop and implement criteria for the prioritisation of survey and clearance tasks.
 ■ Peru should develop a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan.
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(20% of overall score)
4 4 No progress was made in 2019 towards establishing an accurate estimate of 
anti-personnel mine contamination. Reported figures cannot be reconciled with the 
amount of land released in 2019 and continue to be inconsistent across reports and 
reporting periods.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
6 6 Peru has the requisite legislation and the necessary management structure in place 
to oversee demining operations. Peru funds all its own operations but there was a 
decrease in funding in 2019.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
5 2 Peru does not have a gender and diversity policy and implementation for mine 
action. While women and children participate in mine risk education activities it is 
not known if this consultation extends to survey. CONTRAMINAS reported that in 
2019, 20% of operational staff were female and 50% of managerial and supervisory 




(10% of overall score)
5 4 Anti-personnel mine contamination, survey, and clearance figures are inconsistent and 
inaccurate within reports and across reporting periods. In 2019, Peru reported that it 
had improved information management through the introduction of new software.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
6 5 Peru exceeded its land release target for 2019 in its national plan for demining  
2018–2024. It provided an updated plan in its Article 7 report, but the plan lacks detail 
and is based on numbers of mined areas rather than the extent of contamination. 
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
7 6 In 2019, Peru introduced mine detection dogs (MDDs) to conduct technical survey and 
has stated that it plans to use MDDs to identify contamination and conduct clearance. 
There was no change in demining capacity in 2019.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
6 3 Peru went from releasing 27,303m2 of contaminated land in 2018 to 137,078m2, of 
which more than half was from clearance. If it can maintain this output, then Peru 
should easily be able to meet its Article 5 completion deadline. It is, though, unclear 
whether it is sustainable.
Average Score 5.6 4.3 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE 
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Peruvian Mine Action Centre (CONTRAMINAS)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Peruvian Army’s Directorate General for Humanitarian 
Demining (DIGEDEHUME)
 ■ Anti-Personnel Mine Action Centre (CONTRAMINAS) 
Security Division (DIVSECOM)
 ■ Joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining 
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2019, Peru appears to have estimated 
anti-personnel mine contamination at 369,212m2 across  
108 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) within four “sectors”  
(see Table 1).1 Peru has not identified any confirmed 
hazardous areas (CHAs). Its reporting of outstanding mine 
contamination is also inconsistent within and between 
reports. Estimates in its latest Article 7 report, covering 
2019, vary2 and also differ from the one given in its statement 
to the Article 5 Committee in November 2019, when Peru 
reported 109 SHAs remaining over 400,000m2, with 5,500 
anti-personnel mines said to be left to clear and destroy.3 
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by sector (at end 2019)4






The size and extent of the 108 mined areas varies widely, 
with one area only 5m2 in size while the largest, by far, is 
estimated to extend over 160,000m2.5 In fact, most of this 
large area should be released by survey, without the need for 
recourse to full clearance. The true amount of contaminated 
land is probably no more than 100,000m2 as Peru does not 
use polygons to delineate hazardous areas, despite having 
detailed mine maps of almost all the affected areas. 
In its 2016 Article 5 extension request and “Updated National 
Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024” Peru stated that 
it would carry out survey activities to determine the size 
and location of the mined areas using minefield records.6 
Although some survey was conducted in 2019, as at the end 
of the year all of Peru’s outstanding contamination continued 
to be recorded in SHAs.
Mine contamination in Peru results from a 1995 border 
conflict with Ecuador. The mined section of the border was 
predominantly in the Condor mountain range that was at  
the centre of the dispute.
NEW CONTAMINATION
In 2019, following technical survey, two additional areas of previously unrecorded legacy anti-personnel mine contamination 
were located in the Tiwinza sector (Montufar Nuevo and CG-DC-5_Nuevo) of 400m2 each. In the Cenepa sector, a mined area 
estimated at 68,000m2 (PV La Media), which was previously thought to be in Ecuadorian territory, was found to be located in 
Peruvian territory and was therefore added to Peru’s national mine action database.7
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by the Peruvian Mine Action Centre (Centro Peruano de Acción contra 
las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS). CONTRAMINAS is responsible for setting strategy and priorities and for overall 
coordination of mine action activities. It consists of an Interministerial Executive Council, chaired by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and a Technical Secretariat, which oversees the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Directorate of Security and Defence.8
CONTRAMINAS was created in December 2002 after the issuance of a “Supreme Decree”, and an additional “Supreme Decree” 
issued in July 2005 provides additional regulation.9 Directive 001 governs demining operations at the Peruvian Army’s 
Directorate General for Humanitarian Demining (DIGEDEHUME) while Directive 006, issued by the Head of the Joint Command 
of the Armed Forces in 2001, regulates compliance under the APMBC.10
In its revised second Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in August 2016, Peru estimated that US$38.6 million 
would be needed to finish the job, all of which was due to be funded by the Peruvian government.11 This estimate was also 
included in its Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024. Since 2010, Peru has reported contributing about 
$1.4 million annually for anti-personnel mine survey and clearance which is less than the annual amount Peru believes is 
needed to complete clearance by 2024. Based on the figures it has supplied, almost half of this total cost could be saved by 
completing clearance by 2021. 
In its 2016 extension request Peru pledged to increase the annual budget to meet its requested deadline and in 2018 the annual 
budget was increased to $2.36 million although it had been costed at $3.88 million.12 In 2019, Peru contributed $1.32 million to 
demining operations.13 In addition, Peru has sought and received support from international entities.14




CONTRAMINAS does not have a gender and diversity policy but it does abide by gender equality legislation established in a 
2019 decree.15 It is not known if gender and diversity are mainstreamed through the national mine action standards (NMAS) 
but gender or diversity in relation to Article 5 do not feature in Peru’s 2016 Article 5 deadline extension request, in its Updated 
National Plan for Humanitarian Demining, or in its latest Article 7 report. 
Women and children are included in mine risk education activities but it is not known to what extent they are consulted during 
survey and community liaison. CONTRAMINAS reported that it consults the National Service for Protected Natural Areas 
(SERNANP) about the needs of ethnic and minority groups when planning demining activities. Victim data is disaggregated 
by sex and age but it is not known if other relevant mine action data is disaggregated. In 2019, 20% of operational roles were 
staffed by women and 50% of management and supervisory positions.16
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
CONTRAMINAS uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.17 In 2019, Peru linked IMSMA  
with ArcGIS software to improve its capabilities to map anti-personnel mine contamination.18
Peru submits its Article 7 reports on a timely basis and reports on its progress in Article 5 implementation at intersessional 
meetings and meetings of States Parties. However, the quality of data in these reports is poor with frequent inconsistencies 
and inaccuracies both within reports and across reporting periods. The Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, in its decision 
on Peru’s 2016 extension request, noted the importance of Peru providing updated information on an annual basis within its 
Article 7 reports and said that Peru should report on progress in accordance with the Guide to Reporting.19
PLANNING AND TASKING
Table 2: Planned mine clearance in 2018–24 (Updated Plan)20
Year Sector Mined areas Area (m2) AP mines
2018 Tiwinza 16 119,415 2,697
2019 Cenepa 13 92,850 627
2020 Achuime 20 9,458 746
2021 Cenepa 16 12,301 653
2022 Cenepa–Santiago 18 180,965 392
2023 Santiago 16 28,225 838
2024 Santiago 28 48,065 2,136
Totals 127 491,279 8,089
The Updated National Plan for Demining for 2018–24 
projected that some 0.49km2 spread across 127 SHAs will be 
released by 31 December 2024. Peru expects to clear 8,089 
mines from these areas (see Table 2).21 If Peru had met its 
annual land release targets to end 2019 it would have only 
279,014m2 of anti-personnel mine contamination to clear from 
2020 to 2024. 
In 2019, Peru planned to clear 13 mined areas totalling 92,850m2 
from the Cenepa sector according to its Updated Plan or 20 
mined areas from Tiwinza and Cenepa of unspecified area 
according to its Article 7 report covering 2018.22 In fact, Peru  
far exceeded the amount and released 137,078m2 but across  
11 mined areas in the Tiwinza and Cenepa sectors. 
In its Article 7 report covering 2019, Peru included a plan for 
release of 108 mined areas from 2020 to 2024 (see Table 3).
Peru’s criteria for prioritising survey and clearance 
operations are unclear. In its decision on Peru’s 2016 
extension request, the Article 5 Committee called on Peru to 
prioritise operations based on the socio-economic impact of 
mined areas.23 One of the activities listed for CONTRAMINAS’ 
policy work was to set priorities for clearance, in coordination 
with DIGEDEHUME and DIVSECOM.24 Peru reported that it 
prioritises clearance by sector and in consideration of the 
work that has already been carried out in the sector.25
Table 3: Planned mine clearance in 2020–24 (Article 7)26
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Peru has 16 national mine action standards (NMAS) which form part of the Humanitarian Demining Procedures Manual, and 
which are based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).27 According to CONTRAMINAS, the NMAS and standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) are reviewed annually. In 2019, updates were made to the technical survey standard on the use  
of mine detection dogs (MDDs) during technical survey.28
One of CONTRAMINAS four objectives in Peru’s 2016 extension request was to develop new policies for land release, with 
the aim of finalising these policies within six months of the plan’s approval. The same objective was included in its Updated 
National Plan for Demining for 2018–24.29 According to CONTRAMINAS, new land release policies are formulated annually as 
mine clearance progresses and these are then reflected in the operation orders.30 As noted by the Fifteenth Meeting of States 
Parties, Peru should conduct evidence-based survey to define its SHAs and also seek to identify CHA.31
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
DIGEDEHUME, which is responsible for demining on the 
border with Ecuador, has two teams each comprising 60 
personnel.32 In 2019, DIGEDEHUME, carried out eight “work 
days” of 20 days each, from April to September, with 60 
personnel deployed per work day.33 CONTRAMINAS reported 
that in 2019 they had six clearance teams totalling forty-two 
deminers, and six non-technical survey and six technical 
survey teams totalling 32 personnel.34 CONTRAMINAS’ 
Security Division (DIVSECOM), which is responsible for 
supporting DIGEDHUME with demining operations, has 40 
police officers trained in demining.35
In its 2016 extension request, Peru committed to strengthen 
the capacity of CONTRAMINAS’ Humanitarian Demining 
School, with the aim of increasing its capacity by one-fifth 
in the second semester of 2017. This was deferred to the 
second semester of 2018 in Peru’s Updated National Plan 
for Demining for 2018–24.36 There was no change in capacity 
from 2018 to 2019 but Peru expected to increase the number 
of non-technical survey personnel in 2020 and focus on 
further training, through the Humanitarian Demining School, 
of the existing demining companies in light of the COVID-19 
outbreak.37
The joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining 
Unit has been deployed to areas that were at the centre of the 
conflict between the two nations, but it did not carry out any 
demining operations in 2019. According to CONTRAMINAS, 
this is because the Unit’s objective was to clear the Tiwinza 
square kilometre which was completed in 2018.38 In 
November 2019, according to the “Tumbes Declaration”, the 
presidents of Ecuador and Peru committed to continue their 
binational cooperation and pledged to allocate the necessary 
resources to continue demining operations in both countries, 
but no further details were provided.39
In its revised second Article 5 deadline extension request, 
Peru announced it would be using both machines and MDDs 
for demining.40 In its updated multi-year plan submitted in 
May 2018, one of Peru’s strategic objectives for 2018–24 
included the development, design, and implementation 
of new humanitarian demining techniques, such as with 
machines or dogs.41 In 2019, the United States donated four 
MDDs to Peru with two dogs used to conduct technical 
survey during the year. According to CONTRAMINAS, the 
plan is to also use dogs to identify mined areas and for use 
during clearance.42 As at June 2020, discussions have begun 
between CONTRAMINAS and the Peruvian Army’s Directorate 
of Research and Development on the possibility of employing 
drones with hyperthermal cameras that conduct aerial 
analysis of the decomposition of explosives.43
DEMINER SAFETY
In May 2019, a helicopter transporting personnel during demining operations crashed killing two deminers and injuring a  
police officer who was also on board.44 After the crash the Accident Investigation Board of Army Aviation went to the scene  
to determine the cause of the accident.45
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of 137,078m2 of mined area was released in 2019, of which 81,948m2 was cleared, 26,600m2 was reduced through 
technical survey, and 28,530m2 was cancelled through non-technical survey. Peru reported that a total of 1,113 anti-personnel 
mines were found and destroyed.
Included in the land release figures is the 800m2 which was discovered in 2019 and cleared with a total of 22 anti-personnel 
mines found and destroyed.46




In 2019, a total of 55,130m2 was released by survey of which 28,530m2 was cancelled through non-technical survey  
(see Table 4) and 26,600m2 was reduced through technical survey (see Table 5).47 This is nearly three times the land released 
by survey in 2018, when a total of 11,728m2 was released in the Tiwinza sector (9,911m2 cancelled and 1,817m2 reduced).48
Table 4: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201949
Sector Area cancelled (m²)
Tiwinza 28,530
Total 28,530
Table 5: Reduction through technical survey in 201950




In 2019, a total of 81,948m2 was cleared within the Tiwinza and Cenepa “sectors” (see Table 6), more than five times the 
15,576m2 cleared in 2018 when only 140 mines were found and destroyed.51 All clearance was conducted manually by the 
DIGEDEHUME demining teams.52 According to CONTRAMINAS, this increase was due to the location and topography of the 
mined areas that were cleared in 2019 which were easier to access and clear and made clearance more efficient.53
Peru reported that a total of 1,113 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed during clearance in 2019.54 The ratio  
of clearance by square metre to mine find has improved from 111m2 per mine in 2018 to 74m2 per mine in 2019.
Table 6: Mine clearance in 201955
Sector Areas cleared Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed UXO destroyed
Tiwinza 4 64,345 270 5
Cenepa 4 17,603 843 2
Totals 8 81,948 1,113 7
AP = Anti-personnel 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR PERU: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2017
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (7YEAR, 9MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2024
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: YES 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): MEDIUM
Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







* Covers March 2017 to March 2018 
** Covers March 2016 to March 2017 
*** Covers March 2015 to March 2016
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
7-year, 9-month extension granted by States Parties in 2016), 
Peru is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined 
areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, 
but not later than 31 December 2024. If Peru’s estimate 
of anti-personnel mine contamination at end of 2019 was 
accurate (at 369,212m2) then Peru would need to release 
an average of 92,303m2 per year to meet this deadline. 
Peru’s land release output jumped from 27,303m2 in 2018 to 
137,078m2 in 2019, far exceeding the amount it would need to 
release annually to meet its deadline.
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In its decision on Peru’s 2016 extension request, the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties noted that as Peru was seeking to 
develop enhanced processes of land release “Peru may find itself in a situation wherein it can proceed with implementation 
faster than that suggested by the amount of time requested”.56 Peru outlined three scenarios for the completion of clearance 
by the 2024 deadline in its Updated National Plan for Demining for 2018–24. This was said to be contingent on an increase in 
budget, in personnel, and in international support.57 
Peru reported the same demining capacity from 2018 to 2019, despite a budget decrease. Peru also reported receiving 
international assistance in 2019 from China, Germany, and the United States who all donated demining equipment including 
detectors and MDDs.58 Italy reported in its statement to the Committee for the Strengthening of Cooperation and Assistance 
that it had provided support to Peru in a project of technical assistance for demining activities.59
Peru should easily be able to complete clearance well before its Article 5 deadline if it uses the full range of land release 
techniques and efficient, targeted clearance. While there has been a massive increase in clearance and survey output reported 
in 2019, it is unclear whether it will be sustained going forward.
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
CONTRAMINAS reported that after Article 5 completion it, in coordination with the National Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(CENDESMI) in Ecuador, will be responsible for managing residual contamination.60
1 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
2 In Form C of its Article 7 report, Peru estimated contamination at December 
2019 as 454,144m2 across 119 areas but in Form F it estimated remaining 
contamination following land release in 2019 as 369,212m2 across 108 areas.
3 Statement of Peru, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Oslo,  
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6 Revised 2016 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, July 2016, pp. 20–21; 
and Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, May 
2018, p. 15.
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15 Supreme Decree No. 008-2019-MIMP.
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Humanity and Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International), the only international mine action operator in Senegal since 
2014, resumed operations in 2019 after an interruption of more than a year due to lack of funding. The action of Movement 
of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) insurgents in May 2019 briefly detaining members of an HI survey team led to 
another suspension of activities. For the second successive year, Senegal did not record any mine clearance. In June 2020, 
Senegal requested a five-year extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Senegal should complete non-technical survey as soon as possible to establish a comprehensive baseline estimate  
of its remaining mine contamination.
 ■ Senegal should ensure that suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) are recorded on the basis of demonstrable evidence 
and with specific size estimates and the information made public. 
 ■ Senegal should submit its annual Article 7 transparency report each year by the 30 April deadline. 
 ■ The Government of Senegal should demonstrate commitment to its APMBC obligations by making national funding  
and resources available for demining operations.
 ■ Senegal should prioritise technical survey and clearance in readily accessible areas and where the presence of mines 
is reliably attested.
 ■ The Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (Centre National d’Action Antimines, CNAMS) should continue to  
improve transparency and to facilitate dialogue on land release between all relevant stakeholders. An in-country 
platform bringing together the authorities, donors, and key stakeholders could be one mechanism to help strengthen 
national coordination. 



































ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021 
EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 1 MARCH 2026
SENEGAL
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(20% of overall score)
4 5 Senegal remains unclear about the extent of its mine contamination 21 years after 
adhering to the APMBC. While the extent of confirmed mined area is small, minimal 
progress has been made in the past five years to assess contamination in more than 
120 areas. 
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
3 3 Senegal relies on donor funding to cover the costs of mine clearance operations  
and its apparent failure to demine mined areas around military installations calls  




(10% of overall score)
5 5 CNAMS reports employing women in senior positions and appointing staff on the 
basis of qualifications and without regard for gender. HI, the only international 




(10% of overall score)
4 4 CNAMS maintains an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
database but has cited shortages of funds as an obstacle to upgrading it. The quality 
of data in IMSMA is also unclear. Despite the limited extent of operations in 2019, 
results reported by CNAMS differed from those of HI, the only operator. 
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
4 3 The work plan CNAMS presented in 2018 aiming to complete clearance of known 
hazards by Senegal’s Article 5 deadline was never implemented and never amended 
since to meet changing realities. Senegal submitted an Article 5 deadline extension 
request in 2020 with timelines for survey and clearance but faced major challenges 
from insecurity and shrinking international financial support.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
4 4 CNAMS introduced national mine action standards in 2009 but has not revised or 
updated them since 2013.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
3 3 Despite HI’s resumption of demining activities in 2019 Senegal did not clear a single 
square metre or mine in 2019 and reported release of only a little over 11,000m2 
through technical survey, ensuring the need to apply for another extension to its 
Article 5 deadline. 
Average Score 3.8 3.9 Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ National Commission for the Implementation of the 
Ottawa Convention




 ■ Humanity and Inclusion (HI)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Senegal does not have a precise estimate of its mine contamination more than 20 years after becoming a State Party to the 
APMBC. It reports the presence of mines in four of the country’s 45 departments, all of them in the Casamance region, an  
area of low-level insurgency since the 1980s. Senegal’s Article 5 extension request submitted in June 2020 estimated the 
area of confirmed and suspected mine contamination at 1,593,487m2 but the basis for this estimate was unclear.1 It included 
37 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) affecting 491,086m2. This was the same number of areas identified a year earlier, with 
16 in Goudomp, 10 in Bignona, nine in Oussouye and two in Ziguinchor.2 The request also included 118 areas in southern 
departments that have not yet been surveyed, 101 of them in Bignona department, four areas in Oussouye and 13 in Ziguinchor. 
It also reported another nine areas whose size is unknown, eight of them in Bignona and one in Goudomp.3 Adding to 
uncertainty about the extent of contamination, areas such as North Sindian in Bignona department have long been suspected 
to be mined but insecurity has prevented survey.4 
Mine contamination in Senegal is the result of more than 40 years of fighting between the armed forces and a non-state  
armed group, the MFDC. Sporadic fighting with some factions of the MFDC has continued despite a ceasefire in place since 
2004. According to Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), there is overwhelming evidence that the laying of landmines by rebel  
forces was sporadic, while the Senegalese Armed Forces placed hundreds, if not thousands, of mines around military  
outposts in Casamance.5
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention, created in 2005, serves as the national mine action 
authority for Senegal charged with developing a mine action strategy, economic rehabilitation of mine-affected areas and 
overseeing the work of a national mine action centre. The commission is chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and includes 
representatives of the President and government ministries. Senegal has said the commission’s effectiveness had suffered 
from high turnover of ministerial representatives resulting in delays in decision-making, and from the absence of rules on 
decision-making.6
Demining operations in Casamance are coordinated by CNAMS, which was set up by decree in 2006. Regional mine action 
coordination committees have been established in Kolda, Sédhiou, and Ziguinchor departments. CNAMS is responsible  
for promoting the national mine action programme, mobilising resources, coordinating survey and conducting demining, 
designing and implementing a victim assistance programme, accrediting demining organisations, and monitoring and 
evaluating activities.7
In June 2018, CNAMS informed States Parties to the APMBC that it needed around €6.5 million to complete clearance, a figure 
it revised down in October of the same year to close to €5.5 million. It said that the government had earmarked more than €1.8 
million for mine action in 2019,8 but this was not forthcoming in 2019 and CNAMS said the COVID-19 crisis would make it difficult 
to obtain government funds in 2020. The government provides approximately US$500,000 (€457,000) a year to cover salaries 
in CNAMS, but operations in 2019 depended on donor support. The only external funding available in 2019 was a US State 
Department grant of US$450,000 to HI.9 
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
CNAMS asserts there is no gender discrimination in Senegal’s mine action programme and staff are recruited on the basis  
of competence. CNAMS said its staff of 17 included 6 women of whom 2 were heads of division and 2 were heads of offices.  
It reported that HI employed four women among its field teams, including three EOD technicians qualified at EOD Levels 1, 2, 
and 3 respectively, and one paramedic.10 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
CNAMS operates an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, which was reportedly upgraded  
in 201511 but reporting has proved erratic. CNAMS said measures to improve the database were not possible in 2019 due  
to funding shortages while improvements planned for 2020 had been suspended because of the COVID-19 pandemic.12
As at 1 August 2020, Senegal had yet to submit its latest Article 7 report covering 2019.
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PLANNING AND TASKING
CNAMS prepared a work plan covering the period from December 2018 to January 2021, which set timelines for clearing 
Senegal’s 37 CHAs and 9 SHAs before it reached its March 2021 Article 5 deadline, as well as for non-technical survey of the 
144 areas still to be surveyed.13 However, no clearance was conducted in 2018 or 2019. 
CNAMS carried over plans for non-technical survey of 144 areas and clearance of CHAs into 2020 but said implementation 
would depend on the level of available funding and that it would not be able to complete mine clearance by March 2021.14
The Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in June 2020 included a work plan that called for non-technical survey of 
all 118 identified SHAs by the end of 2021, proposing survey of 40 in 2020 and 78 in 2021. The work plan did not foresee any 
clearance in 2020 but aimed to complete clearance of 37 CHAs by the end of 2023, tackling 12 CHAs covering 113,975m2 in 2021, 
16 CHAs affecting 299,871m2 in 2022 and the remaining 9 CHAs covering 77,240m2 in 2023. In 2024, Senegal planned to survey 
nine SHAs and in 2024–25 to clear CHAs identified from the 2020–21 non-technical survey of 118 areas.15 
CNAMS said the work plan was based on the assumption of deploying two demining operators conducting manual and 
mechanical clearance.16 It projected total costs for the mine action programme at US$12.19 million, including US$7.37 for 
demining, of which Senegal would fund US$3.33 million and international donors the remaining US$8.85 million.17 At the  
same time, CNAMS projected the costs of clearing the 37 CHAs planned for 2021–23 at US$2.45 million and said additional 
costs would be detailed after completion of survey.18
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Senegal’s national mine action standards were developed in 2009 and revised in 2013 but have not been updated since.19 
According to CNAMS, the 2013 revision included standards for accreditation, technical investigation, minimum mine clearance 
depth, and the use of machines and mine detection dogs in demining.20
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
CNAMS has a total of fourteen operations staff, including one six-strong manual clearance team, a non-technical survey team 
of five, and one mechanical team with three people. CNAMS results do not indicate they were active in 2019.21 
HI has remained the only international demining operator in Senegal since 2014. It suspended operations in October 2017 
because of lack of funding.22 With new funding from the United States, operations resumed in 2019 when HI had a total staff 
of 20: 5 deminers, 3 mechanical operators, and 12 support staff. In 2020, however, HI hired only 10 staff. It reported that US 
funding would end in 2020, raising uncertainty if this operation would continue.23 
HI deployed a soil preparation and mechanical mine clearance machine, the Digger D-3, before its 2017 suspension of 
operations.24 HI employed a mechanical team in 2019 but it was not clear if the machine was operational as HI reported not 
conducting any clearance during the year.25
DEMINER SAFETY
In mid-May 2019, demining operations, which had recently restarted thanks to US funding, were again suspended after 
members of an MFDC faction abducted a demining team working between Bafata and Bindaba. This occurred despite an 
agreement having been obtained to operate in that zone, according to CNAMS. As noted above, the deminers were all  
released the same day.26 The team were released after handing over their equipment.27
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Land release in Senegal came largely to a standstill in 2018 and 2019 as a result of funding shortages and insecurity. No 
clearance was conducted in 2019. Despite the very limited range of activity, discrepancies between results reported by CNAMS 
and HI, the sole operator, obscured the precise extent of what was achieved. 
CNAMS reported that HI cancelled two tasks of unknown size through non-technical survey in Saré Lao in 2019 and reduced 
11,288m2 through technical survey in Doudomp.28 HI said it cancelled 5,500m2 in Kolda and reduced an area of 22,138m2  
in Sédhiou.29 
HI operated with US funding of US$450,000 starting in February 2019 but operations halted after the kidnapping of five 
deminers in May 2019. The CNAMS said the balance of US funds was carried over for non-technical survey in February  
2020 but operations were again suspended because of restrictions introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.30
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SENEGAL: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENSION PERIOD (7-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2016
SECOND EXTENSION PERIOD (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2021
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (5YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED): 1 MARCH 2026 
ON TRACK TO MEET REQUESTED ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO (EXTENSION REQUESTED) 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties in 2015), Senegal is 
required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later 
than 1 March 2021. 
Senegal submitted its third extension request on 15 June 2020 asking for five more years until 1 March 2026 but left 
uncertainty about the likelihood of achieving completion even in this period. CNAMS signalled the likelihood it would need  
an extension starting with a statement to APMBC States Parties in June 2018.31 In October 2018, it drew attention to obstacles 
to progress including lack of access to certain targeted areas, the withdrawal of traditional mine action partners, and 
deteriorating demining equipment.32
Other key concerns include:
 ■ Continuing lack of clarity on remaining contamination. 
The basis for assessing remaining contamination at 
1,593,487m2 was unclear given that CHAs accounted 
for less than one-third of that area, 118 SHAs remain 
to be surveyed, and a further nine areas whose size is 
unknown are regarded as suspect. Moreover, concerns 
have also been raised about its continued failure to 
clear contaminated areas around military bases which 
verges on use of anti-personnel mines, a violation of 
Article 1 of the APMBC. NPA has previously criticised 
CNAMS for obstructing dialogue between operators 
and the armed forces in particular, which could provide 
the specific locations of mined areas.33 CNAMS claimed 
in August 2017 that it had already demined around all 
the military bases, with the help of the army where that 
was necessary.34 HI has reported that its teams cleared 
22,162m² in Boutoute-Djibanar in connection with a 
former army base in 2015–16, destroying “around” 19 
anti-personnel mines.35 However, it is not certain that  
all other bases have been demined.
 ■ Insecurity. Senegal’s long-running insurgency by MFDC 
rebels continues to deny access to areas targeted 
for survey and clearance. The Extension Request 
acknowledges “very precarious security conditions” and 
that access depends on agreements with the MFDC which 
can take a long time to negotiate and are not stable.36 
Senegal expected that the evolution of peace talks with 
the MFDC would ensure better security and access but 
the brief abduction of an HI team and ensuing suspension 
of operations in 2019 underscored the potential for 
serious delays in implementing the plans outlined in the 
Extension Request.
 ■ Senegal is looking to international donors to provide 
three-quarters of the Extension Request’s projected 
US$12.19 million costs. National funding, according to the 
request, would be limited to salaries and administrative 
costs.37 However, as Senegal prepared to apply for an 
Article 5 deadline extension the financial outlook for mine 
action deteriorated as a result of a decision by the United 
States to end its funding of HI in 2020.38 
Table 1: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







*Includes technical survey and clearance
196   Clearing the Mines 2020
1 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 June 2020, p. 53.
2 Email from Ibrahima Seck, Head of Operations and Information 
Management, CNAMS, 21 May 2020.
3 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 June 2020, p. 54; email from 
Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 21 May 2020.
4 Email from Faly Keita, Coordinator, Casamance Site, HI, 8 August 2018.
5 CNAMS, “Updated Work plan for Senegal’s Article 5 Extension 2016–21”, 
April 2017; and CNAMS, “Updated Work plan for Senegal’s Article 5 
Extension 2016–2021”, 13 October 2017, p. 21.
6 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 June 2020, pp. 9, 75.
7 Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards  
a Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.
8 Ibid.
9 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 21 May 2020.
10 Ibid.
11 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016. 
12 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 21 May 2020.
13 Ibid; and Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards 
a Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.
14 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 21 May 2020. 
15 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 June 2020, pp. 93–98.
16 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 June 2020, p. 53.
17 Ibid, p. 60.
18 Ibid., p. 97.
19 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 21 May 2020. 
20 Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards  
a Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.
21 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 21 May 2020.
22 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 26 September 2016. 
23 Email from Seydou Gaye, Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 3 June 2020.
24 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 20 September 2019.
25 Email from Seydou Gaye, HI, 3 June 2020.
26 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 20 September 2019.
27 Email from Seydou Gaye, HI, 3 June 2020.
28 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 21 May 2020.
29 Email from Seydou Gaye, HI, 3 June 2020. 
30 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 21 May 2020.
31 Statement of Senegal, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.
32 Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards  
a Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.
33 A. Grovestins and A. Oberstadt, “Why landmines keep on killing in Senegal”, 
IRIN, 3 August 2015, at: bit.ly/2THyclz.
34 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.
35 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April 2017.
36 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 June 2020, p. 60.
37 Ibid.
38 Email from Seydou Gaye, HI, 3 June 2020.





AP MINE  
CLEARANCE IN 2019
AP MINES   
DESTROYED IN 2019




In 2019, Serbia continued its progress in Article 5 implementation, clearing a total of 0.61km2, applying funds secured from 
two new international donors, Japan and the Republic of Korea. In late 2019, however, previously unrecorded mined area was 
identified as a result of fires. The Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) planned to survey the area and add the new mined area to 
the database in 2020, which is expected to increase the remaining mined area to be addressed by Serbia’s Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention (APMBC) clearance deadline of 1 March 2023. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Serbia should consider using its armed forces for mine clearance or inviting demining non-governmental  
organisations (NGOs) to help meet its treaty obligations by fulfilling its Article 5 obligations by 2023. 
 ■ SMAC should conduct non-technical and technical survey, rather than full clearance, in instances where  
survey represents the most efficient means to release part or all of areas suspected or confirmed to contain  
anti-personnel mines. 





































(GOVERNMENT ESTIMATE, EXCLUDING PREVIOUSLY 
UNKNOWN CONTAMINATED AREA DISCOVERED)
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2023 
JUST ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
SERBIA
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(20% of overall score)
5 5 Serbia has a relatively good understanding of its baseline of anti-personnel mine 
contamination, although it records all mined areas as suspected hazardous areas 
(SHAs), not confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). Serbia should conduct survey for 
physical evidence of mines and confirm or discredit reported contamination, before 
conducting full clearance. New, previously unrecorded mined area was revealed in 
late 2019, during fires. 
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
7 7 Serbia has strong national ownership of its mine action programme, which is 
nationally funded. It increased the amount of national funding towards survey and 
clearance in 2019 and is actively attracting new donors to help it meet its completion 
plan. Furthermore, in 2019, a Training Centre was established within SMAC.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
4 3 SMAC does not have a gender policy in place and does not disaggregate relevant 
mine action data by sex and age. However, it does ensure women and children, 
as well as ethnic or minority groups, are consulted during survey and community 
liaison activities and that there is equal access to employment for qualified women 




(10% of overall score)
7 7 Serbia submits accurate and comprehensive annual Article 7 reports on Article 5 
progress, which are consistent between reporting periods, and provides regular 
updates on progress at APMBC meetings. SMAC is exploring the possibility of 
installing the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
7 7 SMAC has a plan in place for completion of Article 5 implementation with planned 
annual land release output through to its treaty deadline, subject to the availability  
of sufficient funding. Serbia also produces revised annual work plans based on 
actual progress.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
6 6 While SMAC continues to express a preference for full clearance of SHAs and only 
conducted clearance tasks in 2019, it does remain willing to conduct technical survey 
where it deems it appropriate.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
7 7 Serbia released roughly the same amount of mined area in 2019 as in the previous 
year, but unlike in 2018, land was entirely released through clearance. Serbia has set 
a 2023 target date for completion of Article 5, but meeting it is largely contingent on 
securing sufficient funding. 
Average Score 6.1 6.0 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Sector for Emergency Management, under the Ministry  
of Interior (acts as the national mine action authority)
 ■ Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) 
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ PMC Inženjering and Nucleus Team
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ NGOs:
 ■ In Demining, Pale, BiH, Belgrade branch
 ■ Stop Mines, Pale, BiH, Belgrade branch
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ None
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at end of 2019, six areas in Bujanovac municipality, 
covering nearly 1.13km2, were suspected to contain 
anti-personnel mines (see Table 1).1 This is a decrease from 
the 1.73km2 of mined area as at 1 April 2019,2 the result of 
clearance. However, it excludes the previously unrecorded 
anti-personnel mine contamination that was revealed as a 
result of fires in Bujanovac municipality in 2019.3 
On 2–3 October 2019, in response to a request from local 
authorities, SMAC visited the villages of Đorđevac, Končulj, 
Lučane, Ravno Bučje, and Veliki Trnovac where fires had 
recently occurred and members of the local community had 
reported hearing explosions in several places, indicating the 
presence of mines. Representatives of SMAC and Emergency 
Management Staff of the municipality of Bujanovac visited 
the sites and interviewed local residents, local authority 
representatives, and firefighters, as well as police and the 
military. Mine incident questionnaires were completed in 
accordance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), 
and suspected mined areas were marked with signs in 
both Serbian and Albanian, as the population in this area 
is multi-ethnic.4 The newly discovered contamination is not 
included in Table 1 above. SMAC plans to conduct survey to 
determine the size of the newly discovered contamination, 
once dedicated funding has been secured,5 the size of the area 
is expected to be relatively small based on rough estimates.6
Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by village  
(at end 2019)7
Municipality Village SHAs Area (m2)
Bujanovac Ravno Bučje 1 390,300
Končulj 4  707,010 
Dobrosin 1  28,000 
Totals 6 1,125,310
Bujanovac is the only municipality in Serbia still affected 
by mines. According to SMAC, the contamination is from 
mines of an unknown origin and type which have not been 
emplaced to follow a pattern, and for which no minefield 
records exist.8 According to the national authorities, previous 
surveys found insufficient evidence for mined areas to be 
classified as confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), so they 
remain as suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).9 However, the 
fact that contamination is suspected makes it all the more 
important that SMAC conducts technical survey to confirm 
the presence of anti-personnel mines, before conducting full 
clearance. According to SMAC, the baseline of anti-personnel 
mine contamination has been established through inclusive 
consultation with women, girls, boys, and men, including, 
where relevant, from minority groups.10
Historically, mine contamination in Serbia can be divided 
into two phases. The first exists as a legacy of the armed 
conflicts associated with the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 
early 1990s. The second concerned use of mines in 2000–01 
in the municipalities of Bujanovac and Preševo by a non-state 
armed group, the Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and 
Medvedja (OVPBM). The contamination remaining in Serbia is 
a result of this later phase.11 Contamination also exists within 
Kosovo (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines report 
on Kosovo for further information).12 
Serbia is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants 
(CMR) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), which are 
either the result of the 1999 bombing, remain from previous 
conflicts, or are the result of explosions or fire at military 
depots13 (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition 
Remnants report on Serbia for further information).
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
According to a Government Decree on Protection 
against Unexploded Ordnance, the Sector for Emergency 
Management, under the Ministry of Interior, acts as the 
national mine action authority (NMAA).14 The NMAA is 
responsible for developing standard operating procedures 
(SOPs); accrediting demining operators; and supervising  
the work of SMAC.15 
SMAC was established on 7 March 2002, with a 2004 law 
making it responsible for coordinating demining; collecting 
and managing mine action information (including casualty 
data); and surveying SHAs. It also has a mandate to 
plan demining projects, conduct quality control (QC) and 
monitor operations, ensure implementation of international 
standards, and conduct risk education.16 As from 1 January 
2014, according to a Government Decree on Protection 
against Unexploded Ordnance, the Sector for Emergency 
Management, under the Ministry of Interior, is responsible 
for accrediting demining operators. Previously, SMAC was 
responsible for doing so.17
A new director of SMAC was appointed by the Serbian 
government in July 2019.18 There are seven people employed 
at SMAC; five SMAC employees, plus an Assistant Director 
for Legal Affairs and Operational Support and an Assistant 
Director for Economic Affairs, International Cooperation and 
European Integration.19
SMAC is fully funded by Serbia, including for survey activities, 
development of project tasks for demining and clearance of 
contaminated areas, follow-up on implementation of project 
tasks, and quality assurance (QA) and QC of demining. Around 
€160,000 per year is allocated to the work of SMAC from the 
national state budget.20 In addition, the unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) disposal work of the Sector for Emergency Situations 
of the Ministry of Interior is also state funded.21 Furthermore, 
in 2019, Serbia also contributed national funding towards 
the establishment of an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
training centre.22
200   Clearing the Mines 2020
Since 2015, Serbia has also been allocating national funds 
for survey and clearance, with roughly €100,000 allocated 
per year.23 In 2018, the Serbian Government allocated 
double the amount of national funds previously dedicated to 
demining operations to €200,000 (which were matched with 
US and Korean funding and tendered through ITF Enhancing 
Human Security (ITF)). Serbia continues to seek additional 
international funding.24 At the request of the national 
authorities, national funding was increased to €350,000 for 
2019 demining operations25. The same amount had been 
allocated by the Serbian government for demining operations 
in 2020,26 but was subsequently reduced by 20% due to the 
COVID-19 crisis and efforts by the Serbian government to 
tackle it. Serbia will try to match national funds with donor 
funds through the ITF.27
In June 2018, during the APMBC intersessional meetings, 
Serbia and the Committee on the Enhancement of 
Cooperation and Assistance convened an “Individualised 
Approach Platform” meeting, to hold a frank discussion 
with relevant stakeholders on the current status of Serbia’s 
national programme, the needs and challenges in completing 
its Article 5 obligations.28 SMAC reports having a resource 
mobilisation strategy for Article 5 implementation.29
SMAC also provides expertise in risk education and in 
training in survey and clearance, pursuant to Article 30 of the 
Law on Ministries, and in late 2019, the Serbian government 
approved funds for the establishment of a Training Centre 
within SMAC. In cooperation with representatives of the 
Ministry of Education – Institute for the Advancement of 
Education, SMAC has developed a training programme for 
educators (instructors) for mine and ERW education, which 
will be officially verified. Together with experts from the 
Ministry of Interior, SMAC plans to provide different training 
modules, including on ERW recognition, international mine 
action standards, and medical aspects.30
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
SMAC does not have a gender policy in place and does not disaggregate relevant mine action data by sex and age. However, it 
does ensure women and children are consulted during survey and community liaison activities, and SMAC cooperates closely 
with the local authorities and other relevant stakeholders in this regard. SMAC also ensures ethnic or minority groups are 
consulted, which is important, as remaining mined areas are located in the municipality of Bujanovac, which is an area with a 
multi-ethnic population. SMAC cooperates with Bujanovac municipality officials, including the mayor and deputy mayor, who 
are from different ethnic groups, and other employees in charge of community liaison activities.31 
With regards to the new mined area identified as a result of fires in 2019, SMAC plans to conduct a mine risk education (MRE) 
project and will ensure the MRE team comprises both Serbian and Albanian staff.32
There is claimed to be equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance operations, but 
country/operator-wide, only 15% of those employed in survey and clearance teams in Serbia are women.33
At SMAC, 70% of employees are women, of which 65% of managerial/supervisory level positions are held by women.34
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
SMAC uses its own information management system. Following on from initial discussions several years ago, in early 2020, 
SMAC informally discussed the possibility of the installation of IMSMA with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) and planned to intensify discussions in the forthcoming period.35 
PLANNING AND TASKING
In its 2018 Article 5 deadline extension request, Serbia included a costed plan for the completion of demining, with clear 
milestones, for 2018–23.36 In its Article 7 report submitted in 2020 (covering 2019), Serbia set out an updated plan: to release 
298,700m2 in 2020; 269,280m2 in 2021; 390,300m2 in 2022; and the remaining 167,030m2 in 2023.37 Serbia met its updated work 
plan target for 2019. However, this excludes the previously unrecorded mined area discovered in 2019, the size of which have 
not yet been determined.38 
Serbia intends to use non-technical survey, technical survey, manual clearance, mechanical demining (where applicable), and 
mine detection dogs (MDDs, where applicable), to complete clearance in Serbia before its 2023 Article 5 deadline.39 Progress is, 
however, contingent on funding and Serbia has stated that if it cannot secure international support for demining, its work plan 
will be directly affected.40
The Government of Serbia adopts SMAC’s annual work plan.41 The 2020 work plan adopted by the Serbian government includes 
plans to address both anti-personnel mine contamination and CMR.42 
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Serbia prioritises the demining of areas which directly affect the local population, such as those close to settlements where 
local people have abandoned their houses and stopped cultivating land due to fear of landmines.43 SMAC also noted that 
donors themselves sometimes also influence the choice of the areas which will be demined first, depending on availability  
and amount of their funds.44
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
According to SMAC, survey and clearance operations in 
Serbia are conducted in accordance with IMAS.45 
National mine action standards (NMAS) were said to be in 
the final phase of development as at September 2015.46 In 
April 2017, SMAC reported that, along with the relevant 
national authorities, it was in the process of establishing a 
commission to develop national standards and SOPs to define 
methods and techniques for demining in Serbia.47 However, 
this process has been hindered due to lack of capacity,48 and 
as at April 2020, the development of the NMAS was still only 
“in progress”.49
Under new directorship in late 2015, SMAC reassessed 
its land release methodology to prioritise full clearance 
over technical survey of hazardous areas.50 This does not 
correspond to international best practice and is an inefficient 
use of scarce clearance assets. In February 2016, the then 
new director of SMAC reported to Mine Action Review that 
while SMAC supports the use of high quality non-technical 
survey to identify suspected mined areas, it will fully clear 
these areas, rather than using technical survey to more 
accurately identify the boundaries of contamination.51 
As at April 2020, SMAC’s position on its preferred land 
release methodology remained the same under the current 
Director, but there is a continued willingness to conduct 
technical survey in a form “adjusted to the context of Serbia”, 
in response to the stated preference of international donors 
for technical survey above clearance, where appropriate.52 
SMAC’s primary reluctance to using technical survey as 
a next step to further delineate confirmed mined area 
is its lack of confidence that such survey can effectively 
identify groups of unrecorded mines, not planted in specific 
patterns.53 According to SMAC, incidents involving people 
or animals have occurred in most of these suspected areas 
or else mines have been accidentally detected.54 While only 
clearance was conducted in 2019, the reduction of mined 
area through technical survey in 2017 and 2018, however, 
does demonstrate SMAC’s greater willingness to adopt more 
efficient land release practices.
SMAC has reported that the results of the initial survey 
data are analysed and then further non-technical survey is 
conducted to assess conditions in the field, and to gather 
statements by the local population, hunters, foresters, 
representatives of Civil Protection, and the police, among 
others. Data on mine incidents is another significant 
indicator.55 Also, in the context of Serbia, there is reportedly 
limited potential to obtain additional information on the 
location of mined areas from those who laid the mines during 
the conflict.56 
Technical survey is employed “to additionally collect 
information by technical methods on a suspected area 
and in case when the data collected by a non-technical 
survey are not sufficient for suspected areas to be declared 
hazardous or safe”.57 Clearance is reported to be conducted 
in accordance with the IMAS and to a depth of 20cm.58
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
SMAC does not itself carry out clearance or employ deminers but does conduct survey of areas suspected to contain mines, 
CMR, or other ERW. Clearance is conducted by commercial companies and NGOs, which are selected through public tender 
procedures executed by the ITF, supported by international funding.59 
The Ministry of Interior issues accreditation to mine action operators that is valid for one year. In 2019, 23 companies/
organisations were accredited for demining,60 but only two NGOs and two commercial organisations (working together), 
conducted clearance of mined areas (see Table 2).
Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 201961
Operator Manual teams Total deminers* Dogs and handlers Machines**
Stop Mines 2 20 4 dogs and 2 handlers 0
In Demining 3 30 1 dog and 1 handler 0
PMC Inženjering and 
Nucleus Team
1 10 0 0
Totals 6 60 5 dogs and 3 handlers
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
Table 2 represents a doubling of clearance capacity compared to the previous year, but unlike in 2018, no survey personnel 
were deployed in 2019, as all the tasks conducted were solely for clearance.
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The Serbian Armed Forces maintain a capability to survey, detect, clear, and destroy landmines. This capability includes many 
types of detection equipment, mechanical clearance assets, disposal expertise, and specialist search and clearance teams.62 An 
EOD department within the Sector for Emergency Management, in the Ministry of Interior, responds to call-outs for individual 
items of ERW, and is also responsible for demolition of items found by SMAC survey teams.63
Technical survey and clearance in Serbia are primarily conducted manually. MDDs were used in technical survey and clearance 
operations in 2018 to release land,64 but according to the authorities most of the mines are in mountainous areas with 
challenging terrain and thick vegetation and are not appropriate for the use of MDDs or machinery.65 The fact that these areas 
have not been accessed since the end of the conflict (2001), owing to the suspected presence of mines, means that the land is 
unmanaged, making it even less accessible.66
SMAC uses data obtained by unmanned aerial vehicles to develop and monitor clearance and technical survey projects.67
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of more than 0.6km2 of mined area was released through clearance in 2019, during which a total of 22 anti-personnel 
mines were destroyed. No mined area was reduced through technical survey or cancelled through non-technical survey  
in 2019.68
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, no mined area was reduced through technical survey.69 This compares to the 329,820m2 reduced through technical 
survey in 2018.70 No mined area was cancelled through non-technical survey in 201971 or in 2018.
CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, a total of 606,210m2 of mined area was cleared, destroying 22 anti-personnel mines along with 15 items of UXO.  
The mine clearance, which was carried out in the villages of Končulj and Turija in Bujanovac municipality, was conducted by 
two NGOs from Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Stop Mines and In Demining) and two commercial companies 
(see Table 3).72 This is a significant increase in clearance output compared to 2018, when 293,200m2 was released clearance.73 
However, nearly two thirds of the mine clearance conducted in 2019 found no anti-personnel mines, reiterating once again  
the importance of conducting technical survey prior to full clearance.
Table 3: Mine clearance in 201974
Municipality Village Operator Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed UXO destroyed 
Bujanovac Končulj Stop Mines 198,600 20 0
Končulj PMC Inženjering  
and Nucleus Team
18,410 2 0
Turija In Demining 389,200 0 15
Totals 606,210 22 15
SMAC did not have available data on the number of mines destroyed by the EOD department within the Sector for Emergency 
Management during spot tasks in 2019.75
Of the three clearance projects, one was funded by the 2019 Serbian State Budget for demining operations and matched 
through the ITF with the United States and Republic of Korea donations. One project was funded by Japan through the ITF. 
The final project was mine clearance of the part of power line route in Bujanovac municipality, funded by Joint Stock Company 
“Elektromreža Srbije” - Transmission System Maintenance Division, Belgrade.76 
While a total of 15 items of UXO were discovered at a clearance task at Turija village, no mines were found.
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SERBIA
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SERBIA: 1 MARCH 2004
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2014
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: JUST ON TRACK, DEPENDENT ON FUNDING 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2020 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): HIGH
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
second extension (for four years) granted by States Parties 
in 2018), Serbia is required to destroy all anti-personnel 
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon 
as possible, but not later than 1 March 2023. Serbia is just 
on track to meet this deadline, if it can secure and sustain 
required funding. However, the discovery of previously 
unrecorded anti-personnel mine contamination, revealed as 
a result of fires in 2019, adds to Serbia’s existing Article 5 
commitment. SMAC identified this as a potential obstacle to 
meeting its clearance deadline, along with lack of adequate 
financial resources and the unpredictability of securing 
financial resources.77
In addition, Serbia reported that the remaining mine 
contamination is of unrecorded mined areas/groups of mines, 
with mines having been emplaced with no particular pattern, 
which has complicated survey and clearance efforts.78 SMAC 
also has to simultaneously address areas contaminated with 
CMR and other unexploded ordnance, which also have a 
socio-economic impact.79
Furthermore, Serbia’s claim to continued jurisdiction over 
Kosovo entails legal responsibility for remaining mined 
areas under Article 5 of the APMBC.80 However, Serbia did 
not include such areas in either its first or second extension 
request estimates of remaining contamination or plans for 
the extension periods. 
In the last five years Serbia has cleared a total of over 1.3km2 
of mined area (see Table 4). 
Serbia has fallen well behind the clearance plan it set out 
in its 2013 Article 5 deadline, and also fell behind on land 
release output in its subsequently adjusted work plans in 
2015, 2016, and 2017, largely due to back of funding.81 
In a positive development, on top of existing US funding, 
Serbia also secured funding from a new donor, the Republic 
of Korea, in 2018, and has further secured funding from 
another new donor, Japan, in 2019.82 This enabled Serbia to 
meet the updated clearance target for 2019, envisaged in its 
Article 7 report submitted in 2018.83
In its 2018 Article 5 extension request, Serbia estimated that 
it required €2.5 million to complete release of all remaining 
mined areas, of which €900,000 was planned to come from 
national budget and around €1.6 million from the ITF and 
other sources of international funding.84 
SMAC has pledged to continue to raise awareness of its 
need for further funding and will seek funding from state 
authorities, public enterprises, and local authorities.85
Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







*0.28km2 was reduced through technical survey, during which three anti-personnel 
mines were destroyed.
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
SMAC envisages that it will most likely need both national and international capacity to deal with any residual contamination, 
discovered following completion.86 Serbia is already dealing with residual ERW contamination and investing significant funds 
for ERW clearance, which is expected to be ongoing.87
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AP MINE  
CLEARANCE IN 2019
AP MINES   
DESTROYED IN 2019
ANTIPERSONNEL (AP)  
MINE CONTAMINATION: 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022 
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Somalia is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline and in 2021 intends to submit an extension request in 2021 for a further 
five years. Progress in land release in Somalia continues to be slow, particularly if survey and clearance in Somaliland are 
excluded. The estimate of total contamination decreased by more than 90% in 2019 compared to the previous year. According 
to SEMA, this new estimate of contamination is because “closed” hazardous areas were removed from the database but they 
are not confident that this new estimate accurately represents actual contamination, believing that the extent is far greater.
Government mine action processes continue to be delayed, with the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) still to  
be formally recognised, and both the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 and revised National Technical Standards 
and Guidelines were also still awaiting approval as of writing.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Somalia should establish a national baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination as soon as security conditions allow.
 ■ Somalia should commit resources for mine action operations. 
 ■ SEMA’s status within the Federal Government of Somalia should be officially recognised and national resources 
budgeted annually for its operating costs. 
 ■ Continued efforts should be undertaken to support SEMA to manage the Information Management System for Mine 
Action (IMSMA) database. Regular updates from the database should be shared with all implementing partners. 
 ■ Somalia should elaborate a new National Mine Action Strategic Plan and associated work plan in line with the 
forthcoming 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request, updating the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 
(that had still to be formally endorsed by the Federal Government as of writing).
 ■ Somalia should develop a mine action resource mobilisation strategy and initiate dialogue with development partners 
on long-term support.
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 ■ SEMA should take greater ownership of tasking and prioritisation with the necessary budget and strategy in place to 
support this.
 ■ SEMA should strengthen quality management processes and ensure that operators are following the same standard.








(20% of overall score)
4 4 There is no baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination in Somalia although 
SEMA is intending to submit a plan for nationwide survey in 2021. However, this is 
heavily dependent on securing both funding and access to all potentially affected 
areas, which is currently very difficult due to ongoing conflict and insecurity. The 
significantly reduced estimate of contamination as at end of 2019 is claimed by the 
authorities to be inaccurate and an underestimate.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
4 4 A new director of SEMA was appointed in 2019 and SEMA continued to receive 
capacity development support. However, there is a lack of national ownership as 
the Federal Government of Somalia has still not formally recognised SEMA as a 
government institution or funded its operations.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
5 5 Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 includes provisions 
on gender and diversity. SEMA has been positive towards action on gender and 
diversity, particularly within survey and community liaison teams. However, there 
are challenges to achieving gender mainstreaming within Somalia as a patriarchal 




(10% of overall score)
5 5 SEMA has assumed full ownership and responsibility for the national mine action 
database, resulting in reported improvements in information management. However, 
there are still considerable data inconsistencies in year-to-year reporting and 




(10% of overall score)
6 6 Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 was still awaiting 
final approval as at June 2020. SEMA met with operators in 2019, to discuss 
setting indicators for planning and prioritisation. Operators reported that while 
improvements had been made in tasking by SEMA the process would benefit from  
it taking greater ownership.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
5 5 A process to revise Somalia’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines was due 
to be completed in 2019 but was still awaiting approval as of writing. The current 
standards are not deemed to meet the requirements for Somalia. There was a 
general decrease in demining capacity in 2019 from 2018. In February 2019, the first 
mine detection dog (MDD) team became operational in Somalia.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
4 4 Somalia is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline and intends to submit an 
extension request in 2021 for a further five years. Land release outputs remained 
limited in 2019, primarily due to ongoing armed conflict, new security threats, and 
a lack of resources and operational capacity. The vast majority of the demining in 
2019 was in Somaliland; only eight anti-personnel mines were found during formal 
clearance operations in the rest of Somalia.
Average Score 4.6 4.6 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)
 ■ Mine Action Department in the Somaliland Ministry of 
Defence (formerly, Somaliland Mine Action Centre)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Federal Member States (FMS) NGO consortium
 ■ National NGOs
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
 ■ Ukroboronservice
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 




UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at the end of 2019, the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) reported 125 suspected and confirmed mined areas 
across Somalia covering an estimated total area of 16.2km2 (see Table 1).1 Operators reported that confirmed hazardous areas 
(CHA) containing landmines are mainly concentrated along Somalia’s border with Ethiopia. Data gathered through historical 
surveys indicate that most recorded minefields were contaminated with anti-vehicle mines or had very minimal information 
about the type of contamination.2 Anti-personnel mine contamination in Somalia is believed to be low.3 
Table 1: Mine contamination (at end 2019)4
Type of contamination CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2)
AP mines 29 6,098,846 1 0
AP/AV mines 91 9,999,390 4 121,744 
Totals 120 16,098,236 5 121,744
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle
Contamination from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) exists across Somalia’s three major regions: south-central 
Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu; Puntland; and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised state in the 
north-west. Mines along the border with Ethiopia, mainly in legacy minefields, also continued to affect civilians in south-central 
Somalia.5 It was estimated, at the end of 2019, 29 CHAs contained anti-personnel mines covering a total area of 6.1km2 along 
with one suspected hazardous area (SHA) of an unknown size in Puntland, see Table 2.6 This is a massive reduction from the 
more than 72.2km2 of anti-personnel mine contamination across 72 SHAs/CHAs as at April 2019, which cannot be explained by 
land release.7 According to SEMA, this new estimate of contamination is because “closed” hazardous areas were removed from 
the database but they believe that the true extent of contamination is far greater. SEMA intends to synchronise the national 
database with that of operators in order to improve the quality of the database and, as at August 2020, had begun to meet with 
operators to begin this process.8 
Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination (at end 2019)9
State CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total CHA/SHA Total area (m2)
Galmudug 18 3,482,660 0 0 18 3,482,660
Hirshabelle 3 381,922 0 0 3 381,922
Puntland 1 0 1 0 2 0
South-West 7 2,234,264 0 0 7 2,234,264
Totals 29 6,098,846 1 0 30 6,098,846
While no comprehensive estimates yet exist of mine contamination in Somalia, surveys completed in 2008 in Bakol, Bay, and 
Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718 communities, around one in ten was contaminated by mines and/or ERW.10 Other 
contaminated areas lie along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud and Gedo regions, as well as in Hiraan. Non-technical 
survey initiated in 2015 identified more than 6km2 of mined area.11 However, a baseline of mine contamination is still lacking 
in Somalia, primarily due to a lack of resources to deploy sufficient survey teams and lack of access to areas due to security 
concerns and al-Shabaab control.12 
SEMA is planning to submit an Article 5 deadline extension request in 2021 which will include a plan for nationwide survey to 
establish a baseline of contamination provided that it can secure the necessary funding.13 Lack of safe access is also a major 
obstacle to the completion of survey. Fighting between clans and the presence of Al-Shabaab restricts mobility and places 
operators’ and security personnel at risk.14
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported that as at July 2020, a total of 20 mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle minefields 
remained to be cleared with a total size of just under 5.8km2, most of which are barrier minefields or military base  
perimeter minefields.15
In 2019, The HALO Trust continued to deploy survey teams across Somaliland in order to build a more accurate assessment 
of the remaining contamination. While the general extent of contamination has been established by comprehensive survey 
that HALO has undertaken over the last 20 years in Somaliland, a combination of low-density minelaying and lack of first-hand 
survey information means that new contaminated areas are still being found. In 2019, five minefields totalling 163,049m2 was 
discovered and added to the database, all of which was legacy anti-personnel mine contamination.16
In the Puntland state administration, mine contamination was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), 
implemented by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) and the Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the regions of Bari, Nugaal, 
and the northern part of Mudug.17 Non-technical survey activities continued in Puntland and Galmudug as part of a joint NPA 
and SEMA project.18
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As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977–78 (also known as the Ogaden war), and more than 20 years 
of internal conflict, Somalia is significantly contaminated with mines and ERW. According to the United Nations (UN), 
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were laid as recently as 2012 in the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag.19 According 
to SEMA, Somalia has seen an increase in the use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mines of an 
improvised nature in recent years. The extent of the threat is not well known, and SEMA will begin recording this information 
in 2020.20
EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS
Somalia also has a significant amount of contamination from ERW, including what is thought to be very limited contamination 
from cluster munition remnants (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2020 report on Somalia for 
further information).
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Mine action management in Somalia is the responsibility of 
SEMA with a separate regional office in Somaliland, the Mine 
Action Department within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence 
(formerly, the Mine Clearance Information and Coordination 
Authority (MCICA), and before that the Somaliland Mine 
Action Centre, SMAC) in Somaliland.21 
SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its five 
Federal Member States (FMS): the Puntland State Office, 
Galmudug State Office, Hirshabelle State Office, South 
West State Office, and Jubaland State Office.22 Under each 
of the five states is an independent consortium of national 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) implementing mine 
action activities.
SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action centre 
for Somalia, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action 
Authority (SNMAA) created two years earlier.23 SEMA’s aim 
was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard 
coordination, regulation, and management by December 
2015.24 However, SEMA’s legislative framework was not 
approved by the Federal Parliament in 2016 as expected, and 
progress was further stalled by elections in February 2017 
that resulted in a period of government paralysis.25 Due to 
this lack of parliamentary approval, SEMA has not received 
funding from the Federal Government of Somalia since the 
expiry of its grant in 2015.26 Salaries at SEMA have been 
covered by NPA from 2015 onwards and NPA has committed 
to do so until SEMA is granted parliamentary approval, 
pending available funding in 2021–22.27 The United Nations 
Mine Action Service (UNMAS) supported SEMA state offices 
with operational incentives from January to March 2020.28 
As at August 2020, a UNDP project to support SEMA with 
capacity development, project implementation, and salaries 
was under discussion.29
In May 2020, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that while 
all the required documentation was in place, including from 
the Attorney General, SEMA’s legislative framework had still 
not been approved by parliament. SEMA reported that due 
to the financial crisis in Somalia, the Federal Government of 
Somalia was not able to provide financial support to SEMA 
during 2019. However, the government has stated that it 
intends to provide funding to SEMA in the future, although  
it is unclear when this will happen.30
A new director of SEMA was appointed towards the end of 
2019, the third in as many years, although outside of this 
position staff turnover within SEMA is relatively low. NPA 
expressed concern about the lack of commitment from the 
Federal Government of Somalia to mine action and the impact 
that it may have on fundraising efforts by operators if no 
serious efforts are being made by the Somali government 
towards official approval or financial support of SEMA.31 
In July 2018, the SEMA central office at the Ministry of 
Internal Security in Mogadishu was attacked and significantly 
damaged, some of its staff injured, and much of SEMA’s 
office materials, including computers and documents, 
were destroyed.32 UNMAS provided support to SEMA in the 
reconstruction of a solid-walled office and, as at March 2020, 
reported that this was completed and occupied by SEMA 
personnel. UNMAS has also provided office furniture and 
IT equipment for SEMA’s central and regional offices and 
supports SEMA’s participation at the UN Meeting of Mine 
Action National Directors (NDM-UN).33
In 2019, as part of the United Kingdom Department for 
International Development (DFID)-funded consortium project 
with The HALO Trust, who provide technical training and 
support with quality assurance (QA) to SEMA, NPA continued 
its capacity development work with SEMA. In 2019, key 
activities included supporting information management 
and operational planning, providing QA and quality 
control (QC) training, support in donor liaison and treaty 
meetings, support for quarterly coordination meetings and 
workshops, and providing training in financial, administrative 
and logistical procedures. In addition to SEMA capacity 
development support, NPA also trained the non-technical 
survey, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and 
community liaison capacity of the local SEMA implementing 
partners in Puntland and Galmudug.34 
NPA and the HALO Trust reported that increased support 
from SEMA would be valuable to facilitate the importation  
of equipment and for tax exemptions, in an effort to  
further improve the enabling environment around mine 
action activities.35
SEMA began conducting quarterly meetings with all mine 
action implementing partners in 2018, with a focus on 
monitoring of operations. Operators considered this a 
major step forward towards improving the cooperation, 
consultation, and coordination between SEMA and the 
clearance operators within Somalia.36 





The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with UN Development Programme 
(UNDP) support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional government, the Puntland State Office has coordinated mine 
action with local and international partners, throughout 2019 the implementing partners were NPA and the Puntland Risk 
Solution Consortium.37 It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is responsible for 
collecting and destroying explosive ordnance.38
SOMALILAND 
As part of a larger process of government reform in early 2018, the SMAC, which was responsible for coordinating and 
managing demining in Somaliland since 1997, was restructured and renamed the MCICA, and underwent a change of line 
ministry from the Office of the Vice President to the Ministry of Defence.39 It was renamed the Mine Action Department in 
January 2019.40 The HALO Trust reported that within Somaliland it is involved in key decision-making processes by the 
national authorities; and that there is an enabling environment for mine action as international staff can easily obtain visas, 
memorandums of understanding can be drawn up with line ministries, and there are favourable tax regulations in place  
(as for international NGOs in other sectors). The HALO Trust established a committee for “Explosives Hazards Management” 
within the government to collectively discuss progress, challenges and support for Article 5 implementation in Somaliland.41
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 
recognises gender and diversity as cross-cutting issues for 
the national mine action programme, in line with Somalia’s 
National Development Plan objectives to “implement gender 
equality in education and mainstream gender in all of its 
programmes with a focus on adolescent girls”. The National 
Mine Action Strategic Plan stipulates that the mine action 
programme must reflect gender objectives and ensure the 
specific needs of women, girls, boys, and men are taken 
into account, including through delivery of gender-equality 
programming and adoption of a gender-sensitive approach 
by consortia and implementing partners. The Plan also 
recognises the importance of conducting context analyses in 
areas of mine action operations to clarify important gender 
and diversity issues, such as clan affiliation, movement 
patterns of local populations, and barriers to participation 
for different gender and age groups.42 SEMA reported that 
gender and diversity have also been integrated into the 
national mine action standards.43
In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that 
it does not have an internal gender or diversity policy 
or implementation plan. It acknowledged that this was 
“unfortunate”, and pledged that it would strive for gender 
balance in the future, by ensuring equal employment 
opportunities for qualified men and women.44 
SEMA also reported that within the federal state national mine 
action NGO consortia, there was a large focus on gender in 
survey and community liaison teams to ensure the inclusive 
participation of all affected groups, including women and 
children.45 Operators are working towards gender-balanced 
survey and clearance teams. This is a challenge in Somalia 
as a traditionally patriarchal society where women are not 
usually encouraged to engage in physical work or to take up 
leadership roles.46 SEMA confirmed that data collection was 
disaggregated by sex and age, and gender taken into account 
in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and 
clearance activities,47 although it is unclear how it gender is 
being taken into account.
All operators confirmed that clan affiliation was also an 
important consideration when recruiting and deploying 
operational staff. It is important that the hiring process 
includes people from across the different clan and ethnic 
groups to ensure diversity and that there is sensitivity to 
this when teams are deployed.48 Employing more women 
typically enables operators to access all strata of Somali 
society to gain information and take into account the views 
of all relevant groups.49 In Somaliland, 35% of the population 
are nomadic pastoralists, with many transiting between 
Somaliland and Ethiopia. HALO in Somaliland ensures 
that it employs survey staff from both a rural and urban 
background, and from various regions in Somaliland, to 
ensure that there is a strong understanding of all sections  
of Somaliland society.50
In 2019, NPA’s non-technical survey/community liaison/
explosive ordnance risk education teams were said to be 
gender balanced as was senior management. However, 
no women were working in the clearance teams, apart 
from medics.51 In total, 25% of HALO Trust’s workforce 
were women in 2019 and 18% of its operational personnel 
were women. In Somalia, 40% of women employed by the 
HALO Trust are in operational roles, while in Somaliland 
it is 47%. Women also occupy several managerial roles in 
both Somalia and Somaliland. In 2019, eight of the twenty 
new deminers hired by HALO were women.52 UNMAS have 
been hiring local people on short-term contracts to assist 
clearance teams which has enabled a larger number of 
women to be hired and has brought the average overall 
female participation in mine action up to 25%. Women also 
constituted 27% of leadership (managerial/supervisory) 
positions in the UNMAS Somalia programme.53
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
In 2017, ownership of the national IMSMA database was 
fully transferred from UNMAS to SEMA, with support and 
capacity-building from NPA.54 NPA reported that IMSMA 
operators within SEMA were carrying out data verification 
and entry.55 In 2019, with support from NPA, SEMA staff 
received training on IMSMA and Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS); SEMA updated the data collection forms 
and ensured they were in line with the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS); SEMA continued IMSMA data 
standardisation and clean-up activities; SEMA updated 
Somalia’s country structure in IMSMA; and developed 
a national standard on information management.56 NPA 
reported that in 2019, reporting between operators and 
SEMA improved.57 According to UNMAS, however, SEMA’s 
database is neither up to date nor accurate.58 There were 
large discrepancies between the land release data for 2019 
reported to Mine Action Review by SEMA and by operators. 
As at August 2020, SEMA was continuing to meet with 
operators to discuss synchronising operator data with the 
national database.59
The Mine Action Department, the mine action authority in 
Somaliland, manages a separate IMSMA database. The 
HALO Trust stated that its data undergoes monthly quality 
assurance being reported to MCICA, which uploads it onto  
the central database. In Somaliland, HALO creates its 
own data collection forms, which it says ensure accurate 
collection of data by its survey teams.60
In July 2018, SEMA submitted its first APMBC Article 7 
transparency report for several years covering calendar year 
2017, reflecting improvements in its information management 
and reporting capacity and greater transparency and efforts 
to engage with the APMBC community. However, subsequent 
reporting has been of poor quality, lacking basic details on 
the size of and progress to address remaining contamination, 
and with considerable inconsistencies in year-to-year 
reporting. In September 2020, Somalia submitted its Article 
7 report covering 2019, however, there were some data 
discrepancies between national authority and operator data.
PLANNING AND TASKING
Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020, 
developed with input from SEMA, UNMAS, international 
operators, national NGO consortia, and international 
institutions in late 2017.61 As at May 2020, with the strategic 
plan about to expire, it was still awaiting final approval by  
the Somali Minister of Internal Security.62
The plan focuses on setting “achievable” goals over the 
three-year period. The strategy’s five goals, identified by 
SEMA, are as follows:
 ■ To enhance SEMA’s ability to lead and enable effective 
and efficient mine action
 ■ To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly 
national mine action capacity
 ■ To engage with stakeholders in order to understand,  
and better respond to, their mine action needs
 ■ To achieve a mine-impact-free Somalia 
 ■ To comply with treaties binding Somalia on mines and 
other explosive threats.
In February 2018, an updated second “phase” of the five-year 
“Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management 
for 2018–2022”, first developed in 2015 by SEMA, UNMAS, and 
the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), was officially 
launched in Geneva. It claimed to be a plan to “make Somalia 
mine free by 2022”, but it is not realistic, without detail as 
to the amount of contamination remaining or targets for 
completion.63 According to UNMAS, the Badbaado plan lacked 
consultation with other stakeholders and will be usurped by 
Somalia’s strategic plan once it has been approved.64
SEMA was developing a mine action work plan for 2020, in 
cooperation with the SEMA state offices, and operators, but it 
is not yet finished. NPA is planning to support SEMA with an 
implementation plan for 2021.65
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported that the strategic mine 
action plan was yet to be in place in 2019, though they continue 
capacity development with the mine action department. 
According to The HALO Trust there is a lack of political will to 
conclude a strategic plan or handle residual risk.66
SEMA, with technical and capacity development support from 
NPA, held a meeting in 2019 to set indicators for the planning 
and prioritisation of mine action activities which will be used as 
a guide for future planning and prioritisation.67 In Somaliland, 
anti-personnel mined areas are prioritised by HALO according 
to a criteria of humanitarian need, e.g. number of accidents, 
patterns of land use, and socio-economic data.68 
The HALO Trust reported an improvement in tasking in 
Somalia since the new Director of SEMA was appointed with 
the Authority becoming much more responsive to requests.69 
This remains an area needing further strengthening, 
however. UNMAS, through its implementing partner 
Ukroboronservice, continued to carry out mine action 
activities in support of the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM)’s security priorities in 2019; these activities were 
not tasked by SEMA, although UNMAS report that since 
March 2020 they have been receiving tasking orders from 
SEMA.70 In Somaliland, The HALO Trust manage its own 
tasking and prioritisation.71





STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no national mine action legislation in Somalia. UNMAS developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) 
for Somalia in 2012–13.72 However, according to The HALO Trust, since their introduction there have not been updated and do 
not accurately reflect the clearance standards required for Somalia. They allow for methodologies such as detector-assisted 
prodding, which should be critically reviewed as it has resulted in missed mines in Somalia.73 SEMA conducted a review of the 
NTSGs in 2019 with technical support from NPA and in compliance with IMAS. There were no revisions or updates made to the 
NTSGs in 2019. As at May 2020, the NTSGs were awaiting approval from the Ministry of Internal Security.74
The HALO Trust reported that SEMA still lacked capacity and technical training to perform QA checks in 2018, and that 
consequently it carried out internal QA.75 In 2019, NPA provided QA and QC training to SEMA staff but according to HALO  
there is a lack of clarity around QA processes and not all operators are following the same standards.76
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust confirmed that the Mine Action Department continued to conduct a limited number of formal  
QA reviews in 2019, with support from HALO.77
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2019, two international NGOs conducted clearance operations in Somalia and Somaliland, The HALO Trust and NPA, along 
with UNMAS-contracted commercial clearance company, Ukroboronservice.78












61 0 0 Increase from 2 MTTs and 4 MDTs in 2018 
HALO Somalia 4 38 0 0 HALO Somalia only conducted BAC in 2019
HALO Somaliland 34 259 0 2 Decrease from 2018
NPA 1 6 2 dogs, 2 handlers 0 MDD team deployed in February
Totals 49 364 2/2 2
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters. 
BAC = Battle area clearance MTT= Mobile multi-tasking team MDT= Manual demining team.
UNMAS, through its implementing partner Ukroboronservice, deployed four mobile multi-tasking teams (MTTs) and six manual 
demining teams (MDTs) which are trained to carry out non-technical survey, manual demining, and explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD). In addition, 16 community liaison officers conduct non-technical survey. Operational capacity increased from 2018 to 2019 
with the aim of improving efficiency, speed of clearance progress, and increasing geographical coverage, as well as reducing 
response time in the event of call-outs. In 2020, if funding from the European Union (EU) is approved, capacity may increase.80
In 2019, there was a decrease in anti-personnel mine survey or clearance personnel deployed by The HALO Trust in Somalia 
as only battle area clearance (BAC) was conducted. In addition, HALO deployed eight non-technical survey teams totalling 20 
personnel in Somalia, and two teams totalling eight personnel in Somaliland. The HALO Trust expected to recruit an additional 
eight non-technical survey and clearance/technical survey teams in 2020. No changes in capacity were expected in Somaliland 
in 2020. In 2019, the HALO Trust conducted tests on the application of thermite torches in Somalia and hosted a preliminary 
trial of Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) technology for explosive detection in Somaliland.81
NPA continued mine clearance throughout the year within the disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland, with two 
manual mine clearance teams and one survey/risk education team. It is the only international operator accepted to work in 
the disputed area by the different local clans.82 However, NPA terminated its operations in the disputed area at the end of 
November 2019 and closed its office at the end of January 2020.83 It was determined that the remaining areas of contamination 
within this disputed area were all of low socio-economic impact and therefore suitable for clearance by the residual Somaliland 
national capacity which is currently being developed.84 In 2020, NPA was working in Galmudug and Puntland conducting 
survey and clearance and capacity building, entering into partnerships with each of the local NGO consortia.85 In February 
2019, NPA deployed the first mine detection dog (MDD) team in Somalia. In addition to its clearance capacity NPA also has three 
non-technical survey teams totalling six personnel and two technical survey teams totalling twelve personnel. There was 50% 
reduction in non-technical survey and technical survey capacity during the first half of 2020, with capacity then increasing back 
to 2019 levels by the middle of the year.86
DEMINER SAFETY
In 2019, one HALO Somaliland staff member sustained a minor injury in an accident during clearance. The accident involved the 
unintended initiation of a Pakistani P4 Mk1 anti-personnel mine. The accident was investigated internally by The HALO Trust.87
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Nearly 2.47km2 of anti-personnel mined area was released in total across Somalia and Somaliland in 2019: just over 1.82km2 
through mine clearance and close to 0.50km2 reduced through technical survey, and 0.15km2 by cancellation through 
non-technical survey. A total of 248 anti-personnel mines and 132 anti-vehicle mines were destroyed as a result. Of this, 
0.23km2 was cleared in Puntland by NPA but only two anti-vehicle mines were found and no anti-personnel mines. A further  
26 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in spot tasks.
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, a total of 0.65km2 was released through survey: 0.15km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey (see Table 4) 
and close to 0.50km2 was reduced through technical survey (see Table 5). Only 0.005km2 was cancelled through non-technical 
survey in Somalia; the rest of the mined area released through non-technical survey, 0.15km2, was in Somaliland. This was also 
the case with technical survey with 0.49km2 reduced in Somaliland and 0.01km2 reduced in Puntland.88 This a reduction from 
2018 figures when nearly 0.28km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey and a further 0.55km2 was reduced through 
technical survey.89
Table 4: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201990











Table 5: Reduction through technical survey in 201991








In 2019, a total of 1.82km2 of anti-personnel mined area was cleared with the destruction of 248 anti-personnel mines and 132 
anti-vehicle mines (see Table 6). Of the total clearance, 0.23km2 was cleared in Puntland by NPA but only two anti-vehicle mines 
were found and no anti-personnel mines. The vast majority, 1.47km2, was cleared in Somaliland.92 This is an increase from 
overall clearance of just under 1.6km2 in 2018, again the majority of which occurred in Somaliland at just under 1.49km2.93
Table 6: Mine clearance in 201994
Province Operator Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed
Gedo Ukroboronservice (UNMAS) 120,000 6 2
Hiran Ukroboronservice (UNMAS) 0 0 3
Bakol Ukroboronservice (UNMAS) 0 0 1
Awdal (Somaliland) HALO Trust 136,811 33 0
Maroodi Jeex (Somaliland) HALO Trust 217,846 35 0
Toghdeer (Somaliland) HALO Trust 923,434 170 8
Somaliland NPA 191,638 2 1
Puntland NPA 231,611 0 2
Galmudug NPA 0 2 115
Totals 1,821,340 248 132
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle 
In addition, two anti-personnel mines were destroyed during EOD spot tasks by UNMAS and The HALO Trust in Somalia in 
2019.95 In Somaliland, the HALO Trust destroyed 24 anti-personnel mines during EOD spot tasks.96
The UNMAS-contracted operator, Ukroboronservice, cleared 19 mined areas in 2019 that proved to contain no anti-personnel 
mines.97 NPA cleared 29 mined areas which contained anti-vehicle mines not anti-personnel mines.98 NPA cleared nearly 0.2km2 
in Somaliland with just two anti-personnel mines found and destroyed. The reason for the low number of mines recovered 
was the majority of mines in the contaminated had been already been harvested by the local population prior to clearance.99 
The HALO Trust only conducted land release in Somaliland and one area was cleared in 2019 which proved to contain no 
anti-personnel mines.100




Ukroboronservice cleared more mined area for UNMAS in 2019 compared to 2018 but not anti-personnel mined area.101 
Worsening insecurity meant that the HALO Trust was unable to conduct mine clearance and switched to BAC in 2019.  
In Somaliland, there was no significant change in output from 2018 to 2019. For NPA, both technical survey and clearance 
outputs rose due to the workforce becoming more experienced and efficient.102
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOMALIA: 1 OCTOBER 2012
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Somalia is required to destroy 
all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction 
or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 
2022. It is not on track to meet this deadline. In 2021, Somalia 
plans to submit a request to extend its Article 5 deadline 
by five years.103 In this request Somalia intends to include 
plans for a nationwide survey of baseline anti-personnel 
mine contamination. However, this is dependent both on 
Somalia securing the requisite funding and also access.104 
The security situation remains a major obstacle to survey 
and clearance operations in Somalia.105 A further impediment 
is that SEMA is still to be officially recognised by the Federal 
Government of Somalia as the national mine action centre.106
Overall land release rose in 2019 compared to the previous 
year, and included increased clearance output. However, the 
vast majority of land release took place in Somaliland and 
only ten anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed in 
2019 in the rest of Somalia, two of which occurred during 
spot EOD tasks, over an area of 0.35km2.
As reported by the HALO Trust, there are two main types 
of security threat that operators face: clan wars and 
al-Shabaab. Conflicts between clans can put survey and 
clearance personnel at risk as the operators’ staff can be 
killed for revenge by rival clan members. The group restricts 
the mobility of goods and people throughout the region 
which impacts operational efficiency and increases the cost 
of transporting personnel and equipment as road access is 
not possible so everything must be airlifted. The impact of 
COVID-19 has increased this threat as all flights have been 
grounded which makes this more difficult and riskier.107
In Somaliland, the security situation remained relatively 
stable throughout 2019. The eastern areas of Sanaag and 
Sool continue to see occasional outbreaks of violence as 
a result of clan clashes and disagreements between the 
Somaliland and Puntland administrations but no clearance 
operations were planned in those eastern areas. 
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
According to NPA, Somalia’s new national mine action strategy will include provisions for addressing previously unknown 
areas with capacity in place to conduct survey and clearance as necessary.108 Somalia is planning to introduce state level 
consortiums of local NGOs who will be tasked with dealing with residual contamination.109
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AP MINE  
CLEARANCE IN 2019
AP MINES   
DESTROYED IN 2019
ANTIPERSONNEL (AP)  
MINE CONTAMINATION: 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2021 
EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 9 JULY 2026
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
South Sudan has determined it will not meet its July 2021 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 clearance 
deadline and has requested an additional extension for a period of five years. South Sudan has its most accurate estimate 
of remaining anti-personnel mine contamination to date following revision of the database and large-scale re-survey, which 
combined to reduce the estimate by 85% over two years. However, clearance of anti-personnel mined area halved in 2019 
compared to 2018 and the challenges around the security situation, while improved, still remain. South Sudan intends to  
clear all types of contamination within the period of the extension requested, an undoubtedly optimistic target and one that  
is dependent on peace being sustained. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ South Sudan should increase its financial support for mine action operations as well as to the National Mine Action 
Authority (NMAA).
 ■ South Sudan should elaborate the steps that it is taking to mainstream gender across its mine action programme  
and what plans it is putting in place to ensure that diverse needs are taken into account during the period of the 
extension request.
 ■ South Sudan should report periodically during the extension request period on its progress in establishing  
a sustainable and long-term national capacity (for both demining and information management) to deal with  
residual contamination. 
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(20% of overall score)
8 7 South Sudan continues to improve its understanding of remaining anti-personnel 
mine contamination through re-survey and database review. Estimated at the end of 
2019 at just over 12km2, this is down from nearly 80km2 in 2017. Further re-survey is 
planned to confirm the true size of the last remaining inflated suspected hazardous 
areas (SHAs) although access is dependent on the security situation.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
4 4 The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) continued to face serious financial and 
technical limitations preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively 
in 2019, with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) assuming that 
function. Capacity development of the NMAA was ongoing in 2019 and 2020. In 2019, 
South Sudan received sufficient funding for mine action, but this may decrease if 




(10% of overall score)
6 6 South Sudan’s second national mine action strategy for 2018–22 includes a section 
on gender, as does South Sudan’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines 
(NTSGs). These include a focus on ensuring gender-balanced survey teams and 




(10% of overall score)
7 7 The comprehensive review of all data in South Sudan’s Information Management 
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database which began in 2018, along with re-survey 
of recorded suspected and confirmed hazardous areas, has resulted in significant 
gains in the understanding of mine contamination. South Sudan submitted its revised 
extension request in August 2020, which includes comprehensive objectives for land 
release and data disaggregated by type of contamination and method of land release.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
7 6 South Sudan has a National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2022, which underwent 
a mid-term review in January 2020. South Sudan intends to address all types of 
contamination by 2026 and intends to adopt a pragmatic approach to prioritisation 
focusing on efficient deployment of resources.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
7 7 According to UNMAS, the NTSGs for mine action in South Sudan are subject to 
constant review by UNMAS and the NMAA. South Sudan has provided a detailed 
breakdown of required capacity to 2026. It intends to deploy the full toolbox of 
demining resources but in order to meet its land release projections will need to 
reconfigure its demining teams.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
7 7 South Sudan’s land release output slowed in 2019 as its estimate of anti-personnel 
mine contamination becomes more accurate and less mined area was cancelled 
through non-technical survey. South Sudan will not meet its current Article 5 
deadline of July 2021 and has submitted a five-year extension request. It plans to 
address all types of contamination within this timeframe making for an ambitious 
extension request, particularly when the ongoing challenges around access and 
insecurity are taken into account.
Average Score 6.8 6.5 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY




 ■ Danish Church Aid (DCA)
 ■ Danish Demining Group (DDG)
 ■ G4S Ordnance Management (G4S)
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
 ■ The Development Initiative (TDI)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)





UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at the end of 2019, South Sudan had a combined total of 126 areas confirmed and suspected to contain anti-personnel 
mines covering a total area of almost 12.2km2 (see Table 1). South Sudan now has a far better understanding of remaining 
anti-personnel mine contamination following targeted re-survey and a comprehensive database review of all contamination 
data. It has released significant areas of land since re-survey began, including cancelling nearly 69km2 in 2018–19.
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by state (at end 2019)1
State CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total SHA/CHA Total area (m2)
Central Equatoria 37 1,312,066 35 471,250 72 1,783,316
Eastern Equatoria 14 539,909 10 104,432 24 644,341
Jonglei 6 597,036 8 3,596,842 14 4,193,878
North Bahr El Ghazal 1 26,100 1 21,719 2 47,819
Upper Nile 3 93,761 1 4,683,615 4 4,777,376
Warrap 0 0 1 40,000 1 40,000
West Bahr El Ghazal 1 201,738 0 0 1 201,738
Western Equatoria 1 95,450 7 410,810 8 506,260
Totals 63 2,866,060 63 9,328,668 126 12,194,728
CHAs = Confirmed hazardous areas SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas
According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), South Sudan, at end 2019, also had 59 suspected and confirmed 
anti-vehicle mined areas, covering nearly 4.7km2 (see Table 2).2
Table 2: Mined area (at end 2019)3
Type of contamination CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2)
Anti-personnel mines 63 2,866,060 63 9,328,668
Anti-vehicle mines 35 2,617,389 24 2,074,738
Totals 98 5,483,449 87 11,403,406
In 2017, UNMAS initiated a review of the national Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database which 
led to the conclusion that much of the anti-personnel mine 
contamination may have been over-reported in size. UNMAS 
consequently initiated a process of targeted re-survey aimed 
at better defining the estimated size of SHAs. 
While significant progress has been made to date to 
define the extent of anti-personnel mine contamination 
remaining, its full extent is not known. Further survey 
is still needed to more accurately determine the actual 
extent of anti-personnel contamination in the SHAs, which 
still make up roughly three-quarters of the overall size 
of anti-personnel mine contamination in the database.4 
However, insecurity greatly limits access to many areas 
of the country and displacement of the population means 
villagers are not there to consult during non-technical 
survey, severely impeding efforts to confirm or address 
contamination, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region. 
A total of 37 tasks have been prioritised for re-survey, which 
total a suspected area covering 8.60km2. The largest of 
these was a single SHA in the Upper Nile State, which was 
originally estimated at 4.68km2 and which was almost equal 
to the entire contamination in the state of Central Equatoria. 
This SHA was cancelled through non-technical survey in 
February 2020.5 South Sudan expects a reduction in the 
actual clearance requirement once re-survey is complete to 
5km2 for minefields and 10km2 for cluster munition remnants 
(CMR)/battle area clearance (BAC).6
At the same time, new areas of anti-personnel mine 
contamination continued to be added to the database. A total 
of 0.46km2 of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine 
contamination was added in 2019 across 12 hazardous areas.7 
South Sudan is contaminated by anti-personnel and 
anti-vehicle mines, as well as explosive remnants of war 
(ERW), including CMR. The weapons were used during nearly 
50 years of Sudanese civil war in 1955–72 and 1983–2005. 
The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 
January 2005 led to the independence of South Sudan in July 
2011. Following two years of independence and relative peace 
in South Sudan, heavy fighting erupted in the capital, Juba, 
in December 2013, initiating new armed conflict across the 
country. This expanded in July 2016, leading to widespread 
displacement, distress, and destitution. With the signing of 
the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict 
in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 
2018, the security situation across the country has improved, 
and there is now access to many areas that security issues 
previously rendered inaccessible.8
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NEW CONTAMINATION
Dating back to 2015, there were allegations of use of anti-personnel mines by South Sudanese government forces in an 
area around Nassir, Upper Nile state.9 In June 2018, South Sudan informed States Parties to the APMBC that a four-person 
investigation team travelled to Nassir in November 2017 to investigate the March 2015 allegation. The investigation team  
found no evidence of landmines having been laid in the vicinity of Nassir, on or around the alleged date in 2015.10
While previously undiscovered areas of legacy anti-personnel mine contamination continued to be found in 2019, and despite 
allegations of new use in the course of the conflict that erupted in 2013, Mine Action Review is not aware of confirmed new 
use of anti-personnel mines. In July 2020, UNMAS stated that no new use of anti-personnel mines, including of an improvised 
nature, was recorded in 2019.11
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) — since 
renamed the NMAA — was established by presidential 
decree in 2006 to act as the national agency for planning, 
coordination, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.12 
There is no national mine action legislation in South Sudan.13
In 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1996 tasked UNMAS 
with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening 
the capacity of the NMAA. UNMAS (with the NMAA) has been 
overseeing mine action across the country through its main 
office in Juba, and sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and 
Wau. Together, UNMAS and NMAA accredit, task, monitor 
and evaluate mine action organisations; conduct route 
verification and clearance; provide escorts for convoys on 
high-threat routes to enable the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance; and, conduct data collection and the mapping  
of new hazardous areas.14
While it is planned that the NMAA will eventually assume 
full responsibility for all mine action activities, according to 
UNMAS the NMAA continued to face serious financial and 
technical limitations preventing it from managing mine action 
operations effectively in 2019. It requires substantial resources 
and capacity building assistance if it is to operate effectively.15
UNMAS, mine action operators, and South Sudanese 
government departments are providing capacity development 
to NMAA and other national mine action organisations in a 
project that runs from January 2019 to December 2020. The 
objectives are to develop the managerial and operational 
capacity in key functional and technical areas to enable 
national authorities to assume long-term coordination and 
policy-making roles in mine action; and to strengthen the 
capacity of the NMAA to plan and monitor all aspects of mine 
action, in support of South Sudan’s obligations under the 
APMBC. It is planned that NMAA staff will attend training 
in administration and management, land release, quality 
management, and gender equality and mainstreaming. In 
addition, a resource mobilisation strategy will be developed 
and an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) response capacity 
for the management of residual contamination.16
UNMAS and Danish Demining Group (DDG) are the 
co-coordinators of the mine action sub-cluster. The 
sub-cluster coordinates with the national- and state-level 
Inter-Cluster Working Groups. This enables information to 
be shared on landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), for 
UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to 
inform mine action actors about their own priority locations 
for clearance and for information on landmines and UXO to be 
integrated into the annual Humanitarian Needs Overview and 
the Humanitarian Response Plan.17
In 2019, the Government of South Sudan funded the costs of 
NMAA staff salaries and its sub-offices across the country, 
Malakal, Wau, and Yei. As at March 2020, the Malakal and Yei 
offices were suspended due to the security situation.18 It did 
not, however, provide any funding for survey or clearance. 
The government’s total support was reported as US$75,000 
for the year.19 
In South Sudan’s revised 2020 extension request, it is 
estimated to cost US$148 million to complete clearance by 
July 2026, which now takes into account all the capacity that 
South Sudan has planned to deploy.20 In 2019, South Sudan 
received over US$41 million for mine action which exceeds 
the costs if current levels of support are maintained. It is 
worth noting, however, that much of the funding received 
by UNMAS, which on average has contributed around 75% 
of all sector funding, is used to support the UN Mission in 
South Sudan (UNMISS). This has played an important role 
in the overall mine action effort, as more than 30,000km of 
road have been verified as being free of mines to support the 
mandate of UNMISS, under Security Council Resolution 2459 
(2019). However, it does impact prioritisation as mine action 
teams are deployed in the interest of UNMISS rather than to 
those areas that are most contaminated by mines and UXO. 
Going forward as the role of UNMISS changes it may further 
reduce the resources channelled to the implementation of the 
mine clearance effort.21





GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
South Sudan’s second national mine action strategy for  
2018–22 includes a section on gender, focusing on how 
different gender and age groups are affected by mines and 
ERW and have specific and varying needs and priorities. 
Guidelines on mainstreaming gender considerations in mine 
action planning and operations in South Sudan are also 
incorporated in the strategy, including on the collection of data 
disaggregated by sex and age.22 UNMAS reported that the 
programme was also implementing the UN Gender Guidelines 
for Mine Action, monitored by a gender focal point.23
South Sudan’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines 
(NTSGs) contain provisions requiring all community liaison 
teams to tailor activities on the basis of the gendered needs 
of beneficiaries, and to address the specific risks faced 
by women and girls.24 All teams are reportedly gender 
balanced in composition and trained to be inclusive, for 
example by ensuring outreach through non-technical survey 
and risk education is done separately for different age and 
gender groups, and taking local cultural practices into 
consideration.25 At the same time, UNMAS reported that task 
prioritisation was predominantly dependent on security and 
that resources were concentrated on tasks within limited 
geographical areas rather than on the basis of gender 
needs.26 Ethnic identity is taken into account within survey 
and clearance teams to ensure safe access and acceptance 
by the respective local communities.27 
In 2019–20, UNMAS was planning to provide workshops 
for the NMAA and mine action partners on gender equality, 
gender-based violence (GBV), and gender mainstreaming 
programming in mine action with the aim of GBV prevention 
practices being mainstreamed in mine action and there being 
equal opportunity in decision making regardless of gender.28 
As at July 2020, these had not yet happened.29
UNMAS has stated that there is equal access in employment 
opportunities for qualified men and women in survey and 
clearance teams across the organisations operating in 
South Sudan.30 However, redressing the gender balance 
is a long-term challenge and is dependent on whether 
new vacancies arise. In 2019, however, only 7% of staff in 
operational roles were women and women accounted for 5% 
of managerial or supervisory positions among international 
staff positions, while no women were occupying managerial 
positions among the national staff.31
All of the community liaison teams within Mines Advisory 
Group (MAG) are mixed gender and MAG reports that it 
consults with all affected community members, including 
women and children. MAG also holds women-only focus 
groups to ensure that women’s voices are heard. MAG also 
aims to recruit team members from the more than 60 ethnic 
groups within South Sudan and tries to ensure that at least 
one team member speaks the local language of the planned 
area of deployment. As at October 2019, approximately 25% 
of all operational roles within MAG were held by women. This 
follows a concerted effort by MAG to increase the number of 
women in operational roles. There is one international staff 
member who holds a senior managerial position within MAG 
who is female but none of the female national staff members 
holds a managerial position, although there are national staff 
at a supervisory level.32 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
A comprehensive review of all data in South Sudan’s IMSMA database began in 2018, along with re-survey of recorded SHAs 
and CHAs thought to be exaggerated or erroneously recorded. Through the database review it was found that past efforts to 
upgrade the IMSMA software package led to serious data loss which inhibited efforts to present an entirely accurate record of 
the history of mine action in South Sudan. The ongoing database review has resulted in significant gains in the understanding 
of mine and ERW contamination. UNMAS informed Mine Action Review that, wherever possible, the database disaggregates 
mined areas, CMR, and other ERW-contaminated areas, including spot tasks.33
South Sudan submitted a timely and accurate Article 7 report covering 2019 which disaggregated by type of contamination. 
In addition, it submitted an initial extension request in March 2020, and a revised extension request in August 2020, which 
includes information on all types of explosive ordnance contamination in South Sudan, and a plan to completion of clearance  
of all contamination by 2026. The plan is disaggregated by type of contamination and method of land release.
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PLANNING AND TASKING
South Sudan’s most recent National Mine Action Strategy 
2018–2022, developed with support from the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and 
funded by Japan, was officially launched in September 2018.34 
A mid-term strategic review of the plan, goals and objectives 
was conducted in January 2020.35 According to UNMAS, the 
strategy has three strategic goals with related targets:36
STRATEGIC GOAL 1:  
Advocacy and communication of South Sudan’s mine/ERW  
problem continues through national and international 
awareness-raising and adoption and implementation of 
international conventions to facilitate a mine-/ERW-free 
South Sudan.
STRATEGIC GOAL 2:  
The size of the mine/ERW contamination area is clarified and 
confirmed and the problem is addressed through appropriate 
survey and clearance methods, ensuring safe land is handed 
back to affected communities for use.
STRATEGIC GOAL 3:  
Safe behaviour is promoted among women, girls, boys, 
and men to reduce mine/ERW accidents and promote safe 
livelihood activities.
UNMAS operations staff generate an annual operational 
clearance plan where priority tasks are identified.37 According 
to UNMAS, the operational focus for 2019–20 was on further 
clarifying contamination remaining in the database, with 
re-survey of hazards thought to be exaggerated in size.38 
In its revised 2020 extension request South Sudan presents 
a work plan to 2026, split by region with data disaggregated 
by type of contamination and classified into SHAs and CHAs. 
South Sudan has classified each of the remaining tasks into 
the proposed clearance methodology (manual clearance, 
mechanical clearance, road clearance, or re-survey). In the 
milestones for completion section, targets for mine clearance 
are separated into manual and mechanical clearance but are 
not disaggregated by type of mine nor is there any mention of 
the extensive re-survey that is required.39 In addition, there 
is a lack of clarity in the difference between tasks, minefields, 
and hazardous areas.40
South Sudan’s latest Article 7 report (covering 2019), 
contains annual targets for land release of anti-personnel 
mines to 2026 (see Table 3). However, the total amount 
of anti-personnel mined area exceeds the amount of 
contamination remaining as at the end of 2019. In the same 
Article 7 report, South Sudan also provides a written 
summary of annual clearance projections for anti-personnel 
mined area which totals 143 tasks over 15.65km2.41
South Sudan intends to address all contamination including 
from anti-vehicle mines, CMR, and other ERW in addition to 
anti-personnel mines by its 2026 Article 5 deadline. To that 
end, aside from those tasks where specific humanitarian 
interventions are planned, the intention is to be pragmatic 
in the sequencing of tasks and to deploy clearance teams 
through a prioritisation process that aims to balance security, 
logistical requirements, and concentration of effort. South 
Sudan believes that this combination will lead to the most 
efficient clearance that allows for optimal monitoring of 
clearance efforts.42
Table 3: Projected release of anti-personnel mined area43










STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
South Sudan’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) outline the technical requirements expected of all demining 
operators working in South Sudan, they are adapted from International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and tailored to the 
local context. The NTSGs are annually reviewed and revised by UNMAS and the implementing partners and then approved 
by the NMAA.44 In 2019, revisions were made to the NTSGs for Animal Detection Systems, Site Preparation, Marking, Quality 
Management and Medical Procedures to keep them in line with changes to IMAS. An NTSG on “Stop-Operations Policy” was also 
introduced. This policy mandates that any party can and should suspend an operation whenever it believes a demining situation 
or operation is becoming unsafe.45 The NTSG amendments were made in consultation with the implementing partners.46 
UNMAS noted that the NTSGs require all mine action teams to conduct regular internal quality assurance (QA), along with 
quality control (QC) sampling of 10% of each area cleared. UNMAS conducted additional external QA through visits to each 
clearance task in 2018, as well as upon the completion of a clearance task.47 As part of the capacity development project of the 
NMAA from 2019 to 2020, 30 QA officers will receive training in quality management through workshops and field placements 
with the aim of the NMAA taking ownership of the QA of mine action operations.48





OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS 
Operators in South Sudan in 2019 included international demining NGO MAG and two commercial companies who are UNMAS’s 
implementing partners (G4S Ordnance Management (G4S), and The Development Initiative (TDI)).49 MECHEM were previously 
operational in South Sudan but lost their accreditation in 2018 following unsafe procedures which resulted in a staff fatality. 
Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Danish Church Aid (DCA) both have a small operational capacity that focuses on survey and 
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and clearance of cluster munition remnants, but neither is engaged in mine clearance.50
Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 201951
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Totals 29 246–61 4 4
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
In 2019, UNMAS reported that mine action operating capacity 
remained on a par with that deployed in 2018, with almost 
1,000 persons working in the sector. Every team working in 
South Sudan is accredited to conduct non-technical survey 
and every team also has a community liaison element. In 
2020, there was a reduction in capacity by four non-technical 
survey/EOD teams.52 MAG primarily operates multi-task 
teams that have the ability to conduct non-technical 
survey, mine clearance and BAC. During 2019, MAG’s peak 
operational capacity was nine teams, an increase from the 
seven deployed in 2018. The mechanical clearance capacity 
includes a MineWolf 330 with 12 deminers which focused on 
minefield clearance. One of the multi-task teams conducted 
both mine and cluster munition clearance with a MineWolf 
370 and eight deminers. The rest of MAGs operational 
capacity was focused on BAC during 2019.53
South Sudan’s revised extension request provides a detailed 
breakdown of the capacity that will be needed to achieve 
completion of clearance. South Sudan plans to deploy the 
full demining toolbox to address remaining contamination, 
including light and heavy machines, mine detection dogs 
(MDDs) and manual deminers equipped with appropriate 
detectors. It is expected that operators will reconfigure 
their clearance teams to allow for more deminers and 
fewer support staff on each task to increase efficiency. This 
transformation has already begun, with UNMAS opting to 
field eight 15-lane demining teams from November 2020, but 
according to the extension request this move needs to be 
replicated across the sector in order to deliver the required 
clearance capacity. From 2021 there will need to be twelve 
15-lane demining teams deployed to meet clearance targets.54
South Sudan has disaggregated its mine clearance 
projections in its extension request into manual and 
mechanical clearance. The manual clearance teams of 
15-lane demining teams are expected to clear 300m2 per 
team per day, which equates to 52,800m2 per team per year. 
It is expected that the manual clearance teams will clear 
2.95km2 in total plus 10% additional clearance to account for 
newly identified tasks and the impacts of other unforeseen 
circumstances.55 Mechanical clearance teams cleared 
3,500m2 each per day for 200 days a year during a recent 
commercial contract deploying a Minewolf 370. It is expected 
that mechanical clearance teams will clear 2,000m2 per 
day during the period of the extension request.56 They are 
projected to clear 46 tasks totalling 2.41km2 in total plus 10% 
area as a margin of safety.57
DEMINER SAFETY
Throughout 2019, survey and clearance operations were targeted in four separate armed robberies and there was one  
break-in at a compound. During these incidents no personnel were injured but there was loss of personal belongings and  
some equipment.58
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of 19.16km2 of mined area was released in 2019, of 
which 1km2 was cleared, 0.02km2 was reduced through 
technical survey, and 18.14km2 was cancelled through 
non-technical survey.
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, a total of 18.16km2 was released through survey, 
the majority of which was cancelled through non-technical 
survey (see Table 5). This is a 58% decrease in non-technical 
survey from the 43.06km2 cancelled in 2018. Since the review 
of the national database and nationwide re-survey began 
in 2018, annual cancellation rates through non-technical 
survey have been very high. However, as South Sudan moves 
towards an estimate of mine contamination that is more 
representative of the actual contamination in the country 
cancellation rates are slowing.59 
Reduction through technical survey rose slightly from 
16,348m2 in 2018 to 19,946m2 (see Table 6).60
CLEARANCE IN 2019
A total of over 1km2 was cleared in 2019 with the destruction 
of 405 anti-personnel mines (see Table 7).61 This is less than 
half the 2.08km2 cleared in 2018 when 1,163 anti-personnel 
mines were found and destroyed.62 The reason for this 
reduction in clearance output was a delayed start to the 
demining season and the decision to deploy one of the 
mechanical demining teams to a remote area where manual 
demining was proving to be ineffective and that involved a 
lengthy transit period.63
Table 5: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201964
State Operator Area cancelled (m²)
Central Equatoria G4S 30
Central Equatoria MAG 100,883
Eastern Equatoria G4S 2,827
Eastern Equatoria TDI 10,532





Northern Bahr El Ghazal TDI 32,829
Upper Nile G4S 257
Upper Nile TDI 8
Western Equatoria G4S 150,000
Total 18,138,175
Table 6: Reduction through technical survey in 201965
State Operator Area reduced (m2)
Eastern Equatoria TDI 4,813
Jonglei TDI 1,766
Northern Bahr El Ghazal TDI 13,367
Total 19,946
Table 7: Mine clearance in 201966
State Operator Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed UXO destroyed
Central Equatoria G4S 418,870 83 0 10
Central Equatoria MAG 317,632 97 5 22
Eastern Equatoria G4S 74,932 34 0 2
Eastern Equatoria TDI 26,241 43 0 8
Jonglei G4S 74,871 141 0 0
Jonglei TDI 3,185 6 0 0
Northern Bahr El Ghazal TDI 50,350 0 0 21
Upper Nile G4S 1,838 1 0 0
Upper Nile TDI 35,728 0 0 3
Totals 1,003,647 405 5 66
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle 
In addition, 32 anti-personnel mines were destroyed during EOD spot tasks in 2019; of these, G4S destroyed 28; MAG 2; and TDI 2.67





ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOUTH SUDAN: 9 JULY 2011
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2021
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (5YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED): 9 JULY 2026
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO (EXTENSION REQUESTED) 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC South Sudan is required to 
destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its 
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 
9 July 2021. It will not meet this deadline and submitted a 
request for a second extension of its Article 5 deadline in 
March 2020, for a period of five years, until 9 July 2026.
South Sudan reported in its extension request that insecurity 
has been the greatest impediment to fulfilling its clearance 
obligations. Since 2011 there have been several outbreaks 
of extreme violence, most notably in 2013 and 2016, and 
sporadic fighting continues to this day. This violence, as well 
as the banditry that is prevalent in areas that lack rule of law, 
has persistently inhibited the deployment of mine clearance 
teams and has been an obstacle to a countrywide survey. 
The Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) was 
established in February 2020, which it is hoped will enhance 
peace in the country and improve access for mine action.68 In 
June 2020, a deal was reached on the selection of governors 
for the country’s ten states and three administrative areas. 
Both the number of states and the selection of governors 
had been a contentious issue as it determines the division of 
power within the country.69
Since the database review and re-survey began in 2018, 
South Sudan has cancelled nearly 69km2 and now has 
the most accurate assessment to date of the extent of 
its anti-personnel mine contamination and the clearance 
required to achieve completion. Total land release from 2018 
to 2019 more than halved, which in large part was due to 
the massive decrease in cancellation through non-technical 
survey. Historically, South Sudan has cancelled 6km2 for 
every 1km2 cleared which will not be feasible going forward 
to 2026. It is important to note that South Sudan plans to 
address all contamination (i.e. including anti-vehicle mines, 
on roads, from cluster munitions, and other UXO) in this 
extension period. Anti-personnel mine contamination is 
currently estimated at 12.19km2 which makes up about half 
of the total contaminated area of 24.6km2. The progress 
in clearance of anti-personnel mined areas is therefore 
contingent on the progress in survey and clearance of 
other contamination. In light of this, the requested five-year 
extension looks overly ambitious.
Table 8: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







In addition, the extension request clearly sets out the primary 
assumptions and risk factors in the implementation of land 
release targets: that there is access to contaminated areas 
and no resumption of fighting; that few additional minefields 
are recorded; that the largest recorded hazardous areas are 
cancelled, or drastically reduced, through re-survey; that one 
deminer will clear on average 20m2 per day; that demining 
teams will be reconfigured to 15-lane teams and clear 300m2 
per day; that mechanical clearance teams will clear 2,000m2 
per day. Logistical challenges will also need to be overcome 
due to the poor state of South Sudan’s infrastructure and 
the effects of the seasonal rains, which mean that clearance 
in much of the country is only possible for eight months 
of the year given widespread flooding. Furthermore, the 
methodology previously used to clear roads was flawed as 
several mines have recently been discovered on roads that 
had been declared safe resulting in the need for re-clearance. 
This has diverted resources from clearance of anti-personnel 
mines.70
South Sudan has also been affected by the COVID-19 outbreak 
which has led the government to ban all public gatherings 
and introduce social distancing and lockdown measures. As 
at April 2020, operators had stood down teams, which will 
undoubtably impact on survey and clearance output.71
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
UNMAS reported that it was working with the NMAA to develop plans for a national capacity that will be responsible for the 
clearance of residual contamination. This will be the responsibility of the Government of South Sudan.72 As part of UNMAS’s 
capacity building objectives for 2019 to 2020 it planned to develop the EOD response capacity within the NMAA, national police, 
and partner organisations to manage residual contamination through workshops and field placements.73
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Sri Lanka had hoped to complete mine clearance by the end of 2020, an ambitious target which was contingent on securing 
additional funding and increasing demining capacity. However, while demining capacity did steadily increase during 2019 and 
into 2020, it would not be sufficient to meet the 2020 completion target. 
Furthermore, while a significant amount of mined area was released through survey and clearance in 2019, new, previously 
undiscovered contamination continues to be discovered. Additional survey/re-survey of all mine contaminated districts is 
therefore needed to ensure that Sri Lanka has made every effort to identify all remaining mined areas and address them in  
its planning for fulfilment of Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) should conduct survey/re-survey in mine-contaminated districts to ensure 
that every effort is made to identify remaining mined areas and include them in its completion strategy. 
 ■ Greater efforts should be devoted to information management, including ensuring that the national database is up to 
date; and that survey and clearance reports are sent to the NMAC and entered into the national database in a timely 
fashion. In particular, Sri Lanka should make the necessary changes to its International Management System for Mine 
Action (IMSMA) database to enable “sections” of large tasks that have been released to be recorded as “closed” and 
therefore reflected in the database.
 ■ Sri Lanka should adopt, without further delay, the revised national mine action standards, which were developed with 
support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining Centre (GICHD) and input from clearance 
operators in 2018.
 ■ The NMAC should elaborate a new National Mine Action Strategy to replace the existing strategy which was due to 
expire at the end of 2020.
 ■ The NMAC should establish an in-country forum/platform to bring together all relevant national and international 
stakeholders regularly to discuss progress and challenges in Article 5 implementation and help strengthen coordination. 
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 ■ Sri Lanka should develop plans for the management of mine contamination found after fulfilment of Article 5  
(i.e. residual contamination), including ensuring a sustainable long-term national capacity for survey and clearance 
and information management. 








(20% of overall score)
7 8 Sri Lanka gained better clarity on the extent of confirmed contamination, through a 
district-by-district re-survey in 2015–17 of known hazardous area, which resulted 
in the cancellation of more than 42km2 of mined area. However, new, previously 
unknown mined areas continue to be discovered and additional survey/re-survey is 
still required to ensure that Sri Lanka has made every effort to identify remaining 
mine contamination. 
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
7 8 Sri Lanka’s national mine action programme is nationally owned, with committed 
funding from the national government and significant contribution from the Armed 
Forces in the dedicated demining units. The NMAC suffers from frequent leadership 
changes, which impedes management and reduces its effectiveness. Following the 
November 2019 presidential election, NMAC sat under the Ministry of Community 
Empowerment and Estate Infrastructure Development and new leadership were in 
place. However, following parliamentary elections in August 2020, the NMAC again 
moved line ministry and will now sit under the Ministry of Rural Home Construction 
and Building Material Industry Promotion.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
8 8 Following a mid-term review in 2018, Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Strategy 
2016–2020 contains a section on gender and diversity as cross-cutting themes for all 
mine action. It reflects awareness of the cultural context of gendered employment in 




(10% of overall score)
5 6 A number of efforts are ongoing to help strengthen information management in Sri 
Lanka’s mine action programme. While some progress can be seen, data reporting 
between operators and the NMAC continued to reflect a number of disparities and 
inconsistencies, which are also apparent in the Article 7 reports. As at end of August 
2020, however, Sri Lanka had still to submit its latest Article 7 report covering 2019.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
8 8 Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020, which was reviewed in 2018 
with the support of the GICHD, elaborates the national planning and tasking criteria, 
which are centred around resettlement and urgent livelihood priorities for displaced 
and returning civilians. 
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
7 7 Revisions to Sri Lanka’s NMAS in 2017 and in 2018 through an extensive review 
process with input from operators and support from the GICHD had still to be 
approved and adopted as at August 2020. 
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
7 7 As at end of August 2020, Sri Lanka had still to submit an Article 7 transparency 
report covering 2019, but the NMAC had provided Mine Action Review with requested 
land release data for 2019. However, the 2019 survey and clearance output reported 
by the NMAC was significantly less than data reported by international operators, 
HALO Trust and MAG, who reported releasing a combined total of more than 3.3km2 of 
anti-personnel mined area in 2019. Until a completion survey has been conducted, it is 
not possible to accurately forecast when Sri Lanka will fulfil its Article 5 commitments.
Average Score 7.0 7.4 Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Ministry of Rural Home Construction and Building 
Material Industry Promotion (responsible line  
ministry following August 2020 Parliamentary  
elections, which was previously the Ministry  
of Community Empowerment and Estate  
Infrastructure Development)
 ■ National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH)
 ■ SHARP
 ■ Sri Lankan Army (SLA) Humanitarian Demining Units (HDUs)
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)




UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at end of 2019, mined area in Sri Lanka stood at over 23km2 across 257 mined areas (see Table 1).1 This compares to a total 
of 280 mined areas, totalling close to 24km2, as at end of 2019.2 While there was significant clearance output in 2019 helping to 
reduce the amount of remaining contamination, this was in part offset by discovery of new, previously unknown, contamination 
added to the national database. 
Sri Lanka was once extensively contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). Most remaining contamination 
is in the north, the focus of three decades of armed conflict between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE), which ended in May 2009. Much progress in land release has occurred in the last decade. A district-by-district 
re-survey in 2015–17 of all existing registered SHAs in the national database resulted in cancellation of more than 42km2 of 
mined area and helped provide greater clarity on the extent of remaining contamination.3 In April 2019, Sri Lanka reported that 
since demining operations began in 2002, it had been able to declare 4,616 areas totalling over 1,280km2 free from the threat 
of mines, with the destruction of more than 737,000 anti-personnel mines and over 1,400,000 other explosive items, including 
anti-vehicle mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).4
Estimates of total contamination have fallen sharply: from 506km2 at the end of 2010. The Northern province is still by far the 
most affected, as set out in Table 1.5 
However, while significant progress is being made in releasing mined areas through survey and clearance, previously unknown 
contamination continues to be identified. According to the NMAC, a total of 2,868,123m2 of confirmed hazardous area (CHA) and 
15,280m2 of suspected hazardous area (SHA) of previously unrecorded mine contamination was added to Sri Lanka’s national 
database in 2019.6 In 2019, HALO Trust reported confirming an additional 0.7km2 of previously unrecorded contamination in 
2019, in Kilinochchi, Jaffna, and Mullaitivu districts.7 MAG Community Liaison Teams (CLTs) found an additional 1.1km2 of mined 
area in 2019.8 Previously unknown mine contamination is often discovered when communities return, settle, and try to rebuild 
their livelihoods, exploring the vicinity of their neighbourhoods.9 
Table 1: Mined area and ERW contamination (at end 2019)10





Northern Jaffna 18 1,319,934 1 182,403 19 1,502,337
Kilinochchi 57 9,235,916 0 0 57 9,235,916
Mannar 58 1,662,152 2 76,177 60 1,738,329
Mullaitivu 89 7,719,024 5 649,220 94 8,368,244
Vavuniya 14 1,161,672 1 667,057 15 1,828,729
Subtotals 236 21,098,698 9 1,574,857 245 22,673,555
Eastern Batticaloa 2 25,059 0 0 2 25,059
Trincomalee 6 379,302 0 0 6 379,302
Subtotals 8 404,361 0 0 8 404,361
North 
Central
Anuradhapura 3 169,779 0 0 3 169,779
Polonnaruwa 1 6,053 0 0 1 6,053
Subtotals 4 175,832 0 0 4 175,832
Totals 248 21,678,891 9 1,574,857 257 23,253,748
Further survey/re-survey is still required to ensure that all mined areas have been identified.11 In Jaffna, where the minefields 
were laid by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), the extent of contamination is considered to be well known, with the exception of the 
remaining military-controlled High Security Zone area.12 However, minefield maps and information on mine-laying strategy is 
not readily available for the LTTE-laid minefields, which pose more of a challenge to clear.13 Typically, LTTE mine laying was 
less predictable, more sporadic, and nuisance-type in nature; added to which, many of the LTTE-laid minefields are in jungle 
areas, where limited human activity occurs and contamination is more likely to remain unknown.14
Furthermore, some additional survey is also required due to the relocation of contaminated land for construction. For example, 
in February 2020 gravel from a quarry in Kilinochchi was delivered to a sports club in Jaffna. Whilst levelling the gravel, 
workers found landmines and HALO was subsequently called to survey and clear the area. HALO is seeking to establish where 
the quarry has distributed gravel to and thereby identify any further contamination.15 
HALO Trust continues to urge the development of a unified “end state” strategy for the sector.16 In 2019, the sector began 
liaising with the NMAC to urge the development of a “completion survey”, delivered through a village-by-village assessment, 
to locate any remaining evidence of contamination, prior to any district being officially declared as cleared. International 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) believe this to be essential to fully understand remaining mine contamination, what 
resources are required to address it, and inform other key elements of Sri Lanka’s completion strategy.17 In August 2020, 
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NMAC confirmed it planned to conduct a completion survey in 
conflict-affected areas together with demining organisations, 
in order to update its strategy.18 MAG started a pilot 
completion survey initially in Trincomalee district, and then in 
Mannar, whose findings will help the sector agree on SOPs.19
The NMAC said the current baseline of anti-personnel mine 
contamination has been established through inclusive 
consultation with women, girls, boys, and men, including, 
where relevant, from minority groups.20
Most remaining contamination is located in Sri Lanka’s five 
northern districts. Both sides made extensive use of mines, 
including belts of P4 Mk I and Mk II blast anti-personnel 
mines laid by the SLA, and long defensive lines with a 
mixture of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 
including anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, laid 
by the LTTE.21 Indian peacekeeping forces also used mines 
during their presence from July 1987 to January 1990.22 
The SLA used both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, 
with all minelaying said to have been recorded.23 Operators 
have encountered a wide range of LTTE devices, including 
anti-personnel mines with anti-tilt and anti-lift mechanisms. 
Tripwire-activated Claymore-type mines and, to a lesser 
extent, anti-vehicle mines, were also used by the LTTE, along 
with a number of forms of improvised devices to act as 
fragmentation mines, bar mines, electrical and magnetically 
initiated explosive devices, and mines connected to 
detonating cord to mortar and artillery shells.24 
Aside from mines, Sri Lanka remains contaminated with a 
wide range of ERW, including unexploded air-dropped bombs, 
artillery shells and missiles, mortar bombs, hand-held 
anti-tank projectiles, and rifle and hand grenades. Large 
caches of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) also exist, 
particularly in the north.25 These are being cleared at the 
same time as the remaining minefields.26
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Ministry of Rehabilitation, Resettlement, and Hindu 
Religious Affairs became the lead agency for mine action 
in 2015 as chair of the inter-ministerial National Steering 
Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA). In 2019, the Ministry’s 
name had changed to the Ministry of National Policies, 
Economic Affairs, Resettlement, Rehabilitation, Northern 
Development, Vocational Training, Skills Development, and 
Youth Affairs. The Ministry’s Secretary serves as the Director 
of the NMAC. Following the November 2019 presidential 
election, the NMAC sat under the Ministry of Community 
Empowerment and Estate Infrastructure Development and 
new leadership personnel were in place.27 However, following 
the parliamentary elections in August 2020, the NMAC will 
now sit under the Ministry of Rural Home Construction 
and Building Material Industry Promotion.28 NMAC has 
responsibilities for priority setting, information management, 
quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC), coordination 
with demining organisations and cooperation partners, and 
establishing policy and standards.29 
The NMAC suffers from frequent leadership changes, 
including under which ministry within the Sri Lankan 
government the Centre sits, while the Director of the NMAC 
is a political appointee by the secretary of the ministry 
in question. Lack of consistent leadership can impede 
management of the mine action centre and reduce its 
effectiveness. In the last five years, there are thought to  
have been four different ministerial secretaries/directors 
of the NMAC. This latest change only adds to confusion and 
impedes efficiency.
Clearance operations are coordinated, tasked, and quality 
managed by a Regional Mine Action Office (RMAO) in 
Kilinochchi, working in consultation with District Steering 
Committees for Mine Action. The Committees are chaired 
by government agents heading district authorities.30 NMAC 
and RMAO also suffer from the impact of high staff turnover, 
following the national election in 2019 and also as military 
personnel are seconded and generally rotate fairly quickly.31 
There is no national mine action legislation in Sri Lanka, 
based on available information.
The Government of Sri Lanka created a national budget 
line for mine action in 2015.32 According to Sri Lanka’s 
initial Article 7 transparency report submitted in 2018, the 
government of Sri Lanka has committed 758,534,964 rupees 
(approx. US$4.45 million) each year in 2018–20 to cover the 
operational costs of the SLA Humanitarian Demining Units 
and the Navy Humanitarian Demining Unit’s survey and 
clearance activities, with an additional 20 million rupees 
(US$118,497) a year to cover the administrative costs of  
the NMAC.33 
According to the NMAC, in 2019, Sri Lanka contributed 1.5 
million Sri Lankan rupees (approx. $8,000) towards the NMAC 
and 149.5 million Sri Lankan rupees (approx. US$800,000) 
towards survey and clearance of mined areas in 2019.34 
Sri Lanka does not currently have a resource mobilisation 
strategy in place for Article 5 implementation.35
HALO Trust continued to provide capacity development 
support to NMAC in 2019. In addition to support in information 
management (see the ‘Information Management and 
Reporting’ section), HALO also conducted a medic/trauma 
training course in 2019 for representatives of NMAC, RMAO, 
SLA, Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH) and 
SHARP, and a mechanical QA course to representatives of 
RMAO, SHARP, and the SLA.36 
MAG’s Global Senior Community Liaison Advisor conducted 
a workshop on pre- and post-clearance impact assessments 
for personnel from MAG, DASH, and the NMAC, in May 2019.37
Jointly with HALO Trust, MAG sponsored the Deputy Director 
of NMAC and a representative of the Sri Lanka Campaign to 
Ban Landmines (SLCBL) to attend the Fourth APMBC Review 
Conference in November 2019.38
NMAC and the five operators (DASH, HALO Trust, MAG, 
SHARP, and SLA) generally maintain good cooperation and 
coordination, including ad-hoc meetings throughout the 
year. However, no regular formal in-country platform for 
coordination exists.39




GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
Gender and diversity have been included in Sri Lanka’s 
National Mine Action Strategy for 2016–20, following the 
mid-term review in 2018. The revised strategy contains a 
specific section on gender and diversity, which it emphasises 
are cross-cutting issues for the planning, implementation, 
and monitoring of all mine action initiatives. The strategy 
pledges to ensure that all mine action activities, from 
survey and clearance to victim assistance, are conducted 
in a targeted manner to ensure the equal participation of 
all age and gender groups, and that all data is collected 
is disaggregated by sex and age. It further recognises 
that mine action in Sri Lanka should be tied to the 
implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda 
and Sustainable Development Goal 5 on Gender Equality and 
the empowerment of women, noting that the safe-guarding 
of non-discriminatory employment opportunities and the 
promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women 
has been a particularly successful aspect of Sri Lanka’s 
national mine action programme.40 In 2019, the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) 
carried out a study examining the socio-economic impact  
of the employment of female deminers. The key findings of 
the study were published in 2020.41
NMAC reported that 25% of its employees are female, 
including 12.5% of managerial level positions.42
National operator DASH considers gender equality and 
employment of women important to its programme. As at the 
end of July 2020, 22% of DASH’s 459 employees were female, 
including nearly 35% of demining personnel.43 
As at the end of July 2020, 12% of SHARP’s total employees 
and of its demining personnel were female.44 
DASH and fellow national operator, SHARP, have both sought 
to progressively increase the number of women employed 
in operational positions, recognising the positive impact 
employment has on women and their families’ well-being.45
None of the SLA humanitarian demining unit’s (HDU’s) 328 
employees was a woman.46
International operators The HALO Trust and MAG 
confirmed that each organisation has gender policies 
in place, with a focus on achieving equal access to 
employment, gender-balanced survey and clearance teams, 
gender-focused community liaison outreach, disaggregated 
data collection, and a gender focus to be employed during 
pre- and post-clearance assessments.47 Both organisations 
reported increasing efforts to encourage women to apply 
for operational, as well as managerial positions, and positive 
trends in the increasing number of women employed in their 
respective programmes as a result.48
The HALO Trust reported that as at December 2019, 39% of 
its total staff in Sri Lanka were women. This included 43% 
of all operations staff and 25% of managerial/supervisory 
level positions.49 HALO’s deployment structure was designed 
to allow demining teams to be deployed daily from bases in 
Kilinochchi, Jaffna, and Jeyapuram, in order to allow female 
staff to return to their homes at the end of each working day, 
rather than being based in remote camps for lengthy periods 
of time. This ensured that women who had dependents 
at home were able to provide for their families while 
maintaining their daily home lives. HALO Trust also reported 
specific efforts to encourage women’s employment through 
advertising maternity leave policies.50 
MAG reported that, as at December 2019, 9% of operational 
staff were female and 18% of managerial/supervisory 
positions. MAG continues to consider how more female staff 
could be recruited. As in previous years, in 2019 the main 
blockage to female recruitment in operations is the fact MAG 
deploys for a full work cycle (average operating days per 
month is 21) with teams staying out for that full period before 
returning to base and then having the remainder of the month 
as block leave. MAG is aware that this model of deployment 
is not attractive to potential female recruits who do not wish 
to be out of the family home for extended periods. The areas 
in which MAG works are generally very remote with large 
travel distances back to operating bases so this approach to 
team deployment makes sense in terms of efficiencies and 
economy.51 Following the mitigation measures introduced in 
response to COVID-19 pandemic in Sri Lanka, MAG shifted to 
a non-camping approach in June 2020 and launched a specific 
recruitment campaign for female deminers, which led to a 
20% increase of female staff in operations.52
MAG stated that overcoming barriers which inhibited 
participation by women, girls, people with disabilities, ethnic 
minorities, and other marginalised groups was an essential 
focus for its programme operations in order to ensure that 
programme delivery is inclusive, both in terms of internal 
staff composition and external programme outreach. As 
such, it reported that internal training and awareness-raising 
ensure that staff working with communities recognise 
the importance of gender and diversity and have an 
understanding of tools and approaches to enable inclusive 
participation.53 MAG has been assessing the need to establish 
a community reporting mechanism, which it planned to roll 
out in July 2020.54
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Sri Lanka’s IMSMA database has undergone substantial and continuing improvements since the installation of an updated 
version in 2015 and a subsequent process of data entry and ground verification.55 Since that time, operators have reported that 
significant efforts have been exerted by all stakeholders to correct erroneous data entered into the IMSMA database and to 
update it on the basis of re-survey, leading to a more accurate representation of remaining contamination.56 A transition to the 
use of IMSMA Core software with assistance from the GICHD had been planned for 2020,57 but this was likely to be delayed until 
2021 due to staff changes at NMAC58 and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.59 Challenges to information management and 
establishing long-term sustainable national IM capacity, in part stem from lack of resources and also the high staff turn-over  
at the NMAC and RMAO, as military personnel are seconded and generally rotate fairly quickly.60
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Complications to data management are also posed by the 
existence of very large tasks on the database which consist 
of many “sections”. These tasks show as “open” in IMSMA 
until all sections contained in them have been cleared, 
even if several sections have been reduced or cleared. This 
complicates land release figures and reduces the accuracy of 
the estimated size of mined area remaining in the database. 
This could be rectified with minor changes to IMSMA by 
allowing cleared sections to be recorded as “closed”, thereby 
providing greater clarity on the remaining problem. The 
GICHD has offered support to NMAC to make the required 
minor changes to the database.61
One of the objectives of Sri Lanka’s reviewed National Mine 
Action Strategy is that the Sri Lanka’s mine action sector 
“can access good quality information for its strategic and 
operational decision-making.62 As at 1 August 2020, Sri Lanka 
had still to submit its annual Article 7 transparency report 
covering 2019.
In 2019, The HALO Trust reported it was submitting reports 
every two weeks to NMAC and that a review of IMSMA data was 
usually held on a quarterly basis.63 HALO conducted a series 
of information management capacity development initiatives 
in 2019. This included funding two capacity development 
visits of its global experts to Sri Lanka in 2019, one in July, 
hosted in Kilinochchi by the RMAO, to deliver training on 
HALO’s “predictions tool” to NMAC and RMAO staff, as well as 
representatives from MAG, DASH, and SHARP. The predictions 
tool is designed to help assess when clearance operators are 
likely to complete clearance and to analyse operator capacities 
in order to inform decision making regarding task reallocation, 
completion strategy, and demobilisation. Following feedback 
from other operators, HALO continues to make improvements 
to the tool, and once finalised will hand it to the NMAC to take 
ownership of the resource. 
A second visit, in November 2019, was to help finalise an 
action plan for capacity development training in order to 
assist the NMAC with IM support and development and 
to address queries and reporting challenges, particularly 
prior to the Fourth Review Conference. An action plan was 
developed based on consultation with the NMAC IMSMA 
and geographic information system (GIS) Officers. Capacity 
development initiatives will continue periodically through 
2020, focusing on database management.64 While NMAC 
officers have been trained by GICHD to enter data into IMSMA, 
and also trained by HALO in GIS and mapping, most have 
limited formal training in database theory, management, and 
query design. It is hoped that training in the design of simple 
querying and reporting tools will allow the NMAC to generate 
reports much easier and will allow them more time to focus 
on the quality of the data.65
During 2019, MAG began rolling out its new ESRI-based 
global operational management information system (OMIS) 
in Sri Lanka. The system and processes were put in place 
to update information and support tracking of land release 
and community liaison activities conducted by MAG staff in 
real time. Following planned training of staff in July 2020, 
the OMIS system was due to become operational in August,66 
but was subsequently postponed to early 2021 due to the 
restriction of staff movement due to the COVID-19 pandemic.67
PLANNING AND TASKING
NMAC’s current strategy was developed before Sri Lanka acceded to the APMBC in 2017. At the request of the NMAC,  
Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Strategy for 2016–20 was reviewed in April 2018 in a multi-stakeholder workshop facilitated  
by the GICHD, and in consultation with operators and the SLA. The reviewed strategy was formally approved by the 
government in March 2019 and officially launched at an event organised by the government of Sri Lanka and the GICHD in 
Colombo in April 2019, attended by representatives of all mine action stakeholders, government officials, civil society, and 
international donor governments.
The national strategy is guided by the vision of Sri Lanka to become “set free from the threat of landmines and ERW by  
2020, enabling women, girls, boys and men to live in a safe environment where the needs of mine/ERW victims are met”.  
The strategic vision is based around the following objectives:
OBJECTIVE 1. 
The remaining mine/ERW problem is addressed using the 
most appropriate methodologies and tools.
OBJECTIVE 2.  
Mine/ERW safe behaviour among women, girls, boys and 
men is promoted.
OBJECTIVE 3.  
The needs of mine/ERW victims are determined and met  
and victims are integrated into society.
OBJECTIVE 4.  
Sri Lanka complies with its international convention 
obligations.
OBJECTIVE 5.  
Long-term residual contamination is effectively managed 
with appropriate and sustainable national capacities.
OBJECTIVE 6.  
Sri Lanka mine action sector can access good 
quality information for its strategic and operational 
decision-making.68




The initial strategy set an initial target of the release of 
6.5km2 of contamination by clearance and technical survey 
per year.69 This target increased to 9km2 released through 
clearance and technical survey per year in the revised 
version of the strategy.70 The revised strategy states that 
“completion of clearance at the end of 2020 will only be 
possible if considerably more funding is made available, 
allowing all five operators to expand to their maximum 
capacity”.71 However, the additional funding required to 
enable a sufficient increase in demining capacity, was not 
secured in time. Furthermore, previously unrecorded mined 
areas have continued to be discovered, further hampering 
progress towards completion. 
Sri Lanka’s current National Mine Action Strategy ends in 
2020, and a new strategy will need to be elaborated. The 
GICHD had agreed with the previous NMAC administration 
to support the development of the new national mine action 
strategy and was due to support the organising of a strategy 
progress stakeholder workshop in December 2019, but this 
unfortunately had to be cancelled, due to the ministerial 
reshuffle following the November 2019 election. The GICHD 
had planned to visit Sri Lanka in spring 2020 to meet new 
NMAC staff and discuss plans for developing the new strategy 
but due to the COVID-19 pandemic this had to be cancelled. 
GICHD remains ready to support the development of the new 
strategy,72 in collaboration with international operators and 
the mine action sector in Sri Lanka.73 The NMAC also develops 
annual work plans for survey and clearance.74
Sri Lanka’s mine action programme has a well-developed 
prioritisation system, outlined in NMAC’s national mine 
action strategy. The primary priority is clearance of land for 
resettlement, particularly the return of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs). Further to this, contaminated land planned for 
livelihood activities (mostly agricultural land), access to public 
services, and large-scale infrastructure, are also prioritised 
in accordance with NMAC’s national mine action strategy.75 
According to the NMAC, despite marking of contaminated 
areas and sustained risk education, returnees are likely to 
enter contaminated areas, especially agricultural areas, to 
meet their basic livelihood needs. As such, socio-economic 
pressures and livelihood activities are vital considerations in 
the prioritisation process in relation to resettlement plans.76 
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
A review of Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), taking into account the local context, was carried out in May 
2017 with the input of all demining operators, and support from the GICHD. Input on suggested changes to the NMAS was 
subsequently provided by all stakeholders in the second quarter of 2018 and a follow-up workshop was held in April 2018, 
facilitated by the GICHD, to discuss proposed revisions. However, as at June 2020, the expected revised version of the NMAS had 
yet to be approved and adopted, and the previous version remained in place.77 In August 2020, the NMAC, under new leadership, 
reported that since Sri Lanka was in the final stages of its mine action programme there was no significant requirement for 
the development [revision] of NMAS and that during implementation the programme will apply the International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS).78
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2019, demining continued to be conducted by the SLA; national NGOs, DASH and SHARP; and the two international NGOs,  
The HALO Trust and MAG.








DASH 13 278 0 0
HALO Trust 74 567 0 5 CASE front loaders, 6 Caterpillar 
excavators, 3 JCBs, 1 Beach Tech 
sand cleaner, 1 PrimeTech tiller 
machine, and tractors with various 
attachments.
Based on the average annual 
number of clearance teams 
and deminers in 2019. 
MAG 36 407 0 18 (8 Back hoe excavators of 
various makes, 
3 JCB excavators, and
7 mini excavators of various makes)
Mine Action Teams (MATs) 
also conduct technical survey 
as part of the standard land 
release process.
SHARP 4 99 0 0
SLA HDU 8 320 8 13
Partial Totals 135 Approx. 1,671 8 Approx. 49
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters. N/K = not known
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HALO’s clearance capacity was reduced in the first half of 
2019, due to a decrease in donor funding, but then increased 
in the second half of the year after several new and renewed 
donor contracts were signed. During the period of rapid 
expansion, several hundred new deminers were recruited. 
The increase in clearance capacity was expected to be 
maintained throughout 2020. HALO’s mechanical clearance 
capacity has also increased significantly in 2020.80
MAG’s clearance capacity rose significantly from 18 Mine 
Action Teams (MATs), nine mechanical assets (MSTs) and 
11 Casualty Evacuation Teams (CETs) in 2018 to 40 MATs, 
20 MSTs and 22 CETs by June 2020.81 MAG also established 
a Technical Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (TMEU) in 2019 
to strengthen the quality of its operations. The Technical 
Field Manager was also temporarily seconded to DASH to 
provide additional technical capacity to their operational 
management.82
With regards to survey capacity, DASH deployed three 
non-technical survey teams in 2019, totalling six personnel.83 
HALO Trust deployed two non-technical survey teams in 2019, 
totalling six personnel, and planned to deploy a third team 
from April 2020. Technical survey personnel are deminers 
and included in HALO’s clearance capacity in Table 2.84 MAG 
deployed two non-technical survey teams in 2019, totalling 
six personnel, and 45 technical survey teams, totalling 420 
personnel.85 The SLA HDU deployed four non-technical 
survey teams totalling twenty personnel. Technical survey 
personnel are deminers and are included as part of the 
clearance capacity summarised in Table 2.86 SHARP did not 
deploy any survey teams in 2019.87
According to the NMAC, in 2018, the SLA’s demining unit 
deployed a total of 380 personnel in demining operations, 
which was a slight decrease from the 418 employed in 2017. 
DASH’s demining personnel remained at 365 in 2018, but with a 
decrease in the number of demining staff deployed by its then 
subcontractor, SHARP, which fell by more than half to 50.88 
DEMINER SAFETY
The HALO Trust reported two demining accidents in 2019, resulting in injuries to three staff. One incident in January involved 
a deminer initiating a P4 anti-personnel mine during a break period. The accident, which was the result of a breach of standing 
operating procedures (SOPs), was fully investigated, with observations shared and lessons learned. The deminer made a full 
recovery. The second accident, in April 2019, involved initiation of a highly sensitive 40mm launched grenade during clearance 
operators, injuring the deminer and a section commander. The accident was fully investigated and both made a full recovery.89 
In addition, an accident during clearance of a Rangan 99 anti-personnel mine by SHARP.90 The NMAC said that accidents are 
investigated in line with the national standards, in collaboration with operators and civil authorities, and lessons learned 
shared with relevant stakeholders.91
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
According to data reported by the NMAC, a total of 1.82km2 was released in 2019: 1.20km2 through clearance, 0.59km2 through 
technical survey, and 0.03km2 through cancellation.92 However, the figures reported by the national authorities are significantly 
lower than those reported by international operators. In 2019, HALO Trust and MAG alone reported releasing a combined 
total of more than 3.32km2 of anti-personnel mined area in 2019: nearly 2.46km2 through clearance, reduction of over 0.60km2 
through technical survey, and more than 0.26km2 cancelled through non-technical survey.93 Mine Action Review believes that, 
based on best available data, the total released by clearance in 2019 was actually 2.94km2 (estimated).
SURVEY IN 2019
The NMAC reported releasing a total of 0.62km2 through survey in 2018: 0.03km2 cancelled through non-technical survey and 
0.59km2 reduced through technical survey (see Table 4).94 However, data provided by international NGOs, HALO Trust and MAG, 
to Mine Action Review reported survey output to be higher, with a combined total of 0.86km2 of mined area released through 
survey (0.26km2 cancelled through HALO and MAG non-technical survey (see Table 3) and nearly 0.60km2 reduced through 
technical survey).95
In 2018, a total of over 1.3km2 was released through survey (7,590m2 cancelled and 1.3km2 reduced).96
In addition, a total of 2,868,123m2 of previously unrecorded CHA and 15,280m2 of previously unrecorded SHA was added 
to Sri Lanka’s database in 2019.97 HALO Trust reported identifying 728,557m2 of previously unrecorded mined area during 
survey in 2019.98 MAG reported that it had identified 43 hazardous areas totalling 1,123,649m2 of new mined area in 2019, 
during non-technical survey based on reports received from several sources in Mannar, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee and Vavuniya 
districts. This was an increase on the 743,695m2 MAG discovered in 2018, which was reportedly due to an increasing number of 
people returning to their place of origin, as areas become available for returnees, in districts where MAG operates, resulting in 
new mine affected areas being identified.99 




As already mentioned, the NMAC reported only cancelling 
nearly 0.03km2 through non-technical survey in 2019 
(27,539m2 by the SLA HDU in Mullativu district and 2,417m2  
by MAG in Trincomalee district),100 significantly less than  
that reported by HALO and MAG in Table 3 above.
Table 3: HALO and MAG cancellation through non-technical 
survey in 2019101
District Operator Area cancelled (m²)




Table 4: Reduction through technical survey in 2019102
District Operator Area reduced (m²) Comments
Anuradhapura SLA HDU 9,762
Jaffna
DASH 13,420 
HALO Trust  18,402 HALO reported to Mine Action Review reducing 20,589m2 
SLA HDU 21,986
Kilinochchi DASH 39,378
HALO Trust 178,423 HALO reported to Mine Action Review reducing 216,822m2
Mannar MAG 100,628 MAG reported to Mine Action Review reducing 176,598m2
Mullaitivu DASH 100,157
HALO Trust  4,188 HALO reported to Mine Action Review reducing 17,357m2
MAG 26,374 MAG reported to Mine Action Review reducing 37,866m2
SLA HDU 21,778
Trincomalee MAG 18,726 MAG reported to Mine Action Review reducing 61,426m2
Vavuniya MAG 31,842 MAG reported to Mine Action Review reducing 71,842m2
Total 585,064
CLEARANCE IN 2019
The NMAC reported clearance of more than 1.2km2 in 2019, with the destruction of 9,000 anti-personnel mines and 5 
anti-vehicle mines (see Table 5).103 This excludes 2019 clearance data for national operator, SHARP, which was not reported  
by NMAC. 
However, international NGOs, HALO Trust and MAG alone reported a clearing a combined total of nearly 2.46km2 of mined area 
in 2019, with a total of 13,820 anti-personnel mines, and 37 anti-vehicle mines destroyed – significantly more than reported 
by NMAC.104 This is most likely due to a number of reasons, including a database issue that currently prevents NMAC from 
reporting release of partially cleared polygons; and NMAC appearing to only report tasks completed in 2019, whereas operator 
data includes all clearance that was conducted in 2019.105 
In 2018, more than 3.46km2 of mined area was reported as having been cleared.106
All anti-personnel mines were destroyed by the SLA – Engineers Brigade. As per national standards, humanitarian mine action 
operators are not authorised to conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in Sri Lanka.107 
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Ampara SLA HDU 12,886 0 0
Amuradhapura SLA HDU 7,867 151 0
Batticaloa SLA HDU 7,900 44 0
Jaffna
DASH 18,123 1,876 0
HALO Trust 62,509 94 0 HALO reported to Mine Action Review clearing 
93,987m2 and destroying 418 AP mines and 15 
AV mines
SLA HDU 47,164 27 0
Kilinochchi
DASH 86,840 838 0
HALO Trust 196,429 634 0 HALO reported to Mine Action Review clearing 
1,300,369m2, and destroying 8,060 AP mines 
and 22 AV mines
SLA HDU 78,327 12 0
Mannar MAG 241,006 1,298 0 MAG reported to Mine Action Review clearing 
478,606m2, and destroying 2,794 AP mines 
Mullaitivu
DASH 124,265 1,813 5
HALO Trust 69,436 255 0 HALO reported to Mine Action Review clearing 
155,264m2, and destroying 513 AP mines 
MAG 36,068 93 0 MAG reported to Mine Action Review clearing 
124,309m2, and destroying 475 AP mines
SLA HDU 36,314 53 0
Trincomalee MAG 38,402 108 0 MAG reported to Mine Action Review clearing 
103,428m2, and destroying 212 AP mines
SLA HDU 72,202 1,626 0
Vavuniya MAG 65,501 78 0 MAG reported to Mine Action Review clearing 
202,313m2, and destroying 1,348 AP mines
Totals 1,201,239 9,000* 5
2,458,276m2 cleared and 13,820 AP mines 
and 37 AV mines destroyed (based HALO and 
MAG data only)
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle *Of the 9,000 anti-personnel mines destroyed, 16 were of an improvised nature.
In addition, a further 42 anti-personnel mines were destroyed by during EOD spot tasks in 2019: 2 by DASH and 40 by  
HALO Trust.109
According to the NMAC, two mined areas were cleared by MAG in 2019, which proved to contain no anti-personnel mines.110
HALO also reported clearing 86 devices of an improvised nature during clearance, which due to the clearance methodology 
(for example mechanical clearance), it was not possible for HALO to identify the method of initiation. Degradation of items, 
particularly LTTE-laid devices in jungle areas, also contributes to this challenge. Of the 36 minefields completed by HALO Trust 
in 2019, all contained anti-personnel mines.111 
The total area released by MAG in 2019 was very similar to the previous year, despite a significant increase in clearance 
capacity during 2019. The reason for this is that the ratio of clearance to technical survey shifted from 55:45 in 2018 to 20:80 
in 2019. MAG reported that as at April its 2020 tasks were also continuing to require a greater focus on clearance. Of the 
4,829 anti-personnel mines destroyed by MAG during clearance in 2019, 20 were of an improvised nature. No mines or UXO 
were found during clearance of a MAG task Trincomalee in 2019, and only one item of UXO was destroyed at another task in 
Vavuniya. All of MAG’s other clearance tasks contained mines.112




ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SRI LANKA: 1 JUNE 2018
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: YES 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): MEDIUM
Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







*Mine Action Review calculation
Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Sri Lanka is required to destroy 
all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction 
or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2028. 
It should still complete clearance by this deadline and may 
even fulfil its Article 5 obligations by the end of 2025, but this 
was looking less likely as at 1 September 2020. 
Sri Lanka’s target to complete mine clearance by the end of 
2020, was overly ambitious and contingent on significantly 
increasing funding and capacity. The anticipated increase 
in capacity of the SLA demining units did not materialise 
as was hoped,113 with expansion hindered by the army’s 
focus on responding to the Easter Sunday terrorist attacks 
in April 2019 and by the subsequent COVID-19 pandemic. 
Furthermore, progress towards achieving the 2020 target was 
also hampered by the continued discovery of new, previously 
unknown mined area adding to the contamination baseline. 
According to international operators, despite challenges  
such as the constitutional crisis, terrorist attacks in 2019,  
and COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the Sri Lankan government 
is still committed to complete mine clearance before 2025, 
but it needs sustained political and financial support from  
the international community to achieve the target.114
The re-launch of the National Mine Action Strategy in 
March 2019 and the government of Sri Lanka’s renewed 
commitment to becoming mine free, has however, attracted 
new attention from the international donor community and 
operators reported receiving increased funding.115 As a result 
of additional funding, HALO was deploying an increased 
clearance capacity in 2020 (an average of 98 clearance 
teams, compared to the average of 74 teams in 2019), and 
also an additional non-technical survey team too from April.116 
MAG’s capacity has also risen significantly from 18 MATs, 7 
MSTs and 11 CETs in 2018 to 36 MATs, 18 MSTs and 21 CETs 
by December 2019, and it expected to continue to increase 
capacity in 2020.117
HALO Trust was due to complete clearance of all HALO 
allocated tasks before the end of 2020 with a capacity of 700 
staff. In contrast, two other operators had too many tasks 
allocated to them which would see mine clearance continue 
for many more years. Considering this mismatch, and HALO’s 
recent increase in capacity to over 1000 staff, the NMAC 
allocated additional minefield tasks to HALO and particularly 
those minefields where the terrain is better suited to 
mechanical clearance. This additional tasking being added 
to HALO’s overall clearance plan is crucial in helping Sri 
Lanka fulfil its Article 5 commitment as soon as possible, by 
ensuring that all operators are working at maximum capacity 
up to completion.118 
HALO, in coordination with NMAC and its RMAO, has now 
cleared the majority of accessible SLA-laid minefields in 
Jaffna district. While the High Security Zone is currently 
only accessible to the SLA, the HALO Trust hopes to work in 
partnership with the SLA to assess and clear any remaining 
contamination when areas of the High Security Zone are 
made accessible.119 The SLA is currently conducting clearance 
within the High Security Zone, but it is not known how much 
mined area remains within the zone. 
At the same time, HALO Trust was continuing to focus 
operations on the Muhamalai minefield, along with other 
tasks in southern Kilinochchi district and northern Mullaitivu 
district.120
Newly identified and previously unrecorded mined areas 
continue to be discovered. In 2019, HALO discovered more 
than 0.7km2 of previously unknown mined area and MAG 
identified more than 1.1km2.121 HALO Trust believes that until 
the end-state/completion survey has been conducted and 
the forecasting tool finalized, it is not possible to accurately 
forecast when Sri Lanka will fulfil its Article 5 commitments. 
However, providing donors continue current levels of funding 
for mine clearance and the NMAC allocates minefield tasks 
proportionally to demining operator capacity, HALO is 
confident Sri Lanka will be mine free before the end of 2025.122 
In agreement with NMAC, in early 2020 MAG introduced a 
pilot for a district-level ‘completion survey’ with the aim 
to conduct a final survey of a district to identify any as yet 
unidentified areas of mine contamination.123 It was agreed 
with NMAC and other operators that the process would 
include: a desktop assessment, meetings with District 
Secretariats (DS) and Grama Niladari (GN) authorities, 
and group interviews with communities at village level 
to determine whether there is further knowledge of any 
remaining hazardous areas (HAs) and/or explosive ordnance. 
According to MAG, “if any such report is made, standard 
non-technical survey activities will be conducted, to identify 
any remaining evidence through key informant interviews 
and a field visit. If required, new SHAs/CHAs will be then 
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recorded on the IMSMA database and technical survey and clearance operations will be conducted as per normal tasking 
procedures.” According to MAG, upon completion of this process, NMAC would be able to inform GNs, the DS, and Government 
Administrator (GA) that “all reasonable effort” had been applied to identify and release all mined area. Following some initial 
issues around conducting the pilot in Trincomalee, the pilot district survey was currently on hold as at August 2020, but a pilot 
in Mannar district had resumed.124 It was anticipated though that NMAC and the operators will work with relevant authorities, 
including the military, to relaunch the survey after the general elections (which were subsequently postponed to August 2020, 
due to COVID-19). Dependent on the results of the pilot project, NMAC will then make a decision regarding rolling-out the 
process to other districts.125 
At the time of writing, the full impact of COVID-19 on Sri Lanka, the sector, and donors was unknown but it is likely that 
disruption may occur, particularly as the army diverts resources to respond to the pandemic.126 Due to COVID-19, HALO Trust 
and MAG stopped land release operations in Sri Lanka on 18 March. With the permission of national authorities and with 
COVID-19 mitigation measures in place and staggered deployment, HALO Trust resumed demining operations on 30 April 
2020, with 45% of teams deployed, rising to 100% by mid-May.127 MAG recommenced its operations on 23 May 2020, staggering 
deployment to adhere to physical distancing rules.128
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Sri Lanka’s Mine Action strategy commits the government of Sri Lanka to ensure that relevant plans are in place to ensure 
effective management of residual contamination.129 It sets out that the NMAC will lead efforts to plan for a transitional phase, 
a process which will involve the SLA, relevant government ministries, and civil society, noting that post-completion roles and 
responsibilities for management of residual contamination must be clarified, transparent, and communicated to all relevant 
stakeholders. It also commits the government and mine action operators to develop strategies for the demobilisation of 
deminers as completion approaches, in order to enable them vocational training and other employment prospects.130 As at 
August 2020, the NMAC reported that the Sri Lankan Army EOD team was deployed to cover residual contamination.131
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Sudan’s land release output increased in 2019, exceeding its land release target for the year, due to an improved security 
situation and an increase in funding. However, during clearance Sudan only found and destroyed one anti-personnel mine, 
indicating extremely poor survey. Positively, Sudan initiated a baseline survey in 2019, which should allow it to establish a 
more accurate estimate of contamination. Completion is, though, heavily dependent on improvements in the security situation 
in both Blue Nile and South Kordofan states.. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Sudan should ensure it only clears land where there is firm evidence of mine contamination. 
 ■ Sudan should clarify land release targets and ensure that land release and contamination figures are consistent and 
correct in any official reporting.
 ■ Sudan should provide updated work plans as the baseline survey progresses and it has a more accurate understanding 
of remaining contamination.
 ■ Sudan should continue its efforts to encourage international operators to return, which could significantly boost mine 
action capacity and output.
 ■ Sudan should endorse the new national mine action strategic plan for 2019-2023 and the revised national mine action 
standards (NMAS). 
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(20% of overall score)
7 7 Sudan initiated non-technical survey towards the end of 2019 to establish a national 
baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination. Survey will take place across 
South Kordofan, West Kordofan, Blue Nile and the five Darfur states with planned 
completion by the end of 2021. However, this is dependent upon access being granted 
to currently insecure areas. It is expected that newly found contamination will be 
added to the database but that a large proportion of existing suspected hazardous 
areas (SHAs) will be cancelled.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
7 7 Sudan’s national mine action programme is entirely nationally owned. It benefits 
from experienced national mine action centre staff and national mine action 
operators. The government has provided consistent funding for mine action reported 
at US$2 million per year. Sudan projects that $33 million is required for land release 
from 2020 to 2023.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
6 6 Gender is said to be mainstreamed in the national mine action strategic plan for 2019–
23 and in the national mine action standards, with an emphasis on gender-balanced 
survey teams and the employment of women. At the same time, Sudan acknowledges 
difficulties in employing women in operational roles due to local customs and 
traditions. However, Sudan has managed to achieve gender parity in non-technical 




(10% of overall score)
7 8 The process of upgrading Sudan’s Information Management System for Mine Action 
(IMSMA) is ongoing. During 2019, improvements were made to the reporting process 
and staff were given additional training to reflect the changes. At the request 
of States Parties, Sudan submitted its updated work plan to 2023 and while the 
objectives are sound the plan is let down by numerous errors and discrepancies in 
contamination and land release figures, causing the plan to lack clarity.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
7 7 A new national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 has been finalised and, as at 
April 2020, is still awaiting endorsement. Sudan has provided updated land release 
targets in its work plan to 2023 which require some clarification. It is expected that 
this plan will be updated as survey progresses and should security improve and 
access increase.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
6 7 Sudan’s revised National Mine Action Standards were still awaiting endorsement 
as at April 2020. During clearance of mined areas in 2019, Sudan only found and 
destroyed one anti-personnel mine, indicating extremely poor survey. There was  
no change in operational capacity in 2019 but it was planned that Sudan would 
increase its non-technical survey capacity in 2020. A mine action training centre  
was established in 2019.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
6 6 Sudan exceeded its land release target for 2019 with a massive increase in 
technical survey output. Its clearance output fell from 2018, however, with only 
one anti-personnel mine found and destroyed. Sudan’s updated work plan to 2023 
projects large amounts of cancellation through non-technical survey though none 
has taken place in the past two years. Ongoing peace talks are encouraging and 
increased access through improved security would allow Sudan to complete its 
baseline survey and increase land release output providing it has the required 
capacity in place.
Average Score 6.5 6.8 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)
 ■ Sudan National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD)
 ■ JASMAR for Human Security
 ■ Friends for Peace and Development Organization (FDPO)




 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2019, Sudan reported a total of 95 areas suspected or confirmed to contain anti-personnel mines, covering a total 
area of just under 13.28km2. According to the Sudanese National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), of this total, 52 areas covering 
2.4km2 are confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), while a further 43 areas covering almost 10.9km2 are suspected hazardous 
areas (SHAs). For details, see Table 1.1 This is a decrease from the 18.9km2 of total anti-personnel mine contaminated area 
reported as at the end of 2018. The main difference between the 2018 and 2019 figures is in the total area covered by SHAs, 
which has decreased by 5.64km2.2 This difference cannot be explained by land release during 2019. 
Sudan reported in its multiyear work plan 2020–23 that as at 1 March 2020 there were 90 recorded hazardous areas 
contaminated with anti-personnel mines in eight localities within the Blue Nile, South Kordofan and West Kordofan states 
covering 19km2.3
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by state (at end 2019)4
State CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total SHA/CHA Total area (m2)
Blue Nile  4 219,663 7 840,889 11 1,060,552
South Kordofan 48 2,182,597 33 10,014,564 81 12,197,161
Western Kordofan 0 0 3 21,991 3 21,991
Totals 52 2,402,260 43 10,877,444 95 13,279,704
South Kordofan is believed to be the most heavily contaminated state, as set out in Table 1.5 On 4 April 2019, Abu Karshola 
town in South Kordofan state, once heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), was declared free 
of known contamination, a positive indication of increasing access and improvements in the security situation.6 No mines have 
been reported in Darfur, where the main threat is from ERW.7 The extent of mine and ERW contamination within the disputed 
area of Abyei and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) between Sudan and South Sudan is unknown due to security and 
political issues.8 An additional 28 areas covering nearly 11km2 are suspected to contain only anti-vehicle mines, as set out in 
Table 2.9
Table 2: Mined area (at end 2019)10
Type of contamination CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2)
Anti-personnel mines 52 2,402,260 43 10,877,444
Anti-vehicle mines 0 0 28 10,849,256
Totals 52 2,402,260 71 21,726,700
Sudan’s mine and ERW contamination results from decades-long conflict since the country’s independence in 1956. Twenty 
years of civil war, during which mines and other explosive ordnance were used heavily by all parties to the conflicts, 
resulted in widespread contamination that has claimed thousands of victims.11 In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) ostensibly ended the civil war. A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted in 2007–09 covering Blue 
Nile, Gadaref, Kassala, Red Sea, and South Kordofan states, before armed conflict erupted again in 2011 and continued until 
2016. It is expected that more areas will be found to be contaminated with explosive ordnance including anti-personnel 
mines. There have been “ad hoc” reports of additional mined and ERW-contaminated areas which have been registered as 
“dangerous areas” in the national database. This has caused the LIS baseline of 221 hazards to expand significantly, including 
by encompassing areas not originally surveyed.12
NMAC reported that significant survey is required to more accurately determine the actual extent of anti-personnel mine 
contamination in Sudan.13 NMAC initiated non-technical survey in November 2019, which was due to continue throughout 2020 
and 2021 across South Kordofan, West Kordofan, Blue Nile, and the five Darfur states to establish evidence-based, accurate 
baselines of contamination for all explosive ordnance.14 The NMAC predicts that up to 90% of existing SHAs will be cancelled, 
based on historical Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) data.15 Once surveys have been completed a 
revised clearance plan will be shared with States Parties to the APMBC.16 However, insecurity and lack of access is a major 
impediment to the completion of survey as most of the known impacted communities in Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Jabal 
Marra areas in the Darfur states are still inaccessible.17 The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that all affected 
communities are being consulted during non-technical survey, with special attention being paid to at-risk communities. 
In 2019, a total of 65,083m2 of previously unrecorded legacy anti-personnel mine contamination across two mined areas in the 
states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan was added to the database.18




EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS
Sudan also has a significant problem with ERW, including very limited contamination from cluster munition remnants,  
primarily as a result of the more than 20 years of civil war that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and  
South Sudan’s independence in July 2011 (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report on Sudan  
for further information). While no mines have been found in Darfur, ERW there includes unexploded air-delivered bombs, 
rockets, artillery and mortar shells, and grenades.19 According to the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 
81 localities in Darfur are highly affected by ERW, 431 localities in the medium category, and 84 localities that have low impacts 
from contamination.20
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and 
NMAC manage Sudan’s mine action programme. Upon the 
independence of South Sudan, NMAC assumed full ownership 
of national mine action with responsibility for coordinating and 
supervising the implementation of all mine action activities, 
including quality assurance (QA), accreditation and certification 
of clearance operators. Sudan adopted the Mine Action Bill by 
Presidential Decree No. 51 in March 2010. The act is comprised 
of 29 articles divided into four chapters. Chapter four covers 
APMBC obligations, such as clearance of contaminated areas 
and reporting, and penalties for those who work in mine action 
without obtaining a licence from NMAC.21
After starting an emergency programme in 2002, UNMAS 
re-established activities in Sudan in 2015, following an 
invitation from the Sudanese Government, in an advisory 
and support capacity, to further enhance the national mine 
action capacity and support the country to meet its APMBC 
obligations.22 As part of its mandate, UNMAS provides 
organisational and individual capacity development to NMAC.23
As UNISFA does not have a mandate to conduct 
mine clearance, UNMAS continued its UN Security 
Council-mandated role in Abyei, which includes identification 
and clearance of mines and route assessment in the SDBZ 
and Abyei through its implementing partners, in support of 
peacekeeping operations, humanitarian aid delivery, safe 
return of internally displaced populations (IDPs), and the 
nomadic migration of animals.24
In Darfur, under the umbrella of UNAMID, UNMAS works 
under the name of the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO) in 
direct support of UNAMID priorities.25 UN Security Council 
Resolution 2429 (2018) called the complete closure of 
UNAMID by June 2020.26 As at May 2020, UNAMID teams  
were still working and UNMAS reported that they might 
continue working throughout 2020.27
Sudan is part of the Arab Regional Cooperation Programme 
(ARPC) and as part of this programme, which is coordinated 
by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD), the NMAA attend regional trainings and 
workshops. In December 2019, the NMAA attended the ARPC 
annual conference where they discussed and approved 
recently translated IMAS into Arabic and shared experiences 
of their own NMAS.28
In 2019, the Government of Sudan contributed a total of 
US$2 million to the running costs of NMAC and for demining 
activities. It has consistently funded the national mine action 
programme at this level for the past four years.29 In addition, 
international donors contributed US$5.84 million through 
UNMAS to undertake mine action activities. UNMAS reported 
that, in 2020, a total of $15.8 million would be required to meet 
mine action needs in the country, including demining in South 
Kordofan and Blue Nile states and ERW response in Darfur.30 
In 2018, Sudan reported that as a result of enhanced 
cooperation, both nationally and internationally, in particular 
stemming from a meeting on Sudan of the APMBC’s 
Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and 
Assistance’s “individualised approach” initiative in 2017, a 
number of positive developments had resulted. This initiative, 
Sudan reported, alongside nationally convened mine action 
events and donor field visits to mine-affected areas, had 
resulted in an increase in earmarked funds to the mine action 
programme, with some US$7.1 million in new funding for 
mine action pledged by the governments of Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.31
Sudan’s resource mobilisation strategy aims to increase 
donations from existing donors; increase the number 
and sources of donations; and increase the amount of the 
government’s contribution. This includes identifying new 
donors, including Gulf States; emerging economies receptive 
to becoming “donor” governments; and “non-conventional” 
partners such as philanthropists, private individuals and 
foundations; and commercial companies and corresponding 
funding modalities and mechanisms. Sudan has estimated 
in its 2020–23 work plan that $33.7 million will be required 
for land release. In 2020, Sudan has reported that sufficient 
funding is in place for the year but that if currently inaccessible 
areas open up then the programme will need additional funds 
for an emergency post-conflict mine action response.32
In Sudan, not including Jabal Maarah and Abyei, UNMAS 
and NMAC lead mine action sub-cluster meetings to 
coordinate progress, challenges, and support for Article 5 
implementation in Sudan. All relevant implementing partners, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies and 
government authorities participate. During these meetings 
mine action projects for the annual Humanitarian Response 
Plan (HRP) are developed and prioritised through a 
consultation process with all stakeholders.33
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
In 2019, NMAC reported that it has a gender and diversity policy in place and that gender is mainstreamed in the national 
mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 and in the national mine action standards. It stated that under those standards, all 
survey and community liaison teams are to be gender balanced, and that women and children are consulted during survey and 
community liaison activities. It said that gender is also taken into account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey 
and clearance, as per the national standards and the new standard IMSMA forms.34
Mine action data are disaggregated by sex and age.35 UNMAS reported working with NMAC and implementing partners to 
improve this aspect of mine action reporting and information management because sex and age disaggregated data of land 
release beneficiaries were not being captured in IMSMA.36 New reporting tools were added to the system and new reporting 
formats were developed for the NGOs to include this information.37
NMAC says it always encourages women to apply for employment in the national programme, whether at the office level or in 
the field. Positively, it reported that almost 40% of NMAC staff employed at the managerial or supervisory levels are women. 
But it acknowledged that few women were employed in operational roles in survey and clearance teams due to “local customs 
and traditions”.38 UNMAS reported that, as at May 2020, around 55% of the new non-technical survey teams are female. One 
female deminer started in late 2019, and it is hoped to increase in the number of female deminers in the future.39
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
As at April 2020, NMAC informed Mine Action Review that it was using both the IMSMA legacy version in parallel with the 
newer version, IMSMA-NG.40 In 2018, NMAC began a process of upgrading the IMSMA software to the newer New Generation 
version, with assistance from the GICHD. Significant efforts to correct errors in the database were also undertaken.41 In 2019, 
new reporting tools were designed and new reporting formats were developed in IMSMA-NG, IMSMA staff and NGO staff were 
trained, and all old forms were removed. However, some data still need to be migrated and the GICHD has been contacted 
to support this. In 2020, NMAC planned to commence online data collection and to obtain the ArcGIS and Esri License.42 The 
database contains old information about the disputed Abyei area. 43 However, UNMAS informed Mine Action Review in June 
2019 that UNISFA was working with NMAC on database sharing and had co-located an IMSMA officer within the NMAC office  
in Khartoum to help share historical data, while it was also providing NMAC a monthly report on activities in Abyei.44
Sudan’s extension request submitted in 2018 was notably thorough, generally of good quality, and includes a work plan with 
annual targets for completion.45 The request does, however, contain discrepancies in the total amounts of survey and clearance 
output projections.46 Sudan submitted its Article 7 report in a timely fashion and, as per the extension request decision, an 
updated work plan for 2020 to 2023. Again, the major issue is with errors in the figures.47
PLANNING AND TASKING
In May 2019, NMAC reported that a new national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 had been finalised and was awaiting 
approval. The plan aims to fulfil Sudan’s APMBC obligations, and was developed in coordination with the GICHD to replace its 
previous national strategy for 2016–19.48 NMAC stated that detailed annual work plans had been developed for each year under 
the new strategic plan.49 As at April 2020, the strategic plan was still awaiting approval.50
Sudan’s 2018 extension request contained a detailed work plan with annual survey and clearance projections on a state-by-state 
basis with a total planned release for all types of ordnance of 224 hazardous areas with a size of 26.5km2 by 1 April 2023  
(see Table 3). During 2019, Sudan planned to release 16 SHAs and 2 CHAs, cancelling 4.9km2 through non-technical survey, and 
releasing 0.5km2 through technical survey and clearance.51 In 2019, Sudan released only four SHAs but massively surpassed its 
technical survey/clearance target with a total area of just over 7km2. There was, however, no cancellation through non-technical 
survey.52 The main reason for this was limited access to South Kordofan and Blue Nile due to insecurity. 53










2017–18 80 3 3,783,116 420,346 83 4,203,462
2018–19 54 3 11,944,390 1,327,154 57 13,271,544
2019–20 16 2 4,943,930 549,326 18 5,493,256
2020–21 4 16 1,045,828 116,203 20 1,162,031
2021–22 13 7 1,054,315 117,146 20 1,171,461
2022–23 4 22 1,044,614 116,068 26 1,160,682
Totals 171 53 23,816,193 2,646,243 224 26,462,436




In 2020, in accordance with the terms of its latest Article 5 extension, Sudan submitted an updated work plan for 1 March 
2020–31 March 2023 with revised estimates of contamination, annual targets for land release, and budgetary requirements. 
Sudan has also promised to provide annual updates to this work plan based on new evidence and to report on adjusted 
milestones in their Article 7 reports, including information on the number and size of the contaminated areas to be addressed 
and on how priorities have been established.55 Sudan included updated annual land release projections to 2023, though again 
this was not disaggregated by type of ordnance (see Table 4). This table differs from the annual land release projections 
provided in Sudan’s latest Article 7 report.










2019-20 50 8 5,486,687 147,267 58 5,633,954
2020-21 69 16 10,332,944 147,153 85 10,480,097
2021-22 66 19 7,785,727 1,457,643 85 9,243,370
2022-23 22 8 1,450,916 462,678 30 1,913,594
Totals 207 51 25,056,274 2,214,741 258 27,271,015
One of the main operations in 2020 will be opening the roads and routes in newly accessible areas in support of humanitarian 
aid delivery. Sudan also plans to initiate clearance on the border with Chad. Dependent on the security situation, re-survey of 
recorded hazardous areas and survey of communities close to these areas will take place in Abyei. UNMAS planned to deploy 
four multi-task teams throughout Darfur in addition to the UNAMID teams that are working in the area.57
UNMAS reported that all task dossiers relating to survey and clearance are issued in accordance with agreed criteria and 
prioritisation. NMAC and UNMAS are working together on planning and tasking to meet the need for further development.58  
A systematic prioritisation system will be introduced as part of the new NMAS and linked with IMSMA with each SHA and CHA 
classified as high, medium, or low impact and prioritised accordingly.59 During prioritisation, in addition to taking the affected 
communities needs into account, all stakeholders are consulted to also take their objectives into account. NMAC expects the 
prioritisation process to be more effective once the baseline survey has been completed.60
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In May 2019, NMAC reported that a review of Sudan’s NMAS had been completed and the revised standards were awaiting 
endorsement.61 As at August 2020, these were still awaiting endorsement.62 NMAS were reviewed by a technical committee 
comprised of representatives from NMAC, UNMAS, and national operators with the support of an international expertise from 
UNAMID-ODO. Once the NMAS are endorsed they will be uploaded on the NMAC website and all mine action operators will 
need to ensure their SOPs comply with the new NMAS.63
NMAC confirmed that in 2018, QA and quality control (QC) activities were carried out according to the NMAS.64 During 2019, 
NMAC has completed 46 accreditations and 33 QA visits. During 2019, the accreditation of Global Aid Hand was reviewed and 
survey and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) were added to their EORE existing accreditation.65
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2019, no international NGOs were demining in Sudan. National operators are JASMAR for Human Security (JASMAR), 
National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD), the Friends for Peace and Development Organization (FPDO), 
and Global Aid Hand. A commercial demining company (Dynasafe) and national mine action organisation (NUMAD) continue 
operations in Darfur funded by UNAMID to conduct non-technical survey, surface/subsurface battle area clearance and 
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks.66
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Table 5: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 201967
Operator
Manual clearance teams (MCTs)/ 
Multi-task teams (MTTs) Total deminers* Dogs and handlers Machines





9 dogs & 3 handlers 0
JASMAR 3 MTTs 12 0 0
Totals 14 80 9/3 0
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. 
Table 6: Operational survey capacities deployed in 201968
Operator NTS teams Total NTS personnel* TS teams Total TS personnel*
JASMAR 3 6 Clearance capacity is also technical survey capacity
NUMAD 0 0
Global Aid Hand 7 14
Totals 10 20
According to NMAC there was no change in operational capacity from 2018 to 2019 until November 2019 when additional 
non-technical survey capacity was deployed by JASMAR and Global Aid Hand.69 According to UNMAS, the MCTs and MTTs  
were not only working on anti-personnel mine clearance but also on priority areas contaminated with anti-vehicle mines 
and ERW. This is because most of the anti-personnel mine contaminated areas are located in Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement-North (SPLMN)-controlled areas.70 In Darfur, in 2019, clearance operations continued to be conducted by commercial 
operator Dynasafe and NUMAD.71 The clearance capacity was not fully operational throughout the year with the FPDO 
deployed only until May 2019. Two of the NUMAD MTTs were tasked with investigating residual risk in Kassala state, which 
was announced free from known mined areas and ERW contamination in 2018. Some of the teams only became operational in 
October 2019 as the season in most parts of Sudan, especially South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, runs from October to June 
the following year.72
Demining in Sudan is carried out primarily using manual clearance, as well as through the use of mine detection dog (MDD) 
teams. In 2019, a mine action training centre was established, MDD training and accreditation sites were re-established with 
increased number of training and accreditation boxes, two non-technical survey training courses were also delivered. It is 
planned that new mechanical assets would be deployed in 2020.73
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of 7,001,425m2 of mined area was released in 2019, of which 874,068m2 was cleared and 6,127,357m2 was reduced 
through technical survey. Just one anti-personnel mine was found and destroyed. A total of 65,083m2 of previously unrecorded 
anti-personnel mine contamination was added to the database in 2019.74
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, a total of 6,127,357m2 of mined area was reduced 
through technical survey by NUMAD in South Kordofan.75 
A massive increase from the 21,000m2 that was reduced 
in 2018.76 No areas were reported cancelled through 
non-technical survey in 2018 nor 2019.
Table 7: Reduction through technical survey in 201977
State Operator Area reduced (m2)
South Kordofan NUMAD 6,127,357
Total 6,127,357





In 2019, a total of 874,068m2 was cleared by NUMAD, JASMAR, and FPDO in Blue Nile and South Kordofan.78 This is a decrease 
from the 979,448m2 that was released through clearance in 2018. In 2018 and in 2019, the number of anti-personnel mines 
found and destroyed was low, from 31 in 2018 to just one in 2019.79 In five of the six areas cleared in 2018 no anti-personnel 
mines were found but a small number of anti-vehicle mines, 11 in total, were found in all but two of the mined areas.
Table 8: Mine clearance in 201980
State Operator Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed UXO destroyed
Blue Nile NUMAD 179,900 1 4 7
JASMAR 2,956 0 2 114
FPDO 9,396 0 1 2
South 
Kordofan
NUMAD 660,436 0 4 5747
JASMAR 11,527 0 0 35
FPDO 9,853 0 0 3
Totals 874,068 1 11 5,908
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle 
NMAC and UNMAS reported that four mined areas were cleared in 2019 which proved to contain no anti-personnel mines. 
Overall there was a significant increase in the amount of land release in 2019, compared to 2018, due to an increase in the 
amount of funding and an improvement in security situation with expansion in access for the demining teams, both in South 
Kordofan and Blue Nile states.81
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SUDAN: 1 APRIL 2004
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2014
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 APRIL 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4YEAR EXTENSION): 1 APRIL 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): MEDIUM
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
four-year extension granted by States Parties in 2018), Sudan 
is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas 
under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not 
later than 1 April 2023. It is not on track to meet this deadline. 
The updated work plan for 2020 to 2023 foresees a 
considerable increase in land release output to nearly 
10.5km2 in 2020 and over 9.2km2 in 2021. It is planned 
that the majority of this, 92%, will be land released by 
cancellation through non-technical survey of which there 
was none in 2018 nor 2019. However, Sudan did exceed 
its land release target for 2019 with a massive increase 
in its reduction through technical survey output. Sudan’s 
clearance output fell from 2018 to 2019 with just one 
anti-personnel mine found and destroyed. Sudan is planning 
to increase its non-technical survey capacity in 2020 and is 
conducting survey to establish a more accurate baseline of 
contamination which would improve planning to 2023. While 
Sudan does expect to cancel a large amount of suspected 
hazardous area there is also the possibility that a large 
amount of contamination will be added to the database.
Table 9: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
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The main impediment to survey and clearance is the security situation and the lack of access to most of the known impacted 
communities in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states.82 During 2019, access to South Kordofan and Blue Nile was improved, 
which allowed for roads to be assessed and cleared opening access for humanitarian assistance and population movement. 
It is hoped that with the establishment of the transitional government and the onset of peace talks between government and 
opposition groups that this may lead to a comprehensive nationwide peace agreement. As at June 2020, it was reported that 
Sudanese parties were entering the final stages of negotiation and were planning to sign an initial peace deal on 20 June.83  
This would improve accessibility for the mine action programme but, Sudan reports, it would also pose a challenge as roads 
and other routes will need to be cleared before people can move safely and humanitarian assistance can be provided and 
Sudan does not currently have the capacity to be able to do this.84 
In addition, Sudan reported that obstacles to completion include: inadequate funding for mine action, outdated demining 
equipment that is not fit for purpose which restricts Sudan’s ability to operate at full capacity, poor infrastructure which also 
impedes access and, difficult climatic conditions.85 A further significant factor which continues to impede progress is a lack of 
clearance capacity formerly provided by international demining operators. Sudan has made numerous requests for technical 
and logistical support and appeals for international operators to return.
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Sudan has a plan to deal with residual risk and liability post-completion, but it requires that the national capacity is 
restructured. As at April 2020, NMAC deals with any residual contamination in the eastern states. 86
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In 2019, Tajikistan sought and obtained an extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline 
through to the end of 2025 to complete anti-personnel mine clearance, a timeline that looked unrealistic in view of the 
capacity and resources available. The Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC) completed its transition to full national 
management after the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) concluded its programme of support. It also 
completed an upgrade of its national mine action database to Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Tajikistan should explore all possible avenues of increasing capacity in order to reach its extension request targets, 
including training and deployment of Border Guard forces on the Afghan border as deminers. 
 ■ TNMAC should set up a Survey Working Group to expedite planning and prioritisation of accelerated survey to reach a 
clear national baseline estimate of contamination, as outlined in information supporting Tajikistan’s Article 5 deadline 
Extension Request. 
 ■ Tajikistan should draw up a resource mobilisation strategy in consultation with key national and international 
stakeholders.
 ■ Tajikistan should report land release data more accurately and in a manner consistent with the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS). 
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(20% of overall score)
5 5 Tajikistan lacks a clear baseline estimate of contamination, with 41 SHAs still 
requiring survey at the end of 2019 and some re-survey planned to more accurately 
define the extent of other mined areas. Lack of access has also prevented an 
accurate determination of contamination on the disputed Tajik-Uzbek border. 
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
7 7 Tajikistan has strong national ownership of mine action, including through the 
Ministry of Defence clearance teams. It has political will and provides an enabling 
environment for Article 5 implementation but plans for achieving it rely on a sharp 
increase in international donor support. 
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
 7 7 Tajikistan has a national gender strategy drawn up with support from Geneva Mine 
Action Programme (GMAP), but few women are employed in mine action. Mine 
Action data is disaggregated by sex and age, and women and children are said to be 




(10% of overall score)
6 6 TNMAC has upgraded its information management converting its database to IMSMA 
Core and modified reporting forms to facilitate reporting. The programme still 
struggles to report on land release accurately and consistently.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
7 7 Tajikistan’s national mine action strategy for 2017–20 has been superseded by an 
Article 5 extension request that sets out annual targets, but these far exceed past 
results and require a doubling of capacity. This is dependent on availability of donor 
funding, which appears unlikely, particularly since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
6 7 Tajikistan has national mine action standards that were revised in 2017 and are 
IMAS-compliant. They are available in Russian and English. But UNDP has observed 
that operations could be more effective and efficient through better analysis of 
data, non-technical and technical survey, and greater use of a range of clearance 
approaches. Tajikistan reported its mine action capacity in 2019 consisted of a total 
of 90 deminers. To meet the targets set out in its Article 5 deadline extension request 
Tajikistan said it would need to double capacity to 180 deminers.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
7 6 Land released in 2019 was reportedly close to 50% more than in 2018, mainly 
because of higher rates of cancellation through non-technical survey. Clearance, 
however, was less than half the annual target set for 2019 and for the period of its 
Article 5 deadline extension. To accelerate clearance Tajikistan will need increased 
funding to expand capacity or it will not meet its 2025 completion deadline.
Average Score 6.3 6.3 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Commission for the Implementation of International 
Humanitarian Law (CIIHL)
 ■ Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ TNMAC
 ■ Ministry of Defence (MoD), Humanitarian Demining 
Company (HDC)
 ■ Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST)
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
 ■ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)
 ■ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) 
 ■ Tajik Border Guard Forces
 ■ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Tajikistan estimated its outstanding anti-personnel mine contamination at just short of 12km2 at the end of 2019, almost 
unchanged from the previous year. It included 164 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), covering almost 7.8km2, which made-up 
nearly two-thirds of the total contaminated area, and 85 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) mostly located on the border with 
Uzbekistan (see Table 1).1 
Tajikistan acknowledges that this data does not yet represent a reliable baseline estimate of contamination. Survey and 
analysis of minefield records conducted between 2010 and 2018 identified 10.5km2 of additional mined area. Tajikistan reported 
in 2019 that it still needs to survey 41 minefields which it believes affect a little under 1km2 and resurvey 30 areas covering 
approximately 2.8km2. It also has yet to determine the extent of contamination on the Uzbek border.2 
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province (at end 2019)3
CHA SHA
Total area (m2)Province District Nos. Area (m2) Nos. Area (m2)
Gorno-Badakhshan 
Autonomous Region
Darvoz 14 960,274 3 303,138 1,263,412
Vanj 6 908,119 0 0 908,119
Shugnan 3 56,000 0 0 56,000
Ishkoshi 0 0 1 5,000 5,000
Subtotals 23 1,924,393 4 308,138 2,232,531
Khatlon Farkhor 6 96,800 1 8,000 104,800
Hamadoni 3 80,772 6 177,000 257,772
Panj 25 1,613,484 5 41,000 1,654,484
Jayhun 8 135,636 11 307,000 442,636
Shamsiddin Shohin 94 3,719,243 1 15,000 3,734,243
Kabodiyon 1 0 0 0 0
Shahri 1 30,000 0 0 30,000
Khovaling 2 120,000 1 30,000 150,000
Subtotals 140 5,795,935 25 578,000 6,373,935
Sughd Region 
(Uzbek border)
Asht 0 0 11 610,000 610,000
Ayni 0 0 5 535,000 535,000
Isfara 0 0 20 1,105,000 1,105,000
Konibodom 0 0 3 165,000 165,000
Panjakent 0 0 13 715,000 715,000
Shahriston 0 0 2 120,000 120,000
Subtotals 0 0 54 3,250,000 3,250,000
Central Region Sangvor 1 50,000 2 50,000 100,000
Subtotals 1 50,000 2 50,000 100,000
Totals 164 7,770,328 85 4,186,138 11,956,466
Mine contamination in Tajikistan is the consequence of different conflicts. Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan was mined by 
Russian forces in 1992–98; the border with Uzbekistan was mined by Uzbek forces in 1999–2001; and the Central Region of 
Tajikistan was contaminated as a result of the 1992–97 civil war.4 
A national survey in 2003–05 by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) estimated that mine and explosive remnants of 
war (ERW) contamination extended over 50km2.5 Tajikistan subsequently alleged that lack of experience among the initial 
survey teams, the absence of minefield records and other important information, and inadequate equipment led to that first 
impact survey generating unreliable results. As a result, the sizes of SHAs were miscalculated and their descriptions not 
clearly recorded.6 While most minefield maps/records are of good quality, some do not reflect the reality on the ground and 
need to be verified and validated through new survey and data analysis.7
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Mine contamination remains in the provinces of Khatlon and 
the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) along 
the Afghan border (reported to contain 60,357 anti-personnel 
mines); in the Central Region; and along the Uzbek border.8 
Shamsiddin Shohin district (formerly known as Shuroobod 
district) in Khatlon province is the most heavily mined 
district. Mines were laid in and around military positions on 
hilltops overlooking the Panj river valley, mostly delivered 
remotely by helicopter or laid by troops who were moved in 
and out by helicopter as there are no established roads or 
tracks to access the minefields for survey or clearance.9 
Information about mined areas on the Tajik-Uzbek border 
is limited and based on non-technical survey conducted 
in 2011–15 by FSD and a needs assessment survey by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 2013–15. 
However, the FSD survey only covered one part of the border, 
Sughd province, and survey teams did not have access to 
the border and relied mainly on incident forms. As a result, 
records lack detail on the exact location where mine incidents 
occurred.10 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan settled most of their 1,283km-long 
border dispute following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
but certain areas have not yet been delineated and the exact 
location of mined areas is still not known. Most mined areas 
are thought to be in disputed sections of the Tajik-Uzbek 
border which have not been accessible and assessed.11 Most 
of the mines are believed to be on Uzbek territory,12 but there 
is a possibility that some mines may have been displaced 
downhill into Tajikistan due to landslides or flooding.13 The 
3.25km2 of SHA on the border with Uzbekistan, included in 
Tajikistan’s 2019 extension request,14 is a rough estimate 
and the actual extent of any anti-personnel mined area on 
Tajik territory along this border will only be more accurately 
established once both countries permit survey and have 
delimited the border. According to online media sources, as 
at January 2020, mine clearance on the Uzbek side of the 
border with Tajikistan had been completed.15
Tajikistan estimates the total size of un-surveyed area to 
be 941,000m2 (with approximately 11,685 mines) and the 
total area planned for re-survey is 2,770,557m2. Survey 
and re-survey of these areas will be conducted by Union 
of Sappers of Tajikistan (UST) and Norwegian People’s Aid 
(NPA). Tajikistan acknowledges the urgency and importance 
of establishing a clear baseline of anti-personnel mine 
contamination as soon as possible, and in August 2019 
TNMAC announced that a survey working group will be 
established with expert representatives from all key 
stakeholders and implementing partners to help plan and 
prioritise survey tasks.16 As of June 2020, however, the 
working group had not been established.17
With the introduction of an arrangement for medical 
evacuation by helicopter, in collaboration with the Armed 
Forces, there are no longer any mined areas deemed to be 
“inaccessible”.18 There are, however, mined areas on two 
islands in the Panj river on the Tajik-Afghan border, one of 
which is 538,500m2 in size and the other 30,000m2, which 
are said to be “non-executable” at the present time. The 
islands were created by a change in the flow of the river, and 
it is possible that the river may again change its path and 
re-connect the islands with the Tajik river bank in the future.19
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Commission for the Implementation of International 
Humanitarian Law (CIIHL), chaired by the first deputy of the 
Prime Minister, and containing key representatives from 
relevant line ministries, acts as Tajikistan’s national mine 
action authority, responsible for mainstreaming mine action 
in the government’s socio-economic development policies.20
TNMAC is the executive arm of CIIHL and the body 
coordinating mine action, responsible for issuing task orders, 
information management and quality assurance/quality 
control (QA/QC).21 It was set up by government decree in 
January 2014 replacing the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre 
and taking over the process of managing transition to a fully 
nationally-owed programme.22 In 2016, Tajikistan’s Parliament 
adopted a Law on Humanitarian Mine Action, which covers 
all aspects of mine action, and in 2017 it approved a national 
mine action strategy for 2017–20.23
With transition in place, UNDP formally concluded its Support 
to Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (STMAP) project in 
September 2019. UNDP’s programme had aimed to build 
sustainable national structures and TNMAC’s technical 
capacity and in 2018 it helped TNMAC to elaborate Tajikistan’s 
plan for Article 5 completion.24 Any future support will be 
provided remotely from UNDP’s regional hub in Istanbul.25 
The end of the programme resulted in loss of trained capacity 
for TNMAC as most STMAP staff were on UN salaries and 
left when the programme ended rather than continue on 
lower national salaries. It also raised questions as to whether 
TNMAC had sufficient staff capacity to fulfil its roles, notably 
in relation to planning and developing strategy.26
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) plays a major role in 
Tajikistan’s mine action sector, in particular by conducting 
demining directly.27 The Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe Programme Office in Dushanbe  
(OSCE POiD) has supported the MoD to update its multiyear 
plan, entitled “Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Tajikistan 
Co-operation Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2023.”28
252   Clearing the Mines 2020
In May 2019, during the APMBC intersessional meetings, Tajikistan convened an “Individualised Approach Platform” meeting, 
with support from the Implementation Support Unity (ISU). The meetings allowed TNMAC to outline its current work and to 
present the challenges and opportunities faced in meeting its Article 5 obligations.29
TNMAC also conducted several meetings promoting coordination in the mine action sector in 2019, including a “Mine Free” 
workshop in June, a Mine Action Forum in October, and a technical working group meeting in November.30 The Mine Action 
Forum was convened with financial support from the US Department of State and facilitated by Norway, and was attended by 
the national authorities, MoD, international and national clearance operators, the GICHD, the OSCE, donors and representatives 
from Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. It provided a platform for discussions on the current 
status of the TNMAC and the successes and challenges it faces, and Tajikistan planned to convene the Mine Action Forum again 
in 2020.31
Tajikistan informed the States Parties to the APMBC that it planned to establish a management working group involving key 
stakeholders to develop a working plan for implementation of its Article 5 extension request as well as a survey technical 
working group to promote survey planning and prioritisation, but, as at mid 2020, had yet to convene either group.32
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
TNMAC adopted a gender programme in October 2018 
that was prepared by the Geneva Mine Action Programme 
(GMAP, now a programme of the Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD) and is committed to 
improving the situation of women in the mine action sector.33 
A UNDP evaluation concluded TNMAC had made progress 
mainstreaming gender and diversity in mine action but the 
strategy has not yet been systematically implemented. Areas 
for further action included ensuring that training of trainers 
for MRE was gender balanced, introducing female quality 
assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) officers and developing  
a code of conduct and complaints mechanisms.34 
Women account for around one fifth of personnel in survey 
and clearance teams in Tajikistan, and around one quarter 
of managerial/supervisory level positions. TNMAC plans to 
diversify survey teams to help reach a wider audience and 
more sources of information. Relevant mine action data are 
disaggregated by sex and age.35
TNMAC acknowledged that it would be a challenge to achieve 
gender balance in view of the predominance of men in the 
military. The MoD’s Humanitarian Demining Company (HDC) 
deploys conscript soldiers as deminers, with regular MoD 
personnel overseeing operations. In Tajikistan, military 
service is compulsory for men and voluntary for women 
and while there is equal access to employment for qualified 
women and men in the HDC survey and clearance teams, 
including for managerial level/supervisory positions, in 
practice women do not apply for these positions. 
However, TNMAC said where it could identify key positions 
that can be filled by female candidates like paramedics  
and/or QA/QC officers this will be discussed and prioritised. 
In addition, TNMAC will also seek to increase female civilian 
capacity in coordination with other implementing partners.36 
OSCE, which funds three HDC demining teams, also seeks 
to promote gender awareness by collecting comprehensive 
sensitive information.37 Meantime, the HDC does consult with 
all groups, including women and children, during survey and 
community liaison activities.38 
NPA has a gender and diversity policy which is integrated into 
its Tajikistan project proposals and operations. Three of its six 
support staff are women but its 59 operational staff include 
13 women (22%) with more men than women in its survey and 
community liaison teams. NPA ensures that all groups are 
included during community consultation activities, and has a 
gender balanced community liaison team to help ensure this. 
NPA disaggregates mine action data by sex and age.39
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
TNMAC completed an upgrade of its mine action database from Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
version 6.0 to IMSMA Core, which became fully operational in May 2019 making it easier to input, edit and retrieve data.  
TNMAC also introduced new data collection forms intended to simplify data entry and improve data quality.40 The closure 
of UNDP’s support programme led to loss of trained staff and raised concerns it would be difficult to maintain information 
management standards.41 
Tajikistan submits annual Article 7 transparency reports and delivers updates on its progress in Article 5 implementation 
at the APMBC intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties. However, TNMAC should aim to improve its reporting 
on land release, to make it more consistent with the IMAS, and disaggregate accurately the amount of mined area cancelled 
through non-technical survey or reduced through technical survey.




Tajikistan’s Article 5 extension request submitted in March 2019 forms the basis of its operational planning, superseding 
the National Strategy on Humanitarian Mine Action 2017–2020. The request said land release would concentrate on the 
Central region and the Tajik-Afghan border, especially the Shamsiddin Shohin district as the area most contaminated with 
anti-personnel mines.42 
The request said Tajikistan planned to clear approximately 1.3km2 a year for the duration of the extension which runs until the 
end of 2025,43 a target that appeared more ambitious than realistic. In 2019, TNMAC aimed to clear 1.37km2 but achieved less 
than half that amount.44 In 2020–21, Tajikistan set a target of clearing a total of 60 mined areas covering more than 2.6km2:  
26 mined areas totalling 1.36km2 in 2020 and 34 mined areas affecting 1.27km2 in 2021.45 
TNMAC tasks operators according to a set of priorities agreed with the government and based on criteria that include 
humanitarian impact, national development priorities and the seasonal constraints on access to mined areas in mountainous 
terrain. It has also worked with the GICHD on developing the Priority Setting Tool for Mine Action (PriSMA) to identify specific 
criteria and indicators for different regions.46 
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Tajikistan’s revised National Mine Action Standards (TNMAS) 
were approved by decree on 1 April 2017 and are available 
in Russian and English.47 The standards were developed as 
general guidelines allowing implementing partners scope to 
develop their own standing operating procedures (SOPs).48 
No changes were made to the NMAS in 2019.49 At the same 
time, UNDP observed that operations could be more effective 
and efficient through better analysis of data, non-technical 
and technical survey and greater use of a range of clearance 
approaches.50
TNMAC introduced a new approach to survey in 2017 known 
as “non-technical survey with technical intervention”. In 
addition to standard non-technical survey, survey teams 
use technical assets to confirm the presence of mines and 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) and also to identify their location 
avoiding poorly defined and inflated polygons.51 It is especially 
useful, as minefield records are sometimes incomplete or 
inconsistent due to incorrect coordinates and grid numbering 
or lack of landmarks/reference points, and there are often 
few local people to ask about evidence of mines or accidents 
as people have moved away because of the contamination.  
In addition, mines are sometimes displaced due to landslides, 
rock falls, or flooding.52
UST has conducted non-technical survey with technical 
survey intervention, in line with the new methodology since 
2017.53 Prior to this, UST was only conducting non-technical 
survey. The new approach is expected to improve operational 
efficiency but was also expected to slow down its rate of 
survey of remaining minefields.54 In many instances, some 
suspected mined area is cancelled or reduced through 
survey but minefield records do not always capture the full 
extent of contamination and survey reveals a larger mined 
area than that in the national database. This can be due to 
a number of factors, such as windy conditions at the time 
when helicopter-dropped mines were deployed which leads 
to greater dispersal of the mines; the height of the helicopter 
above the ground at the time of deployment (in time of 
hostilities, the distance of the helicopter from the ground is 
significantly increased, resulting in wider dispersal of the 
mines); and mountainous terrain.55
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Tajikistan reported its mine action capacity in 2019 consisted 
of a total of 90 deminers. To meet the targets set out in its 
Article 5 deadline extension request Tajikistan said it would 
need to double capacity to 180 deminers.56 
The MoD HDC provided the main national capacity, operating 
five multi-purpose teams employing 50 deminers. They 
included three teams financed by the OSCE and two by the 
United States. TNMAC reported it was in discussion with the 
MoD on standing up five additional teams of deminers. It said 
the government had agreed to pay salaries of the deminers 
but Tajikistan needed to raise donor funding to cover 
operating costs.57 
NPA also operated five clearance teams with 38 deminers in 
2019 and in April added another four-person multi-task team 
with a specific focus on non-technical survey. NPA planned to 
add another survey team staffed by civilians in 2020 together 
with a clearance team staffed with personnel seconded by 
Tajikistan’s Border Guard Force.58 NPA took on two Border 
Guard officers to work with civilian deminers in 2019 as a 
pilot project supporting TNMAC plans to engage Border 
Guard forces in demining on the border with Afghanistan.59 
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UST, a national not-for-profit organisation, is accredited to conduct non-technical survey, risk education, and victim assistance. 
UST received additional accreditation to conduct non-technical survey with technical survey intervention in 2017, but it is 
not yet accredited to conduct clearance.60 TNMAC and UST have also discussed plans for converting UST’s survey teams to 
multi-tasking teams but did not take that step in 2019.61 Some staff positions, such as the Operations Manager, are permanent 
but deminers are recruited annually for the operations period from Spring until October, based on UST’s annual survey plan.62 
TNMAC, NPA and the MoD planned a joint initiative to re-activate a Mini Mine Wolf that had been provided in 2015 by the US 
Department of Defense. The asset is intended to conduct mechanical ground preparation for tasks assigned to both NPA and 
the MoD.63 TNMAC estimates that around 1.4km2 or 15–20% of remaining contamination is suitable for mechanical clearance, 
most of it in Panj. Tajikistan said it would need external support to provide initial maintenance and to retrain operators.64 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
TNMAC reported at the end of May 2020 that Tajikistan had released a total of 1.67km2 in 2019, almost 50% more than in 2018, 
with two-thirds released through survey and one-third by clearance.65 The total was a little lower than the amount published 
earlier in Tajikistan’s Article 7 report, which showed release of a total of 1.72km2 in 2019.66
SURVEY IN 2019
TNMAC said NPA and UST cancelled 0.9km2 through non-technical survey in 2019, more than double the area cancelled the 
previous year (see Table 2). It reported a further 0.26km2 reduced through technical survey, much the same level as the 
previous year (see Table 3), half of it attributed to the MoD and half to NPA.67
NPA, working with a dedicated survey team that started operating in April 2019, cancelled more area through non-technical 
survey in 2019 than the previous year68 but recorded less area reduction through technical survey than TNMAC and more land 
released through clearance.69 NPA said many of the minefields it resurveyed in the border with Afghanistan were found to be 
bigger than originally estimated leaving little opportunity for area reduction.70 
Table 2: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2019
Province/Region/District Operator Area cancelled (m²)
Panj UST 28,000
Sh. Shohin UST 189,675
Darvoz UST 626,000
Sh. Shohin NPA 34,220
Total 877,895
Table 3: Reduction through technical survey in 2019
Province/Region/District Operator Area reduced (m²)
Panj MoD 42,960
Sh. Shohin MoD 99,201




Tajikistan cleared 0.54km2 of anti-personnel mined area in 2019, marginally less than the previous year, but destroyed 5,187 
mines through clearance in 2019 compared with 4,998 the previous year (see Table 4). A further 67 mines were destroyed in 
spot tasks by FSD’s explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams and by NPA.71
Table 4: Mine clearance by operator in 201972
Operator Province District Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed UXO destroyed 
NPA GBAO Darvos 25,474 9 23
Khatlon Sh. Shohin 52,286 106 12
MoD HDC Khatlon Panj 178,392 1,474 20
Sh. Shohin 279,159 3,598 117
Totals 535,311 5,187 172
AP = Anti-personnel 
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Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
extension granted by States Parties in 2019), Tajikistan is 
required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas 
under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not 
later than 31 December 2025.
Tajikistan is within sight of completion but without a major 
increase in donor funding will not be able to achieve it by 
2025. Its extension request set ambitious land release 
targets that far exceed its achievements to date. The 
request calls for clearance of an average of 1.3km2 a year.73 
Operating results in 2019, when TNMAC had also aimed 
to clear 1.3km2, underscore the extent of the challenge. 
Operators cleared 0.5km2, the annual average for the last 
five years (see Table 5).74 
Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







Moreover, Tajikistan does not yet know the full extent 
of the contamination it needs to address. The extension 
request clearance targets do not cover 41 minefields that 
are due to be surveyed by 2023, some of them located in 
remote, mountainous areas where conditions only permit 40 
operational days a year, or the estimated 3.25km2 of SHA on 
the Uzbek border which Tajikistan says will be addressed 
only once a political agreement has been made.75 Insecurity 
on the border with Afghanistan has previously prevented 
access to some of Tajikistan’s most heavily mined districts 
and adds a further element of uncertainty to the outlook  
for implementation.76
Tajikistan said to achieve its clearance targets it would need 
to double the number of deminers deployed by the MoD/HDC  
to 100 and by NPA to 80 for a total of 180.77 It estimated it 
needed US$33 million for costs of manual clearance alone 
to complete its Article 5 obligations.78 Funding has been 
heavily dependent on the US Department of State. Tajikistan 
conducted a workshop with other major international donors 
in June 2019 in an effort to diversify its sources of support 
but by the end of the year had not received any additional 
funding.79 Furthermore, there was general uncertainty about 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global funding 
for mine action. In view of such uncertainties, the APMBC 
requested Tajikistan to provide updated work plans by 30 
April 2021 and by 31 October 2023, detailing all known or 
suspected anti-personnel mined areas, annual projections of 
which areas would be dealt with and by which organisations 
during the remaining period covered by the request, and a 
revised detailed budget.80 
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Tajikistan has not yet set out plans for dealing with any residual contamination after completion. It informed the APMBC it 
had started discussions with the GICHD on long-term risk management and expected to address the arrangements in a new 
national strategy due to be unveiled in 2020.81 
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Thailand’s mine action programme continued to improve during 2019, with publication of a “Five-Year Humanitarian Mine  
Action Plan, 1 November 2018–31 October 2023” in April 2019, containing ambitious annual targets. The Thailand Mine 
Action Center (TMAC) reported significant land release output for 2019. The effort was underpinned by an online information 
management system that became fully operational during the year and by effective coordination between TMAC and its 
implementing partners. 
TMAC exceeded its land release target for 2019 by more than 21km2, mostly as a result of non-technical survey in the first 
phase (2019–20) of its Five-Year plan. It was uncertain whether all areas identified for resurvey, and in particular those in  
areas with unclear border demarcation along the Thailand-Cambodia border, would be accessible in 2020. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Thailand should ensure that the pilot border clearance project with Cambodia runs to schedule and should seek to 
conclude a bilateral cooperation mechanism that would enable both countries to survey and clear all mined areas 
along the shared border.
 ■ TMAC should develop suitable national mine action standards and standing operating procedures (SOPs) for the use  
of mine detection dogs (MDDs)/animal detection systems (ADS) and for the use of mechanical assets.
 ■ Thailand should elaborate a gender policy and supporting implementation plan for mine action. 
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(20% of overall score)
7 7 Thailand has been conducting non-technical survey on all suspected hazardous 
areas (SHAs), which was due to conclude in 2020, though the end date may be 
delayed due to the impact of COVID-19 on operations. 
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
7 7 There is strong national ownership of Thailand’s mine action programme, with armed 
forces personnel conducting survey and clearance operations, supported by and in 
good collaboration with non-governmental clearance organisations. 
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
5 4 The overall proportion of women at TMAC increased in 2019 compared to the 
previous year, and four senior positions are now filled by women. However, most 
female personnel at TMAC are employed in administrative roles and military 
regulations prevent women working in the demining teams. However, this policy 
does not apply to civilian operators. Thailand’s ongoing baseline survey is based on 
inclusive community interviews in all areas where the survey is conducted, during 
which women, girls, boys and men are consulted. In areas where minority groups 




(10% of overall score)
7 7 The Arc Geographic Information System (GIS) online information management 
system, introduced in 2018, became fully operational in 2019, allowing demining units 
to submit information online and enabling TMAC to verify data and make corrections.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
8 8 In April 2019, Thailand published a five-year strategic mine action plan through to 
the end of October 2023, containing annual targets and detailing prioritisation for 
the release of mined areas. TMAC exceeded its planned land release target for 2019, 
releasing more than 142km2, primarily through non-technical survey. 
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
8 8 TMAC is applying efficient land release methodology, conducting non-technical 
survey to cancel a significant amount of the overestimated SHA in its database  
and to determine more accurately the location of mine contamination. 
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
7 7 Land release output in 2019 exceeded that in 2018, due to the focus on non-technical 
survey. TMAC has been achieving the annual land release targets largely through 
non-technical survey. Technical survey and clearance targets for phase two of its 
plan (2021–23) are very ambitious and will require sustained funding, extra capacity, 
and successful coordination with Cambodia to address all mined areas along the 
border, including those in areas with unclear border demarcation. 
Average Score 7.1 7.0 Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action (NMAC)
 ■ Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) 
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Humanitarian Mine Action Units (HMAU 1–4) and  
HMAU TMAC
 ■ Thai Civilian Deminer Association (TDA)
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (Golden West)




UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at 31 October 2019 (the end of Thailand’s fiscal year), Thailand estimated that it had over 218km2 of mined area remaining 
over 254 hazardous areas in 9 provinces (see Table 1 below).1 This was a reduction of 142km2 from the 360km2 of mined area  
in 2018.2 
Contamination as at the end of October 2019 consisted of 82 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totalling over 14.5km2 and 172 
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) totalling over 203.6km2.3 In 2019, over 0.32km2 of additional mined area was identified and 
confirmed in Sa Kaeo, Trat, Chanthaburi, and Buri Ram provinces.4
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province (at end-October 2019)5
Region Province CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total area (m2)
North Phitsanulok 0 0 1 25,263,004 25,263,004
North-East Ubon Ratchathani 14 4,109,965 44 76,751,085 80,861,050
Si Sa ket 19 2,267,521 21 24,013,551 26,281,072
Surin 0 0 26 27,299,749 27,299,749
Buri-Ram 14 1,119,179 1 1,838,511 2,957,690
East Sa Kaeo 5 326,000 15 6,440,538 6,766,538
Chanthaburi 2 17,750 10 3,508,622 3,526,372
Trat 25 6,660,719 54 38,529,552 45,190,271
South Chumphon 3 48,499 0 0 48,499
Totals 82 14,549,633 172 203,644,612 218,194,245
Since 2016, TMAC and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) have been working on a pilot project resurveying the vastly overestimated 
SHA. Taking into account the results of the pilot project, TMAC has forecasted that up to 80% of existing SHAs can be cancelled 
or at least significantly reduced in size through survey.6 
In its “Five-Year Humanitarian Mine Action Plan, 1 November 2018–31 October 2023” (hereafter, Five-Year Plan), published in 
April 2019, Thailand projected that of the outstanding 360km2 of contamination, 269km2 will be cancelled through non-technical 
survey and nearly 91km2 of CHA will remain for technical survey and clearance.7 TMAC is therefore focusing its efforts in 
2019–20 on cancelling land through non-technical survey before moving on to technical survey and full clearance in 2021–23.8 
NPA estimates that ongoing non-technical survey will result in an even smaller area (approximately 20km2) requiring 
clearance. But NPA also foresees a need for further non-technical survey and updating of survey data during reduction and 
clearance operations as more information becomes available.9
The baseline non-technical survey project was expected to be completed by October 2020.10 Furthermore, most of the mined 
areas are located along the Thai-Cambodia border11 and it is uncertain whether all areas identified for resurvey will be 
accessible in 2020 due to the unclear border demarcation in many areas along the Thailand and Cambodia border. This is likely 
to further delay the completion of resurvey.12 
Thailand is affected by mines as well as by explosive remnants of war (ERW), the result of conflicts on its borders with 
Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Malaysia, and Myanmar. The majority of remaining contamination 
is in seven eastern and north-eastern provinces bordering Cambodia, with the rest in Chiang Mai and Chumphon, bordering 
Myanmar, and in Pitsanuloke, on the border with Lao PDR.13
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Thailand created the National Committee for Humanitarian 
Mine Action (NMAC) in 2000, chaired by the prime minister 
and with responsibility for overseeing the national mine 
action programme. Since 2008, NMAC did not convene until it 
was reconstituted in May 2017, again with the prime minister 
as chairman. The engagement of national leadership in 
the Committee was seen as important in facilitating policy 
direction and progress on issues affecting national security, 
notably regarding cooperation with neighbouring countries 
on clearing border areas.14
NMAC is currently tasked with creating policy guidance and 
mobilising resources from all sectors to support mine action 
to be able to complete clearance in the allotted timeframe.15 
In reality, however, NMAC has no operational or strategic 
power and is purely procedural.16
TMAC was established in 1999 under the Royal Thai Armed 
Forces Headquarters to coordinate, monitor, and conduct 
mine/ERW survey and clearance, risk education, and victim 
assistance throughout Thailand.17 While the roles and 
responsibilities within the sector are clear and coherent 
TMAC has had to contend with limited funding and, as a 
military organisation, with regular rotation of personnel at 
all levels.18 Lieutenant-General Sittipol Nimnuan took over 
as TMAC’s director in October 2017, the eleventh director 
since TMAC was created in 2000 and the seventh in the last 
nine years. In order to maintain continuity, TMAC has made 
a request with the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters 
that personnel working within TMAC remain in post for at 
least two years rather than be rotated out on an annual 
basis. General Sittipol’s directorship since 2017 has brought 
continuity to TMAC and improved its effectiveness. TMAC 
also requested that personnel working in the Humanitarian 
Mine Action Units (HMAUs) either have the required training 
and qualifications before they assume the role or that 
personnel remain in post for no less than two years. TMAC 
aims to have a 60:40 ratio of old personnel to new for the 
purposes of continuity and to retain knowledge.19 Classes 
taught by US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (US MARFORPAC) 
help TMAC to train newly assigned personnel, as well as 
providing mentorship to operational and staff personnel who 
can remain at TMAC for several years.20
While the roles and responsibilities within TMAC are clear 
and coherent there have been some challenges with the 
command structure of the HMAUs. With the exception 
of one of the HMAUs, HTMAC, personnel come from the 
Division-Level Force of the Royal Thai Army and the Royal 
Thai Navy, which means they must report both to TMAC and 
to their respective divisional command.21 TMAC has worked 
to educate the HMAUs, high-ranking generals, and the Chief 
of Defence Forces on the importance of mine action.22
The cost of TMAC (including personnel, equipment, 
operational costs, meetings, workshops, and trainings), is 
covered by the Thai government, through the Royal Thai 
Armed Forces Headquarters. Survey and clearance costs 
of the HMAUs are also nationally funded.23 In 2018, TMAC 
received a budget of about THB70 million a year (approx. 
US$2.1 million), much lower than the THB177 million (approx. 
US$5.8 million) budgeted in Thailand’s 2017 Article 5 deadline 
extension request.24 In 2019, TMAC’s budget was greatly 
increased to THB248 million (approx. $7.5 million).25 TMAC 
is also seeking additional funds to procure new equipment 
and repair of existing equipment, amounting to THB23 million 
(approx. $746,000) through to 2022.26 Thailand indicated 
in its Five-Year Plan, and at the Fourth Review Conference 
in November 2019, that it would welcome international 
assistance for capacity building and equipment (especially to 
facilitate access areas with rough and challenging terrain).27
TMAC is reported to be very supportive of NPA. Staff from 
HMAU-2 and HMAU-3 are seconded to NPA and the regional 
military command in HMAU-3 provided support to NPA to 
ensure quick and efficient introduction of MDDs and their 
handlers from Cambodia to Thailand, as well as providing 
free and secure training areas for the MDDs and access to 
explosives/landmines for training purposes. TMAC also 
provides NPA with space at its office free of charge.28 That 
said, strict regulations on who can handle explosives in 
Thailand, along with restrictive rules on most demining 
equipment which define it as military equipment, hampers 
the ability of civilian entities to conduct explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD)/clearance.29
While Thailand has not yet created a formal in-country 
platform, such as a National Mine Action Platform (NMAP), 
regular monthly meetings between TMAC, relevant 
ministries, and all HMAU’s and clearance operators are 
convened, during which progress is reported and questions 
and concerns raised.30 In addition, a mid-year workshop for 
all stakeholders is planned, along with an end of year seminar 
to plan for the next fiscal year. Furthermore, orientation 
occurs in October, at the start of the new fiscal year, during 
which new TMAC personnel are brought up to date and 
HMAUs can make suggestions or raise concerns.31
TMAC began a partnership with Golden West in January  
2019, under which Golden West provides technical  
advisory support to TMAC and other partners if requested. 
Golden West works closely with US MARFORPAC and US 
Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining Research  
and Development (US DOD HDR&D).32 
US MARFORPAC provides a range of trainings to TMAC 
related to demining, including in non-technical and technical 
survey, and IMAS EOD Level 1–2 training, which are 
supported by Golden West’s technical advisor. Along with 
training in 2019, US MARFORPAC constructed mine detector 
training lanes and an outdoor classroom facility, and also 
donated 200 sets of personal protective equipment (PPE, face 
shields, and body armour) and 50 Minelab metal detectors. 
This effort took place following a program assessment where 
former students were interviewed at their respective HMAUs. 
US MARFORPAC, US HDR&D, and Golden West participated in 
the assessment. An EOD Level 3 course by US MARFORPAC, 
with Golden West providing technical advisor support and 
mentorship, was scheduled for June 2020, but was postponed 
due to COVID-19 restrictions.33




GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
TMAC does not have a policy or guidelines on gender 
and diversity. While TMAC attempts to diversify gender 
where applicable, challenges are posed by virtue of it 
being a military organisation. In 2019, 40% of staff at TMAC 
headquarters were women, though they were mainly 
occupying administrative positions.34 This is, however, an 
increase on the 27.5% of female staff reported in 2018.35 
Furthermore, as at March 2020, TMAC had female senior 
grade officers serving as the deputy chief of special affairs, 
deputy chief of coordination and evaluation, budget officer, 
and head of admin and personnel.36 There are no women 
working within the HMAUs as the Thai military does not  
allow women to perform combat duties and the roles are 
restricted to combat personnel.37
Thailand’s ongoing baseline survey of mine contamination is 
based on inclusive community interviews in all areas where 
the survey is conducted, during which women, girls, boys 
and men are consulted. In areas where they reside, minority 
groups are also consulted.38 All these stakeholders are also 
present and consulted at the end of the survey, when the 
results are presented.39
NPA has an organisational gender and diversity policy and 
all NPA survey teams are gender balanced. NPA encourages 
TMAC and the HMAUs to become gender balanced. When 
NPA conducts non-technical survey or community liaison 
activities, all local people are invited to participate, including 
women and children, and where they reside, members of 
minority groups. In NPA’s field teams, 45% of personnel are 
women, while three of NPA’s five managers (60%) are female 
as are two of the four supervisors (50%).40
During non-technical survey, the Thai Civilian Deminer 
Association (TDA) speaks to both men and women and 
employs both male and female local informants as part of 
its teams. There is equal access to employment for qualified 
women and men in TDA survey and clearance teams, 
including for managerial level/supervisory positions. As at 
July 2020, women made up 15% of TDA operational roles, 
which was due to increase to 30%. Approximately 50% of 
managerial level/supervisory positions at TDA are held  
by women.41
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
TMAC established a data centre to process land release, risk 
education, and quality management data. It manages the 
central database using Excel and Arc Geographic Information 
System (GIS) mapping.42 ArcGIS Online is being used as 
part of a support package provided by the Department of 
Survey of the Royal Thai Armed Forces. ArcGIS assists TMAC 
and the HMAUs in data collection and dissemination, and 
mapping of SHAs and CHAs; and TMAC senior management 
in decision-making and operational planning.43 The online 
system started in 2018 and became fully operational in 2019. 
HMAUs submit information to TMAC via the online system 
every 15 days, which allows for the verification of progress  
in the field and rectification of any issues.44
NPA and TDA deem data in Thailand to be accurate and 
reliable, with data in the national information management 
system accessible to clearance organisations.45 Thailand 
submits timely and accurate Article 7 reports. Thailand was 
requested by the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties to 
provide an updated work plan to the Committee on Article 5 
Implementation by 30 April 2019,46 which it duly submitted. 
The Five-Year Plan provides details on remaining challenges, 
outstanding mine contamination, the prioritisation system, 
and land release outputs.47 
PLANNING AND TASKING
Thailand’s Five-Year Plan, published in April 2019, is divided into two phases. During the first phase, from 2019–20, 
non-technical survey is prioritised in all outstanding SHAs with the expected cancellation of more than 269km2. During this 
stage TMAC aims to release non-contaminated areas in the north-eastern region and parts of the eastern region, and gain 
more precise information on the mine-contaminated areas, including those along its border with Cambodia.48 The second phase 
in 2021–23 will focus on technical survey and clearance of CHAs, based on the results of the national non-technical survey.49 
TMAC expects to release more than 90km2 of land through technical survey and clearance during this phase. Thailand is 
operating under the assumption that the border demarcation issues will be resolved through bilateral cooperation, allowing 
the HMAUs to access these areas.50
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Table 2: Planned land release from Five-Year Plan 2019−2351
Region Province 2019 (m2) 2020 (m2) 2021 (m2) 2022 (m2) 2023 (m2)
North Pitsanulok 9,510,170 9,510,170 9,510,180 LF LF
Chiang Mai 1,103,526 0 0 9,308,072 15,203,590
North-east Buri Ram 15,587,142 0 3,896,786 LF LF
Surin 0 21,839,800 5,459,949 LF LF
Si Sa Ket 39,495,981 19,210,841 0 14,676,704 LF
Ubon Ratchathani 21,364,937 59,617,291 0 0 20,245,556
East Chanthaburi 3,562,113 374,111 LF LF LF
Sa Kaeo 1,724,472 1,695,254 1,669,773 1,490,174 1,117,125
Trat 26,912,587 34,354,161 3,107,481 3,005,862 2,274,040
South Chumphon 1,586,760 1,586,760 LF LF LF
Totals 120,847,688 148,188,388 23,644,169 28,480,812 38,840,311
LF = Landmine Free
As at the end of October 2019, TMAC had released 142km2 
of SHA52, exceeding the land release target of 120.8km2 in 
its Five-Year Plan, but had also identified 14.5km2 of CHA. 
According to information provided to Mine Action Review,  
in 2020, TMAC planned to complete the resurvey and release 
an additional 154.3km2 of SHA, slightly higher than in 
Thailand’s five-year plan. It expects to have 64 CHAs at the 
end of the resurvey.53 
Thailand’s Five-Year Plan replaced the land release targets 
detailed in its Second Article 5 deadline Extension request 
in 2017, in which the previous projected annual land release 
targets were 34.74km2 (2017); 29.05 km2 (2018); 72.12km2 
(2019); 72.06km2 (2020); 73.23km2 (2021); 74.54km2 (2022), 
and 66.86km2 (2023).54
Thailand is prioritising the north-eastern region, the most 
heavily contaminated area of the country where 61% of SHAs 
are located, but is also taking into account resource limitation 
and access issues in certain areas. Thailand is prioritising 
clearance according to the following five criteria (in order of 
importance): development potential; the access needs of the 
local community; proximity to the local population; terrain and 
environmental challenges; and border and security concerns.55
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
TMAC drafted its first national mine action standards (NMAS) 
with NPA’s support in 2010, formally adopting them in June 
2012, the year Thailand initiated a land release process.56 
Since then, the NMAS have undergone revisions in 2015 and 
2018 in support of Thailand’s shift towards using the full 
toolbox of land release methodologies rather than solely 
relying on technical survey and full clearance.57 In 2018, 
TMAC revised the NMAS on worksite planning and released 
a new NMAS on the “Cancellation of SHAs by Evidence Based 
Survey”, which has made it easier to cancel previously 
inflated, largely uncontaminated SHAs.58 TMAC personnel 
have also been undergoing training on non-technical survey 
to improve speed and efficiency.59
TMAC says it considers input from operators and IMAS 
guidelines when revising the NMAS, ensuring there is a 
proper consultation process with input gathered at the 
beginning of every fiscal year.60 Operator SOPs are then 
adjusted accordingly.61
While TMAC did not officially amend any part of NMAS in 2019, 
there was a year-end seminar in which stakeholders agreed 
to fully incorporate and clarify land release methodology 
and terminology into NMAS to prevent confusion; extend 
consideration of specific dog breeds for future demining 
operations; revise EOD requirements for relevant staff from 
level 3 to level 4; and identify required updates to hazard 
marking and mine risk education.62 
NPA has developed an organisational SOP for the use of 
MDDs, but a national standard for the use of MDDs/ADS in 
technical survey and clearance operations had yet to be 
developed. As at early September 2020, Thailand was in 
the process of drafting a national standard on this and also 
on the use of mechanical assets in technical survey and 
clearance operations, in consultation with its implementation 
partners, Golden West, NPA, and TDA.63 




OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Table 3: Operational survey capacities deployed in 201964
Operator NTS teams NTS personnel TS teams TS personnel
HMAU 1 1 4 1 5
HMAU 2 2 7 2 8
HMAU 3 3 12 3 18
HMAU 4 1 5 1 5
HTMAC 0 0 2 10*
Totals 7 28 9 46
* These personnel can conduct both NTS (non-technical survey) and TS (technical survey) operations.
Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 201965
Operator Manual teams Total deminers Dogs and handlers Machines
HMAU 1 1 3 1 0
HMAU 2 1 (2) 14 1 4
HMAU 3 1 (3) 10 1 0
HMAU 4 1 (1) 7 1 0
HTMAC 1 2 2 0
Totals 5 36 6 4
All clearance in Thailand is conducted by the military due 
to national regulations on who can handle explosives 
and operate demining equipment. There are five HMAUs, 
supervised by TMAC with personnel from the Royal Thai 
Army and Royal Thai Navy, which carry out survey and 
clearance operations. In addition, there is one national 
operator, TDA, and an international operator, NPA, which 
carry out survey in support of the HMAUs.66 TMAC expected 
the number of personnel to remain the same in 2020, but 
then planned to restructure and increase technical survey 
and clearance personnel for the second phase of its Five-Year 
Plan in 2021–23.67
There may be changes to the regulations in the coming years 
due to the complications and related security concerns 
for military personnel entering the border areas. Once 
the TMAC/Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) border 
pilot project is completed, there is a possibility that civilian 
deminers will take part in clearance operations.68 
While only the military can conduct EOD, NGO operators 
work with the full support from HMAUs and are permitted 
to partially uncover buried landmines, which HMAU support 
staff then excavate and destroy.69 In some cases military EOD 
staff are being embedded in NPA technical survey teams and 
for spot tasks, to conduct required EOD on mines and ERW 
detected and uncovered.70 
NPA has supported TMAC operations since 2011, conducting 
land release through non-technical and technical survey. In 
2019, NPA deployed three non-technical survey teams for 
12 months, supporting HMAUs 2 and 3. An additional NPA 
survey team was also deployed in 2019, which conducted 
non-technical survey for half the year and technical survey to 
support the MDDs operations for the other half.71 The use of 
two MDDs for technical survey was successfully piloted and 
NPA planned to continue to use MDDs throughout 2020.72
TDA has supported TMAC operations since 2014.73 In 2019, 
due to an increase in Japanese funding, the number of field 
staff increased from 18 field staff in 2018 to 22 persons 
in 2019, including approximately 8 local key informants.74 
TMAC’s focus in 2019 was on expanding its “SIMA”, its survey 
to identify mined areas comprised of non-technical survey, 
technical survey, and clearance of EOD spot tasks, which is 
focusing on technical survey capacity.75 TDA is planning to do 
research on mine detection using bees, but as at July 2020 
this had yet to begin.76 
TMAC now employs a comprehensive toolbox approach, 
including use of mechanical assets to identify the existence  
of landmines if the terrain permits.77
DEMINER SAFETY
In 2019, two people from HMAU-1 (Sa Kaeo province) and two people from HMAU-2 (Trat province) were injured while clearing 
PMN mines. Every accident is investigated first by the HMAU and then by TMAC, and operations are suspended while personnel 
undergo refresher training. Lessons learned from accidents are discussed and reviewed for future operations, and are used in 
TMAC training.78
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Thailand released a total of more than 142km2 in 2019, of which nearly 0.1km2 was cleared, nearly 13.6km2 was reduced 
through technical survey, and more than 128.4km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey.
In addition, over 0.32km2 of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine contamination was found and added to the database  
as CHA in 2019.79 This comprised 247,245m2 in Sa Kaeo, 2,332m2 in Trat, 2,030m2 in Chanthaburi, and 73,429m2 in Buri Ram.80
SURVEY IN 2019
A total of more than 142km2 was released through survey in 
2019: over 128.4km2 through non-technical survey and nearly 
13.6km2 through technical survey (see Tables 5 and 6). This 
marked a huge increase on the 31.2km2 released through 
survey in 2018, when focused survey efforts by TMAC only 
properly began in November.81
In 2019, over 0.32km2 of additional confirmed mined area  
was discovered in Sa Kaeo, Trat, Chanthaburi, and Buri  
Ram provinces.82
Compared to the previous year, NPA saw a 56% increase 
in the amount of land it cancelled in 2019. This was due to 
the addition of a one non-technical survey team and also 
increased support from TMAC and the HMAU-2 and HMAU-3, 
which seconded additional personnel who were embedded in 
all NPA’s non-technical survey teams.83
In 2019, NPA successfully piloted technical survey with MDDs. 
NPA reported that the results were very promising and that 
it expected NPA technical survey operations in 2020 to yield 
greater results.84
CLEARANCE IN 2019
A total of nearly 0.1km2 was cleared by 3 HMAU units and 
the HTMAC in 2019 (see Table 7).85 The decrease on the 
0.5km2 cleared in 2018 is due to the focus on non-technical 
and technical survey in 2019, rather than on clearance which 
was only conducted where deemed absolutely necessary, for 
example in areas close to communities.86
In addition, in 2019, HMAU units destroyed 36 anti-personnel 
mines, 1 anti-vehicle mine, and 17 items of UXO during EOD 
spot tasks in six districts.87
All mined areas cleared in 2019 contained anti-personnel 
mines.88
Table 5: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201989
Province Operator Area cancelled (m²)
Sa Kaeo HMAU 1 414,122
Chanthaburi HMAU 2 365,676
Trat HMAU 2 (+NPA) 24,299,440
Buri Ram HMAU 3 (+TDA) 10,283,323
Si Sa ket HMAU 3  
(+NPA and TDA)
41,471,791
Ubon Ratchathani HMAU 3 (+TDA) 20,234,757
Phitsanulok HMAU 4 3,267,516
Chiang Mai HMAU 4 19,101,812
Mae Hong Son HMAU 4 6,513,376
Chumphon HTMAC 2,490,290
Total 128,442,103
Table 6: Reduction through technical survey in 201990
Province Operator Area reduced (m2)
Sa Kaeo HMAU 1 697,514
Chanthaburi HMAU 2 46,206
Trat HMAU 2 148,022
Buri Ram HMAU 3 6,316,344
Si Sa ket HMAU 3 5,627,443
Ubon Ratchathani HMAU 3 131,977
Chumphon HTMAC 627,272
Total 13,594,778
Table 7: Mine clearance in 201991
Province Operator Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed UXO destroyed
Sa Kaeo HMAU 1 65,869 2,539 4 0
Trat HMAU 2 18,730 63 2 6
Si Sa ket HMAU 3 3,220 42 0 12
Chumphon HTMAC 7,459 33 0 134
Totals 95,278 2,677 6 152
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle 




ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR THAILAND: 1 MAY 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2009
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (9-YEAR, 6-MONTH EXTENSION): 1 NOVEMBER 2018
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5YEAR EXTENSION): 31 OCTOBER 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): MEDIUM
Table 8: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







Thailand has made significant improvements to its mine 
action programme since the Third Review Conference 
in Maputo in 2014, moving away from an over reliance 
on clearance to the use of the full range of land release 
methodologies demonstrated in its Five-Year Plan. Thailand 
plans to cancel more than 269km2 through non-technical 
survey from November 2018 to October 2020 before moving 
on to technical survey and clearance of the remaining 90km2 
over the following three years. 
Thailand is making excellent progress in meeting and 
exceeding its annual land release targets for survey during 
the first phase of the Five-Year Plan, which focuses on 
resurvey. As at June 2020, COVID-19 had not impacted 
operations too severely and while technical survey with the 
use of MDDs had to be postponed, non-technical survey had 
continued more or less as planned.93 
However, TMAC has set extremely ambitious targets for the 
second phase, during which TMAC plans to release more 
than 23.6km2 of mined area through technical survey and 
clearance in 2021, nearly 22.5km2 in 2022, and more than 
38.8km2 in 2023.94 To meet these targets, TMAC plans to 
increase the number of technical survey and clearance 
personnel, while decreasing non-technical survey personnel, 
with an overall increase in the total number of personnel 
during the second phase (2021–23).95 Current overall capacity 
is far from sufficient to meet the clearance targets.
Whether the required upscaling of technical survey and 
clearance capacity proves possible remains to be seen. NPA 
believes that Thailand’s Article 5 deadline of end October 2023 
is too ambitious due to the lack of sufficient clearance capacity 
to address the CHAs established from the ongoing baseline 
survey and because the border demarcation issues with 
Cambodia, which prevent access to certain mined areas and 
have yet to be resolved.96 Thailand will need to significantly 
increase its technical survey and clearance capacity and will 
need to apply effective and efficient land release methodology 
in order to reach its current Article 5 deadline. This implies 
both more staff as well as more equipment, i.e. detectors, 
personal protective equipment, mechanical assets, and 
MDDs. With a predicted 20km2 of confirmed mined area 
requiring clearance, NPA believes that Thailand would need 
to more or less double its current capacity (potentially with 
less deminers if more mechanical assets/MDDs were made 
available) to reach the current deadline.97
Thailand fully commits to the aim of completing clearance 
by its Article 5 deadline of 202398 and TMAC believes that 
Thailand is on track to meet the 2023 goal, but highlights 
that more assistance and support are welcomed to expedite 
TMAC’s work and further ensure success. 
TMAC also recognises that cooperation between Thailand 
and Cambodia is vital in order for Thailand to meet its 
2023 Article 5 deadline, including access to sensitive 
(non-demarcated) mined areas along the Thailand-Cambodia 
border, which will require close coordination.99 Areas to be 
demarcated (ADs) have been divided into two categories: 
areas that can be accessed immediately and more 
complicated areas where access will need to be negotiated. 
In border areas with Lao PDR, 96% of the land boundary  
has been demarcated and there are no security concerns, 
while the border areas with Cambodia are still subject to  
the demarcation process.100
Improved relations between Thailand and Cambodia have 
opened the way for increased contact with Cambodia on 
border cooperation. The Thailand–Cambodia General Border 
Committee, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Defence from both countries, has agreed that 
TMAC and CMAC can cooperate to conduct demining along 
the Thai-Cambodian border.101 
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In September 2018, TMAC and CMAC met and agreed to find a task for a pilot border project for landmine clearance: a small 
area that could be cleared within a month as a symbolic demonstration of two sides working together. On 14 January 2019, 
TMAC and CMAC held meetings in Sa Kaeo province on the Thai side of the border and Banteay Meanchey province on the 
Cambodian side to further discuss the demining cooperation project. On 16–17 June 2019, TMAC and CMAC met in Sa Kaeo 
province, to conduct a survey and assess prospective areas for demining.102 On 22 and 23 September 2019, TMAC and CMAC, 
accompanied by senior representatives of the General Border Committee, agreed upon the respective mined areas on a 
demarcated section of the Thai-Cambodia border, distanced not too far apart.103 
The selected pilot project area on the Thai side is in Sano-noi Village, Tha-kham Subdistrict, Aranyaprathet District, Sa Kaeo 
province. The selected area on the Cambodian side is Kilobuan Village, Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey province.104 TMAC 
and CMAC signed the record for the pilot site survey on 2 March 2020,105 after which operations were expected to start shortly 
thereafter and were expected to take no more than 50 days to complete.106 Unfortunately, however, operations had yet to 
commence at the time of writing, due to the impact of COVID-19 and the cessation of cross-border activity since mid-March.107
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
TMAC’s mandate covers only formal SHAs and CHAs. Any explosive ordnance (including landmines) found outside of SHAs 
and CHAs comes under police jurisdiction. Once Thailand fulfils its Article 5 obligations, TMAC will act as the information and 
knowledge centre for mines and UXO. If previously unknown mine contamination (i.e. residual contamination) is discovered 
following completion, the local mine risk education network will inform the local authorities, community leaders, and relevant 
government agencies. If the area in question is under the jurisdiction of the military, combat engineers will address the 
contamination. If located in other areas, police EOD teams will take the lead in addressing the contamination.108 
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Turkey published a Strategic Plan for 2020–25 which sets a target of becoming mine free by 2025 while acknowledging it will 
seek an extension to its 2022 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline. The Ministry of National Defence 
and the Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC) significantly increased the military’s demining capacity in 2019, accrediting 12 
more teams, purchasing large volumes of equipment, and preparing to take delivery of new mechanical assets. Nonetheless, 
mine clearance in 2019 fell to the lowest level in three years. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Turkey should commit to a timeline for survey and clearance of its south-eastern border with Iraq.
 ■ Turkey should accelerate survey to define hazardous areas in non-border areas as a prelude to faster clearance.
 ■ Turkey should report systematically and in detail on all victim-activated explosive devices to fulfil its APMBC 
obligations.
 ■ Turkey should report on all mine action plans and activities in Northern Cyprus and the territory it controls  
in northern Syria. 
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(20% of overall score)
7 6 Turkey has good knowledge of its mine contamination and continued to refine 
that understanding in 2019 adding many areas previously identified as suspected 
hazardous areas (SHAs) to its record of confirmed hazards.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
6 6 Since 2015, Turkey has developed an institutional framework for focused mine 
action under the control of the military and since 2018 has embarked on significant 
expansion of its operational capacity although management has suffered from high 
turnover of senior staff.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
4 4 Turkey makes no reference to gender and diversity in its 2020–25 strategic plan and 
military regulations prevent employment of women in military demining teams but 
TURMAC says women are included in survey and community liaison teams and in 





(10% of overall score)
7 7 TURMAC operates an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
database which became operational in 2018. It supported a desktop review of 
contamination data in 2019 that led to a significant adjustment in estimates of both 
SHAs and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). Turkey submits comprehensive and 
timely Article 7 reports.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
6 5 Turkey published a long-awaited strategic plan for 2020-25 in a 12-page document 
that set out five main goals, including becoming mine free by 2025 while confirming 
the intention to seek a further extension to its 2022 Article 5 deadline.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
7 7 Turkey published 44 chapters of mine action standards in 2019 which it prepared 
in consultation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). 
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
6 7 Turkey did not sustain the improvement in clearance achieved in 2018 and although it 
released slightly more land through reduction and cancellation, overall productivity 
remained far below the levels needed to meet its strategic plan goals.
Average Score 6.3 6.2 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Ministry of Defence
 ■ Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC) 
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Altay (national sub-contractor under MECHEM)
 ■ Turkish Armed Forces
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Denel MECHEM 
 ■ RPS-Explosive Engineering Services (QA and QC of the 
EU project)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)
 ■ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Turkey reported 150km2 of anti-personnel mine contamination at the end of 2019, continuing the decline in recent years from 
164km2 at the end of 2017 and 157km2 at the end of 2018. The reduction in contaminated area was largely on the border with 
Syria and, to a modest extent, on the border with Iran. The estimate of mined areas on the borders with Iraq and Armenia 
remained unchanged.1 
Despite the drop, a review of existing data by TURMAC’s Survey and Information Management departments resulted in Turkey 
reporting 670 more confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) at the end of 2019 than a year earlier and slashing the number of 
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).2 It had reported 701 SHAs at the end of 2018, of which 373 were on the border with Iraq 
and 206 in non-border areas. A year later, it acknowledged only 162 SHAs, all of them in non-border areas.3
Almost all contamination is located along Turkey’s borders (see Table 1). It said that just 1% of CHA area is in the interior of the 
country but also reported 701 SHAs affecting 2.8 km2 inside the country.4 
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2019)5
Region CHAs Area (m2) AP mines AV mines SHAs Area (m2)
Syrian border 1,527 128,186,299 411,991 194,618 0 0
Iraqi border 875 2,862,835 79,017 0 0 0
Iranian border* 485 15,515,775 125,558 0 0 0
Armenian border 43 1,097,077 20,275 0 0 0
Non-border areas 762 2,756,422 34,106 0 162 N/K
Totals 3,692 150,418,408 670,947 194,618 162 N/K
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle N/K = Not known * Mined area also intersects with the Azerbaijan border. 
Turkey reports mines were first laid along the Syrian border in the 1950s to prevent smuggling and later in south eastern 
regions for military security.6 Mines inside the country were laid around military installations during the 1984–99 conflict 
with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in the south-east of the country. These are mostly in 
Diyarbakır, Batman, Sirt, Mardin, Şırnak, Tunceli, Bingöl, Bitlis, Hakkari, and Ardahan.7 According to Turkey, these mines, which 
were marked and fenced, have been progressively cleared since 1998.8 The mines on Turkey’s other borders were mostly 
laid in 1955–59 and on some sections of the border with Armenia, Iran, and Iraq in 1992–95.9 Turkey reports that its western 
borders with Bulgaria and Greece, as well as the border with Georgia, are mine-free.10 
In addition to mines laid by Turkish security forces, non-state armed groups have also emplaced mines and improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), rendering clearance more challenging.11 Devices are mostly remote controlled or victim-activated 
pressure plate (in which case they fall within the definition of an anti-personnel mine under the APMBC). Explosive charges  
are mostly ammonium nitrate supported with plastic explosives.12
The number of mined areas along the Iraqi border, as well as part of the Iranian border, is an estimate, as, according to Turkey, 
precise calculation is hampered by armed group activities and the presence of unconfirmed mined areas. In addition, fewer 
mines are expected along the Syrian border than indicated because of detonations by smugglers and as a result of wildfires.13 
NEW CONTAMINATION
Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring launched in northern Syria in October 2019 put it in effective control of territory contaminated 
by mines and other explosive hazards, which humanitarian organisations report have caused civilian casualties.14 
NORTHERN CYPRUS
Turkey’s original Article 5 clearance deadline was 1 March 2014. In 2013, States Parties granted Turkey an eight-year extension 
until 1 March 2022, for clearance of mines in Turkey, but Turkey did not request additional time for clearance of the areas 
it controls in northern Cyprus15 (see the report on Cyprus in this work for further information). This puts into question its 
compliance with Article 5 of the APMBC.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Turkey adopted Law No. 6586 establishing a national mine action centre under the Ministry of National Defence in February 
2015.16 Its director reports directly to the Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defence.17 The law gave the centre, now 
known as TURMAC, responsibility for the clearance of mines and/or unexploded ordnance (UXO) to humanitarian standards.18 
It also has responsibility to elaborate policies for clearance; to plan and steer related activities and to monitor their 
implementation; and to carry out the necessary coordination and cooperation with domestic and foreign institutions.19  
To strengthen project management, TURMAC planned to establish project offices in the regions where it is operational.20 




Turkey reports that the formation of TURMAC has led to significantly increased mine action activities and clearance21 but a high 
turnover of senior staff, including the director, has also had a negative effect on the national mine action programme. Colonel 
Yıldırım Özerkan, the present director, who was appointed director by presidential decree in July 2019, became the third person 
to lead TURMAC in less than five years.22
TURMAC is entirely funded by the Turkish government, as are the Turkish Armed Forces demining units.23 Turkey reported 
investing around 50 million Turkish Lira (approx. US$8.6 million) in 2019 to procure new equipment to establish additional 
demining companies, and pledged that support for personnel, training, deployment, maintenance of equipment, and other 
costs will be increased.24 In 2020, Turkey said the government had allocated an additional TL 53.2 million (US$7.8 million) for 
demining for the period 2020 to 2025.25
In addition, Turkey reported providing some €10 million (approx. US$11.4 million) to the Eastern Borders Mine Clearance 
Project, which is implemented by UNDP and jointly funded by the European Union (EU), Turkey, and the UN.26
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
Gender and diversity are not mentioned in Turkey’s 2021–25 strategy or taken into consideration in planning and 
prioritisation.27 TURMAC says national standards closely follow International Mine Action Standards on gender and that the 
issue of gender is taken into consideration in the preparation of new project documents. Survey and community liaison teams 
include women to facilitate access and participation by all groups, including women and children.28
Women are reported to have equal access to survey and quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) positions and make up 
40% of TURMAC personnel in non-operational positions, including holding the position of department chiefs. Turkish Armed 
Forces regulations do not permit employment of women in military demining units but TURMAC says civilian contractors are 
encouraged and advised to deploy female personnel.29
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
TURMAC installed the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) with support from the Geneva International 
Centre for Mine Action (GICHD) in 2017, and personnel from TURMAC and the armed forces have been trained in its use.30 
Turkey reported the system contains all minefield and mine victim data and is used for all reporting and documentation.31
Turkey has been submitting comprehensive, accurate, and timely annual Article 7 transparency reports. 
PLANNING AND TASKING
TURMAC’s work plan for 2019 called for MECHEM to clear 
around 0.5km2, under the Eastern Border Mine Clearance 
Project.32 The plan called for a total of 18 MoD and 
gendarmerie demining teams to deploy as follows:
 ■ Doğubeyazıt (Eastern Border) 4 teams (gendarmerie)
 ■ Ardahan Göle (non-border) 2 teams
 ■ Syrian Border in Hatay (8 teams), Kilis (4 teams) 
 ■ Hakkari (4 teams
 ■ Diyarbakır (2 teams) 
 ■ Şırnak (2 teams).33
Turkey’s first National Strategic Mine Action Plan, which 
was announced in 2017 and covered 2018–20 was never 
published.34 Changes in government regulations, legislation, 
and structures were said to have held up publication.35 
In November 2019, Turkey informed the Fourth APMBC 
Review Conference in Oslo that it had prepared a three-year 
national mine action plan for 2019–21.36 It later reported that 
TURMAC’s director had prepared and signed a Strategic Mine 
Action Plan (2020–25).37
In 2020, TURMAC released a 12-page Strategic Mine Action 
Plan through to the end of 2025 setting out a vision of 
Turkey becoming mine-free by 2025. It estimated the cost of 
completion at about US$332 million, to be financed by the 
national budget and international sources. The plan identified 
five general goals:38
 ■ To clear all of the emplaced anti-personnel mines  
in Turkey
 ■ To strengthen national capacity and ensure its 
sustainability
 ■ To reduce the number of mines held in depots for training
 ■ To provide Mine Risk Education and support mine victims; 
and
 ■ To develop coordination and cooperation with national 
and international organisations related to mine action.
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SYRIAN BORDER
The 2013 Article 5 deadline extension request had projected completing clearance of the border with Syria, which accounts for 
85% of its contamination, by the end of 2019.39 This was not achieved. The border is Turkey’s easiest clearance task because 
the terrain is flat and has experienced minimal mine displacement due to environmental factors but despite some clearance 
to support construction of a border security surveillance system operations were delayed by the Syria conflict.40 Clearance 
operations under way since 2018 focused on Hatay and Kilis provinces.41 The Strategic Plan said Turkish demining assets 
would clear a total of around 3.4km2 in Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, Mardin and Şırnak provinces on the Syrian border  
at a cost of TLM 55 million (US$8 million) funded from the national budget.42 
EASTERN BORDERS
Turkey proposed a two-phase Eastern Border Mine Clearance project, starting on the Armenian border and continuing 
southwards to the borders with Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq.43 The project is supervised by Turkish authorities and implemented 
in a joint project with UNDP.44 Under the project, UNDP is both managing and quality assuring the demining while also 
supporting capacity development of TURMAC.45 Denel MECHEM (MECHEM) was awarded a contract to conduct demining as 
part of a consortium in which national operators would be subcontracted by MECHEM.46
Phase 1 of the project, implemented between June 2016 and the end of 2017,47 released a total of almost 3.3km2 of mined 
area, much less than the 13.5km2 envisaged in the Article 5 deadline extension request, and destroyed 25,667 anti-personnel 
mines.48 Phase 2, which started behind schedule in June 2018 and was completed in 2019,49 resulted in release of close to 
1.7km2 of land, bringing the total area released in the first two phases to 4.8km2.50 
Turkey planned a third phase that was due to start in 2020 and continue until 2022, which would be funded manly by the 
EU (€18.5 million) and Turkey (€2.12 million). The project will include non-technical survey of all remaining mined areas in 
the eastern border region and clearance of 4km2.51 In slight contrast, the Strategic Plan 2020–25 said the project involved 
clearance of 4km2 in Van province and 5km2 in Kilis province.52 Turkey said activities scheduled for 2020 would be delayed  
by measures taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
NON-BORDER AREAS
Turkey planned to complete clearance of all 873 identified mined areas inside the country by 2021, involving release of 3.1km2 
and destruction of 34,410 mines. The 2013 extension request said the armed forces would conduct clearance in non-border 
areas until the establishment of a national mine action centre, after which a tender would be issued. Operations would 
prioritise areas used for military operations; areas with low or no security threats; and areas where the local population may 
benefit from agriculture and livestock.53 The only non-border activity conducted up to 2020 was clearance of 0.3km2 at a former 
military range in 2018.54 The mined areas are scattered and TURMAC considers it more practical for clearance to be conducted 
by military units but their capacity has been limited.55
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Turkey issued 44 national mine action standards, including on land release, in February 2019. The standards were prepared 
with support from UNDP and the GICHD.56 A separate set of standards specific to the Eastern Border Clearance project were 
also reviewed in 2019, including regulations and medical standards for private companies.57 
As at July 2019, TURMAC’s SOPs had been completed and were available on its webpage. The SOPs of the military demining 
units and MECHEM have been in use since 2017.58
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Turkey’s military has undergone significant expansion of its 
manual demining capacity since 2018. Three new demining 
companies (equivalent to 12 nine-strong demining teams) 
were established in June 2018 and accredited for manual 
demining.59 Twelve more teams making up three demining 
companies were accredited in 2019, most of them becoming 
operational in the second half of the year. By 2020, total 
military capacity amounted to 32 teams, including six 
gendarmerie teams.60 Turkey expected to recruit eight more 
Land Forces demining teams and to complete their training 
and accreditation by the end of 2020. The MoD was also in 
the process of developing a light-medium sized mechanical 
demining machine with a tiller attachment, particularly 
suitable for demining on the flat Syrian border terrain. If the 
machine passed its evaluation, the MoD planned to buy six 
machines.61 Turkey aimed to take delivery of two machines in 
2020 and four in 2021.62 It cautioned those plans could be set 
back by the COVID-19 pandemic.63
MECHEM, a South African company, is contracted for mine 
clearance under the EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance 
Project .64 In 2019, MECHEM deployed 15 mine detection 
dog (MDD) teams, 6 manual clearance teams (approx. 
60 deminers), and 1 MineWolf machine.65 Before 2019, 
MECHEM had subcontracted its demining to a national 
company, Altay, but in 2019 it recruited Turkish nationals 
directly.66 RPS-Explosive Engineering Services, a United 
Kingdom-based company, was contracted for QA and QC.67 
TURMAC also had oversight of operations on site.68




TURMAC, which has three non-technical survey teams, conducted non-technical survey for the Eastern Border Mine Clearance 
Project in 2019. TURMAC also conducted a desk survey of minefield records in 2019 to support planning and prioritization of 
the project activities in 2020. TURMAC has 10 QA/QC personnel who conduct quality management of military demining teams.69 
Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2019
Operator Manual teams Total deminers Dogs and handlers Machines* Comments
MoD 32 N/R 0 0 12 more teams accredited in 2019
MECHEM 6 60 15 teams 1 team
Totals 38 60 15 teams 1 team
* Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
MECHEM and Turkish army demining teams both conduct mechanical as well as manual demining, and also use MDDs. In 2020, 
the MoD planned to deploy two MDDs that have been accredited for humanitarian mine action by the gendarmerie’s Horse and 
Dog Training Centre and to increase the number of dogs in service.70 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Turkey released a total of 6.91km2 in 2019, about 9% less than the previous year, mainly as a result of a fall in the amount of 
clearance. Of the 2019 total, close to 90% was cancelled through non-technical survey.71 
SURVEY IN 2019
Turkey cancelled 6,099,493m2 through non-technical survey in 2019, one-tenth more than in 2018, with most of the released 
land (5,564,625m2) located on the border with Syria. The remaining 534,868m2 of cancelled area was on the Iranian border.72
Turkey did not release any land through technical survey in 2018 but in 2019 said it reduced 136,472m2, including 79,055m2  
on the Syrian border and 55,156m2 in non-border areas with a tiny amount on the Iranian border.73
CLEARANCE IN 2019
Turkey’s mine clearance of 0.67km2 in 2019 (see Table 3) represented less than one-third the amount of land cleared in 2018 
and the lowest output in three years, with sharp falls in each of the three areas where clearance was conducted. Army and 
gendarmerie deminers accounted for clearance of 127,788m2 in the eastern border provinces of Ardahan, Doğubeyazıt, and 
Iğdır. Most of the Syria border clearance was conducted by six demining teams operating in the Hatay region with a small 
amount cleared by four teams in the Beşiriye/Kilis region.74
Operators still managed to destroy more mines in 2019 than the 22,220 destroyed in 2018 largely due to a 60% increase in 
mines cleared on the Iranian border.75
Table 3: Mine clearance in 201976
Region Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed UXO destroyed 
Iran border 513,814 25,619 0 4
Syria border 140,067 36 17 0
Non-border areas 18,844 304 0 0
Totals 672,725 25,959 17 4
Army EOD teams also reportedly destroyed 4,038 improvised explosive devices in 2019 in the course of security operations 
usually focused on non-border areas. Turkey did not provide any details of devices to indicate if any, or how many, were victim 
activated devices that qualify as anti-personnel mines and fall under its APMBC obligations.77 Turkey’s Article 7 report also 
did not provide details of mine clearance, including of improvised mines, conducted in areas of northern Syria where it took 
control after launching Operation Peace Spring in October 2019. The MoD reported in January 2020 only that security forces 
had destroyed 891 mines and 1,660 IEDs.78
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR TURKEY: 1 MARCH 2004
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2014
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (8YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
eight-year extension granted by States Parties in 2013), 
Turkey is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in 
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible, but not later than 1 March 2022. 
Turkey will not meet this deadline and has confirmed it will 
seek a new extension in 2021.79 Turkey’s 2020–25 strategic 
plan says Turkey will request a three-year extension to its 
Article 5 deadline,80 but it appears the amount of extra time 
to be requested has yet to be finalised.81 The plan also sets a 
general target of completing mine clearance by 2025 in line 
with the Oslo Action Plan.82 Neither target can be achieved 
without a dramatic acceleration in mine clearance operations. 
Turkey has made significant progress in the past five years 
creating the institutions, processes, and operational capacity 
to pursue the goals set out in its 2013 Article 5 extension 
request and fulfil its APMBC obligations. The first two phases 
of the Eastern Border Project conducted between 2016 and 
2018 resulted in release of 4.8km2, a marked improvement 
on what was achieved in the 15 years between 1998 and 
2013, when Turkey cleared a total of 1.15km2 of mined area. 
However, the results remain modest in relation to the  
150km2 of remaining contamination and Turkey’s strategic 
plan targets. 
Turkey believes it will cancel at least a quarter of this 
contamination through non-technical survey,83 but it will need 
to sharply accelerate clearance to achieve its strategic goals. 
Instead, clearance in 2019 fell back from the level achieved 
the previous year and has averaged a little under 0.75km2 
a year for the past five years (see Table 4). The setback 
to operations caused by the COVID-19 pandemic makes it 
unlikely land release will significantly accelerate in 2020. 
Turkey, meanwhile, added to its treaty obligations by taking 
control of an area of northern Syria heavily contaminated by 
mines and improvised devices.
Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







*Also included previously unreported clearance output relating to 2016.
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AP MINE  
CLEARANCE IN 2019
ANTIPERSONNEL (AP)  
MINE CONTAMINATION: 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
AP MINES  
DESTROYED IN 2019
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Despite very considerable international assistance, Ukraine’s progress in demining remains extremely disappointing. 
Long-awaited mine action legislation, which was adopted in 2018, could ultimately not be implemented as it conflicts with the 
Ukrainian constitution. This has meant that new legislation has had to be drafted but, as at June 2020, this had not yet been 
adopted. This has further delayed the establishment of the infrastructure needed for an effective mine action programme. 
Ukraine is not on track to meet its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline and has submitted an 
extension request to 1 December 2023. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Ukraine should cease all use of landmines.
 ■ Ukraine should adopt and implement mine action legislation.
 ■ Ukraine should undertake a baseline survey of anti-personnel mine contamination in areas to which it has  
effective access.
 ■ Ukraine should formally establish a national mine action authority and a functioning national mine action centre to 
manage clearance of anti-personnel mines.
 ■ Ukraine should elaborate a national strategic plan for mine action.
 ■ Ukraine should systematically collect data on contamination from mines, cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other 
explosive remnants of war (ERW), as well as progress in survey and clearance, and establish a centralised database 
for planning purposes.
 ■ Ukraine should consult with mine action stakeholders and elaborate standardised national criteria for the 
prioritisation of anti-personnel mine clearance.
 ■ Ukraine should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan for mine action.
 ■ Ukraine should remove civil liability insurance claim for a period of 10 years after the end of mine action in a  
specific territory. 
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(20% of overall score)
3 3 The extent of anti-personnel mine contamination in Ukraine is not known and while 
some survey is being conducted it is not being systematically reported upon by 
Ukraine. Reports of new anti-personnel mine use persist.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
4 5 The Ministry of Defence (MoD) continues to have organisational control of operational 
mine action. It was expected that the adoption of mine action legislation would allow 
for improved management of mine action. However, it was deemed necessary to 
amend the law which is planned to be adopted in October 2020.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
2 2 Ukraine does not have a gender policy for mine action and does not report on 
whether gender is mainstreamed within its programmes. No reference was made  





(10% of overall score)
4 4 There are two Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) databases 
in Ukraine. In 2019, the databases were transitioned to IMSMA Core. Ukraine 
submitted its Article 5 deadline extension request in June 2020 and as with its latest 
Article 7 report it continues to report in a manner inconsistent with the International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
3 3 There is no national strategic plan for mine action or standardised criteria for 
prioritising tasks in Ukraine. In May 2019, Ukraine submitted its annual mine action 
work plan with a list of planned activities but has not reported on whether these 
were in fact achieved.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
5 5 National mine action standards were published in April 2019 but are voluntary until 
the legislation is passed. External quality management was introduced in 2019 
allowing for an official handover of cleared land to take place for the first time.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
5 5 Ukraine is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline and submitted a request in 2020 
to extend its deadline to 1 December 2023, which it will not meet. It is not known how 
much anti-personnel mined area was cleared in 2019 as Ukraine does not report 
those figures and the Ukrainian government does not exercise effective control 
over all mined areas, impeding access for demining. In the area reported as cleared 
during the year, only 12 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed.
Average Score 3.9 4.0 Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ No national mine action authority or mine action centre
 ■ Ministry of Defence (MoD)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
 ■ Security Service
 ■ State Special Transport Service (SSTS)
 ■ State Border Service
 ■ Demining Team of Ukraine
 ■ Demining Solutions
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Danish Demining Group (DDG)
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) – Operations 
suspended in 2019
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) Project Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU)
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)
 ■ Mine Action Sub-cluster chaired by United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of anti-personnel mined area in Ukraine is not 
known. The heaviest mine and ERW contamination is believed 
to be inside the 15km buffer zone on either side of the Line 
of Contact between the warring parties within the Donetsk 
and Luhansk regions, but access to this area for survey and 
clearance operations is severely limited.1 
In 2017, Ukraine estimated, highly improbably, that total 
contamination by mines and ERW could extend over 7,000km2.2 
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD) accepted that this is 
a “rough” estimate.3 In its statement at the May 2019 APMBC 
Intersessional Meetings, Ukraine estimated, also improbably, 
that more than 8% of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have 
been contaminated by anti-personnel mines.4 These estimates 
were also reported in Ukraine’s 2020 Article 5 deadline 
extension request5 and the claim of explosive contamination 
covering 7,000km2 of national territory was repeated in the 
additional information it submitted in August 2020 in response 
to comments provided by the Article 5 Committee.6 
In fact, Ukraine cannot reliably estimate the overall extent of 
mine contamination until surveys have been completed.7 While 
some survey has taken place in the government-controlled 
areas ongoing conflict means that survey is not possible in 
the “grey zone”: the sliver of territory along both sides of the 
contact line that divides Ukrainian government-controlled 
land from separatist-run areas. Ukraine has indicated that 
nationwide non-technical and technical survey will only be 
possible once its sovereignty has been fully restored over all 
territory under its jurisdiction.8
Ukraine reported in its latest APMBC Article 7 transparency 
report (covering 2019) that non-technical survey was 
conducted between 2016 and 2018, with suspected hazardous 
areas (SHAs) identified in the Bakhmut, Sloviansk, Lyman, 
and Volnovakha districts of the Donetsk region, and in the 
Popasna and Stanichno-Luhansk districts of the Luhansk 
region.9 Information was not provided on the number or 
estimated area of these SHAs and, according to the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 
there is currently no agreed definition for a SHA and 
confirmed hazardous area (CHA) in Ukraine owing to a lack of 
implementation of national mine action standards (NMAS).10 
As at April 2020, Danish Demining Group (DDG) was 
conducting non-technical survey as per tasking by the 
MoD and The HALO Trust had deployed three non-technical 
survey teams and three technical survey teams to 
determine the extent of mine contamination across the 
government-controlled area (GCA) in eastern Ukraine.11 
In 2019, The HALO Trust discovered 5.11km2 of previously 
unrecorded anti-personnel mined area, which was added to 
the database. According to information collected during the 
survey, the mines were laid during the peak of the conflict in 
2014–15.12
Ukraine is contaminated by anti-personnel mines as a result of 
the ongoing conflict which broke out in 2014. In the first half of 
2014, armed violence erupted between Ukrainian government 
forces and Russian-backed separatists in the Crimean 
peninsula and in the east of the country in the Luhansk and 
Donetsk regions (oblasts). Strong evidence indicates that 
mines were used in the resultant armed conflicts,13 including 
by Ukrainian armed forces, though the full nature and extent 
of contamination is likely to remain unclear until an effective 
cessation of hostilities. Prior to the current conflicts, Ukraine 
was affected by residual contamination of mines and other 
ordnance, mostly as a result of heavy fighting between German 
and Soviet forces in the Second World War, but also from 
combat in the First World War. MoD engineering units partially 
cleared affected areas in the mid-1970s, suggesting that a 
problem may remain, but the location and extent of any mine 
threat is not known. 
Ukraine is also contaminated with CMR, the extent of which 
is not known, and by considerable quantities of other ERW 
used during the current conflict (see Mine Action Review’s 
Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2020 report on Ukraine 
for further information).
NEW CONTAMINATION
Over the last few years, the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)’s Special Monitoring Mission 
(SMM) in Ukraine has frequently reported on the use of 
both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.14 A December 
2017 report from the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), covering 16 
August to 15 September 2017, stated that: “The parties to 
the conflict continued the practice of placement of IEDs 
[improvised explosive devices] and anti-personnel mines in 
populated areas and near objects of civilian infrastructure.”15 
In 2018, the OHCHR called on all parties involved in hostilities 
to “cease the use of victim-activated devices”.16
At the May 2019 APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Ukraine 
claimed that it had not used, and is not planning to use, 
anti-personnel mines since it acceded to the APMBC in June 
2006 but accused Russia of having used anti-personnel mines 
in its territory since 2014. According to Ukraine, these mines 
have been planted by Russia-backed illegal armed groups 
in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and Russia has also 
emplaced mines on the administrative border between Crimea 
and the rest of Ukraine.17 Ukraine stated that illegal armed 
groups had used different types of mines, including those 
banned by the APMBC and which Ukraine does not possess. 
The mines which Ukraine alleged have been used by the 
opposition groups include PMN-1, PMN-2, PMN-4, POM-2R, 
OZM-72, MES type mines, and MON-50 mines with tripwire.18 
In the past, Ukraine has reiterated that its armed forces 
are authorised to use MON-series and OZM-72 mines only 
in command-detonated mode (through electrical initiation), 
which is not prohibited under the APMBC. According to 
Ukraine, all mines planted in command-detonated mode are 
recorded and secured, and access to the area is restricted.19 
In 2019, Ukraine reported six registered cases of use of 
PMN-2 mines, which had been supplied by Russia to illegal 
armed groups. Eight members of the Ukrainian armed forces 
were wounded by these devices.20 





NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
All areas of mine action in the Donetsk and Luhansk region, 
including humanitarian demining operations, are currently 
planned, coordinated, and controlled by the MoD which 
operates the Kamyanets-Podilsky Demining Centre.21 Other 
national bodies involved in the sector include the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, under which sits the State Emergency 
Services of Ukraine (SESU); the Security Services; the Ministry 
of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced 
Persons; the State Special Transport Services (SSTS) of the 
MoD; the National Police; and the State Border Service.22
The MoD has organisational control of operations, while 
SESU is generally responsible for conducting clearance. 
SESU established a “Special Humanitarian Demining Centre” 
in 2015 in Kiev. The centre’s remit includes coordination of 
SESU pyrotechnical teams (akin to rapid-response explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) teams) involved in technical and 
non-technical survey, demining, internal quality control (QC) 
of SESU units, information management, and handover of 
land cleared by SESU to local authorities, as well as risk 
education.23
Ukraine’s national mine action legislation was adopted by 
parliament on 6 December 2018 and signed into law by the 
President on 22 January 2019.24 However, the legislation 
could not be implemented as it was found to be incompatible 
with the Ukrainian constitution because it gave authority 
to Parliament to create mine action institutions such as the 
national mine action authority (NMAA), which as a “state 
body” is instead the responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers 
(CoM). Following presidential and parliamentary elections 
in September 2019, a working group was set up comprised 
of representatives from relevant government ministries and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization) NATO and the OSCE PCU 
to prepare amendments to the law. In June 2020, the “Law 
on the Amendments to the Law on Mine Action in Ukraine” 
passed its first reading. However, UNDP, OSCE PCU, The HALO 
Trust, and DDG came together to prepare an explanatory note 
with comments on the status of mine victims and their rights; 
training and insurance of deminers; import of the dual-usage 
goods to allow international operators the possibility to use 
explosive in order to destroy items found during demining 
as currently only MoD and SESU can do that; and handover 
procedure and liability of actors after handover. 
It is understood that adjustments will be made taking these 
comments into account before the second reading of the 
amendments to the Law. It is planned that the amendments 
to the Law will be adopted in October 2020, before the 
adoption of the budget for 2021.25 It establishes a framework 
for humanitarian demining, divides responsibilities among 
state institutions, and envisages the creation of an NMAA 
and, strangely, two national mine action centres (NMACs). 
There will be one NMAC under the MoD Kamyanets-Podilsky 
Demining Centre and one under SESU’s “Special Humanitarian 
Demining Centre” each of which will be accredited and 
have their own quality management capacity. Demining 
responsibility will be divided territorially between the two 
NMACs. The NMACs will be coordinated by the NMAA, an 
interagency body made up of the CoM which will be chaired by 
the MoD while “special conditions” exist in Ukraine and then 
during peacetime by the Ministry of Interior. The NMAS and the 
national mine action strategy will be adopted by the NMAA.26
Operators participate in monthly mine action sub-cluster 
meetings, which are attended by representatives of the MoD, 
SESU, and MOFA and which is chaired by UNDP. There are 
also regular roundtable meetings organised by OSCE PCU 
on specific mine action topics and other sectorally relevant 
discussions.27 However, exchange and dialogue among 
stakeholders (NGOs, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), UN agencies, and government ministries) are 
said to focus on issues other than progress and challenges  
in completing clearance by the Article 5 deadline.28 
National funding is provided for clearance of mines and 
ERW and quality control.29 Additionally, the MoD and the 
Civil-Military Cooperation Directorate (CIMIC) of the Armed 
Forces of Ukraine have supported operator survey and 
clearance on all matters related to security and in particular 
have supported the deployment of HALO’s teams in the 15km 
buffer zone.30 Ukraine also receives support from foreign 
partners (OSCE and NATO) for demining equipment.31
A working group on mine action legislation is attended by 
OSCE-PCU, UNDP, HALO Trust, and DDG.32 Government 
bodies do not currently assist operators in obtaining visas or 
to import equipment, and operators do not have permission 
to use explosives or remove explosive items. Operators are 
lobbying for amendments to the mine action legislation to 
clarify these issues.33
The GICHD has been working with the OSCE PCU and the 
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) 
to help foster mine action institutions.34 In 2019, GICHD 
supported the development of new mine action legislation 
and the NMAS; provided training in quality management and 
IMSMA Core; facilitated a regional roundtable on Explosive 
Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) communication approaches 
for different target audiences in affected communities 
organised by the OSCE PCU; developed training programmes 
with the national mine action training centres due to take 
place during 2020; organised a visit to the Lebanon Mine 
Action Centre for the head of the three training programmes; 
and sponsored participants from the Ukrainian national 
authorities to attend the Mine Action Technology Workshop.35 
The OSCE PCU has received funding until December 2021 
to support Ukraine in establishing an NMAA and an NMAC, 
national standards and mine action legislation; to develop 
the IMSMA database in co-operation with the GICHD; to 
organise training for Ukrainian demining specialists in quality 
management, non-technical survey, and IMSMA; to procure 
demining equipment for the MoD and SESU; and to develop 
mine risk education materials.36 
DDG provided capacity development to SESU in 2019 and, as 
at April 2020, was supporting equipment procurement, the 
development of standard operating procedures, deployment/
operational activity (mine clearance, non-technical survey), 
quality assurance and quality control. In addition, DDG 
provided training on non-technical survey, clearance, and data 
management.37 In 2019, the HALO Trust provided information 
management support and quality management training to the 
MoD. In 2020, HALO Trust was providing training to SESU on 
non-technical survey, medical support, geographic information 
systems (GIS), risk education, clearance, and quality 
management. By the end of the year, at least 50 members of 
SESU staff are expected to have been trained.38
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
As at June 2020, no information had been provided on whether there is a gender policy and associated implementation plan 
for mine action in Ukraine. No reference was made to gender or diversity in Ukraine’s Article 5 deadline extension request 
submitted in 2020.39
DDG has a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan. It ensures that all affected groups, including women and 
children, are consulted during survey and community liaison activities. However, as at April 2020, only 10% of operational 
roles were filled by women. With regard to managerial/supervisory positions the Head of Programme and the Information 
Management Officer are both women and DDG recently promoted a female deminer to a Team Leader position.40
The HALO Trust uses mixed gender non-technical survey and community liaison teams. HALO Trust began recruiting women 
for clearance roles in 2017, employing the first female deminers in Ukraine.41 As at April 2020, 16% of operational survey and 
clearance staff were women along with 24% of managerial/supervisory staff.42
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
There are two functioning IMSMA databases in Ukraine, one managed by SESU and the other by the MoD, both of which collect 
and analyse contamination and land release data from national operators and NGOs.43 The databases are, though, claimed to be 
complementary, as they are separated based on region, thematic area, and operational purpose.44 In 2019, the GICHD facilitated 
the transition of the databases to IMSMA Core.45 As at July 2020, in order to ensure the two databases are compatible the 
GICHD was working with SESU and the MoD on a minimum data standard. Once the amendments to the Law are adopted, the 
databases will be coordinated by the NMAA’s secretariat (the ministry of the chairman of NMAA).46
An online map of anti-personnel mine and UXO contamination has been published by the MoD with technical support from 
The HALO Trust, using data from DDG, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), The HALO Trust, and a commercial company, 
Demining Solutions.47 Operators submit survey and clearance data to the MoD on a monthly basis and each submitted a report 
at the end of 2019 on all survey and clearance data for the year.48
Ukraine submits Article 7 transparency reports in a timely manner but does not report on its progress in a manner consistent 
with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). According to its Article 7 obligation, Ukraine should report on “the types 
and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after … entry into force ... in accordance with Articles 4 and 5” but no 
survey or clearance data was provided in its latest Article 7 report. Ukraine will not meet its APMBC Article 5 deadline of  
1 June 2021 and submitted its extension request to 1 December 2023. As with its Article 7 reports the extension request is  
not consistent with IMAS and lacks sufficient detail to be meaningful.
PLANNING AND TASKING
Ukraine does not have a national mine action strategy and, 
as at May 2020, there were no plans to develop one.49 It 
is expected that Ukraine will develop a strategy once the 
NMAA is in place. Ukraine submitted its “Annual Action Plan 
for humanitarian demining in liberated areas in Donetsk 
and Luhansk” for 2019 in May last year, as requested by the 
APMBC Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties.50 
Planned activities for 2019 included development of 
information management systems for mine action, the 
creation of an EOD call-out response, improvement in quality 
management processes, as well as non-technical survey, 
technical survey, and clearance of populated areas, transport 
routes, and infrastructure.51 In the plan, Ukraine also stated 
that the MoD intends to publish information on its website 
every six months that details newly identified SHAs, the 
progress of demining, and the handover of cleared land.52 
In Ukraine’s latest Article 7 report, however, no updates 
are provided on whether these activities were achieved. 
According to the Article 7 report, in 2020 clearance was 
planned in the Bakhmut, Lyman, Sloviansk, and Volnovakha 
districts of the Donetsk region; and in the Stanichno-Luhansk 
district of the Luhansk region. In addition, technical survey 
is planned in the Popasna district of the Luhansk region.53 In 
August 2020, Ukraine submitted an “Action Plan” for 2020,54 
although in truth it was a list of general mine action activities 
and not an action plan as such.
There are currently no standardised criteria at national level 
for task prioritisation.55 Until an NMAC is established, all 
tasking of operators is managed by the MoD in line with its 
annual action plan.56 Local government have been helping 
the MoD to prioritise tasks based on humanitarian criteria.57 
The MoD approves annual survey and clearance work plans 
submitted by operators. Operators prioritise clearance 
according to humanitarian impact and in discussion with the 
local community.58






STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
NMAS were finalised by the MoD in September 2018 after multi-year input and review from key stakeholders.59 The NMAS 
were published in April 2019, but will only become compulsory once the new mine action legislation is passed and are not 
currently applied in practice.60 In addition, The HALO Trust reported that the NMAS will require further development as many 
of the terms and definitions are not in line with IMAS.61 In April 2019, the Cabinet of Ministers approved Resolution 372 on 
“Regulations on marking mine and ERW hazards”, which are said to follow the provisions in the IMAS.62 The lack of an NMAC 
also means that operators’ standard operating procedures (SOPs) are not currently accredited. Operators are therefore 
working in line with IMAS and donor contractual obligations rather than NMAS.63
In August 2020, Ukraine stated that its national standard on mine action management was “being tested” and that, based on 
the results of the testing, necessary amendments would be made in due course.64
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The MoD and several other ministries continue to deploy units that undertake clearance and destruction of mines and ERW. This 
includes engineer-sapper units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; the National Guard of Ukraine; the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
which conducts clearance through SESU and also has an engineering department that conducts EOD; the Security Service; the 
State Special Transport Service, which is responsible for demining national infrastructure; and the State Border Service, which 
conducts demining in areas under its control on land and in the sea.65 In its 2020 extension request, Ukraine reported that 60 
“local administrations” are involved annually in demining in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (up to 300 people).66
Three international demining organisations—DDG, FSD, and The HALO Trust—are operating in Ukraine.67 FSD suspended 
demining operations in 2019 due to lack of funding, though they are actively looking for opportunities to extend their 
programme.68 In addition, the Ukrainian organisations, Demining Team of Ukraine and Demining Solutions, are active in 
demining in eastern Ukraine.69 In its 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request, Ukraine reported that 41 demining “groups” 
with a total of more than 500 people were involved in mine action from these organisations.70








HALO 23 276 0 3 Increased from 2018 by 7 manual demining 
teams (91 staff) and 2 mechanical support 
teams (remotely controlled vegetation 
cutters – 10 staff) 
DDG 2 23 0 0 No change from 2018
Demining Solutions 1 7 0 0
Totals 26 306 0 3
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
In 2019, the HALO Trust also deployed 12 non-technical survey personnel across three teams and 12 technical survey 
personnel across two teams. DDG did not deploy any survey personnel in 2019. The HALO Trust increased its clearance 
capacity in 2019 compared to the previous year thanks to increased funding and intended to maintain that capacity in 2020 
while increasing the number of technical survey teams to three.72 All DDG’s deminers are trained to conduct technical survey 
and will do so “as and when required”. DDG also has three non-technical survey teams totalling six people who conduct 
non-technical survey during the winter stand-down. DDG was due to increase its clearance capacity in 2020 to five teams 
totalling 34 deminers, also the result of increased funding.73
The HALO Trust deployed three mechanical clearance assets and, in 2019, introduced a new mechanical vegetation cutter. 
“Robocut” has quadrupled the productivity of manual clearance in areas that have only an anti-personnel tripwire-threat.74 
DDG does not use any mechanical assets.75
Another step forward in 2019 saw the MoD establish quality control inspection teams. They began conducting post-clearance 
inspection visits, which enabled official handover of land to take place for the first time.76 In its Article 7 report covering 2019, 
Ukraine reported that the MoD carried out quality control of mine clearance conducted by FSD in 2017 in Sloviansk district,  
and of mine clearance conducted by the HALO Trust in Stanichno-Luhansk district.77 In August 2019, HALO Ukraine handed  
over its first 11 cleared areas to local administrations in Luhansk oblast after successfully passing an external quality 
inspection by the MOD’s Kamyanets-Podilsky Demining Centre.78 HALO also handed over eight areas in Donetsk oblast, 
following external quality control.79
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Ukraine did not report its survey or clearance output for 2019. Of the international operators, the HALO Trust cancelled 
30,867m2 through non-technical survey, reduced 2,788m2 through technical survey, and cleared 697,012m2. A total of 12 
anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed, including four destroyed during spot EOD tasks.
The HALO Trust also discovered 5.11km2 of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine contamination, which was added to  
the MoD’s database.
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, the HALO Trust cancelled 
30,867m2 through non-technical survey 
(see Table 2) and reduced 2,788m2 
through technical survey (see Table 3).  
In 2018, HALO did not release any 
mined area through survey.80
DDG did not cancel or reduce any areas 
contaminated with anti-personnel 
mines in 2019. DDG cancelled 
1,150,460m2 through non-technical 
survey and reduced 61,263m2 through 
technical survey of area suspected 
to be contaminated with anti-vehicle 
mines and ERW.81
Table 2: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201982
District/village Operator Area cancelled (m²)
Bakhmutskyi/Riznykivka HALO Trust 30,867
Total 30,867
Table 3: Reduction through technical survey in 201983
District/village Operator Area reduced (m2)
Stanichno-Luhansk/Shyrokyi HALO Trust 40
Stanichno-Luhansk/Krasna Talivka HALO Trust 2,317
Volnovaskyi/Volnovakha HALO Trust 431
Total 2,788
CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, The HALO Trust cleared 697,012m2, destroying in the process eight anti-personnel mines, 27 anti-vehicle mines, and 
164 items of other UXO . Of the eight anti-personnel mines found during clearance, three were of an improvised nature. In 2018, 
HALO Trust cleared 391,819m2, destroying five anti-personnel mines. The increase in output from 2018 to 2019 is due to an 
increase in operational capacity. 
The number of anti-personnel mines found during clearance continues to be very low and, in 2019, the HALO Trust cleared 
seven mined areas that proved to have no anti-personnel mines. According to HALO Trust, there have been incidents of local 
people removing the mines themselves, particularly in the case of above-ground threats such as directional fragmentation 
mines and tripwire-initiated hand grenades (which function as anti-personnel mines).84 In addition, The HALO Trust cleared  
and reduced a combined total of 1,000,353m2 of confirmed and suspected hazardous area containing anti-vehicle mines and 
UXO. The HALO Trust found and destroyed 45 anti-vehicle mines and 43 items of UXO and other ERW.85
DDG did not conduct any clearance of anti-personnel mined area in 2019 but cleared 445,009m2 of area that was suspected to 
contain anti-vehicle mines and UXO, destroying nine anti-vehicle mines and three items of UXO.86










Slovianskyi/Andriivka HALO Trust 43,406 0 0 2
Volnovaskyi/Grafske HALO Trust 108,460 0 0 1
Bakhmutski/Kodema HALO Trust 29,614 2 2 4
Stanichno Luhansk/Komyshne HALO Trust 16,802 0 0 1
Stanichno Luhansk/Krasna Talivka HALO Trust 172,270 0 0 0
Stanichno Luhansk/Krasnyi Derkul HALO Trust 1,626 0 0 0
Lymanskyi/Kryva Luka HALO Trust 42,083 0 0 0
Bakhmutskyi/Novoluhanske HALO Trust 102,585 3 25 39
Lymanskyi/Ozerne HALO Trust 16,886 0 0 4
Bilovodskyi/Pervomaisk HALO Trust 15,177 2 0 8
Stanichno-Luhansk/Shyrokyi HALO Trust 48,326 1 0 2
Svativskyi/Svatove HALO Trust 68,230 0 0 103
Volnovaskyi/Volnovakha HALO Trust 31,547 0 0 0
Totals 697,012 8 27 164
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle 





In addition, four anti-personnel mines during EOD spot tasks. These were reported by HALO and then removed and destroyed 
by the MOD and State Emergency Service, as operators are not authorised to conduct EOD in Ukraine.88
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR UKRAINE: 1 JUNE 2006
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2016
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JUNE 2021
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (2YEAR, 6MONTH EXTENSION REQUESTED): 1 DECEMBER 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO (EXTENSION REQUESTED) 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







N/R = Not Reported
Ukraine is not on track to meet its extended Article 5 APMBC 
deadline of 1 June 2021 and, in June 2020, submitted an 
extension request for two years through to 1 December 
2023, although this would actually be a two year and six 
month extension. It is highly unlikely that Ukraine will meet 
this request and Ukraine has stated that the fulfilment of 
this deadline is dependent upon “completion of hostilities, 
restoration of the constitutional order and gaining the full 
control over the occupied territories, including over the state 
border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation”.89 The 
lack of control over the occupied territories in the Donetsk 
and Luhansk regions and ongoing fighting pose significant 
challenges for the Ukraine to plan for fulfilment of Article 5. 
Even if Ukraine were to gain full control of all mined areas 
on its territory, it is highly improbable that it would be able 
to complete survey and clearance of all anti-personnel 
mined areas by December 2023. The extension request 
should therefore be viewed as an interim request. Ukraine 
continues to provide very little information on outstanding 
mine contamination or the outputs from ongoing survey 
and clearance activities. This makes it very difficult to know 
the true extent of mine contamination in Ukraine or track 
progress in survey and clearance efforts.
The area inside the 15km buffer zone is believed to be heavily 
contaminated with mines and ERW, but access to the buffer 
zone for humanitarian survey and clearance operations is 
severely limited on the government side, and there is no 
access for humanitarian demining in areas not controlled 
by the government.90 Within government-controlled areas, 
there is limited demining close to the contact line as mined 
areas are deemed to serve a tactical purpose and will not 
be demined until there is total de-escalation of the conflict. 
Despite the agreements between Ukraine and Russia to 
implement a “full and comprehensive” ceasefire in eastern 
Ukraine by the end of 2019, the OSCE Special Monitoring 
Mission to Ukraine continued to record ceasefire violations  
in 2020.91
The amount of area cleared in 2019 was higher than the 
amount of clearance reported in 2018, though this data is only 
based on information provided by the HALO Trust and DDG as 
Ukraine did not report clearance data for 2019. Additionally, 
the number of anti-personnel mines found and destroyed 
during clearance is very small, just five in 2018 and eight 
in 2019, with The HALO Trust clearing large areas without 
finding any anti-personnel mines. In 2019, just 195,702m2 of 
the 697,012m2 cleared contained any anti-personnel mines 
at all. Clearance data is not available from areas outside of 
government control, though it is believed that, at least in 
earlier years, pro-Russian rebels conducted some ad hoc 
clearance.92 While Russia is not a State Party or signatory 
to the APMBC it has obligations under international human 
rights law to clear mines as soon as possible, in particular by 
virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person 
under its jurisdiction, in any areas of Ukraine over which it 
exercises effective control.
It was expected that the long-awaited adoption of national 
mine action legislation at the end of 2018 would provide 
a framework for humanitarian demining in Ukraine and 
lead to the establishment of the NMAA and the NMAC, the 
implementation of national standards, and development of a 
national strategy with concrete milestones in place for survey 
and clearance outside of the buffer zone in Ukraine. However, 
as the legislation was deemed to be in contravention with 
the Ukrainian constitution, following oral statement from 
government ministry representatives who were not satisfied 
with the mine action law and their position within it. It was 
decided that the law would need to be amended and the “Law 
on the Amendments to the Law on Mine Action in Ukraine” 
passed its first reading in June 2020. It is planned that the 
amendments to the Law would be adopted in October 2020, 
before the adoption of the budget for 2021.93 
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Ukraine has not provided information on whether it has a plan in place for dealing with residual risk post completion.
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ANTIPERSONNEL (AP)  
MINE CONTAMINATION: 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
AP MINES  
DESTROYED IN 2019




The United Kingdom has again made good progress in 2019, releasing more than 3.6km2 of mined area on the Falkland Islands1 
through clearance and technical survey. The United Kingdom has extended its latest phase of operations to address the four 
mined areas remaining as at April 2020. It has published a work plan through to fulfilment of Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), which it planned to achieve by the end of 2020. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The United Kingdom should disaggregate data on mined area released through technical survey from mined area 
released through clearance, in line with international best practice. 




































ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2024 
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STATES PARTIES








(20% of overall score)
9 7 The United Kingdom has established an evidence-based, accurate baseline of 
anti-personnel mine contamination and has conducted technical survey of the four 
mined areas which remain. 
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
9 9 There is strong national ownership of mine action on the Falkland Islands, with 
oversight from a National Mine Action Authority and a Demining Project Office, and 
100% national funding for all survey and clearance. The United Kingdom is now 
making very good progress in implementing its obligations under APMBC Article 5.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
6 6 Good gender policies and procedures are in place to cover mine action in the 
Falkland Islands, including at the level of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO), the National Mine Action Authority; the land release contractor 
(SafeLane Global); and the Demining Project Office (Fenix Insight). While one third 
of management positions in SafeLane Global in the Falkland Islands are held by 





(10% of overall score)
5 6 The United Kingdom has a well-functioning information management system that 
records progress in land release operations on the Islands. That said, land released 
through technical survey is not disaggregated from release through clearance in the 
United Kingdom’s reporting, as best practice demands.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
9 8 The United Kingdom has a clear work plan in place to address the remaining four 
mined areas on the Islands, as well as measures in place to address residual risk, 
post completion.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
7 6 The United Kingdom does not have its own national mine action standards, but 
survey and clearance operations on the Islands are said to meet or exceed the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). While the land release methodology 
could potentially be viewed as overly risk-adverse, based on full clearance of three 
uncontaminated areas, despite the reported conduct of technical survey prior to 
clearance, the United Kingdom maintains clearance was necessary for full assurance 
and to ensure all reasonable effort, given the lack of minefield records.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
9 8 The United Kingdom released over 3.6km2 of mined area in 2019 and has conducted 
technical survey of the four mined areas which remained as at the end of March 
2020. The United Kingdom plans to complete clearance and fulfil its Article 5 
obligations by the end of 2020, well ahead of its 2024 deadline.
Average Score 7.9 7.1 Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ National Mine Action Authority (chaired by the United 
Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and 
comprising representatives from the Ministry of Defence, 
the Falkland Islands government, and a strategic advisor)
 ■ Fenix Insight (Demining Project Office)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The only mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the 
United Kingdom are on the Falkland Islands in the South 
Atlantic, the result of armed conflict with Argentina in 1982.2 
At the end of 2019, contamination had been reduced to 
six mined areas totalling 391,825m2,3 compared to 22 
mined areas totalling 3,917,839m2 as at the end of 2018.4 
Contamination had been further reduced to four mined areas 
totalling an estimated 226,958m2 by the end of March 2020 
(see Table 1).5
Table 1: Contamination by province (at end March 2020)6
Area Mined area Estimated area (m2)
Yorke Bay  






Some clearance was undertaken in the early 1980s 
immediately following the Falklands conflict, during which 
1,855 mines were removed and destroyed from mined areas.7 
However, between the date the United Kingdom became a 
State Party to the APMBC (1 March 1999) and the submission 
of its first Article 5 deadline extension request in 2008, no 
clearance took place.8
In its 2008 Article 5 extension request, the United 
Kingdom reported that 117 mined areas remained over an 
estimated total area of 13km2, and containing some 20,000 
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.9 On the basis of 
additional information obtained during demining operations, 
the estimate for the total contaminated area was increased to 
13.5km2.10 The total number of mined areas was subsequently 
revised upwards, from 117 to 122, as the earlier feasibility 
study had combined a small number of separately numbered 
mined areas.11 
During the first four phases of clearance (from October 2009 
to March 2016), 35 mined areas were released, totalling 
just over 2km2, with the destruction of 4,083 anti-personnel 
mines, 927 anti-vehicle mines, and 74 items of unexploded 
ordnance (UXO), including 21 submunitions. A further 52 
mined areas, totalling over 2km2, were cleared during Phase 
5(a) clearance (from November 2016 to March 2018, with 
operations stood down for the Austral winter), during which 
a further 4,223 anti-personnel mines, 245 anti-vehicle mines, 
and 43 items of UXO were cleared.12
Phase 5(b) began in April 2018 and proceeded according to 
schedule up to the end of March 2020. This phase of demining 
was subsequently extended to include clearance of four 
remaining mined areas. The last four mined areas, which 
have already been technically surveyed, are all in Yorke Bay 
and total an estimated 226,958m2.13
In addition, two areas, Don Carlos Bay and Beatrice Cove, 
which were fenced off, were released after neither was 
confirmed to contain mines. These areas had never formally 
been considered as mined and were not included in the 122 
mined areas established in the feasibility study in 2007.14 
The United Kingdom has reported that no civilian has ever 
been killed or injured by mines on the islands.15 Over the 
years, very few civilians have deliberately or inadvertently 
entered a minefield. It is a criminal offence on the Falkland 
Islands to enter a minefield.16 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
A National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established in 
2009 to regulate, manage, and coordinate mine action on the 
Falkland Islands. The NMAA is chaired by United Kingdom 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and comprises 
representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Falkland 
Islands government, and the programme’s strategic advisor. 
The NMAA ensures mine action is conducted in accordance 
with United Kingdom and Falkland Islands’ legislation, and 
its approval is required before cleared areas are declared 
completed. It meets at least once every six months, and 
the land release contractors (SafeLane Global; formerly, 
Dynasafe BACTEC) and the Demining Project Office (Fenix 
Insight), are invited to brief the NMAA “as appropriate”.17 
In addition, there is a Suspect Hazardous Area Land Release 
Committee (SHALARC), which is a non-decision-making body 
based in the Falkland Islands, composed of local officials and 
a representative of the British military. SHALARC provides 
a forum for the contractors to discuss issues of concern or 
interest to the committee, and includes explanation of the 
land release process, including when land has been released 
for public use.18
Survey and clearance operations in the Falkland Islands 
are entirely funded by the UK Government.19 The first four 
stages of demining (2009 to March 2016) cost £11 million 
(approx. US$14.5 million at the time),20 and an additional £27 
million (approx. US$35.5 million at current exchange rates) 
was committed on Phase 5 through to March 2020.21 Since 
2018, the United Kingdom has sought additional financing 
to ensure the Programme will be fully funded through to 
completion, which will bring the total investment in demining 
of the Falklands from £38 million to £44 million (approx. 
US$54 million).22 The United Kingdom is, “confident that the 
necessary funding will be in place to allow us to complete 
clearance by 30 December 2020”,23 and will work to ensure 
that resourcing for the Programme remains a priority, even 
in the current climate.24
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The UK reported that it makes every effort to ensure that the 
different needs and perspectives of women, girls, boys, and 
men are considered in planning and implementation of mine 
clearance activities on the Falkland Islands.25
The UK government and its contractors adhere to an equal 
opportunities approach to recruitment for the demining 
programme in the Falkland Islands.26
The NMAA requires its contractors, SafeLane Global and 
Fenix Insight, to meet contractual conditions to prevent 
unlawful discrimination, either directly or indirectly, on the 
basis of race, colour, ethnic or national origin, disability, sex 
or sexual orientation, religion or belief, or age. The provisions 
also stipulate that the Contractor must adhere to the current 
relevant codes of practice or recommendations published by 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission.27 
Fenix Insight has an organisational gender policy which it 
applies to its demining, though there is limited opportunity 
to pursue it on the Falklands given the deployed “team” is 
composed of only one (male) person. SafeLane Global has an 
equal opportunities policy and selects employees based on 
qualification and experience, without gender restrictions. Of 
management level positions employed by SafeLane Global in 
the Falkland Islands, women occupy one third, but none of the 
survey or clearance staff is female.28 According to SafeLane 
Global no female deminers presented themselves during the 
recruitment phases for the Falkland Islands operations and 
only one female applicant applied for a surveyor position, but 
was unsuccessful as she not the most qualified candidate for 
the role.29
At the FCO, the national authority, women are involved in the 
programme in key positions such as Senior Responsible Officer, 
Deputy Senior Responsible Officer, and Project Manager.30
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The information management system is managed at two levels. The Strategic Advisor maintains the public statement of 
progress through a “Cumulative Totals” spreadsheet (as demonstrated in the attached annex to the United Kingdom’s 2018 
Article 5 deadline extension request). This forms the basis of the declarations to the APMBC Meetings of States Parties. Also, 
the Demining Project Office and the Land Release Contractor use an operational-level planning and information management 
tool which guides the work and ultimately leads to the Handover Certificate at the conclusion of each task.31
Historically, the United Kingdom has not collated data on area cancelled and on area reduced,32 and does not disaggregate land 
released through technical survey from land released through clearance in its reporting.33
The United Kingdom submits annual Article 7 transparency reports and reports on its progress in Article 5 implementation at 
the APMBC intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties.
PLANNING AND TASKING
The United Kingdom is currently in its fifth and final phase of demining operations in the Falkland Islands. 
In early 2016, the Ministry of Defence and the FCO commissioned the United Kingdom’s Defence, Science and Technology 
Laboratory to carry out a study to help prioritise clearance of the remaining minefields in a Phase 5 of demining. The resultant 
priority list formed the basis of the UK Government’s invitation to tender for the contract for Phase 5 demining.34 
A land release contract sets out a task list (the work plan),35 and the Demining Project Office (Fenix Insight) monitors the 
Land Release Contractor (SafeLane Global) to ensure that it completes the task list according to the contract standards and 
completion date. Fenix Insight reports regularly to the FCO, and both Fenix Insight and SafeLane Global report to the National 
Mine Action Authority on progress made against timescales.36
Phase 5(b), which began in April 2018, proceeded according to schedule up to the end of March 2020.37 As noted above, this 
phase has been extended with a view to completing clearance of the four remaining mined areas.38 In April 2020, the United 
Kingdom published a costed work plan for the clearance of the last four mined areas and additional funding has been sought  
to ensure the Programme will be fully funded through to completion.39
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The United Kingdom does not have its own national mine 
action standards, but survey and clearance operations on 
the Falkland Islands are reported to meet or exceed IMAS, 
by adapting IMAS to meet the specifics of the situation 
on the Falkland Islands.40 Each project’s Statement of 
Requirement contains the standards specific to the tasks 
being addressed.41 
The United Kingdom reported that it has “followed the 
principles set out in IMAS 09.10 (Clearance Requirements) 
and is very conscious of the statement that “The beneficiaries 
of humanitarian demining programmes must be confident 
that cleared and released land is safe for their use. This 
requires management systems and clearance procedures 
which are appropriate, effective, efficient and safe.” The UK 
and its contractors have used all reasonable effort to achieve 
the best practicable outcome. On the issue of post clearance 
safety, the UK continues to use the principles set out in UK 
Health and Safety legislation to reduce the residual risk to As 
Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) which is similar to 
the IMAS concept of ‘all reasonable effort’.”42
However, it is possible that the land release methodology 
adopted in the Falkland Islands might be overly risk adverse, 
based on the fact that four mined areas in 2019 were 
technically surveyed, but three of which were then fully 
cleared, and found to contain no anti-personnel mines and 
just one item of UXO.43 According to the United Kingdom, 
full clearance is undertaken of mined areas (which were 
included in the original 122 fenced and marked areas) for 
“full assurance”, because of the lack of minefield records, 
and to ensure all reasonable effort was taken.44 Of the four 
areas released in which no mines were discovered, one task 
(MP5) was released without clearance, following technical 
survey. The remaining three tasks (PH3, FB6 and SA004) 
were cleared, despite no mines being found during technical 
survey. On PH3 and FB6, no Argentine mine records existed 
and in addition there was uncertainty regarding the quality 
of the action taken by the British Armed Forces after the 
ceasefire in 1982. On SA004, the Argentine record stated that 
23 anti-personnel mines and 46 anti-vehicle mines had been 
laid but technical survey did not find any direct evidence 
of mine contamination. This task had not been cleared 
previously, so clearance was undertaken to be absolutely 
certain the mines had not moved under the sand dunes.45 
Applicable environmental standards are agreed upon 
in coordination with the Falkland Islands Government 
Environmental Planning Department to minimise damage to 
the fragile environment and to aid remediation.46 The United 
Kingdom conducted an environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) in 2017, which was discussed with the Falkland Islands 
Government. The EIA identified two particular issues: a) the 
penguins on the islands; and b) the area at Yorke Bay, which will 
be addressed in such a way as to ensure impact to the existing 
environment is limited to the minimum practically possible.47 
The UK Government commissioned a mine exploitation study 
in May 2019 to evaluate the effects of ageing on some of 
the anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine types recovered. 
The United Kingdom has planned to share the results at the 
Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2020.48
SafeLane Global, with input from Fenix Insight, had to devise 
innovative procedural solutions to deal with the mechanical 
processing of very large volumes of sand to ensure that there 
was no cross-contamination and to minimise the loss of sand 
due to wind action. Recommendations were drawn from the 
technical survey and applied to the planning for clearance.49
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The Land Release Contractor in the Falkland Islands is 
selected by international competitive tender prior to each 
phase, as required by the European Union. SafeLane Global 
(formerly Dynasafe BACTEC), was awarded the land release 
contract for the current and final phase of demining operations 
in the Falkland Islands, as for the previous four phases.50 
SafeLane Global’s operational capacity in the Falkland Islands 
in 2019 remained constant at seven manual clearance teams 
totalling 56 manual deminers (excluding team leaders and 
medics) and 16 mechanical assets, including sifters which are 
critical to the project.51
The United Kingdom has noted previously that the Falkland 
Islands has limited capacity in terms of accommodation and 
medical/aerial casevac facilities. Current staffing levels have 
reached the maximum that can be safely deployed on the 
Islands, but work was claimed to be progressing “very well” 
with the current capacity.52
The Demining Project Office, which implements the policies  
of the NMAA and monitors the land release operations on  
the Falkland Islands, is also awarded through competitive 
tender. Fenix Insight has been awarded responsibility for  
the Demining Project Office for all five stages of demining.53
SafeLane Global undertakes its own internal Quality 
Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC). Fenix Insight 
monitors this quality management and can also conduct 
its external QA and QC.54 The size of the sampled areas at 
each task is decided by the quality contractor based on the 
guidance set out in IMAS 09.20.55 
Drones have been used for reconnaissance over large 
areas not accessible behind minefield fences and for aerial 
mapping. Use of drones to overfly suspected hazardous 
areas (SHAs) helped to identify mine “dump” locations, row 
markers, and other evidence that might have otherwise 
taken a manual team several days to locate. The United 
Kingdom deems the use of drones to be an excellent addition 
to the demining toolbox and continues to use them when 
appropriate.56 Yorke Bay, where the remaining mined areas 
are located, is a very large sandy area with dunes up to  
10 metres in height. Aerial drones provide a viewpoint that  
is not otherwise available.57
Technical survey during phase 5(b) helped determine the 
most effective clearance methods given the unique conditions 
of the four remaining minefields at Yorke Bay and have 
informed the clearance plan. Technical survey identified 
where block excavation down to the rock or clay layer 
could take place, suggesting a combination of techniques 
(mechanical and manual clearance where necessary) and 
types of equipment to use, including sifting buckets, dump 
trucks, and screening machines.58 
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
In 2019, a total of 3.61km2 of mined area, across 15 SHAs, was released through clearance and technical survey, with the 
destruction of 319 anti-personnel mines, 108 anti-vehicle mines, and 6 items of UXO. No mined area was cancelled through 
non-technical survey.
NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY IN 2019
No areas were cancelled through non-technical survey in 2019.
TECHNICAL SURVEY AND CLEARANCE IN 2019
The United Kingdom does not disaggregate land released through technical survey from land released through clearance,  
and instead reports technical survey and clearance combined as “land release”.
In 2019, a total of 3.61km2 was released through clearance and technical survey, across 15 SHAs. During clearance operations 
completed in 2019, a total of 319 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in situ (298 P4B mines and 21 SB33 mines), along with 
108 anti-vehicle mines, and 6 other items of UXO (see Table 2).59
The United Kingdom does not disaggregate land released through clearance from land released through technical survey, 
preventing comparison of clearance output between years. However, the United Kingdom reported that it conducted less 
clearance and more technical survey in 2019 compared to 2018, when 1.48km2 of mined area had been released with the 
destruction of 588 anti-personnel mines, 31 anti-vehicle mines, and 26 items of UXO.60 



















Fox Bay Cluster 2:  
(FB2, FB5)
2 368,340 19 13 0 
Murrel 
Peninsula










Cluster 2:  
(PH3, FB3, FB4, 
FB6, FB7)
5 2,699,505 114 0 0
Stanley Area 2 Cluster 3: (011) 1 89,861 33 30 0
Stanley Area 1 Cluster 4:  
(004, 005, 018)
3 40,218 55 65 1
Murrel 
Peninsula
Cluster 5:  
(MP1, MP2, MP5)
3 346,437 86 0 5
Totals 15 3,613,377 319 108 6
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle 
In addition, technical survey of a task in Beatrice cove in January–March 2019, released an area of 32,436m2 and “resulted in its 
cancellation as a clearance task”.62 However, Beatrice Cove had never been formally considered as mined and was not included 
in the 122 mined areas established in the feasibility study in 2007, but it had been fenced off63 and so required investigation 
before being released.
PROGRESS IN 2020
Phase 5(b) continued in 2020 and a further 0.16km2 was released across two mined areas in the first quarter of the year, during 
which 191 anti-personnel mines and 2 items of UXO were discovered and destroyed (see Table 3).64 This left a total of four 
mined areas remaining to be cleared as at April 2020. 
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January to March 
2020
Cluster 4: (007) 1 49,254 175 0 1 
Cluster 5: (MP4) 1 115,613 16 0 1
Totals 2 164,867 191 0 2
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2024
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: YES 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): HIGH
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
second extension (of five years) granted by States Parties 
in 2018), the United Kingdom is required to destroy all 
anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control 
as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2024. The 
United Kingdom is on track to meet this deadline.
The United Kingdom stated at the Fourth Review Conference 
in Oslo in November 2019 that it remains committed to 
meeting its obligations.66 It plans to complete clearance 
by the end of 2020, well ahead of its deadline, but has 
said that this remained under review due to the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic and related restrictions.67 The 
Demining Programme was stood down on 26 March 2020 
as part of temporary lockdown measures imposed by the 
Falkland Islands Government.68 Operations subsequently 
recommenced on 19 May69 and the United Kingdom plans  
to complete clearance by 30 December 2020.70 
The United Kingdom is in the fifth and final phase of 
clearance, which includes tackling the most technically 
challenging and environmentally sensitive minefields.71 
The United Kingdom had expected that eight mined areas 
would remain upon completion of Phase 5(b) in March 
2020, covering an estimated 163,460m2.72 In April 2020, the 
United Kingdom reported that only four mined areas in fact 
remained, totalling an estimated 226,958m2, all of which are 
located in Yorke Bay.73
In April 2020, the United Kingdom confirmed that it had 
sought additional financing to ensure the Programme will be 
fully funded through to completion and was “confident that 
all necessary funding will be in place to allow us to complete 
clearance, and will work to ensure that resourcing for the 
Programme remains a priority, even in the current climate.”74
Challenges to clearance in the Islands have previously 
included the remote location of mined areas; incomplete 
Argentine minefield records; concerns about the 
environmental impact of demining; and limits on the capacity 
of the Falkland Islands to provide certain facilities for 
demining, such as accommodation for deminers and medical 
facilities, including for the evacuation of any casualties.75
Additional challenges potentially posed to clearance of the 
last four minefields include the nature of the terrain and the 
potential for water logging or flooding after rainfall, which 
will be mitigated through the use of draining and pumps. 
Due to challenging supply lines to the Falkland Islands, 
there is also a potential risk if key components of equipment 
break down. To mitigate against this, stocks are regularly 
replenished. Finally, the impact of COVID-19 poses potential 
challenges to the planned completion by December 2020.76
Demining on the Falkland Islands is conducted in phases, 
which cut across calendar years, though, based on the year  
in which demining tasks were completed, a total of 7.67km2  
of mined area has been released in the last five years  
(see Table 4).
Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance/technical 
survey







* Based on the year in which clearance was completed
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PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Full and accessible records of all survey and clearance undertaken will be retained by national authorities in the Falkland 
Islands and the United Kingdom.77 The United Kingdom believes there is a very low risk of previously unknown mine 
contamination being discovered post completion, but that it remains a possibility as there is no complete record of mines laid 
on the Falkland Islands. According to the United Kingdom, all known and suspected minefields will have been cleared and the 
contractors have carried out thorough gap analysis work for further assurance.78 If a mine or other item of explosive ordnance 
is found following the conclusion of the demining programme, it will be addressed by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 
team from the UK’s Royal Air Force Armament Engineering Flight on the Falkland Islands, which has an long-term military 
presence there.79
1 There is a sovereignty dispute over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas with 
Argentina, which claims jurisdiction over the Malvinas. Argentina has been 
granted an extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) 
Article 5 clearance deadline until March 2023.
2 2008 Article 5 deadline Extension Request. 
3 FCO, Falklands Demining Programme Work Plan under Article (5), 30 April 
2020, pp. 3–4; and email from an official in the Counter Proliferation and 
Arms Control Centre, FCO, 19 May 2020. 
4 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information received 
6 August 2018; and corrected Annex B.
5 FCO, Falklands Demining Programme Work Plan under Article (5), 30 April 
2020, pp. 3–4; and email from an official in the Counter Proliferation and 
Arms Control Centre, FCO, 19 May 2020. 
6 FCO, Falklands Demining Programme Work Plan under Article (5), 30 April 
2020; and email from an official in the Counter Proliferation and Arms 
Control Centre, FCO, 19 May 2020. 
7 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.
8 Analysis of 2008 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 November 2008.
9 2008 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 2.
10 Ibid.; and “Preliminary observations of the committee on Article 5 
implementation – observations on the implementation of Article 5 by the 
United Kingdom”, 23 June 2015.
11 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.
12 Email from an official in the Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre, 
FCO, 26 June 2018.
13 FCO, Falklands Demining Programme Work Plan under Article (5), 30 April 
2020, pp. 3-4; and email from an official in the Counter Proliferation and 
Arms Control Centre, FCO, 19 May 2020.
14 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 13; FCO, Falklands Demining 
Programme Work Plan under Article (5), 30 April 2020, p. 3.; and email  
from an official in the Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre, FCO, 
19 May 2020.
15 FCO, Falklands Demining Programme Work Plan under Article (5), 30 April 
2020, p. 4.
16 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.
17 Ibid., p. 8; and FCO, Falklands Demining Programme Work Plan under 
Article (5), 30 April 2020, p. 7.
18 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9; and FCO, Falklands 
Demining Programme Work Plan under Article (5), 30 April 2020, p. 7.
19 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request.
20 Ibid., pp. 3 and 10.
21 Email from an official in the Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre, 
FCO, 24 April 2019.
22 FCO, Falklands Demining Programme Work Plan under Article (5), 30 April 
2020, p. 4.
23 United Kingdom, “Submission of information for the Convention’s website”, 
Intersessional Meetings, 30 June–2 July 2020.
24 FCO, Falklands Demining Programme Work Plan under Article (5), 30 April 
2020, p. 5.
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25 United Kingdom, “Submission of information for the Convention’s website”, 
Intersessional Meetings, 30 June–2 July 2020.
26 Statement of the United Kingdom, APMBC Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 
27 November 2019.
27 Email from an official in the Counter Proliferation and Arms Control 
Centre, FCO, 19 May 2020; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), “Additional 
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Yemen submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request in 2019, calling for three years in which to conduct nationwide  
survey and produce a new baseline estimate of anti-personnel mine contamination. HALO Trust started a programme in 
Yemen, opening an office in Aden, and the Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) opened a coordination centre in  
Aden in April 2020. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ YEMAC should report on developments in mine action to meet its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) 
transparency obligations, at a minimum providing annual reports detailing the location of contamination and the 
results of land release disaggregated by survey and clearance. 
 ■ YEMAC should start systematic nationwide survey to establish a baseline estimate of contamination.
 ■ Yemen should step up support to international demining organisations to expedite deployment of survey and clearance 
capacity and enhance training of YEMAC deminers. 
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(20% of overall score)
3 4 YEMAC has declared that the extent of anti-personnel mined area is unknown and 
in 2019 it was unable to conduct non-technical survey as a result of conflict. Armed 
conflict continued to add explosive hazard contamination, with extensive use of 
anti-personnel mines, in particular mines of an improvised nature.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
3 3 Mine action in Yemen, one of the world’s poorest countries, is entirely dependent 
on international donor funding. Conflict between Sana’a-based and Aden-based 
authorities has de facto split YEMAC weakening its role managing nationwide mine 
action. YEMAC has, though, opened a coordination centre (in 2020) and is expanding 
partnerships with international organisations as part of UN-supported moves to 
strengthen the programme in areas controlled by the internationally recognised 
government. Sanaa-based authorities have expressed interest in a coordination 
office but taken no further action. 
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
3 3 No reference was made to gender or diversity in Yemen’s 2019 Article 5 deadline 
extension request and efforts by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and other international organisations to widen the participation of women  




(10% of overall score)
3 3 YEMAC, with support from UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), is preparing to install IMSMA Core and thereby 
upgrade reporting. The existing system, described by YEMAC as unfit for purpose,  
is not reliably receiving or delivering results of survey and clearance. Yemen 
submitted an Article 7 report covering 2019.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
5 5 Yemen does not have a national strategy or plan, but continued operations on an 
emergency basis focused on life-saving interventions and civilian infrastructure hit 
hard in the conflict. 
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
4 4 Yemen’s national mine action standards were once IMAS-compliant but are now long 
out of date and YEMAC says its deminers do not observe them. 
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
6 5 YEMAC’s emergency response targets all forms of explosive hazard and although 
the total area released dropped sharply in 2019, the number of mines cleared by 
YEMAC teams increased. Conflict and insecurity, however, prevented YEMAC from 
conducting non-technical survey to establish a baseline estimate of contamination, 
the main goal of its three-year Article 5 deadline extension plan.
Average Score 4.0 4.0 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ YEMAC
 ■ Yemen Army Engineers
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Danish Demining Group (DDG)
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
 ■ SafeLane/Dynasafe
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)




UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
YEMAC stated in 2019 and again in 2020 that “the level of 
contamination and the subsequent impact by AP mines in 
Yemen is not known.”1 
A Landmine Impact Survey in 2000 found mine contamination 
in 18 of Yemen’s 21 governorates resulting from conflicts 
in 1962–69 and 1970–83, as well as mines laid in border 
areas between North and South Yemen before they unified 
in 1990, and mines from successive conflicts that erupted 
since 1994. Yemen’s second Article 5 deadline extension 
request, submitted in 2014, identified 107 confirmed 
minefields covering a total of 8.1km2 but also an additional 
438 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 338km2. 
By 2017, YEMAC said it had 569 suspected mined areas 
remaining, which were affecting 323.5km2.2 YEMAC believed 
a significant proportion of this might be released or reduced 
through survey. However, the United Nations has observed 
that the conflict which erupted in March 2015 “changed the 
extent and complexity of contamination dramatically.”3 It also 
largely halted systematic survey preventing a determination 
of contamination in any part of the country.
Houthi officials have acknowledged using landmines4 and 
their forces reportedly laid mines in at least six governorates 
in 2016.5 Since 2017, Houthi and associated forces have 
reportedly laid large numbers of anti-personnel mines and 
anti-vehicle mines, including mines of an improvised nature, 
in particular along Yemen’s west coast in a bid to stall the 
advance of pro-government Yemeni and Saudi coalition 
forces towards the strategic port of Hodeida. Houthi-laid 
mines continued to inflict heavy civilian casualties and have 
hampered deliveries of humanitarian aid.6 A mine attack on a 
convoy carrying the internationally-recognized government’s 
defence minister west of Marib city in February 2020 
suggested Houthi forces continue to lay mines.7
Current conflicts have also resulted in increased 
contamination from improvised mines, which have proved 
a particular threat, inflicting heavy deminer and civilian 
casualties. Use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is 
attributed mainly to Houthi-aligned forces, al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula, Islamic State-Yemen, and criminal gangs.8 
YEMAC reported over 4,000 incidents involving improvised 
devices in 2019.9 Analysis of 2,440 improvised devices 
encountered since 2017 found that 70% were anti-personnel 
mines of an improvised nature.10 
Some anti-vehicle mines were reportedly modified to detonate 
with the weight of a person,11 making them anti-personnel 
mines falling within the APMBC. Other improvised mines 
include devices initiated by a pressure plate or crushed 
necklace. Operators also encountered improvised devices 
activated remotely or by photo-electric cells. Improvised 
mines, as well as other IEDs, have been produced in Yemen 
“on an industrial scale” and laid along roads, inside buildings, 
and built into house walls, posing a serious hazard to 
displaced families returning to their property.12 
Independent investigators have documented three types 
of mine of an improvised nature used by Houthi forces 
on Yemen’s west coast that are identical to, or closely 
resemble, conventional mines. They include a Claymore-type 
mine almost identical to a Chinese-made directional mine 
(Type 150-A GLD), a larger directional mine similar to an 
Iranian-made mine (M18A2), and an anti-vehicle mine similar 
to Russian-made TM46 mines. Some of the mines of an 
improvised nature have serial numbers, indicating mass 
production.13 Operators have also found PMN mines attached 
to remote-control firing devices for use as additional charges 
for detonating larger IEDs.14
The UN reported the appearance of improvised sea mines in 
the Red Sea since 2017. These mines, which were probably 
deployed by Houthi forces, pose an obvious threat to 
shipping.15 Sea mines struck 57 vessels, mainly fishing boats, 
in 2017–19, including nine in 2019, and although placed along 
Yemen’s Red Sea coast some have been found drifted as far 
east as the coast of Hadramout governorate.16
A panel of international experts reported to the UN Human 
Rights Council in August 2019 that it had confirmed civilian 
casualties caused by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines 
emplaced by Houthi fighters in Aden, Hudayda, Lahej, and  
Taiz governorates.17
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Management of mine action in Yemen is divided along the 
lines of the conflict that erupted in March 2015 between the 
Houthi (Ansar Allah) movement controlling the capital Sana’a 
and much of the north and west, and the internationally 
recognised government (IRG), operationally based in Aden 
and the south. The Sana’a-based inter-ministerial National 
Mine Action Committee (NMAC), which previously formulated 
national mine action policy, is no longer recognised by the 
IRG, which reported it had disbanded in 2019. In the south, 
YEMAC has fulfilled the double role of regulator responsible 
for policy and planning while also serving as the sole 
national operator.18 
YEMAC was established in Sana’a in January 1999 as a 
national mine action agency and nominally maintains a 
national role today, with more than 1,000 staff working in 
20 of Yemen’s 21 governorates as at late 2019.19 In practice, 
however, YEMAC has split into two, centred round Sana’a  
and Aden. The Sana’a office employed around 500 staff, 
working in northern governorates controlled by the Houthi 
forces. From Aden, YEMAC operated with some 550 staff 
mainly active in 2019 in Abyan, Aden, Amran, Lahej, and  
Taiz governorates.20 
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In April 2020, YEMAC opened a coordination centre in Aden 
intended to strengthen programme management in areas 
controlled by the IRG. The centre is intended to facilitate 
cooperation with international organisations and will 
have responsibility for accrediting them. It will also have 
departments for planning, information management, and 
quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC).21 The centre 
convened its first coordination meeting on 9 April 2020,  
but is expected to take up to 18 months to become fully 
operational as staff undergo training.22 
YEMAC is supported by Regional Executive Mine Action 
Branches (REMABs) in Aden, set up in 1999; al-Mukalla 
(Hadramout governorate), which opened in March 2004; 
and Saada (April 2016).23 The extent to which they are still 
operational is not clear. YEMAC also has an office in Mokha 
and in 2019 opened offices in Taiz to support operations 
around Hodeida and in Marib for operations in al-Jawf 
governorate.24 YEMAC said it had set up “skeleton” offices 
using its own resources pending receipt of financial support 
for them from UNDP.25
UNDP provides technical and administrative support to 
YEMAC through a project carried out by three international 
and ten national staff working from a number of different 
offices. The UN supported mine action in Yemen from 1999 
to 2003 through a programme implemented by the UN Office 
for Project Services (UNOPS). From 2003, the programme 
came under full national management. UNDP deployed an 
international adviser to YEMAC at the end of 2014 to support 
planning and programme management. By the end of 2019, 
its Sanaa office comprised two international staff, including 
a chief technical adviser, and three national staff; in Aden it 
had four international and two national staff. UNDP also had 
national field staff in Hodaydah, Mokha and Mukalla.26 
Yemen’s mine action is funded by international donors. 
UNDP estimated Yemen’s annual funding needs at some 
US$16 million. At the end of 2019, donor funds that had been 
provided or pledged amounted to $20.8 million up to the end 
of June 2021.27 Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s King Salman Fund 
agreed with Dynasafe Middle East Project Management in 
2018 to finance a US$40 million demining project.28 The fund 
provided a further US$30.5 million for the project for the year 
from 1 June 2019 to 30 May 202029 and in June 2020 said it 
would fund the operation for a third year.30 
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
Yemen made no reference to gender and diversity in the mine action plans and priorities set out in the its 2019 Article 5 
deadline extension request. 
UNDP reported placing emphasis on mainstreaming gender principles into plans aiming for equal participation as beneficiaries, 
employees, and decision-makers in mine action. UNDP’s goals included ensuring survey information is collected by 
organisations representing women and girls as well as men and boys; that data are disaggregated by gender and age; and that 
risk education materials address the risks associated with all gender roles.31 
The extent to which YEMAC has embraced these ideas is unclear. In 2019, it rejected a suggestion that women might be 
included in training for demining teams. Employment of women in mine action, however, faces significant obstacles, in part due 
to their position as responsible for family care. Danish Demining Group (DDG) was unable to accept some women candidates for 
recruitment in the face of resistance from family members. Women in management positions often face bullying and disrespect 
from male subordinates.32
Among international operators, DDG employed a female international as head of programme and six women nationals among 
its 25 staff in 2019. Women employees included a risk education/non-technical survey officer and four risk education staff, 
three of whom were also trained as surveyors. DDG also employed a woman medic.33 
Risk education is conducted separately for women, often by women staff to encourage women’s participation. DDG has found 
that including women in non-technical survey/community liaison activities is difficult as men often take the lead in field 
activities and tend to overlook including women.34
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
YEMAC submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request covering 2019. Improved reporting will require not only timely 
submission but also significant improvement in the quality of data on which they are based.
YEMAC with support from UNDP and the GICHD was preparing a major upgrade of its information management in 2020. YEMAC 
has operated an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database but its 2019 Article 5 deadline extension 
request described it as “outdated” and “not usable”.35 The GICHD prepared to install IMSMA Core funded by the United States 
and UNDP, which added an information specialist to its Aden staff in 2019, expecting a soft launch of the system in mid 2020.36 
In the meantime, UNDP also worked with YEMAC on developing data collection forms.37





Yemen does not have a current strategic plan or annual work plans for tackling mines, IEDs, or ERW. Mine action in 2019 and 
2020 continued to be conducted on an emergency basis. Yemen’s recent conflicts “have changed the extent and complexity  
of contamination dramatically and in many cases, YEMAC is neither trained nor equipped to deal.”38 In April 2019, UNDP  
started to develop a counter-IED programme focused on building YEMAC capacity in threat assessment, IED identification,  
and render-safe procedures using semi-remote measures.39
The priority set out in Yemen’s Article 5 deadline extension request in 2019 was to conduct nationwide survey to generate 
a baseline of contamination that would provide a basis for long-term planning. Other goals include developing a system of 
planning and prioritisation, updating Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and national mine action standards, strengthening 
information management, procuring new equipment, and establishing a coordination office. YEMAC reportedly intended to 
assign its planned coordination office the task of drawing up a new planning system. The request also calls for developing 
training and capacity for YEMAC staff, increased partnerships with international organisations, and the opening of additional 
YEMAC offices in Marib and Taiz.40
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Yemen’s national mine action standards were based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) when they were drawn 
up in 2007 but they were only available in Arabic in hard copy. YEMAC acknowledged that the standards were obsolete and 
said SOPs based on the standards were not consistently applied by its deminers.41 YEMAC was in contact with the GICHD 
on developing national standards and the new coordination centre, as one of its first acts, started reviewing a draft of 
interim national standards.42 UNDP also reported preparation of national standards and technical operating procedures for 
humanitarian operators clearing IEDs, including improvised mines.43 
YEMAC has said its deminers’ efficiency was lowered by lack of training, particularly for coping with mines of an improvised 
nature, and by old or obsolete equipment.44 UNDP observed that productivity would be increased by developing survey and 
land-release methodologies.45 UNDP provided training to 25 YEMAC personnel working in Shabwah and Hadramout in January 
2020, focusing on use of pulling kits for remote render-safe procedures and on IED threat assessment, which led to a decline in 
deminer casualties.46 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
YEMAC remained Yemen’s biggest operator, with the number 
of personnel reportedly rising to more than 1,000 in 2019, 
slightly more than in 2018, although it seconded many of 
these to other international operators. It also had the biggest 
geographic reach with teams conducting risk education, 
survey, or clearance in 95 of Yemen’s 333 districts, up 
from 81 districts in 2018.47 In addition to manual demining 
teams, YEMAC started to revive a mine detection dog 
(MDD) programme and had active teams working under its 
Sana’a-run programme and preparations to develop kennels 
and MDD operations in the south. However, YEMAC has faced 
acute lack of resources and training. 
SafeLane/Dynasafe, given US$40 million a year by Saudi 
Arabia’s government through the King Salman Relief and 
Rehabilitation Fund, reported employing 19 internationals 
in 2019 along with some 304 national staff, mainly seconded 
from YEMAC.48 It expected the number of personnel to rise to 
around 400 in the course of 2019 and reported operating 32 
multi-task teams working on the west coast and in the Lahej, 
Marib, and Shabwah governorates.49 SafeLane’s operating 
results are not recorded in YEMAC’s database and it did not 
respond to Mine Action Review’s request for information.
DDG, the longest established international demining 
organisation in Yemen, expanded its programme employing 
26 staff, including four internationals based in Aden, including 
the head of programme, two staff with EOD specialisation, 
and a medical trainer. It also had seven staff trained in risk 
education and non-technical survey and two medics in Mokha 
city covering the west coast, with two risk education staff in 
Ataq, Shabwah governorate. DDG was not able to conduct 
EOD in 2019 but delivered training to YEMAC in January and 
February, though the scope was limited by lack of access to 
explosives or a safe location for demolitions.50
The HALO Trust established a presence in Yemen in July 2019 
when it signed an agreement with the Ministry of Planning 
and International Cooperation (MOPIC). Its programme 
manager arrived in November with two more international 
staff on site by the end of the year. HALO opened an office in 
Aden in January 2020. It then trained 42 YEMAC staff in EOD, 
conducting two courses up to EOD level 3 in Amman and one 
in Aden, but which was also limited by lack of explosives. 
YEMAC seconded 17 of those trained to work with HALO Trust 
in 2020. It expected to deploy two more international staff in 
2020 and to hire additional national staff for administration 
and information management as well as at least two more 
EOD/survey teams and a community liaison team.51 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)’s plan to establish a presence 
in Yemen in 2019 to support development of YEMAC’s MDD 
programme was held up by security developments. NPA 
expected the project to go ahead in 2020 with the deployment 
of a technical adviser in Aden around September or October 
2020. NPA conducted an MDD handler assessment in Aden 
in June 2019, selecting 14 candidates for training due to take 
place at NPA’s Global Training Centre in Bosnia in June 2020. 
As at May 2020, NPA had 12 long-leash MDDs under training in 
Bosnia which would be transferred to Yemen after the handlers’ 
training. NPA had planned to visit Sana’a for discussions on MDD 
support in June 2019 and February 2020 but the visits were 
postponed for administrative and security reasons.52
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YEMAC is acutely short of all forms of equipment. UNDP concluded it would be incapable of fulfilling its APMBC obligations 
even in the event of peace. Plans for a wide-ranging upgrade of equipment in 2019 were delayed by cumbersome regulations 
and procedures. In 2019, YEMAC took delivery of 40 pick-up trucks, 16 ambulances, 16 trucks, two back-hoe loaders, and two 
truck-mounted cranes. Vehicles were divided equally between the Sana’a and Aden programmes.53 
Delivery of 300 Italian CEIA mine detectors planned for 2019 finally occurred in May 2020. UNDP concluded it would not be 
possible to deliver the detectors to the north and that they would all be used by deminers working in the Aden-led programme.54
UNDP reported that YEMAC’s Sanaa-centred operation deployed MDDs in the field more frequently in 2019 and had asked 
for an assessment of its MDD operations.55 YEMAC’s Aden-based operation expected development of an MDD programme to 
accelerate in 2020.56 YEMAC has been developing new facilities in Aden with technical advice from NPA, including three kennel 
buildings, a dormitory for handlers, and outdoor facilities, including a 12,000m2 search training area.57
DEMINER SAFETY
YEMAC has not reported deminer casualties in 2019 but a total of 20 deminers are believed to have been killed or injured in the 
course of the year, mainly as a result of detonations of improvised devices, including mines of an improvised nature.58
The Saudi-financed Project Masam implemented by SafeLane reported a team leader was killed by an anti-personnel mine in 
western Taiz governorate in April 2020. The project’s managing director, Ousama Algosaibi, said the project, which started 
operating in May 2018, had “offered until now 21 martyrs and more than 16 wounded, most of whom lost their limbs.”59 Nearly 
all of the more than 37 recorded casualties are believed to have occurred in 2019. They include five international staff killed 
in a single incident in January 2019.60 Seven SafeLane deminers were killed in April by an explosion in a storage area holding 
mines and ERW for destruction in the port city of Mokha.61
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Against the background of Yemen’s continuing conflict, YEMAC gives priority to delivering an emergency response to mitigate 
the threat to civilians posed by all forms of explosive hazard rather than focusing on anti-personnel mined areas and Yemen’s 
obligations under the APMBC. 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
UNDP reported that YEMAC released 3.5km2 of ERW contamination through survey and clearance in 2019, a little more than 
half the 6.7km2 released in 2018.62 
SURVEY IN 2019
Large-scale non-technical survey to develop a baseline estimate of contamination was not possible in 2019, due to Yemen’s 
continuing conflict and widespread insecurity. UNDP reported that YEMAC released 371,833m2 through technical survey and 
that “numerous survey operations” in 2019 covered a total area of 355,976m2.63
CLEARANCE IN 2019
YEMAC did not release details of any area cleared of anti-personnel mines in 2019, reflecting the emergency firefighting 
character of operating against a background of continuing conflict. Clearance operations are focused on high-impact spot tasks 
giving priority to civilian infrastructure that has suffered heavy damage in Yemen’s conflict aggravating the world’s most acute 
humanitarian crisis in 2019. The data available showed wide variations in results. 
Yemen’s Article 7 report covering 2019 did not record any area clearance, but noted the destruction of 1,414 anti-personnel 
mines, 34,408 anti-vehicle mines, 2,228 IEDs, and 73,739 items of UXO.64 Data provided by UNDP showed YEMAC cleared a total 
of 3.12km2 affected by all types of ERW in 2019. Although this was less than half the 6.66km2 cleared in 2018, it said YEMAC 
destroyed 1,536 AP mines in 2019, compared with 680 the previous year, together with 786 improvised devices, and more than 
53,000 other items of ERW.65
Tasks undertaken by YEMAC included clearance of the Red Sea Mills near the port of Hodeida holding some 51,000 tons of 
grain that could not be reached because of the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance. Three YEMAC teams restored 
access, clearing more than 1,200 ERW items. UNDP observed that “YEMAC does not implement International Mine Action 
Standards but with given restraints and under constant threat of artillery attack, has demonstrated a high-level of diligence, 
adaptability and resourcefulness.” 66




Table 1: YEMAC clearance of mines and ERW in 201967
Area cleared (m2) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed UXO destroyed IEDs destroyed
3,115,830 1,536 10,091 41,687 786
YEMAC did not receive disaggregated details of operating results from SafeLane/Project Masam. In May 2020, Project Masam 
reported that since June 2018 it had cleared 10.3km2, destroying in the process 164,205 landmines and 105,492 items of UXO.68 
A SafeLane press release in June 2020 said that since the start of the project it had cleared more than 10km2 and destroyed 
54,332 landmines, 108,126 items of UXO, and 4,901 IEDs.69
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR YEMEN: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (6-YEARS): 1 MARCH 2015
SECOND EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (5-YEARS): 1 MARCH 2020
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (3YEAR EXTENSION) 1 MARCH 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
Yemen’s five-year conflict has created conditions that prevent 
it from taking the action required to fulfil its obligations 
under the APMBC. The main aim of the three-year extension 
to Yemen’s Article 5 deadline agreed in 2019 is to conduct 
a nationwide survey to establish a baseline estimate of 
contamination that would then provide a basis for assessing 
the time and resources needed for anti-personnel mine 
clearance. Instead, continued hostilities have added new 
contamination, prevented significant survey to establish a 
baseline estimate, and kept clearance of anti-personnel mines 
subordinated to emergency clearance of all explosive hazards.
Expanding engagement with international organisations is 
slowly building the capacity of YEMAC management and field 
teams but mainly in areas under the IRG. There appeared to 
be few immediate benefits for areas under Houthi control, 
where lack of reporting also obscured what activity is being 
undertaken. Moreover, productivity in 2020 will be negatively 
affected by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. YEMAC 
continued to work in the north and south, but non-technical 
survey and IMSMA training was halted or postponed. The 
closure of Aden airport delayed deployments of international 
staff and also prevented casualty evacuation, requiring 
international organisations to suspend clearance.70 
The five-year data in Table 2 below should be treated  
with caution. 
Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







* Mine Action Review estimates.
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Zimbabwe exceeded its land release target for 2019 and increased its clearance output by 30% from the previous year due to 
increased capacity across all operators. All contaminated areas remaining in Zimbabwe are now confirmed hazardous areas 
(CHAs). There is strong national ownership and the mine action programme is effectively coordinated by the Zimbabwe Mine 
Action Centre (ZIMAC). The challenge for Zimbabwe in meeting its Article 5 deadline will be securing the requisite funding from 
donors in a country with significant competing social and economic hardships. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ ZIMAC should increase efforts to secure additional national and international funding to meet its 2025 clearance 
completion deadline. Greater links between mine action and development, along with enhanced cooperation among 
government ministries, would assist this endeavour.
 ■ Increased resources should be allocated to ZIMAC to enable it to effectively manage a fast-growing national mine 
action programme. 
 ■ Zimbabwe should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan for mine action.
 ■ Zimbabwe should review “missed mine drills” (MMDs) to establish a more efficient method of clearance and decrease 
the time spent on MMDs. 
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025 
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(20% of overall score)
8 8 Zimbabwe has a good understanding of remaining mine contamination with only 
confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) remaining. ZIMAC estimates that only about 
11km2 is actually contaminated with anti-personnel mines and that the rest can be 
released by survey.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
8 8 The mine action programme is managed effectively by ZIMAC, with good consultation 
and collaboration with operators. In 2019, ZIMAC’s offices relocated outside of 
military facilities, which allows civilian access for the first time. There is a high 
degree of national ownership with the government continuing to provide US$500,000 




(10% of overall score)
6 6 ZIMAC does not have a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan but the 
importance of gender is acknowledged in the National Mine Action Strategy. Survey 
and community liaison teams are reportedly inclusive and gender-balanced both 
in their make-up and during community consultations. Operators report varying 
proportions of women employed. The Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ National Mine 




(10% of overall score)
8 8 ZIMAC, with the support of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD), continued to make improvements to information management 
in 2019 with monthly meetings to cross reference data with operators. ZIMAC has 
improved its information management capabilities in the past few years and submits 
Article 7 reports annually. 
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
8 8 Zimbabwe has a National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–25, and a subsequent 
revised work plan published in 2019, which accompanies Zimbabwe’s Article 5 
extension through to expected completion in 2025. This presented a realistic 
estimate of remaining contamination and annual milestones for land release, 
identifying the resources, time, and funding needed to complete clearance. However, 
Zimbabwe may need to elaborate revised annual land release targets in light of the 
COVID-19 outbreak.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
8 8 There was a significant increase in capacity across all operators in 2019, although, 
as at August 2020, APOPO had still not become operational (for want of funding). 
Greater use of mechanical assets and mine detection dogs (MDDs) has increased 
efficiency in recent years. However, an ongoing challenge for operators is the 
extraneous time spent on “missed mine drills”, when gaps in the mine pattern are 
found. Despite this, operators continue to clear tens of thousands of anti-personnel 
mines annually with among the world’s highest number of mines cleared per  
square metre.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 5 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
9 8 Zimbabwe released 11.8km2 of mined area in 2019, exceeding its land release target 
for the year. While the majority of this was due to reduction through technical survey, 
Zimbabwe’s clearance output also rose significantly from 2018. The challenge will be 
for Zimbabwe to maintain land release output as expected land released by survey 
decreases. With limited additional funding and capacity, Zimbabwe can meet its 
Article 5 deadline of end 2025, which will be a considerable achievement for one of 
the world’s most heavily mined countries in a particularly challenging political and 
economic context. 
Average Score 8.0 7.8 Overall Programme Performance: VERY GOOD
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
 ■ National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ)
 ■ Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ National Mine Clearance Unit 
(NMCU) 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ APOPO (not operational as at August 2020)
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)





UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at the end of 2019, Zimbabwe reported a total of just 
under 42.7km2 of confirmed mined area remaining (see Table 
1).1 This is a decrease from the just over 52.6km2 reported 
at the end of 2018.2 According to ZIMAC, the baseline of 
contamination is complete following the completion of 
significant re-survey in 2016. The baseline was established 
through inclusive consultation including with women and 
children.3 All contaminated areas remaining in Zimbabwe 
are CHAs. According to operators, Zimbabwe has a good 
understanding of the problem, with some re-survey of tasks 
before clearance expected.4 In fact, as ZIMAC explained to 
Mine Action Review in October 2019, of the total confirmed 
mined area, only about one quarter (some 11km2) is thought 
to be actually contaminated, with considerable area between 
mine lines that can be released through survey.5
In 2019, a total of 1,869,473m2 of previously unrecorded 
legacy contamination was added to the database. These were 
not new polygons per se but the expansion of existing CHAs 
as a result of pre-clearance re-survey.6
Zimbabwe’s mine contamination, the overwhelming majority 
of which is of anti-personnel mines, originates from the laying 
of minefields in the late 1970s during a decolonisation war. At 
the time of its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was left with 
seven major mined areas along its borders with Mozambique 
and Zambia, and one inland minefield laid by the Rhodesian 
Army.7 Initially, anti-personnel mines were laid in very dense 
belts (on average 2,500 mines per kilometre of frontage) 
to form a so-called “cordon sanitaire”, with up to 5,500 
mines per kilometre in some places. Over time, this cordon 
sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion. In response, 
in many sections, a second belt of “ploughshare” directional 
fragmentation mines protected by anti-personnel mines was 
laid behind the cordon sanitaire.8 Anti-vehicle mines were 
used extensively by armed groups but most were detonated 
by vehicles or have since been cleared.9
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area (at end 2019)10
Location Area of CHA (m2)
Mwenezi to Sango Border Post 15,298,782
Rusitu to Muzite 6,145,600
Sheba Forest to Leacon Hill 3,252,871
Musengezi to Mazowe Stretch 6,955,116
Mazoe to Rwenya 10,134,760
Lusulu 905,537
Total 42,692,666
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ) 
is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine 
action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC was established in 2000 within the 
Ministry of Defence as the focal point and coordination centre 
of all mine action in the country. ZIMAC is mandated to report 
to NAMAAZ.11 In August 2019, ZIMAC’s office relocated outside 
of a military cantonment allowing access to civilian operators.12
ZIMAC holds quarterly coordination meetings with all 
stakeholders; operators report being closely involved in the 
decision-making process. Communication between ZIMAC 
and NAMAAZ, operators, and other Zimbabwean government 
ministries was reported as being good with regular bilateral 
meetings and visits from the director of ZIMAC.13 Operators 
reported that approval processes for international visas 
for staff and visitors is very slow, normally requiring a 
minimum of three months, but ZIMAC has provided long-term 
memoranda of understanding (MOUs) and does its best to 
assist.14 There have been some specific challenges related to 
taxation of vehicles but it is understood that this is a broader 
issue and not specific to ZIMAC.15
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) has been providing information management support 
to ZIMAC with an advisor working with the ZIMAC information 
management team and operators on the Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) and data 
handling improvements. The GICHD has also provided 
continued remote support.16 In addition, in 2019, NPA provided 
new IT equipment to the national authority to enhance data 
security in the mine action programme.17
According to ZIMAC’s revised mine action work plan for 
2020–2025, a total of $65.6 million is required by the mine 
action programme to meet its extended Article 5 deadline 
by 2025.18 In 2019, the Government of Zimbabwe provided 
US$500,000 towards the operational and administrative 
costs of both the National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU) and 
ZIMAC. The salaries and allowances and transport expenses 
of staff were covered by the army.19 ZIMAC informed Mine 
Action Review that the economic downturn in 2018 was likely 
to limit the government’s potential to increase any funding 
for mine action, though it expected existing funding levels 
to be maintained.20 According to ZIMAC, the Government of 
Zimbabwe has committed US$500,000 to the NMCU and for 
the operational costs of ZIMAC every year since 2010.21
With assistance from the GICHD and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ZIMAC developed a 
Communication and Resource Mobilisation Strategy in 
2018, which was finalised in the first half of 2019 and due 
to be officially launched in May 2020. However, due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic this has been delayed until there is more 
clarity on how the situation will develop.22 ZIMAC informed 
Mine Action Review that top priorities for which it hoped to 
procure additional resources included funding for a planned 
national mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) victim 
survey, website hosting, the relocation of the office outside 
of the military cantonment, replacement detectors and 
more deminers at the NMCU, and additional funding for the 
international demining operators to expand.23
ZIMAC reported that in 2019, as part of its resource 
mobilization efforts, a joint African Union/United Nations 
assessment team visited Zimbabwe. Meetings were held  
with the relevant government ministries and as a result the 
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has declared 
that it will assist with the mobilisation of demining equipment 
for the NMCU.24
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
ZIMAC does not have a gender and diversity policy and 
implementation plan. Zimbabwe’s National Mine Action 
Strategy 2018–2025 refers to the importance of addressing 
gender and diversity considerations.25 While there is 
not a specific standard on gender mainstreaming in the 
National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), reference to 
gender is contained within the standards, such as NMAS 07 
(Management of Demining Operations) which requires that 
“special efforts should be made to ensure gender balance and 
diversity of background for Community Liaison Officers”.26
ZIMAC confirmed that all community groups are routinely 
consulted in survey and community liaison activities, with 
efforts undertaken to ensure that all age and gender groups 
are consulted. Survey and community liaison teams are 
gender-balanced and diverse, with personnel recruited 
locally from affected areas to incorporate ethnic and minority 
groups. Operators also make use of schoolteachers and 
children to further their outreach. All mine action data is 
disaggregated by sex and age.27 
ZIMAC reported that gender is taken into account during the 
planning and prioritisation of minefields for clearance, such as 
consideration of the risks taken usually by women and girls to 
cross minefields to fetch water and that of men and boys who 
often heard cattle or plough near to mined areas.28 However, 
given the nature of the minefields, which are essentially one 
long and continuous line, operational access constraints often 
dictate clearance priorities as much as other factors.29 At 
the same time, according to The HALO Trust, post-clearance 
surveys reflect the gendered impact of clearance, such as 
women and children who often are reportedly the major 
beneficiaries of clearance, as they are responsible for more 
than 80% of water collection, with clearance providing safer 
and more direct access to water sources.30
According to ZIMAC, women are specifically encouraged to 
apply for operational positions in job advertisements, and 
in 2019 31% of managerial and administrative roles were 
held by women. Yet ZIMAC stated that this fell short of 
“required” levels and noted that Zimbabwean women were 
somewhat reluctant to work in mine action. More effort is to 
be placed on raising awareness among women and ensuring 
equal opportunities to employment, regardless of gender. 
There are no women employed in operational roles in the 
NMCU because staff are recruited from the corps of military 
engineers, where very few women are engaged.31
International operators confirmed that each organisation 
had gender policies in place for their programme staff, 
with a focus on achieving equal access to employment, 
gender-balanced survey and clearance teams, 
gender-focused community liaison outreach, disaggregated 
data collection, and a gender focus to be employed during 
pre- and post-clearance assessments.32 All operational 
organisations reported increasing efforts to encourage 
women to apply for operational, as well as managerial 
positions, and noted positive trends in the increasing number 
of women employed in programmes as a result.33 
In 2019, approximately 25% of MAG’s operational staff were 
female and 50% of staff at managerial level.34 In NPA, 29% of 
operational staff and 20% of supervisory/managerial staff 
are female.35 In The HALO Trust, 24% of operational staff and 
11% of supervisory/managerial staff are female.36
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
In 2018, ZIMAC fully transitioned to the use of the IMSMA database. ZIMAC noted that workshops, trainings, and international 
expert support for information management had produced significant results and remained important to ensure the ZIMAC 
database is up to date and accurate.37 In 2019, a GICHD information management advisor worked with ZIMAC to improve  
the IMSMA database and ZIMAC noted that a large amount of effort has been expended to clean the database and improve  
data quality.38
ZIMAC holds monthly meetings with operators to cross-reference data, which according to operators has improved the 
accuracy and reliability of the database.39 The HALO Trust have suggested that a live shared database that could be accessed 
by all operators would be beneficial, for example, by enabling more accurate country-wide mapping.40 Operators reported that 
data collection forms are consistent and enable collection of the necessary data.41
Over the past few years, ZIMAC’s information management capabilities have increased significantly, with clear evidence of 
improvement in the quality and accuracy of its reporting, including in its most recent Article 5 deadline extension request, 
which established an accurate picture of remaining contamination and set, for the first time, a date for the completion of mine 
clearance. ZIMAC’s National Mine Action Strategy and its revised Article 5 work plan demonstrated consistently high quality 
reporting, something that was once a weak point in the national mine action programme. ZIMAC’s latest Article 7 transparency 
report covering 2019, is comprehensive and of generally good quality. However, there were some discrepancies in the land 
release figures reported by operators and by ZIMAC for 2019 (see section on Land release outputs and Article 5 compliance).






In 2018, Zimbabwe launched its first ever national mine action strategy, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, developed 
by ZIMAC with support from the GICHD and input from government ministries, the NMCU, and international mine action 
organisations.42 The strategic plan complements Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline extension request to 2025, which was approved 
by APMBC States Parties in December 2017. Operators have lauded the Strategy for its detail and its realistic outlook on 
delivery, which it is hoped will encourage donor funding.43 
In April 2019, Zimbabwe published an updated work plan to support compliance with its Article 5 deadline of 31 December 
2025. The work plan was based on revised estimates of remaining contamination and, accounting for progress during 2018, 
updated annual targets for the remainder of the extension period. These included 8.2km2 to be addressed in 2019; 8.3km2 to be 
addressed in 2020; 8.1km2 to be addressed in 2021; 8.3km2 to be addressed in 2022; 8.3km2 to be addressed in 2023; 6.9km2 to 
be addressed in 2024; and the remaining 4.6km2 to be addressed in 2025.44 Zimbabwe exceeded its land release target for 2019 
with 11.8km2 released. The Zimbabwean government introduced a mandatory lockdown in April 2020 due to COVID-19 which 
meant that operators stood down for that month, then in May operators were able to deploy at 90% capacity and in June they 
were back to full capacity. It is unclear whether operators will be able to meet their land release targets for the year: as at July 
2020, ZIMAC felt it was unlikely that Zimbabwe would meet its projected land release targets for 2020 but that operators were 
working hard to meet them.45
Clearance is prioritised according to impact, with contaminated areas closest to highly populated areas prioritised first.46 NPA 
reported that it uses an impact assessment to prioritise areas for release once they have been allocated by ZIMAC.47 The HALO 
Trust also prioritises minefields which are in closest proximity to impacted populations, and which have had a high number 
of accidents. However, for reasons of efficiency operations tend to proceed linearly west-east or east-west (which allows for 
concentrated logistical support and command and control), rather than opening tasks all over the frontage of the border.48
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no national legislation specific to mine action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC reported that Zimbabwe conducts a review of its 
national mine action standards (NMAS) every three years in line with updates to international mine action standards (IMAS).49 
An ongoing challenge for operators and ZIMAC alike continued to be the search for technical solutions to decrease the time 
spent on missed mine drills (MMDs), when gaps in the mine pattern are found.50 According to operators, MMDs should be 
reviewed to establish a more efficient method of clearance as they are time consuming and seemingly ineffective: to date,  
no missing mines have been found.51
ZIMAC conducts regular quality assurance (QA), and an independent quality control (QC) team was dispatched to conduct  
QC by sampling a minimum of 10% of completed tasks.52 Operators confirmed that the ZIMAC QA/QC process was rigorous, 
with well trained and experienced staff. The HALO Trust noted that the combination of a separate sampling team and a highly 
accessible monitoring team worked especially well, with the former providing thorough external oversight and the latter 
helping teams to work through any problems.53 Although the handover process can be time-consuming, delaying the return  
of land to communities, this is a logistical challenge and not a problem with the NMAS.54
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ NMCU and, since 2013, The HALO Trust and NPA, all conduct land release in Zimbabwe.  
MAG became operational in December 2017, and APOPO, while accredited in 2017, was yet to commence operations as at 
August 2020.55
Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 201956
Operator Manual teams Total deminers* Dogs and handlers Machines** Comments
NPA 8 84 2 handlers/2 dogs 0 60% increase from 2018
MAG  3 35 0 0 Number of deminers unchanged
NMCU 15 150 0 1 2% increase from 2018
HALO Trust 31 236 0 2 24% increase from 2018
Totals 57 505 2 3
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
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There was a 10% increase overall in manual capacity across all operators from 457 deminers in 2018 to 505 in 2019. This 
was the result of an increase in donor funding. In 2020, the NMCU was expected to add three new teams of deminers to 
clear the Lusulu minefield after re-survey in 2019 lead to the discovery of an additional 849,573m2 of previously unrecorded 
anti-personnel mine contamination.57 NPA does not expect to increase capacity in 2020 and the HALO Trust expected a modest 
increase in clearance personnel in the latter half of 2020. However, this may not be possible due to concerns over the impact  
of COVID-19.58
Despite its accreditation to start mine action operations in 2017, as at August 2020, APOPO still had not managed to secure 
the funding required to start operations. APOPO reported it is tasked to survey and clear a 7km2 area on a 37km-long stretch 
of minefield along the border with Mozambique. The minefield begins in Chiredzi district, Masvingo province, in south-eastern 
Zimbabwe, in a conservation area just outside Gonarezhou national park in an area known as the Sengwe Wildlife Corridor.  
In August 2020, APOPO informed Mine Action Review that they were expecting to secure funding in the near future and that 
they would be able to mobilise by the end of 2020.59
In 2019, NPA used its two MDDs to conduct technical survey.60 The NCMU has one mechanical asset and the HALO TRUST has 
two machines, which are mainly used on tasks where mines are found at deeper levels, or in patches where soil mineralisation 
makes use of detectors difficult. As at July 2020, the HALO Trust was trialling a new mechanical asset: a mobile sizer/crushing 
unit, which processes minefield spoil without the need for subsequent physical inspection. It hopes this will increase the 
efficiency of mechanical operations and it is expected that the results of the trial will be shared later in 2020.61 MAG does not 
currently use any mechanical assets or MDDs in its operations but, as at July 2020, MAG was seeking a mechanical asset to 
support the programme.62
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of 11.8km2 of mined area was released in 2019, of which more than 2.7km2 was cleared, almost 8.6km2 was reduced 
through technical survey, and almost 0.5km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey. A total of 39,031 anti-personnel 
mines were found and destroyed. In addition, 1.87km2 of previously unrecorded legacy contamination was added to the 
database in 2019. Total land release in 2019 was more than 20% up on the previous year.
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, a total of 9.06km2 was released by survey, of  
which 0.47km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey  
(see Table 3) and 8.59km2 was reduced through technical 
survey (see Table 4).63 There was a 31% decrease in 
non-technical survey output from 0.69km2 in 2018 and a  
30% increase in the amount of technical survey, up from 
6.65km2 the previous year.64 
A large amount of land was reduced in 2019 as operators 
began working on ploughshare tasks which had been 
relatively undisturbed, and so were able to conduct 
extremely tight and delineated clearance only on the mine 
rows. No reduction is possible on cordon sanitaire tasks,  
and going forward, as operators near completion of 
ploughshare tasks, release through survey is expected 
to decline.65 Despite this operators are confident that they 
can meet their land release targets to 2025 providing that 
additional funding can be secured and they can maintain 
sufficient operational capacity.66
CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, a total of 2.76km2 of mined area was released through 
clearance and 39,031 anti-personnel mines were found and 
destroyed.67 This is a 30% increase from the 2.11km2 cleared 
in 2018 and a 77% increase in the number of anti-personnel 
mines found.68 In 2019, on average 70m2 was cleared for each 
mine found, while in 2018 it was 96m2. The increase in the 
amount of clearance was due to increased capacity across  
all operators.69
Table 3: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201970
Area Operator Area cancelled (m²)
Risutu–Muzite NPA 112,287
Mazowe–Rwenya MAG 333,963
Musengezi–Mazowe HALO Trust 20,169
Total 466,419
Table 4: Reduction through technical survey in 201971
Area Operator Area reduced (m2)






Sheba–Leacon Hill NPA 1,327,769
Total 8,590,447





Table 5: Mine clearance in 201972
Area Operator Area cleared (m²) Anti-personnel mines destroyed
Musengezi–Mazowe HALO Trust 1,458,877 29,218
Mazowe–Rwenya MAG 258,047 259
Mwenezi–Sango Border Post NMCU 111,363 5,047
Risutu–Muzite NPA 431,635 439
Sheba–Leacon Hill NPA 499,554 4,068
Totals 2,759,476 39,031
In 2019, 84 mines were destroyed during spot tasks by the HALO Trust, which are included in the figures reported in Table 5 
above.73
MAG cleared two minefields which were phoney and contained no mines.74 The HALO Trust cleared four small areas which 
contained no mines. These were verification tasks on suspected “gaps” in previous commercial clearance which local 
community members thought might still contain a threat as they did not believe that mechanical assets had cleared the  
areas thoroughly.75
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ZIMBABWE: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST TO THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINES (COMBINED 5-YEAR, 10 MONTH EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2015
FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2018
FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (ALMOST 8YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: JUST ON TRACK 
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): MEDIUM
Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
eight-year extension granted in 2017), Zimbabwe is required 
to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its 
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 
31 December 2025. It is just on track to meet this deadline, 
although progress in Article 5 implementation may be 
impacted by the political and economic instability internally 
and will require sustained international funding through  
to completion. 
ZIMAC confirmed in May 2020 that it is confident that 
if current capacity is maintained or increased then the 
2025 deadline is achievable. All operators increased their 
clearance capacity in 2019 and Zimbabwe exceeded its land 
release targets and cleared an additional 30% compared to 
2018 even though APOPO is yet to start operations. As the 
revised work plan and budget includes projections for APOPO 
as an implementing partner, if APOPO are unable to secure 
funding and become operational, then other operators will 
either need to increase their land release output or Zimbabwe 
risks falling short of its targets. 
In 2019, operators were able to reduce a large amount of 
land through technical survey on ploughshare tasks, but 
as operators near completion of these types of tasks these 
numbers are likely to decline.76 In 2019, around a quarter of 
total land released was through clearance. Going forward, if 
proportionately more land is released through clearance, to 
meet its land release targets Zimbabwe will need to further 
significantly increase clearance output.
The Government of Zimbabwe continues to provide half a 
million dollars in funding annually to ZIMAC but close to 
US$16.2 million per year is projected to be needed to finish 
clearance by the 2025 deadline.77 In 2019, the World Bank 
predicted that Zimbabwe’s economy would contract by 7.5%, 
with inflation running at more than 500% by the end of last 
year. Zimbabwe’s 2020 budget includes a significant increase 
in social spending to meet the needs of a population where 
extreme poverty rose by 34% over the previous twelve 
months. However, without a significant scale up of donor 
support the likelihood of a humanitarian crisis in the country 
was deemed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to  
be high.78 
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Despite these competing challenges, operators managed to secure an increase in funding in 2019 and were expected to 
maintain or increase their capacity in 2020. ZIMAC has developed a Communication and Resource Mobilisation Strategy to 
support its fundraising efforts which was due to be launched in May 2020 but this has been postponed due to the COVID-19 
outbreak.79 Zimbabwe was on track to meet its land release targets for the year but with the country in lockdown from  
30 March 2020 the full impact of the global pandemic on mine clearance in Zimbabwe was unknown as of writing.
The HALO Trust emphasised that the more teams that can be put on the ground now will save additional costs and expenditure 
on equipment needed in the future. As at July 2020, The HALO Trust had managed to obtain some demining equipment from 
Mozambique which it had been holding for four and a half years after declaring its completion of Article 5 obligations. This 
should aid productivity once the equipment has been restored to full working order. The HALO Trust hopes to bring over the 
rest of the demining equipment in the coming months.80
At the same time, there are many, clearly positive aspects of Zimbabwe’s mine action programme, such as having a strong, 
nationally-owned mine action centre led by experienced and dedicated staff members; a realistic estimate of the remaining 
problem and national mine action strategy; and a collaborative working environment in which operators can quickly ramp up 
capacity and output, putting additional funds immediately to use towards an achievable goal.
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
On the matter of potential “residual” contamination that might be found after completion of major clearance operations, ZIMAC 
informed Mine Action Review that plans are in place. It will fall to ZIMAC, the NMCU, and the army engineers, who are stationed 
in all provinces, to deal with any new explosive devices discovered.81 In the National Mine Action Strategy 2018–25, Zimbabwe 
has stated that it will develop a strategy on the management of residual contamination by 2022.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Armenia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Armenia has obligations under international human rights law  
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ Armenia should clarify the extent of remaining mine contamination, including in military restricted zones.
 ■ Armenia should mobilise the necessary resources to finish mine clearance and set a deadline for the completion  
of operations. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2019, Armenia had more than 5.69km2 of confirmed mined area and a further 3.8km2 of suspected mined area, 
as set out in Table 1.1 The mined areas contained anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, or a combination of both, as 
well as unexploded ordnance (UXO).2 Of 94 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), 55 contain anti-personnel mines, totalling 
just under 2.9km2. Three of the six suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), totalling just over 0.1km2, may also be contaminated 
by anti-personnel mines.3 Territory occupied by Armenia during the conflict with Azerbaijan is believed to be significantly 
contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including unexploded submunitions.4 However, the precise 
extent of contamination in those districts is unknown. 
Table 1: Mined area (at end 2019)5
Type of contamination CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2)
AP mines 41 2,176,085 3 105,500
AV mines 39 2,791,608 3 3,728,442
AP and AV mines 11 706,046 0 0
AP mines and UXO 2 12,769 0 0
AP and AV mines and UXO 1 4,842 0 0
Totals 94 5,691,350 6 3,833,942
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle
Four of Armenia’s eleven provinces still contain mined areas. Three are contaminated with both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle 
mines, while the fourth — Vayots Dzor — is contaminated solely with anti-vehicle mines, as set out in Table 2.6 The difference 
in the total estimate for mine contamination between the end of 2018 and end of 2019 cannot be explained or reconciled by the 
total area released during the intervening 12 months.
ARMENIA




Table 2: Mined area by province (at end 2019)7
Province Type of contamination CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2)
Gegharkunik AP mines 3 584,022 2 105,123
AV mines 5 2,428,128 3 3,728,442
Syunik AP mines 32 1,424,512 1 377
AV mines 21 280,425 0 0
AP and AV mines 8 676,617 0 0
AP mines and UXO 2 12,769 0 0
AP and AV mines and UXO 1 4,842 0 0
Tavush AP mines 6 167,551 0 0
AV mines 10 15,603 0 0
AP and AV mines 3 29,429 0 0
Vayots Dzor AV mines 3 67,452 0 0
Totals 94 5,691,350 6 3,833,942
A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted in Armenia in 2005, followed by partial survey of 17 sites by The HALO Trust in 
2012, and then again, in 2012–13, by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD). FSD found 17 SHAs estimated to cover 26km2 
and 114 CHAs that covered 21km2 in four districts bordering Azerbaijan. Thirteen of these areas, totalling 1.8km2, contained 
only UXO and not mines.8 In 2019, the Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE) conducted non-technical survey 
in Syunik province but military-restricted zones continued to be off limits for survey and clearance.9
Mine and ERW contamination in Armenia is primarily the consequence of armed conflict with Azerbaijan in 1988–94, in which 
both sides used mines. The heaviest contamination is along the borders and confrontation lines with Azerbaijan, including the 
area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh and other territories controlled by the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Forces. Armenia’s 
border with Georgia has been cleared of mines, whereas the border with Turkey, also mined during the Soviet era, is still 
contaminated.10 While non-technical survey in 2012–13 by the FSD did not find evidence of mines outside the buffer zones 
in Ararat province, which borders Turkey, certain areas on that border remain unsurveyed because they are controlled by 
Russian border troops.11
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The CHDE was established by the Armenian government in 2011 as a civilian, non-commercial state body responsible for 
conducting survey and clearance and identifying contaminated areas. In 2014, the CHDE was made Armenia’s national mine 
action authority.12 The CHDE can negotiate with international demining organisations, accept international funding, sign 
contracts, and receive international assistance.13 The CHDE has an advisory board, composed of representatives from the 
Ministries of Defence, Emergency Situations, Territorial Administration, Education, and Justice.14 
In 2013, in conformity with a government decree, the CHDE began developing national mine action legislation. The CHDE 
began drafting the law in 201515 with the support of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) office 
in Yerevan.16 In 2019, the CHDE expected to submit the draft mine action law to the new Parliament of Armenia for discussion 
before the end of the year following which it will need to receive government approval and be adopted by parliament.17 As at 
June 2020, there has not been any further progress in the adoption of the mine action law.18
In 2019, the government allocated AMD229 million (approx. $475,000) to cover the costs of the CHDE and AMD110 million 
(approx. $228,000) for survey and clearance operations. Armenia does not receive any donor funding for mine action.19 
The CHDE receives capacity development support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). 
CHDE staff have been trained in land release and information management.20
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The CHDE does not have a gender policy and implementation plan but has reported that gender has been mainstreamed in 
Armenia’s draft national mine action strategy. During community liaison activities, all groups affected by mine contamination 
are consulted, including women and children. The CHDE is said to offer equal employment opportunities for both men and 
women. Two of the department heads within the CHDE are female and out of a total of 47 employees, 16 are women (34%), most 
of whom occupy senior or specialist roles. In addition, two women work in the non-technical survey teams, but there are no 
women deminers.21
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
With FSD’s support, the CHDE set up and manages the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
database.22 The CHDE had been planning to install IMSMA Core in 2019 but as at June 2020, this had been delayed for an 
unspecified amount of time due to the outbreak of COVID-19. In 2019, the CHDE elaborated forms using KoboCollect Software to 
improve data collection in the field. Once IMSMA Core is installed, it will be possible to import the data into the database using 
KoboCollect forms.23
PLANNING AND TASKING
The draft National Strategic Plan on Mine Action was presented for the approval to the Armenian Government in 2018, 
however, as at August 2020, it had still to be approved and adopted.24 The main objectives of the draft Plan are to address, 
as a priority, anti-personnel mines in CHAs that have a humanitarian impact, increasing community safety in support of the 
achievement of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.25 
Priority for clearance is based on CHDE criteria. Priority is given first to contaminated areas that are up to 1km away 
from a population centre, then to those near agricultural land, and finally to contaminated areas that negatively affect the 
environment. These are mostly located in the mountains. To optimise efficient deployment of resources, clearance plans are 
typically drawn up on a community-by-community basis.26
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In 2013, with the assistance of FSD, the CHDE developed the Armenian National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) and submitted 
them for government approval. The NMAS were approved by the government in April 2014.27 In 2018, amendments were 
made to the NMAS for mine risk education, accreditation of demining organisations, and mine detection dogs (MDDs). 
No amendments were made to the NMAS in 2019. According to CHDE, reviews of the NMAS are conducted following the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and international best practice.28
The CHDE is currently developing its standard operating procedures (SOPs).29 SOPs on manual mine clearance and battle area 
clearance (BAC) have already been elaborated.30 In 2019, the CHDE elaborated SOPs on BAC, the marking of hazardous areas, 
and medical support.31
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2019 demining in Armenia was conducted by two operators, the Foundation for Demining and Demolition and the HALO 
Trust. The CHDE deployed one non-technical survey team of three personnel while in 2018 they deployed one technical survey 
team. The Foundation for Demining and Demolition deployed two clearance teams totalling six deminers for mine clearance 
operations and The HALO Trust deployed one team of seven deminers for BAC operations. In 2020, there was a planned 
increase in capacity of one manual clearance team, one mechanical demining team, and one non-technical survey team. 
Currently all clearance is conducted manually following the failure of six MDDs to obtain accreditation in 2017 following which 
they were “demobilised”.32
Quality management is conducted in accordance with IMAS and the NMAS. Quality assurance (QA) is conducted by dedicated 
officers who make regular field visits to inspect cleared land.33 Quality control (QC) is conducted once clearance of the land 
has been completed, but prior to handover.34 In 2019, the CHDE conducted QA/QC of demining activities and handed over the 
released land to the community. QA is conducted by CHDE QA officers through regular field visits who ensure that demining 
operations are conducted in accordance with SOPs and the Task Order.35
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
No anti-personnel mined area was cancelled or reduced 
through survey in 2019 as in the previous year. A total 
of 16,271m2 of anti-vehicle mine contaminated area was 
cancelled in Syunik province through non-technical survey  
in 2019; no technical survey was conducted.36
A total of 16,180m2 of anti-personnel mined area was cleared 
in 2019, with two anti-personnel mines found and destroyed. 
The clearance was conducted by the Foundation for Demining 
and Demolition from the Davit Bek CHA in Syunik province.37 
This was the remainder of the Davit Bek CHA where 
clearance began in 2018 (9,237m2 of anti-personnel mined 
area had been cleared by the end of that year). Clearance  
of the Davit Bek CHA has now been completed and the land 
has been handed over to the community. In addition, The 
HALO Trust conducted BAC operations in Syunik province, 
clearing 40,400m2.38
No target date has been set for the completion of mine 
clearance in Armenia, due to the uncertainty over future 
capacity and funding.39 Moreover, over the past five years, 
demining in Armenia has been slow and productivity rates 
paltry, as Table 3 illustrates. In 2019, very little demining 
took place. Armenia claims that challenges in its mine and 
ERW clearance include the low level of contamination and 
the random distribution of mines, which creates obstacles for 
the effective and efficient implementation of technical survey 
and clearance activities, and the absence of donor funding.40 
Operational capacity was expected to increase in 2020, with 
mechanical capacity being introduced for the first time, which 
hopefully will increase clearance output.41 Going forward, 
Armenia will not complete clearance without a significant 
increase in funding and capacity.
Table 3: Mine clearance in 2015-19







* Area rounded up
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
According to the CHDE, Armenia has included provisions for addressing previously unknown mined areas following completion 
in national strategies. Currently the only national survey and clearance capacity in place to address previously unknown mined 
areas discovered following completion is the team at the CHDE.42






 ■ Azerbaijan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Azerbaijan has obligations under international human  
rights law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ Azerbaijan should complete its countrywide re-survey of anti-personnel mine contamination as soon as  
the situation allows.
 ■ Azerbaijan should ensure that clearance is only conducted in areas where there is firm evidence of 
contamination.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The precise extent of contamination from anti-personnel mines in Azerbaijan is unknown, as Armenian forces currently occupy 
a significant area of the country where considerable contamination exists. The Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 
(ANAMA) has suggested that contamination in areas occupied by Armenia may cover between 350km2 and 830km2, and contain 
between 50,000 and 100,000 mines.1
At the end of 2019, Azerbaijan reported 59 mined areas in regions under its control totalling 9.4km2 (see Table 1). A more 
precise estimate of contamination will only be known after completion of a countrywide re-survey which, as at July 2020,  
had been delayed due to the outbreak of COVID-19.2
Table 1: Mined area by type (at end 2019)3
Contamination CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Estimated area (m2) Total SHAs/CHAs Total area (m2)
Anti-personnel mines 8 1,012,469 14 3,000,000 22 4,012,469
Anti-vehicle mines 17 1,430,226 20 4,000,000 37 5,430,226
Totals 25 2,442,695 34 7,000,000 59 9,442,695
CHAs = Confirmed hazardous areas SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas
As at the end of 2019, Azerbaijan estimated that it had 8 confirmed anti-personnel mined areas covering a total of more than 
1km2 (see Table 2).4
Table 2: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2019)5
Region CHAs Area(m2) SHAs Area (m2)
Garadagh 1 17,744 1  -
Jabrail 3 833,907 2  -
Fizuli 2 147,694 3  -
Aghdam 2 11,574 0  -
Aghstafa 0 550 0  -
Ganja 0 600 0  -
Gazakh 0 400 0  -
Totals 8 1,012,469 6 est. 1,000,000
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Mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in Azerbaijan is the consequence of the 1988–94 armed conflict with 
Armenia – which saw landmines laid by both sides – and ammunition abandoned by the Soviet army in 1991. The most heavily 
contaminated areas are along the borders and confrontation lines between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including the area in and 
around Nagorno-Karabakh (see the Mine Action Review report on Nagorno-Karabakh for further information). The adjoining 
districts of Gubadly, Jabrayil, Kelbajar, Lachin, and Zangilan, as well as parts of Aghdam, Fizuli, and Tartar, are under the 
control of Armenian forces, and are suspected to contain both mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).6 
Azerbaijan is also suspected to be contaminated with cluster munition remnants and other ERW: both UXO and abandoned 
explosive ordnance (AXO), the extent of which is not known (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2020 
report on Azerbaijan for further information).
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
ANAMA, the national mine action authority and mine action centre, was established by Presidential Decree No. 854 to plan, 
coordinate, manage, and monitor mine action in the country. It also conducts demining operations, along with two national 
operators it contracts: Dayag-Relief Azerbaijan (RA) and the International Eurasia Press Fund (IEPF). No commercial company 
is active in mine action in Azerbaijan.7 In March 2020, the mine action programme was restructured and RA’s field personnel 
were incorporated within ANAMA while RA as an organisation will continue to provide logistical support to ANAMA.8
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provides capacity development to ANAMA and was planning to so 
until December 2020. The five main project activities were: maximising the socio-economic impact of clearance; supporting 
the institutional capacity of ANAMA for mine/UXO clearance according to international and national mine action standards; 
promoting ANAMA as an international mine action centre; procurement and upgrading of equipment; and introducing a 
gender-sensitive approach to mine action to Azerbaijan.9 According to ANAMA, as at June 2020, project outputs included 
improvements to ANAMA’s regional structure, enhanced international training services, better training equipment, and support 
for the training centre.10 As at July 2020, ANAMA and UNDP were discussing the possibility of extending the project until 2023.11
As at June 2020, Azerbaijan was still in the process of adopting a national mine action law, with draft legislation under review 
by the Cabinet of Ministers.12 The process has been ongoing for six years already. Once adopted, it will regulate mine action in 
Azerbaijan, governing issues such as licensing, accreditation, quality assurance (QA), and tender procedures.13 
The Azerbaijani government funds 90% of ANAMA’s operating costs and 90% of all survey and clearance in Azerbaijan.14 
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
ANAMA does not have a gender policy. No women are working in any operational roles in survey and clearance in Azerbaijan. 
In 2019, however, women made up 11% of mine action programme staff, mainly through administrative roles in ANAMA. They 
also participate in mine risk education sessions and are consulted during survey.15
One of the goals of the UNDP-ANAMA capacity strengthening project is to introduce a gender-sensitive approach to mine action 
to Azerbaijan.16 This is defined as delivering train-the-trainer sessions to mine action staff on a gender-sensitive approach 
to working with affected populations and the development of an accompanying training manual. No information on progress 
towards this goal has been provided by ANAMA or UNDP.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
ANAMA uses an old version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, and has been working 
with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to upgrade this to the latest IMSMA Core in 2019–20.17
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PLANNING AND TASKING
The existing mine action strategy was for 2013–18.18 Its main aims were said to be to continue mine and ERW clearance in 
support of government development projects and to provide safe conditions for the local population in affected regions.19 The 
strategy expired at the end of 2018 and has not yet been replaced. As at June 2020, ANAMA reported that a new strategy was 
in the process of being developed.20
ANAMA is integrated into the State Social and Economic Development programme and mine action is reported to be an integral 
part of the new state socio-economic development plan developed for 2019–22.21 ANAMA had annual work plans for 2019 and 
2020. In 2019, ANAMA was intending to continue mine clearance in Aghdam and Aghjabedi, Fizuli, Heybet, Jabrayil, and Terter 
regions. In the absence of a new multiyear strategic plan, tasks are prioritised according to the state development plan and 
instructions from the government.22
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Azerbaijan has its own National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), which were adopted in 2001 and subsequently revised in 2003, 
2004, and 2010 in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and best practice.23 No major modifications 
to the standards were made in 2019.24
ANAMA periodically conducts meetings with stakeholders to discuss and make relevant changes to NMAS and standing 
operating procedures (SOPs).25
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2019, the Azerbaijan mine action programme had more than 300 deminers/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel 
(see Table 3).
Table 3: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 201926
Operator Manual teams Deminers* Dogs and handlers Machines**
ANAMA 2 (ACT-1; ACT-2) 115 32 dogs and  
34 handlers
18-strong team  
with 6 machines
EOD Team 79
Special Mobile Operation Team (SMOT) 37
IEPF 1 40
RA 1 40
Totals 311 32/34 18/6
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
In addition, to its clearance capacities ANAMA deployed five technical survey teams in 2019 totalling 45 personnel.27  
Mine detection dogs (MDDs) and mechanical assets are used to support reduction through technical survey and manual 
clearance operations.28
The Training, Survey and Quality Assurance Division continued its quality management (QM)-related activities during 2019. 
There were both quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) sampling inspections. QA and QC were carried out on both 
ANAMA’s operations and the operations by the two national non-governmental organisations (NGOs).29
mineactionreview.org   321
STATES NOT PARTY
AZERBAIJAN
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of 2.01km2 of mined area was released in 2019, of which 1.01km2 was cleared and 0.99km2 was reduced through 
technical survey.
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, nearly 1km2 of anti-personnel mined area was 
reduced through technical survey across three regions  
(see Table 4). There was no cancellation through 
non-technical survey.30 This is an increase from 2018 when  
no anti-personnel mined area was cancelled or reduced 
through survey.31
Table 4: Reduction through technical survey in 201932
Region Operator Area reduced (m2)
Garadagh ANAMA (SMOT) 17,744
Jabrail ANAMA (ACT-1) 833,907
Fizuli ANAMA (ACT-1) 147,694
Total 999,345
CLEARANCE IN 2019
More than 1km2 of anti-personnel mine contaminated area was cleared in 2019 with 32 anti-personnel mines found and destroyed 
(see Table 5).33 This is an increase from the 353,258m2 of mined area that was cleared in 2018 when 29 anti-personnel mines were 
found and destroyed.34 The reason for the increased output was additional tasks assigned by the government.35










Garadagh ANAMA (SMOT) 17,744 12 0 517
Jabrayil ANAMA (ACT-1) 833,907 4 0 0
Fizuli ANAMA (ACT-1) 147,694 3 1 1
Aghdam ANAMA (ACT-2) 11,574 1 0 0
Aghstafa ANAMA (EOD) 550 1 0 0
Ganja ANAMA (EOD) 600 3 0 0
Gazakh ANAMA (EOD) 400 8 0 0
Totals 1,012,469 32 1 518
ANAMA reported that in 2019 12 mined areas were cleared 
that proved to contain no anti-personnel mines.37
Azerbaijan submitted voluntary APMBC Article 7 
transparency reports in 2008 and 2009 but has not submitted 
an Article 7 report in the last ten years. Over the last five 
years, 7.68km2 of mined area has been reported cleared in 
Azerbaijan. Mine clearance output nearly tripled in 2019 from 
a five-year low of 0.35km2 in 2018 (see Table 6). Accuracy 
of reporting of contamination, survey, and clearance data, 
though, continues to be an issue in Azerbaijan. So too are 
the effectiveness and efficiency of land release methodology, 
with many areas being cleared that prove to have little or 
no mine contamination. As at June 2020, no target date had 
been set for the completion of anti-personnel mine clearance 
in Azerbaijan. ANAMA has stated that mine clearance can 
only be completed once it has access to territories currently 
occupied by Armenia.38
Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







* A further 3.7km2 was cleared but was found not to contain mines.
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Azerbaijan has a national capacity which could be deployed to deal with residual risk post-completion but, as at June 2020,  
no plan in place for the management of residual risk.39 ANAMA reported that the elaboration of a plan for the management  
of residual risk is contingent upon the liberation of contaminated areas that are currently occupied by Armenia.40
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ China should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, China has obligations under international human rights law to clear 
anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION 
The extent of mine contamination remaining in China is 
not known. In the 1990s, the United States reported that 
China had emplaced mines along its borders with India, the 
Russian Federation, and Vietnam.1 China’s military estimated 
that around two million mines of a wide variety of types 
were emplaced on the Vietnam border alone.2 China has 
not reported on mine contamination along its borders with 
Russia and India or on operations to clear them. 
China conducted clearance operations along its border 
with Vietnam between 1992 and 1999,3 between 2005 and 
2009,4 and between 2015 and 2018.5 In 2009, China said it 
had completed demining along the Yunnan section of its 
border with Vietnam and that this “represents the completion 
of mine clearance of mine-affected areas within China’s 
territory.”6 This was followed by a statement in 2011 when 
a Foreign Ministry official reported that China maintains 
a small number of minefields “for national defence”.7 Two 
months later, at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, China 
said that large-scale demining activities had “on the whole 
eliminated the scourge of landmines in our territories”.8 
At the Third Review Conference in 2014, China said it had 
“basically eradicated landmines on its own territory”.9 At the 
Fourth Review Conference in 2019, China said that, since the 
1990s, it has carried out large-scale demining operations 
on the border many times. In the past three years, China 
has cleared approximately 58km2 of mined area on its 
borders with Vietnam and Myanmar and “enclosed” 25km2 
of minefields (permanently perimeter-marking, fencing, and 
closing down mined areas).10 China began demining its border 
with Myanmar at the end of 2018 with a team of more than 
300 deminers.11
Demining of the Vietnam border was conducted in three 
“campaigns” in Yunnan province and Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region. The first was in 1992–94 and the second 
in 1997–99.12 However, these two campaigns did not deal with 
minefields located in disputed areas of the border, where 
500,000 mines covered an estimated 40km2. After a technical 
survey of mined areas, China embarked on a third clearance 
campaign in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Yunnan 
province in 2005. China stated in 2009 that it had completed 
clearance of this border after clearing a total of 5.15km2.13 
In early November 2015, however, China embarked on a 
further demining operation along the border with Vietnam.14 
In its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency report 
submitted in March 2017, China reported that in November 
2015–February 2017, the Chinese army cleared 18.4km2 
of minefields on the Yunnan border.15 As noted above, in 
November 2019, China announced that in the past three years, 
it had cleared some 58km2 of mined area on its borders with 
Vietnam and Myanmar, destroying in the process 170,000 
items of explosive ordnance, including mines.
CHINA
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PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
There is no formal mine action programme in China. Any mine clearance is conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)  
as a military activity.
According to China, the military is building international humanitarian mine clearance professional classrooms and conducting 
research on the application of virtual reality technology in humanitarian mine clearance training. China also reported that 
it had carried out technical research related to mine clearance and destruction, and completed research on mine detection 
dog training, operational procedures, and on the impact of post-war mine clearance methods on the environment.16 In 2019, 
China said that it has continuously improved its demining capabilities and has developed a complete set of mine clearance 
equipment and technologies that meet international mine action standards and high cost-efficiency. It claimed to have achieved 
breakthroughs in research and development, including in unmanned mine detection and laser demining (use of directed energy 
weapons to destroy landmines).17
LAND RELEASE 
Media accounts reported that mine clearance resumed in November 2017 in the Yunnan border area and in the Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region.18 Clearance was reportedly completed in November 2018, with 2,300 explosive items found and destroyed 
across 1.5km2 in Guangxi province.19 In Yunnan province an estimated 200,000 explosive items were found and destroyed in 
over 50km2 of mined area between November 2015 and November 2018.20
In its latest CCW Amended Protocol II report, China reported that Chinese military and public security departments cooperated 
closely to dispose of 600 mines in 2019.21
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 ■ Cuba should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Cuba has obligations under international human rights law 
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION 
Cuba’s mine contamination remains unchanged from previous years. Cuban authorities maintain minefields around the United 
States (US) naval base at Guantánamo in the south-east of Cuba. In 2007, Cuba said it carries out “a strict policy with regard 
to guaranteeing a responsible use of anti-personnel mines with an exclusively defensive character and for [Cuba’s] national 
security.”1 According to an earlier statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, existing minefields are duly “marked, fenced and 
guarded” in accordance with Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts.2 
According to a book published in 2008, mines laid around the naval base detonate “at least once a month”,3 but it has not been 
possible to independently confirm this claim. In February 2018, a fire broke out in the 17-mile strip of land separating the 
Guantánamo base from Cuban territory which reportedly detonated 1,000 landmines and burned 1,700 acres over three days 
before being extinguished.4 
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
There is no mine action programme in Cuba.
LAND RELEASE 
Cuba has not conducted clearance in its minefields around the US naval base at Guantánamo over the last ten years.
1 Statement by Rebeca Hernández Toledano, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Cuba to the UN, “Item 29: Assistance in mine action”, UN General Assembly, 
Fourth Committee, New York, 6 November 2007.
2 Statement of the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2000.
3 “The Cuban mines detonate at least once a month, sometimes starting fires that sweep across the fence line. [Staff Sergeant Kaveh Wooley of the US Marines]… 
described a fire that started the previous summer and turned into a giant cook-off, with about 30 mines exploding….” D. P. Erikson, Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the 
United States, and the Next Revolution, Bloomsbury, United States, October 2008, pp. 196–97.
4 “U.S. and Cuban forces unite to fight a common foe: wildfire at Guantanamo”, USA Today, 1 March 2018, at: bit.ly/2KytDH9.




RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Egypt should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Egypt has obligations under international human rights law 
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION 
The precise extent of anti-personnel mine contamination 
in Egypt remains unknown and past estimates have been 
unreliable. Egypt is contaminated with mines in the Western 
Desert, which date from the Second World War, and in the 
Sinai Peninsula and Eastern Desert, which are a legacy of 
wars with Israel between 1956 and 1973. Some recent mine 
incidents in Sinai may have been caused by mines emplaced 
by anti-government jihadist groups.1 It was reported in 
August 2016 that Islamic State had been digging up Second 
World War-era landmines and re-using them.2 
Most of the Western Desert contamination occurred 
around the location of Second World War battles that took 
place between the Quattara depression and Alamein on 
the Mediterranean coast. Other affected areas lie around 
the city of Marsa Matrouh and at Sallum near the Libyan 
border. In November 2016, during a ceremony to mark 
the opening of a new prosthetic limb centre, the United 
Kingdom’s Ambassador to Egypt announced that all the 
maps of minefields laid by British and Allied forces during 
World War II had been handed over.3 According to the head 
of the military engineering department, though, the British 
minefield maps were “sketch maps” and most of the mines 
were buried randomly.4 Major General Mahrous Kilani, Head 
of the General Secretariat for Mine Clearance, reported 
that while the mine maps are an indication of possible mine 
locations many mines have been found in areas that are 
unmarked by the maps.5 
In January 2018, the British MP Daniel Kawczynski 
put a written question to the UK Secretary of State for 
International Development asking whether her Department 
was taking steps to assist with the mapping and disposal 
of Second World War mines in the Tobruk and El Alamein 
regions. The United Kingdom reiterated that maps of 
minefield locations had been provided to the Egyptian 
authorities and that, since 2006, through multilateral funding 
along with other donors (including Germany, Japan, New 
Zealand, and the United States), it had funded clearance of 
130,446 acres (some 520km2) of land around El Alamein.6 
The Egyptian government has claimed that some 17 million 
mines remained in the Western Desert and another 5.5 
million in Sinai and the Eastern Desert.7 In an April 2009 
assessment, though, the United Nations (UN) Mine Action 
Team cautioned that data needed careful analysis to avoid 
reporting areas that had already been cleared and thereby 
misrepresenting the problem.8 In this regard, in October 2017, 
it was reported by the European Union (EU)’s ambassador 
to Egypt that 2,680km2 of land in the North West Coast was 
claimed to still be contaminated.9
In August 2010, the Executive Secretariat for the Demining 
and Development of the North West Coast (Executive 
Secretariat) reported to donors that the army had destroyed 
2.9 million mines while clearing 38km² in five areas, leaving 
“more than 16 million mines” covering an estimated area of 
248km².10 Details of items cleared are not consistent with 
other available information.
In 2013, the army handed over to the Ministries of Housing 
and of Planning and International Cooperation an area of 
some 105km² in the Western Desert, which it had reportedly 
cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Details of 
clearance operations were not reported. Minister of Housing 
Tarek Wafiq was quoted as saying that with completion of the 
project one-fifth of the Western Desert had been cleared.11
In August 2016, it was reported that Islamic State had been 
harvesting the explosives from Second World War mines 
still uncleared in Egypt. According to Ambassador Fathy 
el-Shazly, formerly the head of Egypt’s Executive Secretariat 
for Mine Clearance, “We’ve had at least 10 reports from the 
military of terrorists using old mines. Even now, these things 
trouble us in different ways.”12 These findings were reiterated 
in June 2017 at a UN Security Council briefing when Egypt’s 
permanent representative to the UN Amr Abdel-Latif Abul 
Atta stated that “abandoned mines and explosive remnants of 
wars have become a source of access for armed movements 
and terrorists to find materials for manufacturing improvised 
explosive devices”.13 It was reported in January 2018 that 
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), which pledged allegiance to 
Islamic State in 2014, has been using old mines and caches of 
explosives left in Sinai to produce different types of explosive 
devices. There were at least five major attacks by terrorist 
groups using such devices in Egypt in 2017.14 This should 
serve as a wake-up call to Egypt to pursue mine clearance 
with far greater vigour than it has done so thus far.
EGYPT
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PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
In 2019 as in previous years, the mine action programme in 
Egypt was not functioning effectively. 
A joint project between the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and Egypt, entitled, “Support the North 
West Coast Development Plan and Mine Action Programme: 
Mine Action” was conducted in two phases from 2007 to 2014 
and from 2015 to 2017.15 In August 2017, it was reported that 
negotiations had begun on a third phase of the project to 
allocate $5 million to clear the rest of the northern coast and 
the Sinai peninsula.16
The project provided for the creation of an “Executive 
Secretariat for Mine Clearance and the Development of the 
North West Coast”, which is mandated with coordinating and 
monitoring the implementation of the development plan and 
humanitarian mine action activities in the North West Coast.17
The army is the only entity authorised to demine in Egypt. 
However, the Executive Secretariat supports clearance 
operations through demining requests received from 
concerned ministries. It was reported that a total area 
of 2,182km2 of land has been demined from 5,100 km2 of 
contaminated land since the beginning of the project in 2009.18 
Trained deminers from the Corps of Military Engineers conduct 
manual and mechanical demining. The Executive Secretariat is 
said to have procured 461 mine detectors, 355 demining suits 
and protective helmets, one Casspir armoured vehicle with the 
“Mine Lab” detecting device, and five Amtrak vehicles.19 
According to its website, “the Executive Secretariat’s Quality 
Management Unit proactively guarantees quality in all key 
processes, makes sure that quality requirements are fulfilled 
in accordance with IMAS, measures process performance, 
develops procedures, and provides the right equipment”. 20 
Funding was also used for capacity building, establishing  
a quality management unit, and supporting the creation  
of the Information Management System for Mine Action 
(IMSMA) database.
In November 2019, Egypt’s Minister of Investment and 
International Cooperation signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with the Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) on mine clearance and 
development of Egypt’s North West coast. The MoU provides 
a cooperation framework to enhance capacity building for  
the Egyptian mine action programme.21
In May 2017, Kuwait granted Egypt an aid package of almost 
US$1 million through the Arab Fund for Economic and 
Social Development, for mine clearance in the North-West 
Coast area.22 In January 2019, Egypt called for renewed 
international support for mine clearance, especially around El 
Alamein. Parliament member Mohamed el-Ghoul resubmitted 
a 2017 motion demanding financial compensation from the 
countries that laid mines in Egypt, mainly Germany and the 
United Kingdom.23
LAND RELEASE 
Egypt has not reported on its release of mined areas in recent years and no target date has been set for the completion  
of mine clearance.





 ■ Georgia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Georgia has obligations under international human rights law  
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ Georgia should continue to engage in political dialogue with Azerbaijan, to enable full clearance of the Red Bridge 
border minefield.
 ■ Georgia should grant access to The HALO Trust to complete survey and clearance of the remaining mined areas.
 ■ Georgia should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and engage with donors to secure the resources needed  
to complete clearance.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The full extent of mine contamination in Georgia is not known due to access restrictions and lack of survey. According 
to estimates, as set out in Table 1, Georgia has more than 2.7km2 of contamination across six mined areas in the Tbilisi 
Administered Territory (TAT),1 although the size of four areas is not reported. Contamination comprises both anti-personnel 
and, in one area, also anti-vehicle mines.2






Kvemo Kartli Marneuli Kirach-Muganlo (Red Bridge) AP/ AV mines 1 2,738,730
Mtskheta-Mtianeti Dusheti Barisakho AP mines 2 28,058
Mtskheta-Mtianeti Dusheti Kadoeti AP mines 1 N/K
Shida Kartli Kashuri Osiauri (Military zone) AP mines 1 N/K
Samegrelo Zemo Svaneti Mestia Khojali AP mines 1 N/K
Totals 6 2,766,788
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle N/K = Not known
In 2019, The HALO Trust was given permission to conduct survey and clearance in the Kadoeti and Khojali minefields but it 
does not currently have the funding to do so. In Barisakho, two mined areas are close to a police station on the Russian border, 
which were laid to prevent entry from Ingushetia during the Second Chechen War. In Osiauri, a military base, mines were laid 
around the perimeter of an ammunition depot. 
The Red Bridge minefield is an unfenced 7km-long minefield consisting of densely packed lines of anti-personnel and 
anti-vehicle mines at the “Red Bridge” border crossing between Azerbaijan and Georgia. Laid in 1991 by Azerbaijan during the 
Nagorno-Karabakh war, it is Georgia’s largest minefield and the last major minefield not in the vicinity of a functioning military 
establishment. As at May 2020, there had been 88 incidents: 22 involving humans and 66 involving livestock.4
There may also be mined areas in South Ossetia as a result of the 1990–92 Georgian-Ossetian war, and the more recent 2008 
conflict with Russia. The HALO Trust has planned to conduct non-technical survey in South Ossetia, but, to date, has not been 
granted access. South Ossetia is effectively subject to Russian control and is inaccessible to both Georgian authorities and 
international non-governmental organisation (NGO) demining operators.
There are four suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and one confirmed hazardous area (CHA) totalling 9,600m2 in Abkhazia 
which came to HALO Trust’s attention in 2019. It is expected that these tasks will each require deployment of a four-person 
demining team and will take, on average, two months to complete. However, the HALO Trust does not currently have sufficient 
funding to carry out this clearance.5
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Georgia is believed to be free of cluster munition remnants (CMR), with the possible exception of South Ossetia, which is 
occupied by Russia and inaccessible to both the Georgian authorities and international mine action NGOs (see Mine Action 
Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2020 report on Georgia for further information).6 Georgia remains contaminated 
by other unexploded ordnance (UXO), likely in South Ossetia and also within Georgia in former firing ranges.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Humanitarian Demining Control Division (HDCD), 
renamed after a reorganisation in January 2019, sits under 
the State Military Scientific Technical Centre, known as 
DELTA, within the Ministry of Defence (MoD).7 The primary 
task of the HDCD is to coordinate mine action in Georgia, 
including overseeing the national mine action strategy and 
quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC), and facilitating 
the development and implementation of Georgian National 
Mine Action Standards, in accordance with the International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS).8 
For all mine action-related issues, The HALO Trust 
communicates with DELTA.9 The Georgian authorities are 
supportive of the granting of visas for international staff 
and the importation of demining equipment. The HALO Trust 
submitted several requests to the MoD seeking access to 
the remaining minefields, the last of which was submitted 
in April 2018. As at May 2020, the HALO Trust had received 
permission to begin clearing two of the six remaining 
minefields, at Khojali and Kadoeti, respectively, but does not 
have sufficient funding to complete these tasks. Permissions 
for the remaining three minefields have not yet been granted 
and the HALO Trust has reported that it may be forced to 
permanently close its programme in the TAT if permissions  
is not granted by 2021.10
The Georgian government funds the running costs of the 
HDCD as well as the Engineering Brigade, which carries out 
some survey and battle area clearance (BAC).11 The HALO 
Trust is funded by international donors.
The national authority has received capacity development 
support from HALO Trust and the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The HALO Trust 
has provided training on IMAS, geographic information 
systems (GIS), clearance and survey techniques, and, in 
2018, donated a mine action vehicle to the HDCD.12 The GICHD 
has provided training for HDCD staff on the Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core database, 
ammunition storage, and technical survey.13
In 2019, the Georgian government joined the Landmine Free 
South Caucasus Campaign (LMFSC), which brings together 
governments and civil society from all three states in the 
South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) on an 
annual basis to encourage cooperation and dialogue on the 
clearance of mines and UXO in the region.14
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
DELTA and The HALO Trust each has gender and diversity policies in place. HALO Trust supports use of mixed-gender teams 
to conduct survey, which allows for greater engagement with women and children.15 If HALO Trust is given permission to 
work in the remaining minefields in the TAT, community liaison and survey teams will be mixed gender and inclusive of ethnic 
minorities.16 HALO Trust’s EOD teams in Abkhazia are mixed ethnic Georgian and ethnic Abkhaz.17
There is equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams in Georgia, including for 
managerial level/supervisory positions although proportionately the number of women remains low. In Abkhazia, The HALO 
Trust works with local women’s organisations to increase the visibility of its work to a female audience. As at May 2020,  
30% of its operational and management staff were female and at the end of 2019 the HALO Trust employed its first female BAC  
team leader.18
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The HDCD uses the IMSMA database and, according to The HALO Trust, the data is accurate. Data archives go back to 2009 
and are regularly updated, based on HALO Trust’s operations reports and on work by the Engineering Brigade. The IMSMA 
database is updated regularly and is administered by a certified specialist within the HDCD, trained by the GICHD, who receives 
regular refresher training in the latest procedures.19 In 2019, HDCD personnel attended an IMSMA Core workshop, hosted by 
the GICHD and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Kiev (Ukraine).20
The data in the national information management system is accessible to the HALO Trust.21 HALO Trust uses its own 
IMSMA-compatible data collection forms that DELTA has approved while the HDCD QA/QC team also have its own forms.22
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PLANNING AND TASKING
Georgia has a national mine action strategy. Its main aims and targets are focused on clearing the remaining mined areas  
and other areas contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW).23 The annual work plans for 2019 centred on BAC within 
the TAT.24
In 2019, due to access not being granted to the remaining minefields, The HALO Trust had suspended all operations in TAT, 
apart from one two-month task clearing abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) at Chonto, near the Administrative Boundary 
Line with South Ossetia, which it completed in July. The Abkhazia programme continued operations at Primorsky and HALO 
also responded to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs.25
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
As at May 2020, Georgian National Mine Action Standards and National Technical Standards and Guidelines were still under 
development. The IMAS and International Ammunition Technical Guidelines are being translated into Georgian.26
The HALO Trust has standing operating procedures (SOPs) in place for all its activities, including survey, mine clearance,  
and EOD. No modifications or enhancements were made to these SOPs in 2019.27
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The HALO Trust, which is the only international operator 
working in the country, conducts survey and both BAC and 
mine clearance.28 In 2019, the HALO Trust did not conduct 
and survey or clearance of anti-personnel mined areas in 
TAT. In Abkhazia, the HALO Trust re-tasked two EOD teams 
to conduct non-technical survey of five mined areas for four 
weeks. As at July 2020, The HALO Trust was seeking funding 
for clearance of four of these tasks. In 2019, the HALO Trust 
deployed 33 personnel to conduct clearance at Primorsky.29 
DELTA retains a small demining and EOD capacity in TAT. In 
2019, the Engineering Brigade carried out technical survey 
and BAC of a former military base in the Adjara region. 
The Engineering Brigade and the State Security Service 
of Georgia have capacity to carry out EOD spot tasks. In 
Abkhazia, the emergency services (EMERCOM) have a small 
EOD capacity, though HALO Trust is generally relied upon to 
deal with all items of UXO.30
In 2019, the HALO Trust had two mechanical assets deployed 
at the explosion site around the Primorsky ammunition 
storage area in Abkhazia. The HALO Trust developed and 
deployed bespoke operational methods to clear heavy rubble 
and UXO. Innovations such as reinforced armouring of 
mechanical assets and the use of drones to map and identify 
hazardous items increased the programme’s effectiveness 
and efficiency.31
The Engineering Brigade deployed four mechanical assets 
and 47 personnel for BAC in the Adjara region in 2019.32 The 
State Security Service of Georgia has several mine detection 
dog teams, which it uses for EOD spot tasks.33
In TAT, quality management (QM) is conducted by DELTA. In 
Abkhazia, The HALO Trust is responsible for its own QM.34
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
No mined areas were released through survey or clearance in 2019, but 37 anti-personnel mines were destroyed by HALO 
Trust during EOD spot tasks in Abkhazia. A further 332 unemplaced anti-personnel mines were destroyed by HALO Trust in 
Abkhazia during clearance of an unplanned ammunition storage area explosion. 
The Engineering Brigade also released UXO-contaminated area in 2019, through survey and clearance in Tbilisi Administered 
Territory. 
SURVEY IN 2019
No mined area was released through survey in 2019, but some UXO-contaminated area was. The Engineering Brigade reduced 
160,823m2 of UXO-contaminated area through technical survey in the Batumi village, Adjara region in Tbilisi Administered 
Territory.35 In Abkhazia, the HALO Trust conducted initial non-technical survey of four SHAs and one CHA, totalling 9,600m2.36 
This is an increase from the 37,758m2 of UXO-contaminated area that was reduced through technical survey in 2018 by the 
HALO Trust in TAT.37




In 2019, the HALO Trust cleared 394,004m2 of hazardous 
area in Primorsky, Abkhazia, destroying in the process 
332 anti-personnel mines and 30,943 items of UXO. The 
anti-personnel mines destroyed in Primorsky were the 
result of BAC and mechanical clearance of an unplanned 
ammunition storage area explosion that occurred in August 
2017; the mines were scattered across the landscape as 
a result of the explosion and had not been emplaced.38 In 
addition, the HALO Trust destroyed 37 anti-personnel mines 
in Abkhazia during EOD spot tasks in 2019.39 
The Engineering Brigade conducted BAC and cleared 
13,772m2 destroyed 31 items of UXO from the Batumi village 
in the Adjara region in Tbilisi Administered Territory. In 2018, 
389,204m2 was cleared and 556 anti-personnel mines were 
destroyed.40
No target date has been set for completion of anti-personnel 
mine clearance in Georgia. The Red Bridge minefield is 
Georgia’s largest, clearance of which has been identified 
as one of its key strategic mine action priorities.41 Georgia 
previously reported plans to start clearing the Red Bridge 
minefield in 2015 but after discussions between Georgian  
and Azerbaijani representatives only survey was permitted.42  
The HALO Trust conducted non-technical survey between 
1 and 3 July, and then began technical survey on 4 July 
2015. The following month, however, the Azerbaijani military 
demanded that technical survey operations be halted.43 
During 2018, Georgia reported further discussions with 
Azerbaijan regarding the clearance of Red Bridge minefield.44 
As at May 2020, however, The HALO Trust had not been 
granted permission to restart clearance there.45 HALO 
has temporarily shut down operations in TAT as, while 
permissions have been granted to conduct clearance in 
Kadoeti and Khojali, the programme does not have the 
funding in place. If funding is not forthcoming, HALO may be 
forced to exit the TAT in 2021. If the HALO Trust leaves, it is 
unclear when the remaining anti-personnel mined areas will 
be cleared as there are no other operators with Georgia’s 
Engineering Brigade having only limited resources and in 
need of training.46
For The HALO Trust, the main priority in Abkhazia is the 
clearance of the site at Primorsky, where an explosion in 2017 
contaminated the surrounding territory with mines and UXO. 
In 2019, HALO received additional funding from the European 
Union and Switzerland. Previously funding came from the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. With adequate funding, HALO 
Trust hopes to finish the clearance of Primorsky by 2021.47
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Georgia does not have a sustainable capacity in place to address previously unknown mined areas following completion.48
1 The Tbilisi Administered Territory (TAT) does not include the autonomous 
republics of Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, which are outside of Georgia’s 
effective control.
2 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, Head of Division, DELTA, 12 May 2020
3 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 12 May 2020; and from Michael 
Montafi, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 8 May 2020.
4 Email from Michael Montafi, HALO Trust, 8 May 2020.
5 Ibid.
6 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 12 May 2020; and from Michael 
Montafi, HALO Trust, 8 May 2020.
7 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, Head of Division, DELTA, 28 March 2019; and 
Matthew Walker, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019; Decree 897 
issued by the Minister of Defence, 30 December 2010; and email from Oleg 
Gochashvili, DELTA, 20 June 2016 and 10 June 2019; Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 21 March 
2017 to 31 March 2018), Form A.
8 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.
9 Email from Michael Montafi, HALO Trust, 21 June 2019.
10 Email from Michael Montafi, HALO Trust, 8 May 2020.
11 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 12 May 2020.
12 Emails from Matthew Walker, 8 April 2019, and Michael Montafi, HALO Trust, 
8 May 2020; and Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 10 June 2019.
13 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 2020
14 Email from Michael Montafi, HALO Trust, 8 May 2020.
15 Email from Matthew Walker, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.
16 Ibid.
17 Email from Michael Montafi, HALO Trust, 8 May 2020.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 12 May 2020.
21 Email from Matthew Walker, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.
22 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019; and from Michael 
Montafi, HALO Trust, 8 May 2020.
23 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019.
24 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March and 10 June 2019; and 
Matthew Walker, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.
25 Email from Michael Montafi, HALO Trust, 8 May 2020.
26 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 12 May 2020.
27 Email from Michael Montafi, HALO Trust, 8 May 2020.
28 Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.
29 Email from Michael Montafi, HALO Trust, 20 July 2020.
30 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019 and 12 May 2020;  
and Matthew Walker, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.
31 Email from Michael Montafi, HALO Trust, 8 May 2020.
32 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 12 May 2020.
33 Email from Matthew Walker, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.
34 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019.
35 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 12 May 2020.
36 Email from Michael Montafi, HALO Trust, 8 May 2020. 
37 Email from Matthew Walker, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.
38 Email from Michael Montafi, HALO Trust, 8 May 2020.
39 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 12 May 2020; and Michael Montafi, 
HALO Trust, 8 May 2020.
40 Email from Matthew Walker, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.
41 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.
42 Interview with George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva,  
28 May 2009; and response to Mine Action Review questionnaire by Oleg 
Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 June 2015.
43 Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016; Irakli Chitanava, 
HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.
44 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019.
45 Email from Michael Montafi, HALO Trust, 8 May 2020.
46 Ibid.; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 12 May 2020.
47 Email from Michael Montafi, HALO Trust, 8 May 2020.
48 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 12 May 2020.




 ■ India should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, India has obligations under international human rights law 
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION 
The extent of anti-personnel mine contamination is not known. Large-scale mine-laying was conducted by government forces 
on and near the Line of Control (LoC) separating India and Pakistan during the 1971 war and the 2001–02 stand-off between the 
two states. Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were laid on cultivated land and pasture, as well as around infrastructure 
and a number of villages. 
Despite occasional official claims that all the mines laid were subsequently cleared, reports of contamination and casualties 
have persisted. A media report in 2013 cited a government statement that about 20km2 of irrigated land was still mined in the 
Akhnoor sector of the LoC alone.1 In June 2016, India’s NDTV news reported that the Indian army was demining areas of the 
LoC in Rajouri district, Kashmir, in order to return land to communities for agricultural use as it vacated fields near the border 
that were reportedly taken over and mined during the Kargil Conflict in 1999 and Operation Parakaram in 2001.2 
Landmine incidents continue to be reported, primarily involving Indian army personnel, but also civilians.
Security forces have also reported extensive use of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by Maoist fighters in the 
north-eastern states of Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand causing civilian and military casualties. In July 2018, it was reported 
that 15 anti-vehicle mines placed by Maoist rebels were neutralised by security forces in Garhwa district, Jharkhand state.3 
However, mine types are usually not specified and may include command-detonated explosive devices as well as mines  
(i.e. victim-activated explosive devices).4
Furthermore, if India proceeds with the purchase of 1 million landmines, following reports of it inviting manufacturers to bid  
in late 2019, it would be a clear indication that India is not seeking to clear anti-personnel mine contamination on areas under 
its territory or control, but rather, that it plans to add to the already existing contamination.5
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
India has no civilian mine action programme. The Director-General of Military Operations decides on mine clearance after 
receiving assessment reports from the command headquarters of the respective districts where mine clearance is needed.
LAND RELEASE 
There is no publicly available official information on land release in 2019. The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for 
clearing mines placed by non-state armed groups.6 In July 2017, for instance, according to a media account, the Indian Army was 
manually clearing mines in the border districts of Jammu and Kashmir and was procuring more advanced demining equipment 
with a view to improving safety and decreasing the number of deminer casualties.7 Media reports have indicated the police also 
play an active part in clearing mines and other explosive hazards on an ad hoc basis in states dealing with insurgency.8 
India has not reported that any mine clearance has occurred in its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
Amended Protocol II (AP II) Article 13 transparency reports since 2006.9 
In a statement delivered at Fourth Review Conference of the APMBC in November 2019, India said: “Mines that are used for 
defensive military operations are laid within fenced perimeters and marked, in accordance with the requirements specified  
in AP II. Post operations, these mines are cleared by trained troops”.10
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Iran should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Iran has obligations under international human rights law  
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ Iran should report publicly on the extent and location of mined areas and prepare a plan for their clearance 
and destruction.
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
Iran is contaminated by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, mainly as a result of the 1980−88 war with Iraq. The extent of 
the remaining mined areas is unknown, but mine contamination is concentrated in five western provinces bordering Iraq. 
According to the Iran Mine Action Center (IRMAC), the initial estimation of “contamination” in Iran was 42,000km2 (llam 
Province, 17,000km2; Kermanshah Province, 7,000km2; Khuzestan Province, 15,000km2; Kurdistan Province, 1,500km2; and 
West Azerbaijan, 1,500km2); which by February 2020 had reportedly been reduced by 90%,1 which would put contamination 
at approximately 4,200km2. However, this is not in line with previous estimates of mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) 
contamination, which were reported to be far lower.
For example, the Minister of Defence Hossein Dehghan said in 2014 that the 4,500km2 of mine and ERW contamination left by 
the Iran-Iraq war in the five western provinces had been reduced to 280km2.2 In February 2014, IRMAC reported that the five 
Western provinces had remaining contamination totalling 250km2.3 
According to online media sources, flooding that hit large parts of Iran in March and April 2019 exposed mines and unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) remaining in western provinces of Iran.4 Sources report that security forces continue to emplace mines in 
areas close to Iran’s borders in order to deter cross-border smugglers and infiltration by anti-regime groups. There are also 
mined areas around military bases. 
A further complication for contamination estimates pertains to reports of continuing casualties in areas that were supposed to 
have been cleared, calling into question whether mine clearance has been conducted to international standards.
Iran is also believed to have cluster munition remnant contamination (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition 
Remnants 2019 report on Iran for further information).
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
IRMAC was established as the national mine action centre in 2005, taking the place of a Mine Action Committee within the 
Ministry of Defence. IRMAC is responsible for planning, data, managing survey, procurement, and the accreditation of demining 
operators. It also sets standards, provides training for clearance operators, concludes contracts with demining operators, and 
ensures quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of their operations. It coordinates mine action with the General Staff 
of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Interior, the Management and Planning Organisation of Iran, and other relevant ministries 
and organisations, and handles international relations.5 Several IRMAC staff are believed to be serving or former military 
personnel, including its Director, while others are civilians employed by the Ministry of Defence.
IRMAC is said to have a branch in every affected province. Available demining assets, such as mechanical assets, vary from 
province to province.
In March 2019, Iran hosted a three-day international roundtable on “humanitarian mine action: challenges and best practices”, 
attended by representatives from other states, national and international demining organisations, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). The aim of the roundtable was to share 
knowledge and experience on mine action, challenges, and best practices.6 
In November 2019, Iran opened its first international humanitarian demining training centre in Tehran.7
Iran is believed to have dedicated significant resources and effort to clearing areas on its territory contaminated by mines, 
CMR and other ERW, but the results of survey and clearance have not been made publicly available.
IRAN





IRMAC actively maintains a national mine action database but it is not known to what extent it is comprehensive, up-to-date, 
and able to disaggregate anti-personnel mine contamination and clearance output from that of other explosive ordnance.
IRMAC reported that it has a GIS web-based, integrated information management system, which integrates information on 
quality, safety, and the environment.8
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
IRMAC combines the roles of regulator and operator, with 
demining teams and support staff deployed in five affected 
provinces. In Kurdistan province, IRMAC is conducting 
verification, mainly through mechanical clearance. IRMAC 
also responds to calls from the local community reporting 
landmines or items of UXO. Demining capacity in Kurdistan 
province is believed to stand at around 12 personnel, a 
reduction on earlier capacity.9
Commercial operators include AOM, Immen Sazan Omran 
Pars International, Immen Zamin Espadana, and Solh 
Afarinan-e Bedoun-e Marz (SABM). Three other companies, 
Imen Gostaran Mohit (IGM), Moshaver Omran Iran, and ZPP 
International, undertake quality assurance/quality control 
(QA/QC).10 
Petroleum Engineering and Development Company (PEDEC), 
the development arm of the National Iranian Oil Company 
(NIOC), contracts and monitors commercial operators 
conducting clearance of Iran’s oil and gas producing areas 
which are concentrated in mine-affected areas of western 
and south western Iran bordering Iraq.11
Commercial mine and ERW clearance in Iran is conducted 
to ensure that land is free from explosive ordnance before it 
is used for economic purposes or developed. It is separate 
to humanitarian demining of areas known or suspected to 
contain explosive ordnance in order to make the land safe 
for civilian use, which comes under the remit of IRMAC. In 
a number of countries, commercial demining is applied to 
areas whether or not there is firm evidence of a threat from 
explosive ordnance.
The Iranian Army and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
assisted demining efforts to support the response to the flash 
flooding which affected Iran in March and April 2019.12
International operators are not believed to have been active 
in Iran since 2008.
There is no available information on quality management 
procedures. In the past, very high levels of casualties were 
recorded during demining in Iran. IRMAC reported that since 
its establishment, in 2005, 200 deminers have been killed or 
injured during clearance of mines and ERW, which equates to 
one accident for every 15,000 mines or ERW detected.13
According to IRMAC, more than 2 million mines and over  
1 million items of ERW have been destroyed since the start  
of its programme.14
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS 
No data were available from IRMAC on any mine survey or clearance in 2019, as was the case in previous years.
Iran is believed to have dedicated significant resources and effort to clearing mined areas on its territory, but the results of 
survey and clearance, and the standards to which clearance has been conducted, have not made publicly available.
IRMAC lists the challenges it faces in humanitarian clearance in Iran as: high density of contamination; minefield barriers in 
place; flooding in contaminated areas, which hinders access; mines and UXO displaced by flooding; displacement of mines to 
bottom layers of soil (up to 6 metres); the transformation [degradation] of mines, and vegetation.15
In a mine/ERW clearance project in western Iran, three mines were discovered in 2019, during the first phase of mine/ERW 
clearance of a 10km2 commercial clearance project.16
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Israel should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Israel has obligations under international human rights law 
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION 
The exact extent of mine contamination in Israel is not known. Israel reported 41.58km2 of confirmed mined area and a further 
48.51km2 of suspected mined area, as at the end of 2017,1 but did not report the amount of mined area as at the end of 2018 or 
2019. The combined 90km2 as at end 2017, represents only the area affected by mines that are not deemed essential to Israel’s 
security. The size of other mined areas is not made public. The total figure includes 18.38km2 of mined area in the Jordan 
Valley (11.84km2 of anti-personnel mined area, 6.19km2 of anti-vehicle mined area, and 0.35km2 of mixed mined area) and in the 
West Bank2 (see the Clearing the Mines report on Palestine in this work for further information). 
Table 1: Mined area (at end 2017)3
Type of contamination CHAs Area (km2) SHAs Area (km2)
AP mines only 201 19.93 5 39.54
AV mines only 29 17.00 8 1.17
AP and AV mines 2 4.65 9 7.80
Totals 232 41.58 22 48.51
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle CHA = Confirmed hazardous area SHA = Suspected hazardous area
Israel’s mine problem dates back to the Second World War. Subsequently, Israel laid significant numbers of mines along its 
borders, near military camps and training areas, and near civilian infrastructure. In August 2011, Israel’s military reported 
planting new mines to reinforce minefields and other defences along its de facto border with Syria in the Golan Heights.4 
In the Golan Heights the mines laid by Syrian forces remain largely unknown and areas have been fenced off by the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF). However, according to an online media report, fencing is not always properly maintained with warning 
signs, and civilians occasionally cross into minefields looking for edible plants.5
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
A March 2011 law on minefield clearance established the Israeli National Mine Action Authority (the INMAA) to undertake a 
“comprehensive programme of mine clearing projects inside Israel”.6 The law’s aim was “to create a normative infrastructure 
for the clearance of minefields that are not essential to national security, and to declare them as free from landmines with 
the highest degree of safety to civilians, in accordance with the international obligations of the State of Israel, and within the 
shortest period of time possible.”7 
The law provides for the establishment of a professional Advisory Board, to be composed of representatives of relevant 
ministries and governmental and municipal authorities, as well as a representative for mine victims. It calls for the formulation 
of annual and multi-year plans; coordination and cooperation between INMAA and the IDF; employment of private contractors 
in mine clearance operations; earmarking of specific government budget for such activities; and the creation of a National 
Minefield Clearance Fund which will receive, manage, and allocate donations.8
In February 2019, the Director of INMAA reported that new legislation had been passed, in the form of a regional law, giving 
INMAA responsibility for clearing former military bases and for addressing abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), unexploded 
ordnance (UXO), and anti-vehicle mines. Prior to this, the INMAA had only had responsibility for addressing anti-personnel 
mines, and for mixed mined areas.9 
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INMAA was established within the Ministry of Defence, with ministry staff responsible for planning mine action.10 As a result 
of the new law, staffing at the INMAA was expected to expand by at least 50%, but as at February 2019 it was unclear if the 
budget would be increased to enable this to occur.11
In 2017, the annual mine action budget for Israel was NIS41.7 million (approx. US$11.5 million), of which NIS27 million was from 
the INMAA’s budget and the remaining NIS14.7 million from additional external funding by various infrastructure development 
companies and state authorities.12 The size of the 2018 or 2019 budget is not known.
INMAA provided funding to support mandatory quality assurance (QA) covering the last two months of HALO Trust clearance 
operations at the Arraba minefield in the West Bank and for the full cost of QA at the Baptism Site Project in 2018 and 2019. In 
addition, since November 2019, the Israeli Ministry of Defence (MoD) funded HALO’s full clearance costs at the Baptism Site 
(see the Clearing the Mines report on Palestine for further information).13 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
According to Israel, in 2019, the IDF’s Engineering Corps continued its activities to promote an improved minefield GPS 
recording and GIS capacity “building an accurate archive of manually-emplaced minefields”.14 In addition, INMAA manages  
a “minefield information bank” that is open for public queries concerning demining plans and programmes.15
PLANNING AND TASKING
INMAA is “tasked with forming a national demining plan, which will be consistent with Israel’s international obligations and 
based on IDF demining procedures and instructions, as compatible as possible with International Mine Action Standards”.16 
INMAA approves annual mine clearance plans and “keeps mapping existing minefields and sets priorities, creating a work  
plan for mine clearance in coordination with the relevant agencies”, which is implemented by local civilian operators.17 INMAA 
also has a multi-year clearance plan for 2017−20 that focuses on technical survey and clearance in the Golan Heights in the 
spring/summer/autumn, and in the Jordan Valley and Arava Plain in the winter.18
At the start of 2017, INMAA began surveying the Jordan Valley minefields in the West Bank, operating through Israeli 
companies funded from the national budget. INMAA sees significant potential for cancellation and reduction of mined areas  
in the Jordan Valley, and is using a range of technologies and scientific tools to assess incidence of mine drift. The INMAA 
planned to invest around NIS 900,000 (approximately US$250,000) in this project in 2017–1919. 
In addition, the INMAA continues to oversee HALO Trust clearance projects in Area C of the West Bank.20 
INMAA “defines clearance policies, sets the national priorities and implements them in coordination with other relevant 
governmental ministries, the IDF, and local authorities”.21 Clearance tasks are assigned according to a classification formula 
laid down by INMAA, and prioritisation is set nationally every three years. The criteria used for the formula are largely based 
on the risk level and development potential of the affected areas.22 INMAA has been studying the social and economic impacts 
of land released over the last four years, as well as on the potential impact for future clearance sites.23 
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
National mine action standards, which concern rules and regulations covering clearance methods, quality management, 
legislation, and insurance, are contained on the INMAA website.24 There are also IDF regulations and orders concerning 
marking, fencing, and monitoring, as well as demining and disposing of mines, booby-traps, and other devices.25
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Commercial companies are contracted to conduct clearance as well as QA and quality control (QC). 
In 2017, 106 demining personnel and 36 machines were deployed for clearance operations.26 The clearance companies 
contracted in 2018 and 2019, and their demining capacity, is not known.
The IDF also conduct mine clearance according to their own mine action plans “that are executed by their military methods and 
techniques”. They have an annual programme that includes demining, monitoring, and maintenance of mined area protection.27 
During the winter, the IDF give special attention to minefields that are close to farms, residential areas, or hiker routes, as 
mines may be carried into these areas by floods.28 
The HALO Trust works under the auspices of both INMAA and the Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the West Bank29  
(see the Clearing the Mines report on Palestine for further information).
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Every mine clearance project in Israel has an INMAA supervisor, a QA/QC contractor, and a clearance operator.
Israel uses several types of machines in its mine clearance operations for ground preparation, survey, and clearance.  
They are said to include, as and where appropriate, screening and crushing systems, bucket loaders, excavators, sifters,  
and flails/tillers.30 Some of these operations are conducted by Israel directly, while others are performed by contractors.31 
Throughout 2019, INMAA continued to be supported by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)  
in developing its animal detection system capacity.32 A pilot project using mine detection dogs (MDDs) conducted in 201733 had 
concluded that dogs would not be a valuable tool.34 However, after investigating and conducting further research into animal 
detection and behaviour, INMAA planned to conduct further trials.35
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
In reporting under Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II, Israel stated that INMAA had 
overseen clearance of approximately 577,000m2 in 2019, destroying 1,200 mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). In 
addition, the IDF’s Engineering Corps was reported to have cleared 106,000m2, destroying 911 mines and ERW.36 However, 
there was no disaggregation on what proportion of this land release was of mined area (as opposed to battle area) or whether 
it also includes land released in Palestinian territory in the West Bank.
In addition, according to Israel, in 2019, “the IDF has made significant progress in re-surveying mine affected areas, and in 
examining the possibility of area cancellation, following a completion of a full detailed non-technical survey”.37
The HALO Trust continued its clearance of minefields in Area C of the West Bank in 2019, working under the auspices of both 
INMAA and PMAC, with international and Israeli funding for the Baptism Site Project (see the Clearing the Mines report on 
Palestine for further information). 
Based on the clearance rates of the past few years, it will take many years to clear remaining anti-personnel mine 
contamination in Israel. 




RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Kyrgyzstan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Kyrgyzstan has obligations under international human rights 
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ Kyrgyzstan should detail whether it has fully addressed mine contamination in areas under its jurisdiction or control 
and, if not, report on the extent and location of its remaining mined areas and clearance operations.
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION 
Kyrgyzstan is suspected to be contaminated by mines, though the precise location and extent of any mined areas is not known. 
According to the Minister of Defence, contamination in the southern Batken province bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the 
result of mine use by Uzbekistan’s military between 1999 and 2000, was cleared by Uzbek forces in 2005.1 It was reported, 
however, that rainfall and landslides had caused some mines to shift.2
In 2003, Kyrgyz authorities claimed that Uzbek forces had also laid mines around the Uzbek enclaves of Sokh and 
Shakhimardan located within Kyrgyzstan. Press reports have suggested that Uzbek troops partially cleared territory around 
the Sokh enclave in 2004–05 and that they completely cleared mines around the Shakhimardan enclave in 2004.3 In October 
2017, Uzbek President Islam Karimov, and his Kyrgyz counterpart, Almazbek Atambaev, signed an agreement to demarcate 
some 85% of the countries’ nearly 1,300km-long border and began discussing options for the 36 disputed sectors.4
Kyrgyzstan has admitted using anti-personnel mines in 1999 and 2000 to prevent infiltration across its borders, but has 
claimed that all the mines were subsequently removed and destroyed.5 In June 2011, a government official confirmed:  
“We do not have any minefields on the territory of Kyrgyzstan.”6
In October 2011, ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
and Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Defence conducted a mine action assessment mission. The assessment confirmed that poor 
ammunition storage conditions as well as obsolete ammunition posed a serious threat to human security. Agreement on 
cooperation was reached on 25 July 2013, when the ITF signed a Protocol on Cooperation with the Ministry of Defense of 
the Kyrgyz Republic.7 The ITF has reported that in 2014 it continued to implement activities agreed on in the Protocol on 
Cooperation. This includes technical checks on anti-personnel mines and other ammunition in three storage warehouses, 
procurement of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) equipment, and support for disposal of ammunition surpluses.8
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
Kyrgyzstan has no functioning mine action programme.
LAND RELEASE 
There are no reports of any survey or clearance of mined areas occurring in 2019.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) 
as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Lao PDR has obligations under international human rights law to 
clear landmines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ In light of the continuing reports by clearance operators of anti-personnel mines being encountered during cluster 
munition remnant survey (CMRS), the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) should consider convening a  
sector-wide meeting to discuss National Standards, accreditation, and procedures for addressing all mine 
(both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle) contamination. 
 ■ Lao PDR should ensure that its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database disaggregates 
data on landmines, distinguishing anti-personnel mines from anti-vehicle mines.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
While by far the greatest contamination in Lao PDR is from explosive remnants of war (ERW), in particular cluster munition 
remnants (CMR) (see the Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report on Lao PDR for further information), Lao PDR is also 
contaminated by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. The extent of mine contamination is not known. During the Indochina 
conflict of the 1960s and 1970s, all sides in the war laid anti-personnel mines, particularly around military installations and patrol 
bases. Mined areas also exist in some border regions as a legacy of disputes or tensions with or within neighbouring countries.1 
A Humanity and Inclusion (formerly Handicap International, HI) survey in 1997 found mines in all 15 provinces it surveyed, 
contaminating 214 villages.2 As at June 2020, HI had identified 44 suspected minefields in 19 villages, during non-technical 
survey in Houamuang district of Houaphanh province, where it is currently operating. Anti-personnel mines discovered 
included United States (US)-manufactured M7, M16, and M14 mines, Vietnamese MBV-78A1 mines, and Soviet POMZ mines.3 
Across Lao PDR as a whole, the NRA has reported that “gravel mines” (US air-dropped anti-personnel mines) had all degraded, 
but remaining mine types included M14 anti-personnel blast mines, M16 bounding fragmentation mines, M18 claymore mines, 
and M15 and M19 anti-vehicle mines, Soviet or Chinese PMN anti-personnel blast mines, POMZ fragmentation stake mines, and 
TM41, TM46, and TM57 anti-vehicle mines.4 
The remote location of many mined areas means that mines have little impact and are not a clearance priority. Of 101,512 items 
of explosive ordnance destroyed in 2019, only 40 (less than 0.04%) were mines.5 The NRA, however, has observed that “with a 
steady expansion of land use ‘mined areas’ will become areas for growing concern.”6
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The NRA, created by government decree in 2004 and active since mid 2006, has an interministerial board composed of 
representatives from government ministries and is chaired by the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare.7 The Prime Minister 
of Lao PDR approved a new decree, “On the Organisation and Operations of the National Regulatory Authority for UXO in 
Lao PDR”, in February 2018. The decree defines the position, role, duties, rights, organisational structure, and the working 
principles and methods of the NRA.8 
The NRA acts as the coordinator for national and international clearance operators and serves as the national focal point 
for the sector. This includes overall management and consideration of policy, planning, projects, and coordination of survey 
and clearance operations nationwide, as well as NRA planning and coordination functions at the provincial and district 
levels.9 While the NRA has the central role of UXO Sector coordination, increased coordination and collaboration between all 
stakeholders, including line ministries, local authorities, UXO operators, development partners, are essential for the NRA to 
fulfil its coordination role.10 
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The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provides programmatic and technical support to the NRA and UXO Lao, 
including with regard to information sharing and coordination, albeit at a reduced capacity compared to previous years.11 
Further capacity development in information management, quality management, and operations support, is provided primarily 
to UXO Lao, and to a lesser extent the NRA, through a US-funded grant manager, Tetra Tech.12 The Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) provide capacity development support on the development of Lao’s new national strategy, 
information management, and risk management.13
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
For details regarding gender and diversity in Lao PDR’s survey and clearance programme, please see the Clearing Cluster 
Munition Remnants 2020 report on Lao PDR.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
In November 2019, Lao PDR stated at the Fourth Review Conference of the APMBC in Oslo, that it was in the process of 
preparing a voluntary APMBC Article 7 report. 14 However, as at 15 August 2020, a voluntary report had yet to be submitted. 
The only voluntary Article 7 report submitted previously by Lao PDR, was in 2011.15
PLANNING AND TASKING
The Lao Government’s national strategy, “Safe Path Forward 
II, 2011–20”, was reviewed in June 2015, when the NRA set  
a number of specific targets for the remaining five years  
up to 2020.16 There is a corresponding multi-year work plan  
2016–20 for implementation of the Safe Path Forward 
II strategy,17 but both Safe Path Forward II and the 
corresponding work plan predominantly focus on CMR,  
and do not include a strategy or plans for addressing  
mined areas.
A multi-stakeholder workshop facilitated by the GICHD and 
planned to take place in Vientiane in March 2020, to discuss 
the elaboration of “Safe Path Forward III, 2021–2030”, the 
new ten-year strategy, was postponed due to the COVID-19 
outbreak.18 As at August 2020, the new strategy was being 
drafted.19 Through its US-funded agreement between Tetra 
Tech and the NRA, the United States is continuing to “support 
the Lao Government as it formulates its 10-year National 
Strategic Plan for the UXO Sector, a plan that will map the 
path to achieving SDG 18 – the elimination of UXO as a barrier 
to national development by 2030.”20
Discovery of mines during CMRS will impede CMR survey 
and clearance operations.21 However, it is not known to 
what extent the new “Safe Path Forward III”, which was 
being elaborated during 2020, will include addressing 
anti-personnel (and anti-vehicle) mine contamination.
According to an interview with the NRA in 2018, responsibility 
for clearance of mined areas in Lao PDR predominantly falls 
under the remit of the Lao armed forces.22 
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
Lao PDR’s National Standards make a clear distinction 
between UXO clearance (including CMR) and mine clearance, 
and for the purposes of the National Standards, “UXO does 
not include hand-laid mines but it may include disposal of 
‘one off’ mines located during EOD roving tasks.”23 As such, 
the National Standard on UXO clearance only relates to UXO 
clearance operations and not to mine clearance operations.24 
Furthermore, while dated 2012, the National Standards are 
believed to have been drafted several years before, and are 
in need of being brought up to date in accordance with the 
latest International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). 
According to Lao PDR’s National Standard on Mine Clearance 
Operations (Chapter 12), “the systematic locating and clearing 
of hand laid mines in known or suspected mined areas, are 
not commonly conducted in Lao PDR. However, it is known 
that mined areas exist in Lao PDR and at some stage in the 
future these areas will have to be cleared.”25 
According to Chapter 7 of the National Standards, if a mine 
is located during UXO clearance, work is immediately ceased 
and “the clearance supervisor should then assess the 
situation and determine if the mine is a random one or part of 
a mined area. If the mine is assessed as being part of a mined 
area, work on the site is to cease and the matter reported 
to the tasking authority. Details of mined areas are to be 
reported by the clearance organisation concerned to the NRA 
head office and the NRA provincial office.”26 
However, in practice, determining whether a mine is part 
of a bigger mined area can prove challenging, especially 
if field-based personnel are not trained (or equipped) to 
address anti-personnel mine contamination. Therefore, at the 
July 2019 technical working group meeting on clearance, HI 
proposed an addendum to the standard to help address this.27 
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HI further discussed this issue with the Director of the 
NRA during a visit to Houamuang district in March 2020 
and recommended that the National Standards could be 
expanded to include the suggestion that, “if a landmine is 
found in undeveloped land it shall be assumed to be part of 
a minefield” and “if the landmine is found in well-developed 
land it can assumed to be a random one”. HI also noted, 
however, that “additional information should be gathered to 
add weight to the conclusions; namely the location of wartime 
military bases and location of other landmine finds”,28 as 
well as whether mines discovered by members of the local 
community had been moved.
The standards also note that, “Some relatively small-scale 
mine clearance has been carried out by UXO Lao and by 
commercial operators in the past but mine clearance 
operations are not regularly carried out as a deliberate  
mine action activity in Lao PDR.”29
According to the National Standards, “Mine clearance 
operations are considerably more dangerous than UXO area 
clearance operations and the requirements and procedures 
for mine clearance are more stringent. When mine clearance 
operations are necessary, they are only to be carried out by 
accredited mine clearance organisations with personnel with 
the appropriate training and equipment and specific mine 
clearance operating procedures.”30
Non-governmental organisation (NGO) clearance operators 
in Lao are not currently accredited for mine clearance,31 and 
national standards would need revising in order for NGO to 
conduct mine clearance.32 In addition, HI believes that the 
NRA should coordinate and organise training, and adjust the 
standards accordingly, with regard to CMRS in areas also 
affected by mines. Demographic pressures regarding land 
will lead to people accessing remote places that could be 
mined. Action on locating and recording mined areas needs 
to occur before the older generations that know about the 
presence of landmines disappear.33
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS
No planned or systematic mine clearance was conducted 
during 2019, though 40 mines were reported to have been 
destroyed in 2019 out of a total of 101,512 items of explosive 
ordnance, according to Lao PDR’s transparency reporting 
under the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).34 This 
compares to 28 mines in 91,468 items of UXO destroyed 
in 2018.35 As yet, no distinction is made in IMSMA between 
anti-personnel mines and anti-vehicle mines.36
However, according to the NRA’s 2019 UXO Sector Annual 
Report, a total of 39 mines were destroyed during 2019: 
4 by humanitarian clearance operators during clearance 
operations (3 by UXO Lao and 1 by HI); 1 by HALO Trust 
during technical survey operations; and 34 destroyed during 
roving tasks (10 by UXO Lao; 3 by HALO Trust; 4 by NPA; 2 by 
MAG; 17 by HI; and 2 by Army58).37
Data reported by HALO Trust, HI, Mines Advisory Group 
(MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) on the number of 
anti-personnel mines discovered and destroyed during cluster 
munition survey and clearance operations in 2019 varied from 
data in the NRA’s 2019 UXO Sector Annual Report.38
In 2019, HALO Trust discovered and destroyed four 
anti-personnel mines. Three were found during non-technical 
survey as part of CMRS operations in Sepon and Phalanxai 
districts in Savannakhet province and one anti-personnel 
mine during an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot task.39 
In addition, as already included in last year’s Clearing the 
Mines 2019 report on Laos PDR, in July 2019, HALO Trust’s 
EOD team leader responded to a call-out in Phalanxai 
district in Savannakhet province, near the site of an old US 
military base, during which a cache of M-16 mines, a couple 
of other laid M-16 mines, and a PMN mine were discovered. 
Villagers told HALO Trust that there had been accidents 
in the immediate area in the 1980s, but that the PMN had 
been discovered last year while ploughing the land and 
was moved to its current position. HALO did not destroy 
the mines discovered, but reported the mined area to the 
NRA and withdrew from the area immediately.40 The HALO 
Trust planned to start mine clearance operations in 2020 in 
Phalanxai district,41 subject to accreditation and necessary 
amendments being made to the National Standards.
In 2019, HI discovered and destroyed one anti-personnel mine 
during CMR clearance operations in Houaphan province and 
a further 15 anti-personnel mines during EOD spot tasks.42 
With respect to spot tasks, HI will only destroy mines that 
are clearly identified in a spot task location where it can be 
accessed safely.43 If mines are discovered during cluster 
munition remnant survey or clearance operations, the task 
is immediately suspended and the discovery reported to HI’s 
Operations Manager, who then visits the site to assess the 
situation. If the discovered mine was not emplaced and was 
found in land used for agriculture it is destroyed. Additional 
information is obtained about the threat of mines from the 
landowner and a risk assessment conducted before deciding 
whether or not operations are allowed to resume. If the 
mine found is emplaced and is in an area which has not been 
developed, the task is halted, additional data collected, and 
external boundaries of the site are tentatively identified 
(historically safe tracks). A mine report is then submitted by 
HI to the NRA.44
As at June 2020, HI had identified 44 suspected minefields in 
19 villages, in Houamuang district, in Houaphanh province.45 
During non-technical survey and risk education visits, HI 
interviews older generations to understand the village 
history during the war, including anti-aircraft gun and 
other military positions; often M16 and M14 mines were laid 
around defensive positions. HI also collects information on 
injuries sustained in the forest due to mines and on areas 
not developed or which are not accessed due to previous 
accidents or reports of injured animals, or mines being 
detonated by fires during “slash and burn” operations. In 
some instances, villagers had collected or moved mines they 
had discovered.46
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During non-technical survey in 2019, MAG found five emplaced anti-personnel mines in two separate suspected minefields 
in Gnommalath district, Khammouane province. For emplaced mines, basic information is gathered, a projected polygon 
produced electronically, and information immediately shared with the NRA. MAG reported, but did not destroy the emplaced 
mines, and its teams are not trained or authorised to deal with suspected minefields.47 MAG did, however, also find a small 
number of abandoned or moved landmines and obtained specific permission for its EOD team to destroy these, with the support 
of MAG’s international Technical Field Managers. 48
In 2019, NPA discovered and destroyed (in situ) a total of four anti-personnel mines. One mine was discovered in Laongarm 
district of Saravane province and the remaining three mines (types M14, M16, and M18) were discovered in Champasak 
province, in the districts of Bachiangchaleunsook, Paksong, and Pathoomphone.49 NPA’s survey teams in Champasak province 
received information on the presence of mines during non-technical survey in September 2019, and after this was confirmed  
by NPA, work was stopped in the area and NPA reported the suspected minefield to the NRA.50
UXO Lao was operating in nine provinces in 2019: Attapeu, Champasak, Houaphanh, Khammouane, Luang Prabang, 
Savannakhet, Saravan, Xekong, and Xiengkhouang. UXO Lao did not report the total number of anti-personnel mines it 
destroyed, but did note that during its CMR clearance operations in 2019 it destroyed two anti-personnel mines, both in 
Xiengkhouang province. It also confirmed that no anti-vehicle mines were found or destroyed in 2019.51 
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The Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) and its national and international partners continued to make progress in mine 
clearance in 2019, both in the far south near the Blue Line and in small, scattered mined areas in Mount Lebanon, as well as 
addressing more recent contamination along the border with Syria in the north. In a positive development, on 30 January 2020, 
the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) and LMAC signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on demining, 
with UNIFIL planning to start survey and clearance for humanitarian purposes. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
 ■ Lebanon should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority. Despite not yet 
being a State Party to the APMBC, Lebanon has obligations under international human rights law to clear landmines  
in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ Wherever possible, evidence-based non-technical survey and technical survey should be used to more accurately 
define areas of actual mine contamination prior to initiating clearance. 
 ■ The integration and consolidation of the LMAC and Regional Mine Action Centre (RMAC) databases and servers 
should be completed as soon as possible. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2019, Lebanon had more than 18.65km2 of confirmed mined area, including along the Blue Line, across 
1,353 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) (see Table 1).1 Three new CHAs of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine 
contamination, totalling 8,714m2, were added to the database in 2019.2
At the end of 2018, Lebanon reported more than 19.6km2 of confirmed mined area across 1,399 CHAs.3 
Table 1: Mined area by province (at end 2019)4
Province CHAs Area (m2)*
Al Beqaa 51 969,733
Al Janoub and Al Nabatiyeh (south Lebanon) 985 7,927,166
Jabal Loubnan (Mount Lebanon) 272 9,501,128
Al Shimal (north Lebanon) 45 254,658
Totals 1,353 18,652,685
* Includes 474,904m2 containing anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature at Jroud Arsal.
In addition, “Dangerous Areas” totalling more than 13.3km2 are suspected to contain scattered mines, booby-traps, or other 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) other than cluster munition remnants (CMR).5 The “Dangerous Areas” relate predominantly 
to rapid response or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks and are often the result of accidents having been reported 
to LMAC by the local community,6 for which further investigation/survey is required in order to confirm the existence, type, and 
extent of any contamination.7 
Mines affect the north and south of the country, and the Mount Lebanon governorate in the middle, though most mined areas 
are in the south. The minefields in north Lebanon and Mount Lebanon are typically “militia” minefields (i.e. were laid without 
a pattern and for which minefield records and maps do not exist), and were laid by multiple actors during the civil war. The 
mined areas in the south are typically conventional minefields, laid according to a pattern and where the location of the mines 
is identified on minefield maps.8
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Lebanon’s mine problem is largely a legacy of 15 years of earlier civil conflict and Israeli invasions of south Lebanon (in 1978 
and 1982) and subsequent occupations that ended in May 2000, and there is a small amount of new mine contamination in “Jroud 
Arsal” on the north-east border with Syria, resulting from spill-over of the Syrian conflict onto Lebanese territory in 2014–17.9 
The Lebanese territory in question was fully regained by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in August 2017 and was assigned to 
LMAC for survey and clearance. Contamination also includes improvised explosive devices (IEDs), CMR, and other ERW.10 
The LAF continue to play a major role in this northern region, as the number of rapid-response missions remains high. The 
increased number of returnees for economic purposes has led to more ERW being found.11 Furthermore, in its annual report 
for 2019, LMAC noted that it has had to address the challenge posed by contamination from mines migrating from the north 
Syrian border, through floods and river beads, to new areas in Wadi Khaled and Wadi Nahle in the north.12
Lebanon is also contaminated with CMR and other ERW (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report 
on Lebanon for further information).
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Established in 1998 by the Council of Ministers, the Lebanon 
Mine Action Authority (LMAA) is the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Defence and is chaired by the Minister of Defence. 
The LMAA has overall responsibility for Lebanon’s mine 
action programme. In 2007, a national mine action policy 
outlined the structure, roles, and responsibilities within the 
programme, and LMAC was tasked to execute and coordinate 
the programme on behalf of the LMAA.13
LMAC, part of the LAF, is based in Beirut. Since 2009, the 
RMAC-N, based in Nabatiyeh, which is a part of LMAC, has 
overseen operations in south Lebanon and western Beqaa, 
under LMAC supervision.14 At the end of 2018, a new regional 
centre, RMAC-RB, was established in the north-east of 
Lebanon in the village of Ras Baalbek, to oversee the mine 
action operations in this region.15 To a large extent LMAC has 
a well-functioning capacity, but, as they are army officers, 
the senior management of LMAC and RMAC are typically 
routinely rotated (every couple of years), which can hamper 
development and continuity in the management of the three 
mine action centres.16 The current director of LMAC started 
in March 2019, replacing his predecessor who had served as 
director for two years.17
A new standing operating procedure (SOP), developed 
for LMAC in 2020, was reported to be in its final stage of 
approval as at March 2020. This SOP specifies the roles of 
each section of LMAC and clarifies the responsibilities and 
cooperation between sections. It is hoped that it will help  
new LMAC staff and reduce the impact of staff rotations.18
UN Development Programme (UNDP) personnel, funded 
by the European Union (EU), are also seconded to 
LMAC, providing support for capacity building, including 
transparency reporting, strategic reviews, Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database  
entry, community liaison, and quality assurance (QA).19 
EU funding for UNDP institutional support to LMAC, which 
had been due to finish at the end of 2019, but which would 
have resulted in a gap in capacity development,20 was 
extended for the first six months of 2020. During this period, 
UNDP was providing expertise and support on operational 
efficiency, prioritisation, research into clearance in difficult 
terrains, and risk education for Syrian refugees.21 With 
regard to difficult terrains, the Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) will also partner with 
LMAC on a study that was expected to start in the third 
quarter of 2020.22 UNDP also mobilised funds for the first 
half of 2020 from the Norwegian Embassy, in order to: assist 
with the strengthening of national capacity to document and 
prioritise clearance operations in line with Mine Action Forum 
recommendations; help LMAC to meet its national, regional, 
and international obligations and coordination functions and 
ensure follow-up of Mine Action Forum action points; and to 
support LMAC in effectively communicating its results and 
establishing partnerships.23 LMAC will seek to extend UNDP’s 
support beyond the second quarter of 2020.24
A “Mine Action Forum” has been established in Lebanon in 
close partnership between LMAC and Norway. It provides 
an informal platform for LMAC to continue open dialogue 
and information sharing between the national authorities, 
implementing partners, and donors, on priorities and needs 
for the survey and clearance of cluster munitions and 
landmines in Lebanon.25 Through the forum, the LMAA is 
“promoting a transparent and inclusive partnership with all 
HMA stakeholders”.26 The forum meets twice a year, with UNDP 
designated as the secretariat to follow up on action points and 
develop progress reports.27 It is an example of what a “Country 
Coalition” under the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) 
could look like, but in the case of Lebanon it was agreed the 
forum should be broadened to include landmines, and not 
just CMR. As of writing, the most recent Mine Action Forum 
was held on 22 January 2020, during which LMAC officers 
presented and discussed the new 2020–25 national mine 
action strategy, operational efficiencies, and a new explosive 
ordnance risk education (EORE) project.28
The Mine Action Forum in Lebanon has resulted in better 
coordination and greater transparency as well as on 
enhancements to land release methodology, enshrined in 
the revised National Mine Action Standards (NMAS). These 
measures have all served to strengthen donor confidence 
and mobilise additional resources.29 
There is good coordination and collaboration between  
LMAC/the RMAC and clearance operators, with the operators 
consulted before key decisions are taken.30 International 
clearance operators reported that an enabling environment 
exists for mine action in Lebanon, with no obstacles 
regarding visas for international staff, approval of MoUs,  
or the importation of equipment.31 
A technical working group (TWG) was established in March 
2018, under the auspices of LMAC, following the release of 
the revised NMAS. The TWG, which meets quarterly, provides 
a useful forum for LMAC/the RMACs to meet collectively 
with clearance operators to review and discuss field issues, 
including implementation of revisions to the NMAS, and 
potential ways to improve operational efficiencies.32




As in the previous year, Lebanon reported contributing US$9 million annually in 2019 towards mine action in Lebanon (for both 
mine- and CMR-related work): to support costs associated with the running of LMAC (facilities and staff); the LAF Engineering 
Regiment companies working in demining (four teams, two of which work on submunitions; in addition to mechanical and mine 
detection dog (MDD) support); risk education; and victim assistance.33 
A Regional School for Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon (RSHDL) has been established in partnership between Lebanon and 
France, with technical mine action support provided by a French military officer, to support the development of the curriculum 
on EOD disposal (EOD levels 1, 2, and 3) in compliance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).34 The Regional 
School became operational in 2017, enabling civilian and military personnel from Arab and other countries to benefit from an 
array of courses and workshops on demining.35 It now provides training to national, regional, and international participants, 
including courses on non-technical survey, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), operational efficiency, and threat assessment 
and risk management.36
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The gender and diversity-related policy applied at LMAC 
is that of the LAF military rules. According to LMAC, all its 
personnel are familiar with these rules and the specific 
provisions related to gender equality and inclusion, 
safeguarding, and behavioural codes.37 
LMAC reported that it has taken several actions to 
mainstream gender in its implementation plan, including 
through inclusive policies, data disaggregation in risk 
education and victim assistance, and participation in 
courses at the RSHDL.38 In agreement with LMAC, the GICHD 
conducted a gender and diversity capacity assessment visit 
to Lebanon in July 2019. The aim of the assessment was 
to reinforce a sustainable national capacity for gender and 
diversity mainstreaming in the LMAC and contribute to the 
achievement of gender equality and inclusion.39 In August 
2019, LMAC reported that it had appointed a new gender focal 
point, who will help mainstream gender-sensitive policies 
and procedures and monitor their implementation across the 
mine action centre.40 
Lebanon’s new National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, signed 
by the LMAA in June 2020, includes considerations on gender 
and diversity.41 Of the five objectives in the new strategy, the 
fifth states that, “The specific needs and perspective of women, 
girls, men and boys from all groups of society are considered, 
in order to deliver an inclusive HMA [mine action] response”. 
LMAC also acknowledges in the strategy that, “Mine Action 
is a male-dominated environment and we have therefore a 
particular responsibility to empower women and ensure that 
we have a gender sensitive approach to our work”.42 Gender 
and diversity considerations will be further detailed in LMAC’s 
strategic implementation plan, which was being elaborated in 
the course of 2020, to support the new strategy.43
Of LMAC’s 157 personnel, 16 (10%) are female. The number 
of staff at LMAC is determined by the LAF headquarters, 
to whom LMAC always requests that the percentage of 
women is increased.44 With respect to operational roles, two 
women work for the operations section and one woman is a 
member of the non-technical survey team. With respect to 
managerial/supervisory level positions at LMAC, six women 
work in management and five in IT.45 
Humanity and Inclusion (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 
and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) all reported having gender 
policies in place in 2019.46
HI disaggregates relevant mine action data by sex and age. 
HI also ensures that all population groups, including women 
and children, are consulted during its survey and community 
liaison activities. However, while 50% of HI managerial/
supervisory positions are held by women, only 3% of its 
survey and clearance staff are female.47 
LAMINDA did not report the percentage of female deminers, 
but did report that women are employed in LAMINDA’s 
clearance teams and that one female staff member is in a 
managerial position, as clearance team leader.48
MAG reported that it consults women during survey and 
community liaison activities; that all its community liaison 
teams are mixed; and that its data is disaggregated by sex 
and age. Overall, women account for 16% of operational roles 
in MAG’s survey and clearance teams in Lebanon, and 28%  
of managerial level/supervisory positions.49 
NPA is in the process of developing an implementation plan 
for its organisational gender policy for Lebanon, based on 
recommendations from the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). It reported making progress 
in encouraging more women to apply, resulting in a 5% 
increase in the proportion of women hired for operational 
roles. NPA planned to conduct training in gender equality, 
safeguarding, and code of conduct in 2020.50 NPA reported 
that its survey and community liaison teams are gender 
balanced, and 20% of employees in operational roles in NPA’s 
survey and clearance team in the south are women and 32% 
in its Arsal operations which commenced in 2018. A total of 
20% of NPA’s managerial level/supervisory positions are held 
by women. NPA disaggregates data by sex and age.51
Both UNIFIL’s Troop Contributing Countries (Cambodia and 
China) have female deminers and team leaders and in total 
there are seven women (5% of the total demining personnel).52
Women and children are consulted during survey and 
community liaison activities.53 According to LMAC, Lebanon’s 
baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination has been 
established through inclusive consultation with women, girls, 
boys, and men, including, where relevant, minority groups.54
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
During 2019, efforts continued to integrate RMAC’s 
information management database with the LMAC server 
and to synchronise the two databases.55 Harmonisation and 
consolidation of the LMAC and RMAC databases will enable 
IMSMA reports will be sent directly to LMAC for approval, 
improving the accuracy and efficiency of the process. The 
integration will also help better protect data while decreasing 
maintenance costs.56 As at March 2020, harmonisation of the 
two databases had been completed and servers installed to 
maintain the database, but LMAC was awaiting resolution of a 
technical issue to ensure the two servers are properly linked.57 
Furthermore, LMAC is migrating from its current version 
of IMSMA (IMSMA New Generation) to IMSMA Core, which it 
hopes will help facilitate the production of clearer reports 
that can be translated into dashboards for stakeholders, 
including donors, to monitor and follow.58 As at March 2020, 
migration of data to IMSMA Core had begun, but the process 
requires regular IMSMA back-ups and corrections to data and 
therefore takes time.59 In the process of migrating to IMSMA 
core, LMAC discovered some overlap between its records 
of Dangerous Areas and minefields. Non-technical survey 
teams therefore checked these overlaps on the ground and 
the database clean-up was completed in July 2020.60 LMAC 
personnel will receive GICHD training on IMSMA Core and 
LMAC planned to launch it by the end of 2020.61 
Some clearance tasks result in a clearance output in excess 
of the task size originally recorded in IMSMA, often due to 
fade-out. LMAC has reported that the system for database 
entry now more accurately reflects operational data.62 Now, 
any area cleared in excess of the original task size is no 
longer recorded as additional tasks in the database, but  
as “productivity”.63
Some of the information in the database may not be accurate. 
This is especially the case with respect to minefields from 
civil war, for which non-technical survey was conducted 
many years ago, with limited information available. It can be 
challenging to gain a clear picture of what contamination was 
cleared by the LAF and if the related clearance documents 
were transferred to LMAC and are included in the information 
management database.64
MAG started work on “Survey123” in 2019, during which it 
reviewed data forms and data flow, in preparation for the 
launch of the project in the second half of 2020.65 According  
to LAMINDA, there are now daily reporting sheets for items 
and clearance.66 
In the Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, LMAC states 
that it will initiate voluntary APMBC Article 7 reporting,67 but 
had yet to do so as at May 2020.
PLANNING AND TASKING
In September 2011, LMAC adopted a strategic mine action 
plan for 2011–20.68 The plan called for clearance of all CMR 
by 2016 and for completion of mine clearance outside the 
Blue Line by 2020. Both goals were dependent on capacity, 
but progress fell well short of planning targets, which were 
not met. Interim reviews of the strategy conducted in 2014 
and 2016, to assess progress against milestones, highlighted 
the huge gap between actual mine clearance output and 
planned output, when compared to the original strategic 
plan. The second review also reflected on the achievements, 
challenges, and lessons learned, offering recommendations 
that reflected available resources (financial and human), as 
well as a qualitative roadmap towards completion.69
LMAC has developed a new National Mine Action Strategy 
for 2020–25, with support from the EU funded UNDP project, 
in a participatory approach with national and international 
implementing agencies, mine action non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), UN agencies, and donors.70 The new 
strategy was signed by the LMAA in June 2020. A mid-term 
and final external review are planned, as well as annual 
reporting on progress.71 LMAC is also elaborating a strategic 
implementation plan for 2020–25, in collaboration with 
implementing partners, to operationalise the new strategy 
with objectives, outputs, and indicators. LMAC expected to 
complete the implementation plan in August 2020. LMAC also 
plans to develop annual plans.72 
Clearance operators in Lebanon believe that reprioritisation 
is needed, as all of the current tasks fall between priorities 
2 and 3, and reprioritisation has not occurred for some 
time.73 According to LMAC, increased urbanisation; clearance 
of the Blue Line; spill-over from Syria creating new 
contamination, including IEDs; and the sudden increase in 
residents, have combined to result in a change to clearance 
priorities. LMAC plans to work with operators to develop an 
updated prioritisation approach, including focusing on the 
socio-economic impact of contamination.74
HI’s prioritisation of tasks is based on proximity to populated 
area, but mine clearance operations in north Lebanon and the 
Mount Lebanon area are also determined by seasonal factors: 
clearance of low altitude minefields during winter (October to 
April), and then clearance tasks above 2,000 metres begin in 
April and continue through the summer, depending on snow.75 
Most of the remaining demining tasks in the area in which 
HI has been operating since 2011 are in contaminated cedar 
forests at high altitude.76
Prior to 2016, demining along the border with Israel had 
been said to depend on “political developments”,77 but the 
Lebanese government subsequently took the decision to 
initiate larger-scale, planned clearance on the Blue Line78  
and clearance by humanitarian demining operators began  
in November 201679 and remained ongoing as of writing.





STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Lebanon developed its first NMAS in 2010.80 Adopting a 
consultative and constructive approach with its implementing 
partners, LMAC undertook a project with UNDP and other 
partners, funded by the EU, to revise and harmonise national 
standards with IMAS, as well as to add new modules not 
present in the original standards.81 The revised NMAS, 
formally approved in March 2018, have a solid focus on land 
release and evidence-based decision-making, in line with 
the IMAS, and based on recommendations and analysis of 
operational data. Notable enhancements included reduction 
of the required clearance depth from 20cm to 15cm; 
revision of fadeout specifications for pattern minefields, and 
enhancements in how rapid response tasks are addressed 
and recorded.82 
Mined areas in pattern minefields/along the Blue Line have 
been reclassified into high-threat hazardous area (HTHA) 
and low-threat hazardous area (LTHA). The use of technical 
survey, instead of full clearance, is permitted for some parts 
of CHAs based on discussion and agreement between LMAC 
operations officers and clearance operators.83 Previously, 
full clearance had been required for 15 metres from the mine 
rows, but in the revised NMAS this has been changed to a 
required fade-out of five metres from the mine rows, and 
technical survey from the edge of the five-metre fadeout 
up to the minefield fence, for minefields in which the lanes 
have not been disrupted.84 If there is no fence, 10 metres of 
technical survey is required from the edge of the 5-metre 
fade-out. Fade-out for anti-vehicle mines has been reduced 
from 20 metres to 10.85 Previously, operators have been 
required to fully clear the area between the mine rows and 
the minefield fence, plus an additional two metres outside  
the fence, with one asset.86 
MAG and NPA have noted that to further enhance efficiencies, 
fade-out requirements at the Blue Line could be further 
revised based on empirical evidence. Evidence from 
clearance operations on the Blue Line to date reveals that 
no mines have been found further than five metres from the 
outer mine row, in minefields in which the lanes have not 
been disturbed. In the operators’ opinion, technical survey 
beyond the five-metre fadeout (up to the minefield fence or for 
ten metres in the absence of a fence) should only be required 
if there is sufficient evidence to suggest mines have migrated 
from the mine rows.87 
Further updates made to Lebanon’s NMAS in 2019, included 
introduction of a new NMAS (07.14) on Risk Assessment and 
a new standard (09.31) on IED Disposal (IEDD).88 With regard 
to technical survey, the NMAS no longer specifies a minimum 
percentage of area over which technical survey must be 
conducted, which permits LMAC to reduce technical survey 
when appropriate, especially on the Blue Line and for cluster 
munition remnants.89 The NMAS also allows for areas under 
full clearance to be reduced (or in part reduced), based on 
information gathered during clearance, as well as for the 
original task boundaries to be changed based on experience 
during clearance. Changes were also made to the NMAS 
(09.31) on demolitions.90
NPA believes changes could be considered to the procedure 
for missing mines in patterned minefields along the Blue 
Line. Many mines are missing due to water and soil-related 
movement or detonation by animals and the current 
“missed-mine” protocol is resource-intensive. In 2019,  
NPA began to consider using Ground Penetrating Radar 
(GPR)-equipped detectors as a solution and was planning 
to arrange a potential trial of United Nations Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS)-owned dual sensor equipment in 2020  
to conduct missed-mine checks.91
NPA also recommends that LMAC continues its review of 
how the metal-free requirements contained in NMAS are 
implemented in operations in the north-east of Lebanon, 
with a view to enhancing clearance efficiency while also 
maintaining safety.92
LAMINDA and MAG also reported that following discussions 
between clearance operators and the national authorities, 
the NMAS for non-fragment blast minefields on the Blue 
Line have been amended and now permit the safety distance 
between deminers to be reduced from 25 to 15 metres.93
Anti-vehicle minefields represent another challenge on the 
Blue Line because of their proximity to the fence. LMAC has 
been discussing the best way to render safe the anti-vehicle 
mines and move them away, in order to save time on 
anti-personnel mine clearance. In coordination with LMAC, 
multiple trials were conducted by MAG in late 2019, looking 
at various destruction techniques, including burning, which 
has proved to be effective and safe. Other options are under 
consideration, including render safe and moving the mines, 
UNIFIL involvement, and a combination of these and existing 
methods. As at March 2020, a final decision had not been 
made on this issue.94
New Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS) 
detectors were planned to be introduced for use on Blue Line 
operations in 2019, with the aim of increasing efficiency. This 
did not occur. As at March 2020, however, a training area at 
the RSHDL was close to completion. MAG planned to bring 
HSTAMIDS detectors to Lebanon in 2020, after which training 
and testing will be conducted.95 
In the last couple of years, national authorities in Lebanon 
have actively promoted the use of non-technical survey and 
technical survey, in order to define the presence or absence 
of an explosive threat.96 In 2019, LMAC agreed with the 
NGO operators the option for each to have a non-technical 
survey team to re-survey for each new task prior to starting 
clearance. As at March 2020, the NGOs had non-technical 
survey teams or were negotiating with donors to establish 
them,97 and where necessary, clearance operators are now 
permitted to conduct non-technical survey prior to clearance 
operations.98 
Furthermore, operators now have an opportunity to discuss 
specific land release considerations with LMAC for assigned 
clearance tasks, which arise during the pre-clearance 
assessment stage of operations. Such discussions might 
result in the refining of the task size or approved land release 
specifications (e.g. use of technical survey, for all or part of 
the task, rather than full clearance).99 International NGOs 
see collaboration between LMAC and clearance operators 
on application of evidence-based non-technical survey and 
technical survey where needed as being essential to more 
accurately confirm and define areas of mine contamination 
prior to clearance.100
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OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2019, manual mine clearance was conducted by international operators DanChurchAid (DCA), HI, LAMINDA, MAG, and NPA, 
along with the Engineering Regiment of the LAF. In addition, as in previous years UNIFIL also conducted demining operations 
on the Blue Line in 2019, but not for humanitarian purposes. 
The LAF Engineering Regiment has deployed four clearance teams (two BAC and two mine clearance) to work in the south of 
Lebanon and Mount Lebanon. In addition, Engineering Regiment and Combat Engineering companies in all Brigades conduct 
EOD spot tasks and respond to rapid-response callouts across Lebanon.101 The LAF has seven MDD teams102 for technical 
survey and for use as a secondary asset supporting clearance. The LAF also have mechanical assets. In Lebanon, machines 
are mostly used as secondary assets to support clearance teams (e.g. for ground preparation, rubble removal, or for fadeout); 
in areas where manual clearance is difficult; and for technical survey and LTHA.103 Through the Engineering Regiment, LMAC 
provides MDDs and mechanical assistance to clearance operators that lack this capacity.104 Often, however, the terrain is not 
suitable for MDDs or machines.
Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2019105
Operator Manual teams Total deminers* Dogs and handlers Machines** Comments***
DCA 2 16 0 0
HI 4 29 0 0
LAMINDA 2 12 0 0 LAMINDA increased its mine 
clearance capacity by two 
persons in each team in 2020.106
LMAC 2 16 7 4
MAG 6 48 0 7
NPA 7 37 0 0
Totals 23 158 7 11
* Clearance personnel could also be deployed for technical survey. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters. *** Clearance teams also work on technical survey tasks.
In addition, in 2019, clearance capacity was also provided 
by two UNIFIL Troop Contributing Countries, Cambodia and 
China. Operational capacities and capabilities of UNIFIL are 
determined by operational need. UNIFIL capacity in 2019 
remained the same as the previous year and comprised five 
manual clearance teams, two EOD teams, and one mechanical 
team, totalling 123 persons in total. Capacity was expected 
to remain the same in 2020.107 UNMAS provided refresher 
training, validation of the teams, and QA during UNIFIL 
demining operations in 2019. 108 UNMAS also carries out 
confirmatory training with UNIFIL demining units when  
they rotate into the country.109 
UNIFIL was established in 1978110 in order to confirm the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon (which 
occurred in 2000); restore international peace and security; 
and assist the Government of Lebanon to re-establish its 
authority in the area.111 The primary task of UNIFIL mine 
clearance teams has been to clear access lanes through 
minefields in order to visibly demarcate the 118km-long Blue 
Line. Historically, UNIFIL has not conducted clearance on the 
Blue Line for humanitarian purposes but only to facilitate 
placement of markers by clearing three-metre-wide lanes 
into mined areas,112 and also to clear mines close to UNIFIL 
posts or which pose a danger to UNIFIL patrols. However, in a 
positive development, on 30 January 2020, UNIFIL and LMAC 
signed an MoU on Humanitarian Demining, and as at April 
2020, were working together to plan to begin survey and 
clearance for humanitarian purposes and for UNIFIL to help 
the LAF/LMAC clear areas contaminated by both mines and 
unexploded ordnance (UXO).113
With respect to non-technical survey capacity, LMAC had 
three non-technical survey teams in 2019;114 HI had one 
non-technical survey team with three personnel, which 
started field operations in October 2019;115 and MAG had 
two operational non-technical survey teams in 2019, with 
a total of four personnel.116 NPA had no non-technical 
survey capacity in 2019, although it was in the process of 
establishing this in 2020. NPA’s dedicated technical survey 
capacity was exclusively tasked to CMR tasks, although, 
where necessary, clearance personnel also undertook 
technical survey of mined area. NPA reported that it was 
moving towards a multi-task approach to be able to respond 
to changing priorities and operational constraints.117
NPA believes that MDDs could be beneficial in technical 
survey to help reduce areas containing low density ERW 
(including CMR) and IED contamination in north-east 
Lebanon, on the border with Syria.118




LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of more than 0.79km2 of mined area (i.e. area suspected or confirmed to contain anti-personnel mines) was released 
in 2019, of which 0.48km2 was cleared, 0.11km2 was reduced through technical survey, and 0.2km2 was cancelled through 
non-technical survey. 
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, 204,343m2 of mined area, was cancelled through 
non-technical survey and 109,191m2 was reduced through 
technical survey (see Tables 3 and 4).119 This is an increase 
compared to the 28,633m2 of mined area cancelled through 
non-technical survey in 2018 and 7,646m2 reduced through 
technical survey,120 and reflects LMAC’s increased application 
of survey.
As non-technical survey operations in 2019 were focused on 
CMR, no mined area was cancelled by NGO operators in 2019. 
Non-technical survey of mined areas was planned to take 
place in the course of 2020.121 
Neither DCA, HI, nor NPA reduced any mined area through 
technical survey the previous year, demonstrating a positive 
trend in the increased use of technical survey in Lebanon  
in 2019.
Three CHAs of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine 
contamination, totalling 8,714m2, were added to the database 
in 2019.122
Table 3: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2019123
Province Operator Area cancelled (m²)




Table 4: Reduction through technical survey in 2019124






* Included in Table 5 clearance data.
CLEARANCE IN 2019
Lebanon reported clearing more than 0.48km2 of mined area in 2019 (0.36km2 by demining NGOs and 0.12km2 by LAF), 
destroying in the process 21,708 anti-personnel mines (21,655 by demining NGOs, 53 by the LAF), 22 anti-vehicle mines, and 
301 items of other UXO (see Table 5).125 A further 3,393 anti-personnel mines were destroyed by UNIFIL in 2019.126 Clearance  
in 2019 was a slight increase on the 0.39km2 of mined area cleared in 2018.127
Table 5: Mine clearance in 2019128
Operator Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed UXO destroyed
DCA 37,481 3,489 0 76
HI 92,264 262 0 25
MAG 190,920 14,416 22 144
NPA 25,784 2,660 0 4
LAMINDA 15,130 828 0 52
LAF* 121,398 **53 14 ***4,134
Totals 482,977 21,708 36 4,435
AP = Anti-personnel; AV = Anti-vehicle; UXO = unexploded ordnance; N/R = not reported
* Includes items destroyed by the LAF combat engineers during rapid response call outs across Lebanon.  
** Includes three victim-activated IEDs. *** UXO destroyed across all LAF operations, including BAC.
In addition, UNIFIL found and destroyed 3,393 anti-personnel mines during its 2019 operations along the UNIFIL patrol road, 
in the far south of Lebanon near the Blue Line.129 LMAC does not have access to UNIFIL clearance data, but as part of the MoU 
signed in 2020, LMAC have asked for UNIFIL’s historical clearance data and will update the national database accordingly.130
According to LAMINDA, its mine clearance tasks are larger than the reported size in the database, due to the disturbance of 
the minefield areas and dislocation of mine rows onto nearby land, which reportedly occurred in 2016 when Israeli bulldozers 
entered the minefields during the conflict and after the initial survey by the LMAC.131
HI’s clearance output decreased slightly in 2018, compared to the previous year, due to extremely bad weather conditions in 
2019. The number of anti-personnel mines found and destroyed decreased significantly. A total of 10 mined areas cleared by HI 
in 2019 were found not to contain anti-personnel mines.132
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Due to the nature of the militia minefields in north Lebanon, there is sometimes a lack of clearly defined CHAs. Accordingly, 
in certain areas, additional non-technical survey and technical survey could help to more accurately define areas of actual 
contamination. Unfortunately, deployment of MDDs or demining machinery to help facilitate survey and clearance in north 
Lebanon is limited in scope, due to the climate and terrain of many of the tasks in the region.133
The CHAs tasked by LMAC to clearance operators do not include obligatory fade-out distances, which can considerably 
increase the overall size of the task.134 
NPA cleared roughly the same amount in 2019 as the year before, with the slight increase in 2019 due to expansion of  
clearance operations in north-east Lebanon. NPA reported completing one clearance task in the north-east in 2019 in which  
no anti-personnel mines were found. It also reported a slight decrease in productivity overall due to the increased difficulty  
of the tasks (harder to access, steep slopes, heavy vegetation, and high metal content).135
PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
According to Lebanon’s Statement as an observer at 
the Fourth Review Conference of the APMBC in Oslo in 
November 20119, Lebanon’s national mine action policy 
affirms its aspiration to become a State Party to the APMBC. 
The Minister of Defence, who also heads the LMAA, sent 
a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that the 
Ministry of Defence has no objections to Lebanon acceding 
to the Treaty. LMAC recognises the 2025 aspiration of a 
landmine-free world and works in the spirit of compliance 
with the APMBC and with the IMAS.136 LMAC also asserts that 
it will implement the Oslo Action Plan, adopted at the Fourth 
Review Conference of the APMBC.137
Clearance of mined areas was originally expected to be 
completed by the end of 2020, in accordance with the 2011–20 
national strategy, but meeting the target was contingent on 
deployment of considerable resources: 125 manual clearance 
teams (45 for minefields excluding the Blue Line and 80 for 
the Blue Line), 2 mechanical teams, and 9 two-strong MDD 
teams.138 Actual mine clearance capacity was far lower and 
progress against the strategy fell well behind schedule. 
Lebanon’s new National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 sets 
out annual targets for the next six years. LMAC expects 
Lebanon to be free from known mined areas in ten years, 
with the application of efficient land release methodology 
and subject to securing the necessary funding.139 However, 
this looks to be very ambitious, considering the extent of the 
remaining mined area (18.65km2) and annual mine clearance 
rates of less than 1km2 per year, with less than 3km2 of mined 
area cleared in the last five years (see Table 6).
It will take many years for Lebanon to become mine-free. 
However, progress in land release is expected to be 
accelerated by adoption of better land release procedures 
since 2018, as enshrined in the revised NMAS. Crucially, 
LMAC’s demonstrated commitment to enhance the use of 
non-technical and technical survey should help to cancel  
or reduce areas more efficiently.140 
Rocky and forested terrain continued to pose a challenge to 
demining operations, in addition to lack of minefield records 
for much of the contamination (especially in the North).141 
The COVID-19 pandemic impacted the whole of Lebanon’s 
mine action programme and all operations were suspended 
from 12 March for more than two months. After the relaxation 
of general mobilisation measures by the government of 
Lebanon, a TWG meeting was held and the phases for 
restarting operations and necessary safety measures 
relating to COVID-19 were developed and adopted. Operations 
resumed in early May 2020, under the new guidelines 
and safety measures, and as at July 2020 NGO clearance 
operators were fully operational.142
Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
According to LMAC, the strategic implementation plan, which will support the new National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25,  
will address an exit strategy and long-term risk management.143 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Libya should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Libya has obligations under international human rights law 
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ All parties to the conflict in Libya should ensure that forces loyal to them do not use anti-personnel mines.
 ■ As soon as political conditions permit, Libya should enact mine action legislation, establish an interministerial 
national mine action authority, and adopt a national mine action strategy.
 ■ Libya should, at the earliest opportunity possible and as soon the security situation permits, conduct a baseline 
survey to identify the extent of contamination from anti-personnel mines and begin systematic clearance.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Mine contamination in Libya is a legacy of the Second 
World War (mainly in the east and mostly anti-vehicle mine 
contamination), as well as subsequent armed conflict with 
Egypt in 1977 (pattern minefields mapped, fenced and 
marked), with Chad in 1978−87, which resulted in mines being 
laid on Libya’s borders with these two neighbours, and the 
Libya revolution of 2011 and subsequent armed conflicts.1 
The border with Tunisia is also believed to be affected. During 
Colonel Muammur Qaddafi’s four decades in power, mines 
were emplaced around a number of locations, including 
military facilities and key infrastructure.
Mines were used by both the government and the opposition 
forces during the 2011 conflict leading to Colonel Qaddafi’s 
overthrow. According to the Libyan Mine Action Centre 
(LibMAC) around 30,000−35,000 mines were laid in five 
regions and cities, including Misrata, but were “largely 
cleared” after the downfall of the Gaddafi regime by 
volunteers with previous military experience.2
Since the overthrow of Qaddafi in 2011, Libya has remained 
mired in conflict as tribal and armed groups struggle to 
take over power. Confirmed instance of landmine use by 
rebels occurred in Ajdabiya, and other locations where 
pro-government elements laid mines included Brega, 
Khusha, Misrata, and the Nafusa Mountains.3 The escalation 
of conflict in Libya in 2014 brought new reports of mine use 
by armed groups fighting around Tripoli airport.4 There were 
also allegations of landmine use by non-state armed groups 
between 2016 and 2018,5 with contamination believed to be 
mainly in Benghazi, Derna (in the east of Libya), and Sirte.6
Mines of an improvised nature are suspected to have been 
laid during 2016 by Islamic State in areas that they controlled, 
such as in Sirte.7 In July 2017, the engineering divisions of 
Operation Dignity8 continued to clear mines and booby-traps 
left by Islamic State fighters from Benghazi, but also warned 
civilians from attempting to return to their homes before 
clearance work was finished.9
Since April 2019, Libya’s governance has been divided 
between the two entities engaged in an armed conflict, the 
UN-recognised Government of National Accord (or GNA) 
and the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), led by 
commander Khalifa Haftar, who laid siege to Tripoli beginning 
in April 2019.10 According to reports by Human Rights Watch, 
fighters aligned to Khalifa Haftar, including foreign forces, 
appear to have laid mines as they withdrew from southern 
districts of Tripoli in May 2020.11 
In June 2020, the President of the APMBC Meeting of States 
Parties issued a press release expressing concern at reports 
of the use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature 
in and around Tripoli. The press release followed reports, 
including by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), of 
anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature being discovered 
in the Ain Zara and Salahuddin areas of Tripoli, which have 
maimed or killed civilians returning home for the Eid holiday.12 
Other reports include evidence that LNA-affiliated forces have 
laid extensive tripwire-activated anti-personnel mines and 
booby-traps in homes and other civilian objects, and photos 
and videos verified by Amnesty International show Russian 
and Soviet-era anti-personnel landmines, including MON-50s, 
MON-90s, OZM-72s, and MS3s.13
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has reported 
that substantial quantities of “legacy” victim-operated IEDs 
(VOIEDs) are still present in formerly contested areas, such as 
Sirte. According to UNMAS, most VOIEDs are based on simple 
switches and, invariably, use items of military ordnance as 
the main charge. When buried in rubble, they represent an 
enduring hazard to clearance operations.14
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There is no accurate estimate of the extent of anti-personnel 
mine contamination across Libya, as many suspected 
hazardous areas (SHAs) have not been surveyed. As at 
February 2017, national contamination data from the LibMAC 
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
database, reported six confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) 
contaminated by anti-personnel mines, four in Sirte and two 
in Misrata, totalling almost 41.5km2, while a seventh CHA, 
in Sirte, of some 7.5km2, was contaminated by anti-vehicle 
mines. A massive single SHA, of almost 223km2, was 
suspected to contain only anti-vehicle mines.15 It is likely that 
further survey will drastically reduce these figures, but at 
the same time many further suspected areas have not been 
surveyed and furthermore, new use of anti-personnel mines 
of an improvised nature has been reported.
UNMAS advocates for survey to help quantify the scale and 
type of contamination, but the ongoing security situation poses 
major challenges to operationalising the necessary survey.16 
According to UNSMIL, the presence of landmines, improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), and unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
poses a persistent threat to the Libyan population and also 
hinders the safe return of internally displaced people and 
restricts access for humanitarian workers.17 
Libya is also contaminated by cluster munition remnants 
(CMR) (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition 
Remnants report on Libya for further information), and 
ongoing conflict has left significant quantities of other 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) in cities across Libya.18
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Mine action exists in a fragmented and violent political 
context. Following years of armed conflict, a new UN-backed 
“unity” government, the Government of National Accord 
(GNA), was formally installed in a naval base in Tripoli in 
early 2016. It has subsequently faced opposition from two 
rival governments and a host of militia forces. In April 2019, 
Khalifa Haftar, a military commander based in the west of 
the country, launched an offensive to take control of Tripoli 
and topple the GNA, and fighting continued into the first half 
of 2020.
LibMAC was mandated by the Minister of Defense to 
coordinate mine action in December 2011.19 Operating under 
the UN-backed Government of National Accord, LibMAC’s 
headquarters are in Tripoli, in the west of the country, 
and it also has offices in Benghazi20 and Misrata.21 The 
operating costs and salaries for LibMAC are funded by the 
United States Department of State and administered by ITF 
Enhancing Human Security (ITF).22 
ITF also provides capacity building support to LibMAC. 
In order to further increase LibMAC capacity, a new ITF 
operations technical advisor was deployed on 1 February 
2019, primarily to advise LibMAC’s Chief of Operations 
and provide advice on improvement of internal LibMAC 
procedures. In early April 2019, however, ITF was forced to 
evacuate its technical advisor due to the lack of security.23
UNMAS has largely been operating from Tunis since 
November 2014, from where it provides institutional and 
operational capacity-building, training, including in explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD), and coordinates with national 
authorities and implementing partners to carry out mine 
action activities to mitigate the threat posed by ERW and 
provide technical advice and advisory support on arms and 
ammunition management. The UNMAS Libya Programme is 
an integral part of UNSMIL.24 
In January 2019, most UN staff returned to Tripoli, but due 
to the hostilities that commenced in April 2019 and the 
deterioration of security, most subsequently returned to 
Tunis to operate remotely again. In 2019–20, UNMAS was 
providing non-technical survey, risk education, and EOD 
response in various locations across Libya, including in 
Tawargha, Tripoli and Benghazi, to facilitate humanitarian 
activities, early recovery, and to prepare for the safe return 
of displaced people.25
UNMAS prioritises capacity enhancement of Libyan mine 
action actors and supports LibMAC in coordination with 
Implementing Partners. Since 2015, UNMAS has trained 
more than 70 National Safety Authority (NSA) operators 
and Military Engineers in advanced EOD; 30 officers from 
eastern Libya in non-technical survey; provided advanced 
medical first responder training to 72 EOD operators from 
Benghazi; and trained several operators to address the 
threat from explosive hazards in Sirte. UNMAS also provided 
EOD equipment to national actors and assisted LibMAC in 
developing the Libyan Mine Action Standards which are now 
being implemented.26 In 2017/18, the United States Office of 
Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA) and the United 
Kingdom financed training of 70 IED operators in Sirte, 
conducted by JANUS, and with participants from the NSA  
and Military Engineers).27 
In 2019, The HALO Trust worked closely with LibMAC to build 
their capacity to quality assure and accredit mechanical 
clearance. HALO Trust ran a workshop in the LibMAC 
Tripoli office, covering all aspects of mechanical clearance. 
In addition, HALO provided translated quality assurance 
forms for quality assuring task sites and for accrediting 
the armouring of mechanical assets; and also conducted 
armour testing of different materials to provide a baseline of 
information for LibMAC.28




LibMAC is not thought to have a gender and diversity policy 
for mine action in place. Of the twenty employees at LibMAC, 
three are women, including one in the Risk Education (RE) 
department (whose responsibilities include providing RE 
to women and children); one in logistics; and one in an 
administrative role.29
The HALO Trust reported that its Libya programme seeks 
to comply with HALO’s general gender and diversity 
policy. However, due to rigid gender norms that largely 
impede women’s free movement and ability to work in 
a mixed-gender office setting, particularly reinforced in 
areas with strong Islamist influence such as Sirte, HALO 
has reported that the recruitment of women, including for 
non-operational roles, has proved difficult. In 2019, four 
of HALO’s thirty employees in Libya were women (one 
international staff and three national staff), including one 
female community liaison officer in Sirte.30 
HALO’s approach to community liaison, including 
door-to-door risk education prior to clearance, targeted 
risk education task sites, and specific events to reach out 
to women in particular, is designed to reach out to women 
and men equally. This is especially important, given that 
women are largely absent from public life. In particular, 
the introduction of pre-clearance focus group discussions 
with women and men separately helps to ensure that 
subsequent community liaison/risk education activities are 
targeted to the needs of all beneficiaries.31 With regards to 
diversity, in Sirte, HALO Trust recruits equally among the 
tribes and seeks to consult all ethnic groups during survey 
and clearance processes. HALO makes task prioritisation 
recommendations based on humanitarian need, although 
all task orders are issued under the authority of LibMAC.32 
The HALO Trust disaggregates relevant mine action data by 
gender and age.33
Humanity and Inclusion (HI) reported in 2019 that it had 
a gender policy in place and disaggregates data by sex 
and age.34 HI’s risk education team, which also conducted 
community liaison, was gender balanced. Two of HI’s project 
managers and two project officers were female, but women 
were not employed in survey and clearance, as this was 
deemed culturally unacceptable for now.35 HI stopped mine 
action operations in Libya in April 2019.36
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
LibMAC receives technical support for IMSMA from the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and UNMAS. In 
March 2019, HI reported that LibMAC had recently announced details of a new effort to bring the IMSMA database up to date 
and ensure the data are reliable.37 With support from the GICHD, LibMAC planned to transition from IMSMA to IMSMA Core in 
mid-2020.38
IMSMA is accessible to clearance organisations and data collection forms are reported to be consistent and enable collection  
of necessary data.39 
Since early 2019, The HALO Trust has been working closely with LibMAC to cover mechanical clearance in the Libyan IMSMA 
database. The planned transition to IMSMA Core will allow data entry for mechanical clearance.40 
PLANNING AND TASKING
No national mine action strategy is currently known to exist 
for Libya.
LibMAC does, however, prioritise survey and clearance 
operations and is responsible for issuing task orders. 
Prioritisation is, in part, informed by data collected and 
reported to LibMAC by operators such as the Danish 
Demining Group (DDG), during non-technical survey or EOD, 
and by reports from the local community.41 According to HI, 
LibMAC generally tasks according to geographic area and  
the nearest available assets.42
HALO Trust reported that prioritisation is based on 
humanitarian need with residential areas, community 
infrastructure, and key access points taking precedence. In 
Sirte, this means the two neighbourhoods where fighting was 
heaviest in 2016. In preparation for future clearance along the 
Tripoli frontlines, areas with significant verified evidence of 
fighting (as determined by HALO Trust’s Tripoli ERW Hazard 
Mapping and Information Management (IM) project) will be 
prioritised for survey.43
The Tripoli ERW Hazard Mapping and IM Project uses 
open-source data collation and geolocation techniques to map 
potential ERW contamination along the Tripoli frontlines by 
collecting information on active fighting incidents, weapons 
systems and ammunition used, and ERW-related accidents 
and displacement. The online data collection portal, linking 
to a live database that is shared with LibMAC and other 
stakeholders, is used to track historical data starting from 4 
April 2019 up to recent events. Mapping ERW contamination 
along the frontlines enables LibMAC to coordinate and direct 
specialist clearance capacity as well as risk education teams 
to the most highly contaminated areas.44
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no national mine action legislation in Libya, but National Mine Action Standards (LibMAS), in Arabic and English, have 
been elaborated with the support of the GICHD and UNMAS, and were approved by the GNA in August 2017. The LibMAS are 
available on the LibMAC website.45 According to international clearance operators, the national mine action standards are 
aligned to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), reproducing it word-for-word in many parts.46 
While the LibMAS are broad and not overly restrictive, they may, however, be open to different interpretation by various 
stakeholders and do not necessarily reflect local circumstances and conditions, including the specific context of clearance in 
urban areas. An example of this is the lack of urban specific characteristics of direct versus indirect evidence, which may lead 
to more general consideration of evidence and result in less accurate task boundaries.47 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS 
Mine action operations have been conducted by the army 
engineers, a police unit, and the Ministry of Interior’s National 
Safety Authority (NSA), also known as Civil Defence.48 
Military engineers reportedly lack mine detectors and are 
working with basic tools.49 The NSA is mandated to conduct 
EOD in civilian areas.50 These institutions liaise with LibMAC 
but are not tasked or accredited by them, nor do they provide 
clearance reports to the Centre. 
The deteriorating security situation resulted in the 
withdrawal of UNMAS and international mine action 
operators from Libya in mid 2014. International clearance 
operators active in Libya include DanChurchAid (DCA), DDG, 
and HALO Trust.51 HI’s survey and clearance operations 
stopped in April 2019 and the project formally ended in June 
of that year.52 National NGO operator, Free Fields Foundation 
(3F), was also operational and another national operator, 
the Libyan Demining Group (LDG), was in the process of 
becoming established as at February 2019.53 LDG is believed 
to have been accredited by LibMAC, but was not currently 
operational as at the time of writing. Local organisations 
Peace Organization from Zintan and World Without War 
(3W), from Misrata, which had been trained by HI in 2016 
and received accreditation for non-technical survey,54 
subsequently had their operations suspended for not fully 
following standards and in addition, neither organisation  
had secured funding.55
DCA is operational in Libya clearing residential, commercial, 
education, medical, and agricultural sites of mines and ERW, 
and providing training in clearance, search, and EOD, to help 
strengthen the capacity of national authorities. DCA also 
conducts risk education. Now in its ninth year of working in 
Libya, DCA has offices in Al-Bayda, Benghazi, Misrata, Sirte, 
and Tripoli.56 
DDG set up in Benghazi in December 2017. It had hoped 
to expand non-technical survey and EOD capacity in 
Benghazi from the late summer of 2018. In Sabha, DDG had 
one non-technical survey team and one EOD team, which 
it was managing remotely. Security issues in the south 
continue to disrupt mine action operations and prevent 
continuous operations. In Tripoli, DDG works through its 
national implementing partner, 3F. 3F operates under DDG’s 
accreditation and SOPs, and has an operational contingent 
of 37, composed in three EOD teams and one non-technical 
survey team.57
GCS, which finished its operations in 2019, was working 
in partnership with Libyan NGO 3, to clear ERW from an 
ammunition storage area on a military airbase in Misrata. 
The area comprised 37 bunkers destroyed by NATO airstrikes 
in 2011.58 As of March 2019, GCS and 3F had collected a 
cumulative total of more than 200 tons of ERW and scrap 
metal of which 40 tons were successfully destroyed through 
bulk demolitions and burning. An estimated 12,500m2 of 
battle area clearance (BAC) was also conducted around the 
ammunition storage area.59
The HALO Trust has been present in Libya since November 
2018, and has offices in Misrata, Sirte, and Tripoli. HALO 
deployed one four-strong survey/community liaison team in 
2019, in partnership with DCA. In September 2019, LibMAC 
accredited the first mechanical clearance teams in Libya, with 
clearance at HALO’s first task site beginning in October. HALO 
deployed two mechanical clearance teams, each consisting of 
one team leader, one operator, and two deminers. The teams 
shared a single mechanical asset in 2019, while awaiting 
physical delivery of additional assets. As at July 2020, HALO 
Trust was training non-technical survey teams in Tripoli and 
aimed to introduce mechanical clearance in 2020 in response 
to newly suspected mined areas in southern Tripoli.60 
The HALO Trust and DCA are currently working in partnership 
in Sirte under a joint three-year European Union (EU) 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (ICSP) 
contract, which started in February 2019. Under this contract, 
HALO provides three mechanical clearance assets and two 
mechanical clearance teams (MCTs). In January 2020, the 
first EU-funded MCT was deployed in Sirte. The first of three 
mechanical clearance assets, a medium-range front-loader, 
was procured and upgraded locally in Libya in January 2020.61
A separate 18-month UK Conflict, Stability and Security Fund 
(CSSF) contract in which HALO Trust had also partnered 
with DCA in Sirte ended on 31 March 2020. During this 
project HALO had led on mechanical clearance and DCA had 
provided the supporting EOD capacity, along with a joint 
non-technical survey team and mine risk education team.62 
HALO Trust and DCA conducted a socio-economic assessment 
of Sirte and a field assessment for areas of possible mine 
and ERW contamination which potentially require mechanical 
clearance.63 CSSF continue to provide funding in Sirte to 
HALO who provide mechanical clearance teams as well as 
non-technical survey and community liaison teams.64
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Humanitarian access to Libya for survey and clearance 
operations, remains challenging for all operators. HALO, for 
example, experienced delays in the granting of multiple-entry 
visas and limited movement between locations due to 
ongoing conflict and changing frontlines. In Libya, the 
provision of security is highly localised; tribe-affiliated 
armed groups, with oftentimes shifting allegiances, control 
cities and towns down to neighbourhood level. This in turns 
requires humanitarian actors to have good knowledge of 
armed group conglomerates on the one hand and to liaise 
with many interlocutors on the other hand. The risk of 
arbitrary detention for local staff is high, either due to tribal 
background or due to suspected affiliation with opposing 
armed groups.65
HALO is mitigating security risks to its staff by maintaining 
working relationships with key interlocutors in both East 
and West Libya, including LibMAC, ministries, and municipal 
authorities. Community liaison in Benghazi, Misrata, Sirte, 
and Tripoli is key to ensuring community acceptance. In 
Sirte specifically, HALO recruits equally among the tribes. 
International staff are sometimes needed to cut across tribal 
lines when negotiating access.66 
HI conducted EOD spot tasks in 2019 in Tawerga, Misrata, 
but was hindered by security issues. It stopped survey and 
clearance operations in April 2019 and the project formally 
ended in June 2019, although its victim assistance work in 
Libya continues.67
A number of other Libyan civil society organisations are also 
reported to carry out mine action operations, but they are not 
accredited by LibMAC. 
UNMAS provides institutional and operational 
capacity-building, training, including in EOD, and coordinates 
with national authorities and implementing partners to 
carry out mine action activities to mitigate the threat posed 
by ERW and provide technical advice and advisory support 
on arms and ammunition management. The UNMAS Libya 
Programme is an integral part of UNSMIL.68 (See Programme 
Management section for further detail.)
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
There were no reports of planned anti-personnel mine clearance during 2019 although several operators engaged in EOD 
operations. No mined area was reported to have been released through survey in 2019 either.
SURVEY IN 2019
There were no other known reports of anti-personnel survey during 2019, although data from LibMAC, UNMAS, and several 
clearance operators were not made available. 
According to ITF’s annual report, in 2019, LibMAC personnel opened 84 new tasks mostly for risk education and non-technical 
survey activities performed by international and local NGOs in Benghazi, Sirte, and Tawargha where LibMAC personnel 
conducted 52 QA/QC missions. LibMAC also conducted 23 accreditation procedures for international and local NGO teams to 
perform non-technical survey, risk education and EOD activities/tasks.69
According to a January 2020 report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL, “The Mine Action Service project in Benghazi, 
[mandated] to conduct emergency clearance and map explosive hazards, has removed 40 items of unexploded ordnance and 
completed non-technical surveys of 24 sites. The surveys will inform future clearance operations and support the protection  
of civilians and stabilization.”70 The report did not, however, specify the type of unexploded ordnance.
CLEARANCE IN 2019
There were no known reports of anti-personnel clearance during 2019, although data from LibMAC, UNMAS, and several 
clearance operators were not made available. 
In June 2020, it was reported in online media sources that demining experts from the Turkish Armed Forces had started to 
clear landmines and IEDs planted by Khalifa Haftar’s forces in south Tripoli, Tarhouna, and other areas, according to the Libyan 
Foreign Ministry.71
PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LibMAC describes the following challenges to implementation of mine action operations: the high level of contamination; 
ongoing conflict and the continued presence of Islamic State; the difficulty in convincing internally displaced persons to delay 
their return until the ERW threat is addressed; security and access to priority areas; the limited ERW and EOD capacity in 
Libya; the vast geographical area; and limited governmental and international support.72 Security conditions continued to pose 
a challenge to mine action in Libya.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Morocco should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Morocco should continue to submit voluntary APMBC Article 7 reports. It should provide greater detail on the extent 
of mine contamination and report on progress according to international standards for land release methodology.
 ■ Morocco should establish a timeline for completing clearance of all mined areas on territory under its jurisdiction  
or control. 
 ■ Morocco should ensure freedom of access and unhindered movement of all UN Mission for the Referendum in Western 
Sahara (MINURSO) personnel and take all necessary measures to facilitate the conduct of demining. 
 ■ Morocco is strongly encouraged to provide minefield records to other relevant stakeholders to facilitate survey and 
clearance of affected areas.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Morocco has obligations under international human rights law  
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The exact extent of contamination from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in the area of Western Sahara controlled 
by Morocco, on the west side of the Berm,1 is not known. In the past, Morocco declared, highly improbably, that a total of 
120,000km² of area was contaminated,2 although the threat is undoubtedly significant. 
Morocco’s contamination is a result of the conflict between the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) and Polisario Front forces over 
Western Sahara. Morocco has reported having registered and mapped the minefields it has laid, and has pledged to clear  
them as soon as the conflict over Western Sahara is over.3
Morocco reported in its latest voluntary APMBC Article 7 transparency report covering 2019 that the following provinces 
were mine affected: Tata, Akka, Aousserd, Assa-Zag, Boujdour, Dakhla, Laayoune, Smara, and Tan Tan.4 In its corresponding 
Article 7 report covering 2018, Morocco had reported that 10 localities within these provinces contain mines: Bir Anzarane, 
Douiek, Gerret Auchfaght, Gor Lbard, Gor Zalagat, Hagounia, Idiriya, Imlili, Itgui, and Tarf Mhkinza. It claimed these contain 
contamination as the result of “haphazard” mine laying across the south of Morocco by the Polisario Front in 1975–91.5
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Morocco does not have a national mine action authority or a mine action centre. The RMA carries out demining, which it 
reports is conducted in collaboration with MINURSO.6 
In 2019, the RMA continued to receive training from the United States (US) Marines on demining and explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) techniques.7
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Morocco is not believed to have a gender policy in place for its demining operations. 
MOROCCO
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Morocco does not use the Information Management System for Mine Action.
PLANNING AND TASKING
It is not known how Morocco plans its demining operations.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
Morocco appears to use only manual demining techniques, which is not efficient given the size and type of terrain  
being released.
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Morocco has not adopted national mine action legislation or standards, but has reported that “normal safety and 
environmental protection standards have been followed” in clearance of mines and ERW.8
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
All mine clearance in Morocco is conducted by the RMA. In 2019, it reported that 13 demining modules and 165 demining 
detachments were deployed and responded to 54 interventions during the year.9
Previously, in 2010, Morocco declared it had employed 10,000 deminers, though only 400 detectors were at their disposal  
at that time.10 This raised serious questions both about the procedures being used and the accuracy of clearance figures  
being reported.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Morocco has not reported in detail on its release of 
mined areas in recent years, nor given any indication of 
implementing land release methodology. The figures it does 
provide are not credible and should be taken as an indication 
of land released or declared as clear of contamination rather 
than land physically cleared.
In its voluntary Article 7 report covering 2019, Morocco 
reported “clearance” of a total area of 301km2, with the 
destruction of 23 anti-personnel mines, 21 anti-vehicle mines, 
and 511 items of ERW.11 This compares to 2018 when Morocco 
reported “clearance” of a total area of 313.4km2, with the 
destruction of 232 anti-personnel mines, 18 anti-vehicle 
mines, and 574 items of ERW.12 Morocco also reported that 
there were 25 casualties due to mines in 2019, the highest 
number since 2015.13
In his October 2019 report to the UN Security Council, the 
UN Secretary-General reported that, from 1 March to 31 
July 2019, the RMA claimed to have cleared more than 
98km2 of land west of the berm, with the destruction of 441 
items, consisting of 415 items of unexploded ordnance, 17 
anti-personnel mines, and 9 anti-vehicle mines.14 Previously, 
in his April 2019 report, the UN Secretary-General noted that 
the RMA had reported “clearing” more than 126km2 of land 
to the west of the berm with the destruction of 679 items, 
including 614 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO), as well  
as 53 anti-vehicle and 12 anti-personnel mines during the 
period 3 October 2018 to 1 April 2019.15 No further details 
were provided.
Morocco has reported that since 1975 and through the end of 
October 2019, a total of 96,727 mines, of which 49,325 were 
anti-personnel mines, along with 20,543 items of ERW had 
been destroyed and a total of almost 5,561km2 was cleared 
during demining operations.16
Morocco initiated major demining efforts in 2007, following 
an increase in the number of incidents. In April 2016, Morocco 
reported plans to clear mines from along the Berm. The  
units to be deployed were reportedly those trained by the  
US Marines.17
Morocco is not a State Party to the APMBC, but nonetheless 
has obligations under international human rights law to 
clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or 
control as soon as possible. Morocco has stated on numerous 
occasions its determination to voluntarily comply with the 
provisions of the APMBC, including completion of stockpile 
destruction of anti-personnel mines and demining. It has 
provided annual voluntary Article 7 reports to the APMBC 
regularly over the past decade and attends APMBC meetings 
as an observer. It has not, however, indicated when it might 
complete mine clearance.




1 The Berm refers to the defensive wall built by Morocco in 1982–87 to secure the north-western corner of Western Sahara. It is constituted of earthen walls some 
three metres in height. Morocco controls the area located on the west side of the Berm. 
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There were positive developments in mine action in Myanmar during 2019 and in early 2020, including preliminary steps by 
the government towards establishing a national mine action authority (NMAA) and approval of Myanmar’s first national mine 
action standard on the marking of hazardous areas. But although non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are permitted to 
conduct non-technical survey, which was ongoing as of writing, they are not yet authorised to conduct mine clearance, an 
activity that remains under the sole remit of the Myanmar army (Tatmadaw).
The Government of Myanmar has recognised the importance of mine action in helping ensure the safe return or resettlement 
of internally displaced persons (IDPs), as part of its National Strategy on Resettlement of IDPs and Closure of IDP Camps, 
which was launched in November 2019. The planned return of IDPs imposes upon the Myanmar authorities the need to 
accelerate mine action coordination and activities to help ensure that areas of return are safe or that at a minimum mined 
areas have been clearly delineated and marked and risk education conducted.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
 ■ Myanmar should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Myanmar has obligations under international human rights law  
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ The Myanmar army (Tatmadaw) and armed groups should stop all use of anti-personnel mines.
 ■ Myanmar should accelerate non-technical survey, marking of hazardous areas, and permit accredited operators to 
conduct clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). 
 ■ Myanmar should accelerate efforts to establish a NMAA to plan and coordinate comprehensive mine action to meet 
humanitarian needs. 
 ■ Myanmar should ensure that areas planned for IDP returns are safe or that at a minimum, mined areas have been 
clearly delineated, perimeter-marked and fenced, and risk education conducted.
 ■ The authorities, NGOs, and other implementing partners, should continue to develop and approve National Mine Action 
Standards (NMAS), particularly for non-technical survey, technical survey, and clearance.
 ■ A centralised information management database should be established, into which data collected on mined areas 
should be entered. 
 ■ Myanmar should support the mobilisation of technical capacity by ensuring that no taxes are imposed on mine 
action equipment (such as personal protective equipment (PPE) and detectors) and vehicles that are imported by 
international operators.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Myanmar is heavily mine-affected as a result of conflicts between the Myanmar army and numerous non-state armed groups 
affiliated with ethnic minorities. The violence in Myanmar started after the country’s independence in 1948 and is ongoing, 
with anti-personnel mine continuing to be laid.1 Mined areas are in areas of the country close to Myanmar’s borders with 
Bangladesh, China, and Thailand, and pose a particular threat in the north and east of the country. 
There is no accurate estimate of the extent of mine contamination. The government of Myanmar has said that while it is very 
difficult to have a complete picture of contamination, data shows that 9 out of the 14 states and regions are contaminated with 
landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).2 Although landmine casualty data is not systematically collected in Myanmar, 
of the recorded incidents in recent years, Kachin and Shan states have seen the highest number of casualties.3 





The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on 
Myanmar, established by the United Nations Human Rights 
Council, reported in September 2019 that northern Myanmar 
is “heavily contaminated with landmines” and that the 
parties to the conflict, including the Tatmadaw, the Kachin 
Independence Army (KIA); the Restoration Council of Shan 
State (RCSS, formerly referred to as the Shan State Army 
South (SSA-S); and the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP, 
formerly referred to as the Shan State Army North (SSA-N), 
all continue to lay landmines and use improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs).4 
In September 2018, the Fact-Finding Mission had reported 
that mines had been laid by the Tatmadaw soldiers along 
the border with Bangladesh in the lead-up to and following 
operations targeting fleeing Rohingya civilians and seeking 
to prevent those who had already left from returning. In 
April 2017, it was reported that the Myanmar and Bangladesh 
governments had agreed to remove mines and IEDs from 
the border area. By August, however, the Tatmadaw was 
laying mines along the border, not removing them, and in 
September, Bangladesh formally complained to Myanmar 
about the latter’s emplacement of mines.5
Continued use of mines has occurred despite the signing 
of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in October 2015 
between the Government of Myanmar and eight ethnic armed 
groups (with a further two signing the agreement in 2018), 
which committed all parties to end the use of landmines and 
cooperate on mine-clearance operations.6
Non-technical survey conducted by international NGOs and 
their partner organisations in recent years is starting to 
provide a better idea of the extent of anti-personnel mine 
contamination in areas in which they operate, but due to 
sensitivity on the part of ethnic groups and the authorities, 
data are not always openly accessible or centrally reported.
Anti-personnel mines laid by the Tatmadaw are mostly 
produced in state-owned factories.7 Ethnic armed groups 
acknowledge use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised 
nature as well as of a number of anti-vehicle mines, but 
unconfirmed reports have suggested groups in the north 
have also obtained Chinese factory-made Type 72 anti-vehicle 
mines.8 
In a statement delivered at the Fourth Review Conference 
of the APMBC in Oslo in November 2019, the Government 
of Myanmar said, “Myanmar will continue to promote the 
full stop in the use of anti-personnel mines by all parties 
to the conflict” and that it was “working hard to strengthen 
the knowledge of and the respect towards international 
humanitarian law among all parties to the conflict.”9
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The government set up a Myanmar Mine Action Centre under 
the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) in 2012 with support from 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), but the centre was never fully 
staffed. The MPC was dissolved at the end of March 2016 
and replaced by a National Reconciliation and Peace Centre, 
which reports to the head of government, State Counsellor 
Aung San Suu Kyi.10
In 2019 and early 2020, Myanmar was making welcome 
progress towards establishing an NMAA, which is needed 
to strengthen its humanitarian mine action programme. 
The government told the Fourth APMBC Review Conference 
in November 2019 that “Myanmar will as soon as feasible 
establish the needed national legislation to establish a 
national mine action authority.”11
An initial workshop on how Myanmar can establish an NMAA 
to lead and manage a humanitarian mine action programme 
was hosted by Myanmar in Nay Pyi Taw in October 2019, 
attended by the Tatmadaw, humanitarian mine action NGOs 
in Myanmar, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) Regional Mine Action Centre (ARMAC), the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 
and several ambassadors.12 Discussions focused on which 
ministries would form part of a future NMAA and the 
mechanisms for establishing the Authority. The Attorney 
General’s Office reportedly advised that establishment of a 
NMAA, including its mandate, terms of reference, and budget 
would need to follow the national legal process, which could 
take time, especially in the absence of sufficient political 
will and pressure to fast-track the process.13 On 3 January 
2020, an interministerial meeting took place, attended by 14 
different ministries, including the Ministry of Defence, during 
which it was agreed in principle to establish an NMAA and 
for a governmental task force/working committee to be 
established to begin the process.14 
A second international workshop in January 2020 discussed 
how Myanmar can establish an NMAA in Myanmar. It was 
attended by the GICHD and the Norwegian Presidency to the 
APMBC, but NGO clearance operators were not invited.15 
The need to accelerate the establishment of an NMAA is all 
the more pressing in light of the government’s plan to close 
IDP camps. There are reported to be more than 140 camps, 
with a total population of more than 160,000 in 15 townships 
in four states.16 The government of Myanmar launched the 
“National Strategy on Resettlement of Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) and Closure of IDP Camps” in November 
2019.17 The plan identifies the need for landmine clearance to 
enable IDPs to return to their villages of origin, but does not 
provide any further details of how and when such clearance 
will take place. At the Fourth APMBC Review Conference in 
November 2019, Myanmar said publicly that “that mine action 
is a precondition for safe return and resettlement of IDPs, 
and sustainable and durable solutions”; that the government 
is “now currently finding practical ways to move forward 
to closing the IDP camps using this national strategy”; 
and that it “has an aim to start humanitarian demining in 
non-conflict areas as a part of this camp closure strategy.”18 
Several senior government officials have similarly reportedly 
expressed support for the need for mine clearance and other 
mine action activities in areas identified for IDP returns.19 
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International NGO operators are advocating for camp closures 
to be conducted in a safe, voluntary and dignified manner, and 
for mine action to form an essential part of the planning and 
activity implementation process of IDP returns. In particular, 
non-technical survey and hazard marking conducted to 
international standards are urgently needed in potential 
resettlement areas, to define and demarcate hazardous areas 
and to verify safe areas; and should be a pre-requisite step 
prior to IDPs returning to suspected mined areas.20 According 
to Mines Advisory Group (MAG), there have already been 
reported accidents involving recent IDPs that had recently 
returned to their village of origin in Kachin state.21
Many parts of Myanmar are still in armed conflict and part 
of the timeline for the return of IDPs, depends on progress 
in the peace process with the ethnic armed groups.22 
According to a briefing by the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in March 2020, 
in western Myanmar, the return of IDPs is “hindered by 
ongoing fighting” and “newly laid anti-personnel mines and 
improvised explosive devices pose additional risks.”23 Kachin 
is a priority state in the IDP camp closure strategy, but the 
KIA has not yet signed the ceasefire agreement with the 
government. However, in negotiation with the government, 
a mandate has been given to Kachin church leaders to act 
on behalf of non-state armed groups with regard to IDP 
resettlement.24 MAG (through joint deployments with Kachin 
humanitarian organisations) has conducted baseline and 
remote baseline survey in Kachin state, targeting 59 villages 
identified for IDP return or resettlement. The resulting report 
published in 2020, revealed that 90% of the villages surveyed 
had reported some evidence of contamination by landmines 
or unexploded ordnance (UXO), with 70% of the villages 
reporting direct evidence of contamination. The report 
highlights the need for the Myanmar government to make 
humanitarian mine action a prerequisite for any IDP return.25
Discussions continued in early 2020 between humanitarian 
operators and the national authorities regarding possible 
survey and clearance in relation to the IDP camp closure 
strategy,26 but had been suspended as at March 2020, due to 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.27 According to online 
sources, some mine clearance has been undertaken by the 
military as part of an initiative to facilitate the return of IDPs, 
but there are serious doubts as to the standard to which 
this mine clearance has been conducted.28 Similarly, the 
Independent International Fact Finding Mission expressed 
concerns “about reports that some demining operations 
conducted by the Tatmadaw may have failed to meet 
relevant quality standards and did not include agricultural 
land surrounding residential areas.”29 The Tatmadaw has 
historically seen mine clearance as solely its own task.
The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement between the 
Government and 10 ethnic armed groups also included a 
dedicated provision on demining, and the government of 
Myanmar highlights that mine action is a precondition for 
lasting peace.30 That said, armed conflict is ongoing in many 
parts of the country and a number of armed groups have  
not yet signed the ceasefire agreement.31
The Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement 
(MSWRR) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
co-chair the Mine Risks Working Group (MRWG), which was set 
up in 2012 and comprises 10 ministries, 41 international and 
national organisations, and 4 state-level coordination agencies 
(in Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, and Shan states).32 In 2018–19, the 
MRWG was guided by a strategic work plan whose six main 
priorities are: inter-ministerial and inter-agency coordination 
mechanisms; mine risk education (MRE); victim assistance; 
data collection and information management; advocacy; and 
land release operations, including non-technical survey.33 The 
MRWG is said to convene regularly (on a quarterly basis) and 
the meetings are well attended, with active participation from 
state and union level government representatives, and mine 
action NGOs.34 Along with UNICEF, Humanity and Inclusion (HI) 
co-chairs the Victim Assistance Technical Group (VATG),  
a subgroup of the MRGW.35
There is also an informal Non-Technical Survey Working 
Group (NTSWG), which was an ad-hoc group established in 
late 2018 as an offshoot of the MSWG. The working group 
was initially held in Yangon and comprised only humanitarian 
actors, but was subsequently moved to Nay Pyi Taw and 
expanded to include the Department of Rehabilitation, the 
Tatmadaw, and additional mine action organisations.36 Since 
October 2019, the NTSWG has met quarterly, chaired by 
the Department of Rehabilitation, with the second meeting 
in January 2020.37 Through the NTSWG, mine action NGOs 
and their partners were able to successfully advocate for 
permission to mark and fencing of hazardous areas, and 
jointly review and approve the national standards on marking 
in early 2020.38 
Myanmar is also working closely with the ASEAN and the 
ARMAC, enhancing technical cooperation in mine action.39 In 
addition, Danish Demining Group (DDG) is helping to develop 
the capacity of both the national and the regional authorities 
by conducting humanitarian mine action sensitisation 
workshops with them.40
In 2018, operators facilitated workshops and cooperative 
visits between government delegates from Myanmar 
and neighbouring countries. This included a study tour 
to Cambodia in collaboration with the ARMAC and the 
Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority 
(CMAA) where delegates learned about land release, 
national standards, Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), 
and information management, as well as about Cambodia’s 
experience in adhering to the APMBC. 41 A similar trip to 
Thailand took place in 2019.42






DDG reported having a gender and diversity policy and 
implementation plan. It also disaggregates relevant mine 
action data by sex and age, and has gender-balanced survey 
and community liaison teams to help ensure women and 
children in affected communities are consulted as part of its 
survey and community liaison activities in Myanmar. There is 
equal access to employment for women and men at DDG, and 
in Kayah state in 2019, DDG’s two most senior staff managing 
non-technical survey were women. Overall, approximately 
40% of DDG managerial/supervisory level positions in 
Myanmar are held by women.43
The HALO Trust has a gender and diversity policy and 
implementation plan specific to its work in Myanmar. HALO 
consults all gender and age groups, including women and 
children, during non-technical survey and community 
liaison, and its survey and community liaison teams are 
gender-balanced as far as possible. HALO disaggregates 
relevant mine action data by gender and age.44
There is equal access to employment for qualified women 
and men in HALO survey and community liaison teams in 
Myanmar. Of HALO Trust’s 26 operational staff in Myanmar,  
10 are women; and of the 16 managerial/supervisory roles,  
5 are women.45 
HI rolled out a newly released gender/age/disability policy 
in 2019, in which specific markers are assessed and followed 
up on throughout the duration of HI projects, helping to 
improve inclusion of vulnerable persons. HI disaggregates 
relevant mine action data by gender and age and has an 
equal employment opportunity policy, which includes giving 
persons with disabilities an equal chance to apply for HI 
positions. Of HI’s employees in Myanmar, 3.7% are persons 
with disabilities. HI did not conduct non-technical survey in 
2019, but of its overall programme in Myanmar, 11 out of 18 
managerial positions (61%) are held by women.46
MAG has a gender and diversity policy and its implementation 
plan in Myanmar is focused on gender balanced community 
liaison teams, equal participation by women in all MAG 
activities, and gender and age disaggregated data.47 MAG does 
not discriminate anyone based on gender, sex, age, ethnicity 
or religion, and there are equal employment opportunities 
for women and men. A total of 43% of personnel in MAG’s 
Community Liaison Field Teams are female (50% of community 
liaison officers; 67% of community liaison team leaders; and 
25% of community liaison supervisors); and a total of 44% of 
all MAG staff employed at managerial level or supervisory 
positions in Myanmar are female.48 Women are always 
consulted during baseline survey (BLS) and non-technical 
survey by MAG, and to help ensure this, the organisation 
asks village leaders to gather a mixed group of local women 
and men to avoid the tendency for village leaders to only 
recommend local men for consultation.49 All MAG’s community 
liaison teams are gender balanced and consist of one male and 
one female community liaison officer.50
NPA has a gender and diversity policy and implementation 
plan, and relevant mine action data is disaggregated by sex 
and age. NPA consults with women and children during its 
non-technical survey and explosive ordnance risk education 
(EORE) operations in Myanmar. All non-technical survey 
teams are at least 50% female, and teams are fluent in the 
local languages of the area of operations.51 There is equal 
access to employment for qualified women and men in NPA 
survey teams in Myanmar, with women making up 50% of 
the NPA and partner organisation survey staff, and 20% of 
leadership roles.52
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
As at April 2020, there was no centralised mine action 
information management database in Myanmar,53 but it 
is hoped that this will be set up once an NMAA has been 
established.54 Issues around conflict sensitivity pose potential 
challenges for such a database, which would require input 
from the joint parties to the ceasefire.
DDG uses the Fulcrum information management system.55
MAG is working closely with other mine action stakeholders 
on the development of a data sharing platform in Myanmar, 
in which findings from the baseline survey and non-technical 
survey could be shared among all humanitarian mine action 
organisations. It is hoped that this will serve as a centralised 
database to assist coordination and tasking by the national 
authorities.56 
The HALO Trust’s information management system is 
Fulcrum, with data recorded in Microsoft Access.57 MAG 
is using ‘Survey123’ for data collection and ArcMAP for 
mapping and GPS services, both provided by ArcGIS. In 
2020, MAG planned to upgrade its information management 
systems by switching to MAG’s new global IM system which 
is on the ESRI platform and is called Operations Management 
Information Systems.58 
NPA Myanmar and its partner organisations also use 
“Survey123” in the collection of non-technical survey 
information and all survey data is recorded digitally, including 
polygon mapping directly via “survey123” , with hard copy 
sketch maps drawn as a backup. This enabled “live” quality 
control (QC) checking by NPA Myanmar’s information 
management officer.59 
368   Clearing the Mines 2020
PLANNING AND TASKING
Currently there is no national mine action legislation in 
Myanmar, but the government has reported that it plans 
to elaborate and adopt the required national legislation to 
establish an NMAA, “as soon as feasible”.60
HALO Trust follows a systematic work plan for its 
non-technical survey, while also prioritising credible  
reports received of local contamination.61
The first stage of MAG’s task prioritisation is based on 
desk research using the “Village Situation Analysis” tool, 
through which data is gathered on all villages within 
MAG’s operational areas, including information on conflict, 
accidents, victims, and access. This information is used 
alongside MAG’s operational database to target activities.62 
MAG conducts two types of survey in Myanmar: the BLS 
and non-technical survey. The BLS is a basic preliminary 
assessment that offers a rapid snapshot of contamination 
in a particular area, based on focus group discussions and 
data from community members. On completion of a local 
BLS, villages are assigned one of three colour categories: 
red, which represents a high confidence of contamination 
(direct evidence of contamination is reported); amber, 
which represents low confidence of contamination (indirect 
evidence of contamination is reported); and grey, which 
indicates there was no evidence of contamination at the time 
of the survey. This categorisation forms the basis for MAG’s 
prioritisation of non-technical survey.63 
In 2019, MAG also undertook “remote BLS” within the IDP 
camps and villages with a large proportion of displaced 
people, in the states of Kachin and northern Shan.64 Remote 
BLS is a similar process to regular BLS, but involves 
focus discussion groups and interviews with IDPs about 
the mine contamination situation in their place of origin. 
This is a helpful tool in the Myanmar context, where many 
IDPs frequently return to their village to check on their 
agricultural lands and to scavenge and hunt for food. 
Whenever possible, MAG triangulates information by doing 
multiple remote baseline surveys in different IDP camps to 
gain more information about contamination in villages of 
origin. However, due to the conflict situation and political 
complexity in Myanmar, it is often not possible to follow up 
with non-technical survey, in which case MAG relies on the 
results from the remote BLS. In addition, MAG prioritises 
baseline survey based on villages identified for IDP returns, 
in order to gather information about safety threats before  
IDP returns begin to these villages.65
MAG’s non-technical survey is a more detailed survey 
that more accurately identifies the location of suspected 
hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas 
(CHAs), enabling MAG to create polygons, identify EOD spot 
tasks, and generate hazardous area reports which can 
be shared with local communities and key stakeholders. 
Non-technical survey is prioritised in villages categorised as 
red through the BLS, followed by those classed as amber.66
NPA prioritises areas for survey using joint input from local 
stakeholders and communities along with NPA’s local partner 
organisations. Non-technical survey teams conduct both 
risk education and village baseline assessments involving 
members of the communities. Risk education sessions are 
interactive and facilitate a two-way conversation between 
local communities and NPA/partner team members. Based on 
community responses, a conflict, accident, and contamination 
overview of the village is determined through community 
mapping, after which CHAs and SHAs are identified.67
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Historically, Myanmar has not had national standards 
and therefore operators have followed the International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and their own SOPs. 
However, progress is now been made, with Myanmar’s 
first national standard on marking, which was approved by 
the government in January 2020. Progress is being made 
to elaborate and get approval for a national standard on 
non-technical survey.
In 2018, operators successfully advocated for the 
Government of Myanmar to include physical marking (with 
warning signs) and fencing of SHAs and CHAs as part of the 
non-technical survey process. The central government now 
approves marking of polygons, though local authorities are 
also involved in the approval process.68
DDG was not able to mark the hazardous areas it identified 
in 2019, but many were identified along electricity cable 
base structures, which were already fenced off to prevent 
people from entering. DDG also donated fencing material for 
hazardous areas identified to the Ministry of Electricity and 
Energy in Kayah state.69
The HALO Trust reported that permission had been granted 
for marking of hazardous areas by authorities in both north 
Shan and Kayin states, provided that the village chief is in 
agreement. In 2019, HALO marked 17 hazardous areas with 
warning signs in the local languages in both states.70
As at April 2020, MAG had not commenced “fencing/marking” 
operations in Myanmar, but expected to do so during the 
year. Unfortunately, as at the time of writing, the COVID-19 
pandemic had brought efforts to a standstill for the immediate 
future. As and when MAG does commence marking, it plans 
to do so in accordance with IMAS and so will require PPE and 
technical equipment. Deployment of teams will be dependent 
on the importing the necessary PPE.71
NPA was unable to conduct any marking due to the sensitivity 
of the areas in which it conducted non-technical survey  
in 2019.72
A standard for non-technical survey is also being elaborated 
by the NTSWG, and it was hoped the working group would 
approve the standard soon.73 
There has, however, yet to be progress in elaboration of 
national standards for technical survey or for clearance; 
activities that humanitarian mine action organisations were 
not yet permitted to conduct in Myanmar, as at April 2020.74





OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Six international demining organisations have offices in 
Yangon and some provincial locations: DanChurchAid 
(DCA), DDG, The HALO Trust, HI, MAG, and NPA. None of 
the humanitarian demining organisations in Myanmar 
is yet permitted to conduct clearance, EOD, or technical 
survey; as at May 2020 they were only permitted to conduct 
non-technical survey, risk education, and community liaison. 
Tatmadaw engineers have reportedly conducted some military 
mine clearance but operations are neither systematic nor have 
they been formally recorded, and there is concern regarding 
quality and standard to which clearance is conducted.75
In 2019, DDG deployed two non-technical survey teams in 
Kayah state, as well as community liaison and community 
mapping in Kachin and north Shan states. DDG’s non-technical 
survey and community liaison capacity remained constant in 
2019 compared to the previous year, and DDG also worked with 
civil society partners, but only in risk education. DDG planned 
to expand its non-technical survey operations into Kachin and 
north Shan states in 2020.76
In 2019, the HALO Trust continued to conduct non-technical 
survey in north Shan and Kayin states, although the 
intensity of fighting prevented some survey work in north 
Shan.77 HALO employed seven teams in 2019, all capable of 
conducting non-technical survey and MRE. In addition, HALO 
Trust continued to operate with two local partners in north 
Shan state, which increases access to ethnic Kachin and 
Shan communities.78 From April 2020, the number of HALO 
Trust teams had been reduced by two and there was ongoing 
uncertainty regarding capacity for the remainder of the year, 
due to the impact of COVID-19.79
In 2019, HI’s efforts in Myanmar were focused on leading the 
development of Victim Assistance in Myanmar and HI did not 
conduct non-technical survey. In 2020, however, it deployed a 
team to conduct risk education in schools in Kachin State and 
was planning to start non-technical survey in Kachin State 
once access to villages allows. As at May 2020, access was 
restricted due to the COVID-19 pandemic.80
In 2019, MAG’s non-technical survey and community liaison 
capacity consisted of nine community liaison teams and three 
implementing partner teams, with a total of 26 community 
liaison staff as at the end of 2019. This was roughly the same 
capacity as the previous year, but with a slight decrease in 
MAG’s own teams and an increase in partner organisation 
teams. The three civil society implementing partners were 
contracted to conduct risk education and BLS in Kayah, 
Kachin, and northern Shan state.81
In 2019, NPA was focusing on three areas of work: national 
ownership and capacity development, non-technical 
survey and risk education with civil society partners, and 
emergency response by local and national partners.82 NPA 
conducted non-technical survey with two local civil society 
partners in the Bago, Tanintharyi region, and Mon state, 
during which NPA provided training and technical support 
to the partner organisations and experienced NPA team 
leaders accompanied partner teams during non-technical 
survey operations. Together with its civil society partners, 
NPA deployed three non-technical survey teams and 
three EOP/conflict preparedness and protection (CPP) 
teams in 2019.83 NPA expected to increase capacity to four 
non-technical survey teams in 2020.84
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
As in previous year, no land release took place in 2019 as humanitarian mine action operators are not permitted to conduct 
clearance or technical survey by either the government or ethnic minority authorities. Since 2018, operators have been 
authorised to conduct non-technical survey to identify mined areas, in addition to conducting risk education and community 
liaison activities which they were already undertaking. NGO operators are not permitted to conduct EOD of any explosive 
ordnance discovered during survey operations. 
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, DDG identified two SHAs totalling 68,959m2 and one CHA totalling 15,806m2, all in Kayah state.85
In 2019, HALO Trust identified a total of 1,282,515m2 of mined area in north Shan and Kayin states, including 17 CHAs totalling 
811,946m2.86 This is an increase in mined area identified on the year before, due to an increased number of non-technical survey 
teams deployed to north Shan state, where hazardous areas tend to be larger.87
In 2019, MAG conducted 88 non-technical surveys in Myanmar, comprising 40 hazardous area reports and 48 EOD spot task 
reports, mainly in Kayah state (see Table 1).88
Table 1: MAG non-technical survey in 201989
State Operator Hazardous area reports EOD spot task reports
Kayah MAG 35 37
Southern Shan MAG 2 5
Kayin MAG 0 2
Tanintharyi region MAG 3 4
Totals 40 48
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In 2019, MAG identified 39 SHAs totalling 622,524m2 in Kayah and southern Shan states, and the Tanintharyi region; and 3 CHAs 
totalling 2,387m2 in Kayah state (see Table 2). As at April 2020, none of these areas has yet been marked.90
Table 2: Anti-personnel mined area by state (identified by MAG, as at end 2019)91
State CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2)
Kayah 3 2,387 34 532,771
Shan 0 0 2 567
Tanintharyi Region 0 0 3 89,177
Totals 3 2,387 39 622,515
In 2019, NPA identified a total of eight SHAs across Bago, Tanintharyi, and Mon, totalling 213,659m2, and one CHA of 16,614m2  
in size, in Bago region.92 
CLEARANCE IN 2019
No clearance of anti-personnel mines or other ordnance by international NGOs was permitted by the authorities in 2019.93 
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 ■ North Korea should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, North Korea has obligations under international human rights  
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ North Korea should cease all use of anti-personnel mines.
 ■ North Korea should resume mine clearance in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) as soon as possible and permit 
independent verification of clearance.
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION 
The extent of North Korea’s mine problem is not known. North Korea admitted in 1998 that it had laid mines in the DMZ,  
a 1,000km2 strip of land between the north and south of the peninsula believed to be one of the most densely contaminated 
areas in the world. Mined areas are reported to be marked and fenced but mines are also believed to have shifted as a result  
of flooding and landslides.1 
North and South Korea completed clearance of the Joint Security Area (of the DMZ) in Panmunjom in October 2018 under an 
agreement on measures to ease tensions. Additional clearance was conducted in late 2018 around Arrowhead Hill (also known 
as Hill 281) in Cheolwon, Gangwon province, under a pilot joint operations project to recover human remains.2 No other land 
release is known to have occurred.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
North Korea has no functioning mine action programme. 
In September 2018, the North Korean and South Korean 
Ministers of Defence signed a military agreement, the 
Panmunjom declaration, which mandated North Korea, South 
Korea, and the United Nations Command (UNC) to “remove all 
mines in the Joint Security Area (of the DMZ) in Panmunjom 
within 20 days, beginning on October 1, 2018”.3 Diplomacy 
intended to improve relations between North and South in 
2019 did not lead to any additional action.
Following a request from North Korea to the UNC, the 
Korean People’s Army engineers received training on use 
of US detectors using ground penetrating radar for tackling 
box mines.4 US army engineers trained South Korean army 
engineers who in turn provided the training to the Korean 
People’s Army.5
LAND RELEASE 
South Korean officials confirmed on 22 October 2018 that 
clearance of the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom by North 
and South Korea had been completed.6 Officials said North 
Korea had notified the government it had cleared 636 mines 
while South Korea found none.7 At the request of the Korean 
People’s Army, South Korean troops trained by the US Army 
conducted the clearance of one area on the northern side of 
the JSA that was heavily contaminated by box mines working 
with US-supplied Minehound dual purpose detectors.8 The 
north also reportedly cleared a 1.3km-long mine belt in the 
Arrowhead Hill region.9 Reviving tensions between North 
Korea and the United States in 2019 held back further 
progress in demining. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Pakistan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Pakistan has obligations under international human rights law  
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE 
CONTAMINATION 
The extent of anti-personnel mine contamination in Pakistan 
is not known. Pakistan remains affected by mines and other 
explosive ordnance resulting from the Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan (1979–89) and three wars with India, as 
well as from more recent and continuing conflicts in areas 
bordering Afghanistan, including, in particular, the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 
In 2019, Pakistan reiterated past statements that, “Pakistan 
at present faces no problem of uncleared mines since no 
mines have been laid by [the] Pakistan Army after escalation 
of 2001–2002 on Pakistan’s Eastern Border”. 1 Previously it 
had elaborated that mines laid during the tensions in 2001–02 
were all cleared and that no mines have since been laid.2 
In 2018, Pakistan stated that non-state armed groups 
(NSAGs) have employed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
including mines during attacks.3 Pakistan again reported 
the use of IEDs in 2019 by NSAGs had resulted in casualties,4 
stating also that “terrorists carried out 349 IED attacks 
involving use of mines as well”.5 In fact, according to media 
reports across Pakistan in 2018–19, civilian mine casualties 
were from mines of an improvised nature laid by NSAGs, 
from mines laid by troops along the Line of Control (LoC) 
between India and Pakistan, and from mines and other 
explosive hazards in South Waziristan (in an area that had 
been cleared and declared safe by the military).6 
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
Pakistan has no formal civilian mine action programme. 
Pakistani military engineering units have been responsible 
for mine clearance in conflict zones, while the Frontier 
Constabulary has conducted mine clearance in contaminated 
areas of Baluchistan, FATA, and other conflict zones in the 
North-West Frontier Province.
LAND RELEASE 
There are no reports of formal survey or clearance of mined 
area in 2019. 
According to a media report, on 15 December 2018 an 
unnamed senior security official said that 22 demining teams 
were being formed by the Pakistani Army to defuse and 
remove IEDs and mines in the North Waziristan District of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in the FATA. These deminers would 
be in addition to the reported 43 teams already working in 
the seven former tribal districts.7
In a statement delivered at Fourth Review Conference of 
the APMBC in November 2019, Pakistan said that: “The 
use of landmines is exclusively by the military for defence 
purposes”. Pakistan also acknowledged that although it was 
occurring at [a] “much lower scale now, Pakistan has itself 
been a victim of the use of landmines, including as IEDs by 
terrorists and non-state actors. Notwithstanding their use 
by terrorists. Pakistan security forces do not use mines for 
the maintenance of internal order and law enforcement in 
counter-terrorism operations.”8
Pakistan reported a total of 187 attacks causing casualties due 
to IEDs “all over the country”, but did not disaggregate the type 
of IED or specify the proportion that were victim-activated.9
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Russia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Russia has obligations under international human rights law  
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION 
There is no accurate estimate of the extent of mine contamination but Russia is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) as a result of the Second World War, the two Chechen wars (1994–96 and 1999–2009), and armed 
conflicts in the Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.
Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the extent of 
contamination vary greatly because no systematic effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact of the problem.1 
In 2010, Russia’s deputy prime minister and presidential special envoy to the Caucasus, Aleksandr Khloponin, claimed that 
mines affected 14km2 of land and posed a major obstacle to development.2 In contrast, Chechen officials and human rights 
organisations have previously estimated that 245km2 of land was mined, including 165km2 of farmland and 73km2 of woodland.3
In January 2017, a commander in the Russian Armed Forces reportedly told press agency Interfax that more than 100km2 
of land remained to be cleared in Chechnya, and a further 20km2 in neighbouring Ingushetia.4 According to the online media 
report, areas cleared to date had nearly all been in lowland Chechnya and remaining mined area is in more mountainous 
terrain, complicating demining efforts.5 
As at 2011, according to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 3,132 civilians, including 772 children, had been 
killed (731) or wounded (2,401) by mines and ERW in Chechnya since 1994. Data collection, which was conducted by a local 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) partner Voice of the Mountains, was suspended in January 2011, due to lack of funding.6 
ALLEGED USE OF MINES IN CRIMEA IN 2014
Reports of minefields emplaced to demarcate border areas after Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, appear to have concerned 
either “phoney minefields” or areas containing trip-flares. Trip-flares are not covered by the APMBC.7
On 8 March 2014, the Israeli newspaper Harts reported that “Russian combat engineers were seen placing mines in the land 
bridge connecting the [Crimean] peninsula to the mainland in order to foil any Ukrainian attempt to retake Crimea.”8 The 
photographer Evgeny Feldman of the Russian publication Novaya Gazeta photographed an apparent minefield laid near a road 
leading into Crimea and close to the villages of Chongar and Nikolaevka, in Kherson province of Ukraine. The photographs 
show a line of mounds of earth in a field and “Danger Mines” warning signs.9 Other photographs, shared with Human Rights 
Watch by a photo-journalist, showed an area near Chongar marked with “Danger Mines” signs and evidence of stake-mounted, 
tripwire-initiated flares in the ground, also known as “signal mines”.10
Members of the local population informed Ukrainian partners of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) that 
Russian Special Forces operating in Kherson province had laid mines, but it was not possible to confirm the reports, including 
whether any mines laid were anti-personnel or anti-vehicle.11 On 7 March 2014, Ukrainian media reported that the Russian 
military had laid mines around the main gas line into Crimea, but this allegation has not been independently verified.12
At a meeting of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in April 2014, Ukraine alleged Russian use of TM-62 
anti-vehicle mines and unidentified anti-personnel mines in Kherson province just north of Crimea.13 At the same CCW meeting, 
Russia denied using anti-personnel mines, asserting “the Self Defence forces of Crimea, before the referendum, placed the 
minefields with relevant markings, around Chongar”. Russia said, “they placed only signal mines and put proper signage 
around the fields”.14
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1 UNMAS, “Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2009”, New York, 2008, p. 284.
2 “Medvedev emphasizes vision of Chechnya’s future with personal visit”, Russia Today, 14 June 2010, at: bit.ly/33H4BgO.
3 “MoE sappers to demine arable land in Chechnya”, Caucasian Knot, 3 April 2009, at: www.kavkaz-uzel.ru; “In Chechnya MES deminers destroyed 25 explosive 
devices”, Caucasian Knot, 5 October 2009; and “Human rights activists: 25,000 hectares of Chechen territory are still mined”, Caucasian Knot, 7 May 2008.
4 “Landmine threat in Chechnya still prevalent”, OC Media, 23 January 2017, at: bit.ly/33HxfOT.
5 Ibid.
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PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
There is no formal civilian mine action programme in Russia and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance is  
carried out by Federal Ministry of Defence engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the Ministry 
of Emergency Situations (MES), through its specialised demining units (EMERCOM Demining and the “Leader” Center for 
Special Tasks).15
Russia reported that its armed forces established an International Demining Action Centre in 2014. The Centre serves as a 
base for specialist training in detection and clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation of mobile robotic tools,  
and does not function as a mine action centre (MAC) as the term is generally understood in mine action.16
In 2019, Russia reported that 5,960 military personnel were involved in clearance operations in the Russian Federation and 
overseas, including 148 mine clearance teams.17 
LAND RELEASE 
Russia reported clearing more than 614km2 of mine and ERW-contaminated area inside the Russian Federation and abroad  
in 2019, with 151,203 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) found and destroyed.18
The main tasks of Russia’s engineering troops in 2019 included clearance in Chechnya and Ingushetia.19





RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)  
as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, South Korea has obligations under international human rights  
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ South Korea should establish a mine action authority to assume responsibility for planning and implementing  
mine clearance.
 ■ South Korea should enact long-considered legislation permitting mine clearance by accredited civilian demining 
organisations.
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION 
The Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ, 
remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world due to extensive mine-laying during the Korean War and in the 1960s, 
in 1978, and in 1988. 
A National Defence Committee report in 2010 said that South Korea had 1,309 mined areas covering about 118km2, including 
1,100 “planned” mined areas affecting 20km2 and some 209 unconfirmed mined areas covering almost 98km2.1 
A report presented to a side event at the 2019 APMBC Intersessional Meetings showed the number of mined areas as almost 
unchanged at 1,308 containing an estimated 828,000 mines (see Table 1).2 According to information provided by the Army’s 
Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2018, 380,000 of these mines were emplaced in 786 sites within the DMZ.3 Mined areas in the DMZ 
include 771 emplaced minefields which are mapped and 15 undocumented mined areas covering a combined total of 10.03 km2. 
CCZ contamination includes 257 defined mined areas and 176 undocumented sites covering a combined total of 114.79 km2.4
Table 1: Confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in South Korea5
Total
Controlled Protection Zones
Restricted Protection Zones Rear areaDMZ CCZ
No. of sites 1,308 786 433 22 67
No. of mines 828,000 380,000 389,000 50,000 9,000
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT  
The southern half of the Demilitarized Zone is controlled by South Korea but under the Armistice Agreement the area between 
the Demarcation Line and the Southern Line Limit is under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Command (UNC) and any mine 
clearance activities are conducted with UNC approval. 
Mine action in the Civilian Control Zone (between the SLL and the Civilian Control Line) and the rest of South Korea is overseen 
by the Ministry of National Defence and conducted exclusively by South Korean army engineers. There is no national mine 
action authority or mine action centre in South Korea. Government ministries have discussed creation of a national mine action 
authority but as of April 2020 had not decided to proceed and the idea reportedly remains in its infancy.6 Although only the 
South Korean army is permitted to conduct clearance, General Robert Abrams, Commander of US forces and the UNC, has 
reportedly explored the possibility of bringing in international non-government organisations as advisers.7
In September 2018, it was reported that the South Korean army had called for the establishment of an agency dedicated to 
removing mines in the DMZ with responsibility for planning and implementing clearance.8 No action to implement the proposal 
had been reported by the start of 2020. 
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South and North Korea agreed in the Panmunjom Declaration of April 2018 to transform the DMZ into a peace zone. Under the 
Pyongyang Joint Declaration signed in September 2018 the two countries agreed to expand the cessation of hostilities into 
the removal of the danger of war across the peninsula. They also signed an Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic 
Panmunjom Declaration, which provided for clearance of all mines and other explosive devices from agreed areas with a view 
to the joint recovery of remains of soldiers killed in the Korean War. The agreement specified that clearance operations would 
be conducted for four hours a day in designated times using agreed equipment and that the perimeter of cleared areas would 
be marked.9 
South Korea’s Ministry of Defence submitted a bill to parliament in 2013 that would allow civilian organisations to remove 
mines laid during the Korean War.10 As at February 2020, South Korea’s National Assembly had not passed the bill.
LAND RELEASE 
Under the Panmunjom implementation agreement, South Korean army engineers conducted clearance operations in the 
southern part of the Joint Security Area of the DMZ in October 2018 without finding any mines.11 They also cleared several 
areas round Arrowhead Hill in Cheolwon, Gangwon province, to facilitate exhumation of soldiers killed in action during the war. 
South Korea said it destroyed 27 mines and 1,479 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).12 
In 2019, around 500 ROK army engineers completed demining of 102,688m2 of the DMZ around Arrowhead Hill, clearing 255 
mines and 5,754 items of UXO.13 UNC said clearance was conducted according to international mine action standards (IMAS).14
South Korean army engineers also continue to clear mined areas south of the CCL. South Korea’s last Article 13 transparency 
report under Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which was submitted in 2019, 
recorded army clearance of nearly 2km2 in 2018 with the destruction of 10,207 mines.15 Since 2005, the army has reportedly 
cleared 49 mined areas south of the CCL.16




RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Syria should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Syria has obligations under international human rights law to clear 
mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ Syria should establish a mine action authority and expedite access for international demining organisations to 
facilitate a credible humanitarian demining programme.
 ■ Syria should initiate a programme of mine survey and clearance as soon as possible and take other measures to 
reduce the risk to civilians of mines and explosive remnants of war.
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION 
Syria is heavily contaminated by mines and mines of an 
improvised nature used extensively by parties to the 
country’s eight-year-old conflict. It also has mined areas  
left by successive Arab-Israeli wars since 1948. 
The extent of contamination is not known. The United  
Nations (UN) estimated in 2019 that mines and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) affected 2,563 communities and 
11.2 million people and that it recorded an average of 
184 explosive incidents every day.1 Human rights groups 
reported heavy civilian casualties from mines and ERW in 
many governorates in 2019 and 2020, further attesting to  
the density of the contamination.2
The Syrian government reportedly laid mines along borders 
with Turkey and Lebanon in 2012 and Turkish authorities 
claimed five years ago that between 613,000 and 715,000 
mines had been planted along the Turkish-Syrian border, 
making clear they were not emplaced by Turkish forces.3 In 
Manbij, close to the Turkish border, heavy casualties from 
mines, including those of an improvised nature, occurred 
after Kurdish forces pushed out Islamic State in mid-August 
2016 and were still occurring as a result of continuing 
conflicts in 2019.4 Islamic State heavily mined the approaches 
to Manbij and around the Tishreen dam to the east of it, using 
young boys disguised as shepherds to lay the mines, the 
UN Commission of Inquiry monitoring the conflict in Syria 
reported in March 2017.5 
In Aleppo and neighbouring Idlib governorates, volunteers 
similarly report mines and other explosive devices planted 
in agricultural fields, next to roads, inside villages, and 
around schools and hospitals.6 Rebel forces which subjected 
the towns of Foua and Kfraya to years of siege are said to 
have left hundreds of mines in surrounding fields as well as 
individual explosive devices in many homes.7 
Further south in Hama and Homs governorates, open-source 
reports of mine casualties, although unconfirmed, are 
suggestive of significant contamination left by all sides 
during years of conflict.8 The Syrian Observatory for Human 
Rights said that between 24 February and 17 March 2019 it 
documented the death of 44 people in mine and improvised 
explosive device (IED) explosions in Deir Ezzour, Homs, and 
Hama. It also documented casualties from mines, including 
those of an improvised nature, around towns in the southern 
province of Dara.9 
From Raqqa, former capital of the self-proclaimed Islamic 
State caliphate, to Hassakeh governorate in the north-east, 
and south to Deir Ezzour and Barghuz (the last remaining 
Islamic State stronghold overrun in May 2019), retreating 
Islamic State forces left massive contamination of mines of an 
improvised nature and other improvised devices. These have 
taken a heavy toll on returning civilians: non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) Médecins sans Frontières reported that 
the number of victims of mines and other explosive devices 
it treated in north-east Syria doubled between November 
2017 and March 2018. Half of them were children. Its patients 
reported discovering mines and booby-traps on roads, beside 
fields, on rooftops, and under staircases, as well as rigged 
devices placed in common household items from refrigerators 
and air conditioners to televisions and cooking pots.10 
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Syria does not have a national mine action authority or a 
national programme for survey and clearance. Mine action 
has been conducted by a wide range of organisations, largely 
determined by the forces controlling different regions. 
In areas under government control, these have included 
mainly Russian and Syrian military engineers and civil 
defence organisations. International and national demining 
organisations conducted clearance in north-east Syria 
controlled by the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces. Turkey 
reported its security forces cleared mines and IEDs in areas 
of northern Syria it occupied in October 2019.11
Russia deployed several hundred military deminers from 
its Armed Forces Demining Centre from 2017 onwards, 
conducting clearance with manual teams supported by 
mine detection dogs and Uran-6 mine detection robots. 
Russian troops also provided training courses for Syrian 
army engineers at Hmeimim air base and at training centres 
established in 2017 in Aleppo and Homs. By the start of 
January 2018, Russian armed forces reported they had 
trained 900 Syrian engineers.12 
Russia started to withdraw troops, including deminers, from 
Syria in 2018 but its Ministry of Defence continued to report 
mine clearance and EOD in Syria in 2020.13 Russia appealed 
to other countries in 2018 to provide support. Armenia 
responded by sending an 83-man team to Syria in February 
2019, planning to focus its work on the northern governorate 
of Aleppo.14 Armenia rotated a new team to replace the first 
after four months.15
National operators included Syrian Civil Defence (SCD), 
widely reported as White Helmets, which worked with six 
clearance teams and three community liaison/survey teams 
in north-west Syria in 2019. Three clearance and two survey 
teams operated in Idlib province, a focal point of conflict in 
2019, with two clearance teams and one survey team working 
in Aleppo and one clearance team in Hama province. Teams 
mostly destroyed cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other 
unexploded ordnance tackling a wide range of unexploded 
ordnance (UXO). In January 2019 five SCD staff took part 
in a two-week course delivered remotely in humanitarian 
response to IEDs focusing on search, identification and threat 
assessments to increase team safety in their daily search and 
rescue activities.16 
AFAK, a Syrian NGO working in partnership with The HALO 
Trust, conducted clearance in the southern provinces of Dar’a 
and Quneitra in the early part of 2019 until a Syrian army 
offensive took control of the area.17 
In areas outside government control in the north east, 
humanitarian demining organisations and commercial 
companies have conducted large-scale clearance in areas 
recaptured from Islamic State. Tetra Tech worked operated 
in Raqqa, Deir Ezzour, and, after its recapture in 2019, in 
Barghuz. Funded by the United States (US) Department of 
State, Tetra Tech focused on critical infrastructure such as 
hospitals, schools, water pumping stations, and electricity 
generating plants. A small national organisation, Roj Mine 
Control Organization (RMCO), was conducting clearance in 
north and north-east Syria but reportedly sustained heavy 
casualties among its deminers attempting clearance of 
improvised devices.18 
The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) with the Syrian government in 
July 2018 under which it deployed two staff to Damascus in 
October 2018. After meeting Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal 
Mikdad in Damascus in October 2019, UNMAS Director Agnes 
Marcaillou reported the government had agreed to the 
involvement of international demining organisations. They 
would be registered by the government and coordinated 
by UNMAS, which stated that discussions were underway 
on plans for survey, marking, and clearance.19 As of May 
2020, however, no international demining organisations 
had registered with the government and UNMAS remained 
focused on training Syrian partners for risk education and 
community survey. Between January and July 2019 teams 
had surveyed 365 areas in Aleppo, northern Hama and Idlib 
governorates, marking 370 explosive items.20
In January 2019, UNMAS started a first risk education training 
course for 26 Syrian personnel, of whom 16 were women.21 
Since then, risk education has expanded, including through 
joint initiatives with UNICEF.22
Russia announced in March 2019 it would provide funding 
of US$1 million to support UNMAS’s activities in Syria.23 
In April 2019, UNMAS announced a “Humanitarian Mine 
Action Support to Syria (31 March 2019–31 March 2020)” 
project, supported by a $1.4 million grant from Japan, which 
is expected to deliver risk education to 43,000 people and 
conduct contamination impact surveys in 85 communities,  
as well as marking and fencing off explosive hazards.24 
380   Clearing the Mines 2020
LAND RELEASE 
Syria’s continuing conflict prevented progress towards a coordinated national programme of mine action. Comprehensive 
information on outcomes of survey and clearance in any areas was unavailable. 
Syrian deminers were reported to have cleared mines and explosive devices in areas recaptured from opposition armed 
groups. Among tasks continuing in 2020 was clearance of the Damascus-Aleppo highway.25 Armenia’s Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining and Expertise reported that by April 2020 the Armenian army engineers had cleared 147,697m2 and destroyed more 
than 300 mines.26 An Armenian deminer was injured in the explosion of a mine or IED in March 2019 resulting in amputation of  
a foot.27 Demolitions of cleared items are conducted by the Syrian military.28 
Humanitarian mine action in north-east Syria halted after President Trump’s October 2019 announcement of US withdrawal 
from Syria and Turkey’s October 2019 invasion and occupation of parts of northern Syria and the move of Russian troops into 
northern Syria. Some clearance operations had reportedly resumed by early 2020 but the extent was unknown. 
Tetra Tech had operated with approximately 400 personnel in the north east in 2018 but after President Trump’s December 
2018 announcement of the US intention to withdraw from Syria it reduced capacity from seven multi-task teams. In 2019, it  
was working with two multi-task teams and two risk education teams until halting operations in October. After suspending 
Syria operations, the programme closed temporarily in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.29 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Uzbekistan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Uzbekistan has obligations under international human rights law  
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ Uzbekistan should be more transparent in detailing the extent of its mine contamination and clearance operations.
ANTIPERSONNEL  
MINE CONTAMINATION 
Uzbek forces have laid mines along its international borders 
at various times, including on its borders with Afghanistan 
in 1998, with Kyrgyzstan in 1999, and with Tajikistan in 
2000. While Tajikistan and Uzbekistan settled most of their 
1,283km-long border dispute following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, certain areas have not yet been delineated and 
therefore the exact location of mined areas is not known.1 
In 2010, the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), 
Ban Ki-moon, criticised as “unacceptable” Uzbekistan’s 
emplacing of mines along parts of its border that have not 
been delineated.2
Soviet troops also laid mines on the Uzbek-Afghan border. 
Uzbekistan had reportedly cleared 95% of the minefields along 
the Tajik border by the end of 2007 in demining operations 
conducted by Uzbek army deminers in cooperation with Tajik 
border troops.3 
The first ever state visit of the President of Uzbekistan to 
Tajikistan took place in March 2018, and several agreements 
were signed between the two countries, including one on 
demarcation of the separate regions of the Tajik-Uzbek 
border. According to online media, during the visit the heads 
of the two states agreed that the common border would 
be cleared of landmines by the end of 2019.4 Online media 
sources reported that by October 2018 demining along 
the border had started.5 Mine clearance along the border, 
conducted by Uzbekistan, was reportedly completed by 
January 2020;6 the Uzbek and Tajik authorities then moved 
from delimiting their border to demarcation.7
In 2005, media reports cited Kyrgyz officials in Batken 
province as saying Kyrgyz border guards had checked 
previously mined areas of the border around the settlements 
of Ak-Turpak, Chonkara, and Otukchu, which had been cleared 
by Uzbek deminers, and confirmed that they were free of 
contamination.8 According to the most recent information 
available (2005), Uzbekistan has no plans to clear mines laid 
on its 150km border with Afghanistan.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
There is no functioning mine action programme in Uzbekistan.
LAND RELEASE 
There are no detailed reports of survey or clearance 
output in 2019, but according to online media sources in 
January 2020, mine clearance on the Uzbek side of the 
border with Tajikistan has been completed.9 Mine clearance 
was reportedly carried out exclusively by Uzbekistan and 
assistance from Tajikistan was refused, as the clearance 
conducted was exclusively on Uzbek territory.10
1 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 25 April 2018.
2 “Ban calls Uzbekistan land mines ‘unacceptable’”, The Hindu, 6 April 2010, at: bit.ly/2Z3WYgN.
3 Email from Jonmahmad Rajabov, Director, Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC), 16 February 2009; Tajikistan Anti- Personnel Mine Ban Convention Article 7 
Report, “General situation”, 3 February 2008, p. 3; and “Uzbekistan started demining on Tajik border”, Spy.kz, 23 October 2007.
4 “Uzbekistan reportedly completes demining work on Tajik border”, The Diplomat, 10 January 2020.
5 “Putting an end to 20 years of death along the Tajik-Uzbek Border”, RFERL , 13 October 2018; and “Report: Tajik-Uzbek Border Cleared of Mines”, RFERL ,  
6 January 2020.
6 “Uzbekistan reportedly completes demining work on Tajik border”, The Diplomat, 10 January 2020; “Uzbekistan, Tajikistan to finalise border demarcation”, 
Azernews, 7 January 2020; and “Uzbekistan completes demining of border with Tajikistan, say officials”, Central Asia News, 4 February 2020.
7 “Uzbekistan reportedly completes demining work on Tajik border”, The Diplomat, 10 January 2020; and “Uzbekistan, Tajikistan to finalise border demarcation”, 
Azernews, 7 January 2020.
8 IRIN, “Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan: Landmine threat along Uzbek border removed”, at: www.irinnews.org.
9 “Uzbekistan reportedly completes demining work on Tajik border”, The Diplomat, 10 January 2020.
10 Ibid.






Vietnam’s national programme is in the process of developing its legal framework, structure, policies, and standards. With the 
adoption of a new national mine action decree in 2019, followed up with a more detailed Guiding Circular in February 2020, the 
Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC) has now been officially empowered to start coordinating mine action in Vietnam. 
Progress is being made towards establishing a fully functioning national information management database and quality 
management (QM) capacity, and there were plans to update national mine action standards in 2020 to bring them more in line 
with the international mine action standards (IMAS).
However, VNMAC’s primary focus is on cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), and 
there is a lack of clarity as to what extent mine clearance will benefit from the mine action structures and systems being 
established in Vietnam. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
 ■ Vietnam should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Vietnam has obligations under international human rights law  
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ Vietnam should elaborate up a strategic plan for addressing anti-personnel mine contamination.
 ■ Vietnam should publish a detailed assessment of remaining mined areas.
 ■ Vietnam should publish annual reports on its progress in the survey and clearance of mined areas.
 ■ National Technical Regulations (QCVNs) and National Mine Action Standards (TCVNs) should be updated in line  
with IMAS, including with regards to addressing anti-personnel mine contamination.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Vietnam’s mine problem is certainly small compared with contamination from ERW, though the full extent of its mined area is 
unknown. A survey published in 2018 reported the presence of anti-personnel mines in 26 of 63 cities and provinces but gave 
no further details.1 
Most mines were left by conflicts in the 1970s with neighbouring Cambodia and China, and affect areas close to its borders with 
those countries.2 Clearance had been reported by Vietnam along its northern border with China in the 1990s and since 2004, 
but mined areas further inland are believed to persist.3 It was reported in 2013 by Vietnam’s Military Engineering Command 
that clearance had been completed in the Cambodia border areas.4 Many ports and river deltas were mined extensively during 
the armed conflict with the United States and were not completely cleared when it ended. A number of sea mines have been 
found on the coast.5 Some mines have also been found around former US military installations.6
Vietnam also has extensive contamination from CMR and other ERW (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition 
Remnants report on Vietnam for further information).




NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
VNMAC was established in 2014 by Prime Ministerial decision 
(No. 738 of 2013) to strengthen the direction of mine action 
and provide a focal point for mine action operations, although 
management and operations continued to depend largely on 
the Armed Forces. 
In a positive development, Vietnam’s mine action programme 
is now undergoing significant restructuring, following the 
Decree on the Management and Implementation of Mine 
Action Activities, issued in February 2019 (Decree No. 18) and 
subsequent approval of a Guiding Circular which came into 
effect in February 2020 (Guiding Circular No. 195).7 
Under Decree No. 18, while the Ministry of National Defence 
(MoD) will continue to elaborate and preside over the 
national mine action programme, as the lead authority, in 
coordination with other relevant ministries and sectors,8 
VNMAC will, under the direction of the Prime Minister and 
management of the MoD, “monitor, coordinate and implement 
mine action tasks”.9 Guiding Circular No. 195, which details a 
number of articles and methods regarding implementation 
of the Decree, also officially appoints VNMAC as the national 
coordinator of mine action activities in Vietnam. 10 Therefore, 
this is an important period for VNMAC, as the national 
programme develops its legal framework, structure, policies, 
and standards. 
Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid 
(NPA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
PeaceTrees Vietnam (PTVN), and Golden West all provide 
capacity development support in Vietnam (see Mine Action 
Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2020 report  
on Vietnam for more details).11 
While there is still a need for greater transparency from 
VNMAC, international mine action organisations reported that 
their coordination and collaboration with VNMAC improved 
throughout 2019, most notably with VNMAC’s engagement 
with the Landmine Working Group (LWG). The LWG, which 
is co-chaired by NPA and the International Centre (IC), is 
a platform for humanitarian mine action stakeholders in 
Vietnam to meet quarterly to share and discuss updates that 
impact the sector, although in 2019 the LWC only met twice 
and the first LWC meeting of 2020 took place in July. 
In 2019, VNMAC participated and engaged in this forum, 
specifically calling on LWG members to help it develop 
Decree No. 18 and Guiding Circular No. 195.12 During 2020, 
the LWG was due to be involved in the planned update to the 
national regulations and standards. International operators 
hope that VNMAC will use the LWG forum for collective 
discussions on continued improvements in coordination and 
collaboration of mine action in Vietnam.13
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
As at June 2020, Vietnam had not provided information on whether it has a gender policy and implementation plan for mine 
action or on the proportion of female employees at VNMAC.
International operators Danish Demining Group (DDG), MAG, NPA, and PTVN all report having organisational gender and 
diversity policies and state that they consult both women and children during community liaison activities with male and 
female members of community liaison/survey teams. They say they provide equal opportunities during the recruitment 
process and are working towards gender-balanced employment.14 For more information see Mine Action Review’s Clearing 
Cluster Munition Remnants report for Vietnam.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Data quality and accessibility continues to be a major 
challenge in Vietnam. VNMAC is responsible for national 
information management and uses the Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). However, 
information is not currently shared with mine action 
operators.15 The ERW impact survey report released in 2018 
noted that “regulations on reporting demining activities 
have not been strictly followed”. Authorities had, however, 
received clearance data for Ha Tinh and Quang Tri provinces, 
where international donors have supported operations.16 
VNMAC also receives data from the 2018–20 joint KV-MAP 
project, between VNMAC, the Korea International 
Cooperation Agency (KOICA), and UNDP in Binh Dinh and 
Quang Binh provinces.17
However, deficiencies in national-level information 
management are now starting to be addressed by VNMAC, 
made possible by Decree No. 18 and Guiding Circular No. 
195, which makes clear that VNMAC is responsible for the 
management and development of the national mine action 
database. The Director General of VNMAC is responsible for 
regulating the scope, content, and nature of mine action data 
that is allowed to be shared and accessed by the information 
users. As at April 2020, VNMAC was in the process of 
determining how information management will be collected 
nationally and shared.18
A number of data collection forms are used in Vietnam by 
different mine action actors. However, following the adoption 
of Guiding Circular No. 195, it is expected that national 
regulations and standards will be updated to allow for the 
approval of one set of standardised data collection forms 
across Vietnam.19
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NPA is working with VNMAC at the national level to establish information management units (IMUs) to collect and collate 
information from across Vietnam and give transparent access to available data. Throughout 2019, VNMAC’s IMU worked to 
input historical data stored on other databases and available data from the provinces; a process which was expected to be 
completed in 2020.20 
For details on information management at the provincial level, please see Mine Action Review Clearing Cluster Munition 
Remnants report for Vietnam. 
PLANNING AND TASKING
Vietnam does not have a strategy specifically targeting anti-personnel mines. Decision 504, approved by the Prime Minister in 
April 2010, set out a National Mine Action Plan for 2010–25. The plan aimed to “mobilize domestic and international resources 
in making efforts to minimize and finally create impact-free environment for social economic development.” It called for ERW 
clearance of 8,000km2 between 2016 and 2025.21
As at June 2020, there was no national prioritisation system for mine clearance. For details on prioritisation at the provincial 
level, please see Mine Action Review Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report for Vietnam. 
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Vietnam has both National Technical Regulations (QCVNs), which are legally binding and similar in content to standing 
operating procedures (SOPs), and National Mine Action Standards (TCVNs), which despite being standards are considered 
optional by VNMAC and the MoD.22 
The existing QCVNs and TCVNs are outdated and not in line with IMAS.23 According to NPA, the current QCVNs are drafted  
with the MoD in mind and without consideration of other operators’ SOPs, equipment use, land release methods, or structure 
and composition of teams. There are issues with the terminology used in TCVNs; chapters contradict themselves; and they 
read as a combination of SOPs and standards.24 However, in a positive development, VNMAC planned to update the QCVNs and 
TCVNs in 2020 to bring them in line with IMAS.25 As part of this process, VNMAC will update the SOP on QM and the SOP on 
technical and non-technical survey, and although consideration was given as to whether to merge the QCVNs and TCVNs into 
one document,26 as at August 2020 the QCVNs were being updated separately.27 Work commenced in May 2020, with the aim  
to complete the required updates by the end of the year, but it will likely take longer to elaborate and approve the new  
circulars needed. Updates will reportedly be made in consultation with LWG members and the Geneva International Centre  
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).28
The QCVNs and TCVNs reportedly cover anti-personnel mine operations under the heading mines/ERW clearance, but more 
work is required in both documents with respect to addressing mined areas.
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Most clearance in Vietnam is conducted by the Army Engineering Corps and military-owned commercial companies; 
coordination for which does not fall under the remit of VNMAC. Outside the central provinces, the current strength and 
deployment of military-related demining is unknown.
Engineering Command teams were, however, being deployed as part of the KV-MAP project, which was initiated in February 
2018 and is being jointly implemented by KOICA, UNDP, and VNMAC in Binh Dinh and Quang Binh provinces.29
International operators active in 2019 included DDG, working in Quang Nam province; MAG, working in Quang Binh and Quang 
Tri provinces; NPA, working in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Hue provinces; and PTVN, who have been working in Quang Tri 
province since 1995. DDG ceased operations in Vietnam in January 2020, due to lack of funding.30 Survey and clearance by 
the NGO operators are solely focused on contamination from CMR and other ERW, and not anti-personnel mines. For further 
details on survey and clearance capacity of humanitarian operators, please see Mine Action Review Clearing Cluster Munition 
Remnants report for Vietnam. 
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
VNMAC has not shared any data on mine clearance activities in Vietnam in 2019 and operators did not report any 
anti-personnel mined area reduced or cancelled through survey or cleared in 2019.31
The Quang Tri Mine Action Centre (QTMAC, and previously known as the Legacy of War Coordination Centre), recorded 
destruction of nine anti-personnel mines in 2019: one during technical survey and eight during EOD responses. All of the  
mines discovered and destroyed by QTMAC were isolated mines and were not part of a minefield. This was a decrease 
compared to the 17 anti-personnel mines destroyed during EOD responses in 2018.32 
MAG reported destroying one anti-personnel mine in 2019, during an emergency EOD task response in Quang Tri Province.33 
A small number of anti-personnel mines were also found and destroyed during clearance operations in 2019, as part of the 
KV-MAP project.34
Vietnam has not set a deadline for completion of anti-personnel mine clearance. In its national mine action plan for 2010 to 
2025 it called for the clearance of 8,000km2 of ERW from 2016 to 202535 but did not specify how much of this, if any, should  
be mined area. 
In the past, the challenge for VNMAC was identifying and implementing the legal framework that would allow mine action 
stakeholders to support the decision-making process,36 but addressing this should now be possible under the Decree 85 and 
Guiding Circular 195. It is hoped that their adoption will enable VNMAC to put in place systems and practices to coordinate and 
strengthen mine action in Vietnam, bringing national standards relating to survey and clearance operations in line with IMAS, 
and establishing a national information management database accessible to all mine action stakeholders to more accurately 
determine the extent of CMR contamination; and to set national priorities for clearance.
VNMAC’s focus however, is on CMR and ERW, and there is currently a lack of clarity as to what extent anti-personnel mines fall 
under VNMAC’s responsibility.
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Golden West is partnering with the GICHD in a Management of Residual Explosive Remnants of War project to study the 
ERW ageing; develop standards for the collection, cutting, and dissection of ERW; and to draw up and pilot a long-term risk 
management model.37
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 ■ While formal accession to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) is not currently possible for Kosovo,  
as it is not yet recognised as a state by the depository to the Convention, Kosovo should submit a letter to the United 
Nations (UN) Secretary-General stating that it intends to fully comply, on a voluntary basis, with the APMBC. 
 ■ This should include the submission of a voluntary Article 7 transparency report on an annual basis, as Kosovo has 
proposed in its Mine Action Strategy 2019–24.
 ■ The Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) should continue its efforts to ensure timely and efficient clearance of  
anti-personnel mines, in line with the objectives in its latest mine action strategy and complete clearance by the  
end of 2024. 
 ■ Where necessary, evidence-based survey should be conducted to confirm the presence of mines before embarking  
on full clearance of mined areas.
 ■ KMAC and international mine action operators should increase their collaboration to seek additional funding and 
greater financial stability for mine action. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Kosovo is contaminated by mines, cluster munition remnants (CMR), and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as 
a result of the conflict between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the late 1990s, and 
between Yugoslavia and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states in 1999.1 At the end of 2019, 35 confirmed 
mined areas remained, covering almost 1.36km2; including four confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totalling 425,000m2 which 
contained mixed mine and CMR contamination.2 
The end-2019 figure is a significant increase on the 1.2km2 of mined area, across 44 CHAs, reported for the end of 2018.3 
According to KMAC, the reason for the increase in Kosovo’s baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination is that the 1.36km2 
of mined area includes mixed anti-personnel mine and cluster munition remnant contamination, whereas previously mixed 
contamination had not been included in the baseline of mined area.4 
The last comprehensive survey of contamination in Kosovo was in 2013, during which The HALO Trust and KMAC conducted 
thousands of community surveys and confirmed 130 hazardous areas: 79 mined areas covering an estimated 2.76km2 and  
51 cluster munition strikes covering an estimated 7.63km2.5 
KMAC believes the current baseline of contamination to be reasonably accurate, evidence-based, and complete, but said there 
may still be reports by locals in the future of previously unknown areas suspected to be contaminated by mines.6
The HALO Trust believes Kosovo’s current baseline reflects a relatively accurate picture of the remaining contamination, but 
suggests that it would benefit from a critical review and further assessment of the existing 2013 survey data. This would 
inform future targeting of survey and clearance of remaining contamination, in order to achieve completion by the target date 
of 2024.7 
Both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were used during the conflict, in fixed-pattern minefields as well as more randomly 
in “nuisance” minefields. Many anti-personnel mines had minimal metal content.8 Although the total number of mines emplaced 
during the conflict is not known, the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) reported, as at 31 May 2000, that a total 
of 7,232 mines had been cleared in the preceding year (3,448 anti-personnel mines and 3,784 anti-vehicle mines).9 The UN 
reported in 2002 that “the problems associated with landmines, cluster munitions and other items of unexploded ordnance 
[UXO] in Kosovo have been virtually eliminated”,10 but further investigation revealed that considerably more contamination 
remained to be addressed.11 
EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS 
In addition to contamination from mines, Kosovo is contaminated with CMR (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition 
Remnants report on Kosovo for further information) as well as other ERW. Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR) and Kosovo 
Security Force (KSF) explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams regularly dispose of ERW in response to information provided 
by the public and demining organisations.12 
KOSOVO
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In January 2011, the EOD Coordination Management 
Section became KMAC, responsible for managing survey 
and clearance of mines and ERW throughout Kosovo. 
KMAC prepares an annual work plan in cooperation with 
international demining NGOs and coordinates their operations 
along with the national demining teams of the KSF. It also 
coordinates survey, quality assurance, risk education, public 
information, and victim assistance activities.13 KMAC’s role 
and responsibilities as head of the national mine action 
programme under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence 
were established and institutionalised by Kosovo’s 2012  
Law on Humanitarian Demining.14 
In 2019, KMAC had five permanent staff: a Director, a Senior 
Quality Assurance (QA) Officer, a QA Inspector, a Mine Risk 
Education (MRE) Officer, and a Public Information Officer.15
Kosovo’s mine action programme is fully nationally owned, 
with a strong, longstanding commitment from the national 
government. The dedicated team of permanent national staff 
have been employed by KMAC since its creation. This has 
benefitted the programme with the retention of experience 
and institutional memory.16 
NGO operators in Kosovo report having a constructive and 
proactive working relationship with KMAC. HALO Trust staff 
meet with the director of KMAC for monthly coordination 
meetings,17 and, in addition, KMAC’s QA officers visit HALO 
Trust on a quarterly basis to discuss operations planning, 
along with conducting unannounced weekly field visits to 
HALO tasks.18
In 2019, the Kosovo government provided €990,000 in 
financial support to KMAC, and to the KSF for mine and  
ERW clearance.19 
Kosovo’s current Mine Action Strategy 2019–24 sets out the 
objective of intensifying resource mobilisation efforts in order 
to gain greater financial stability.20 While a specific resource 
mobilisation strategy does not exist, operators reported that 
coordinated approaches with KMAC were made to potential 
donors such as the United States and the European Union.21 
Unfortunately, the misperception persists that mine, CMR, 
and other ERW clearance in Kosovo was completed in 
2001, whereas the reality is that significant contamination 
remains. Kosovo remains a poor country and needs economic 
assistance to help it complete clearance in a timely manner, 
hopefully in less than five years if sufficient support is 
provided. In 2019, KMAC identified funding and logistical 
support as the two primary areas where it could most  
benefit from assistance from international donors and mine 
action operators.22
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Kosovo’s Mine Action Strategy 2019–24 reflects the 
commitment of the mine action programme to ensure 
that gender is taken into consideration in the planning, 
implementation, and monitoring of all mine action projects, 
with a view to promoting equality and quality.23 The Strategy 
stipulates that all mine action activities and assistance must 
reflect the needs of different ages and gender in a targeted 
and non-discriminatory manner, and that mine action 
and community liaison data are also to be collected and 
systematically disaggregated according to sex and age.24
Both KMAC and KSF have gender policies in place. KMAC 
reported that the KSF’s gender policy aims to facilitate 
the consultation of all groups affected by mines and ERW, 
expressly women and children. Within KMAC, one of its five 
staff (the MRE Officer) is a woman. A total of 5% of KSF staff 
employed in operational mine action roles were women, but 
none is in a managerial or supervisory position.25
Kosovo’s mine action strategy recognises the barriers that 
exist against equal employment in Kosovo society, including 
significant differences in employment levels between men and 
women, despite the number of men and women of working 
age being broadly similar. The Strategy notes that, as at 2019, 
more than four-fifths of women of working age were not 
employed in Kosovo’s labour market, and less than one in 
eight women of working age has been employed annually over 
the past five years. The primary reasons given by women for 
unemployment are child and family care obligations, which 
traditionally fall on women in Kosovo society. The Strategy 
notes the efforts of mine action operators to overcome 
these challenges and barriers to employment, such as 
through child care and parental leave, and gender-sensitive 
recruitment practices that encourage women to apply for 
positions traditionally seen as jobs for men. It further recalls 
the importance of employment of not only multi-gender, 
but also multi-ethnic survey and clearance teams and the 
particular benefits of recruitment in areas affected by high 
unemployment and poor socio-economic conditions.26
In 2018, The HALO Trust developed a gender policy in 
consultation with the Kosovo Women’s Network, an advocacy 
network of more than 140 member organisations, including 
women’s organisations of all ethnic backgrounds from 
throughout Kosovo, which was adopted in February. The 
policy aims both at increasing the recruitment of women, 
as well as retention of existing female employees.27 In 2019, 
HALO further developed this policy to include provision 
for increased family leave and child-care allowances for 
those taking care of children, in order to remove barriers 
to women’s employment. Through the Dutch Government, 
HALO Trust contracted the Gender and Mine Action 
Programme (GMAP, a part of the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD) to conduct gender 
sensitivity and leadership training in July 2019 to more than 
20 managers in the global organisation, to address issues of 
unconscious bias and inclusion.28
In HALO Trust’s Kosovo programme, 17% of employees 
are women, including in 14% of operational roles in survey 
and clearance teams, although there were no women in 
operational management positions in 2019. HALO also 
ensures that community liaison teams are gender balanced 
and include senior personnel fluent in relevant languages, 
to ensure that community liaison activities are inclusive for 
ethnic or minority groups.29 
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Although HALO Trust is committed to increasing the number of women in the organisation generally and specifically in 
management roles, without recruitment or expansion opportunities, this has proved difficult. In May 2019, however, HALO 
trained and promoted four women to operate Handheld Stand-off Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS) detectors – a first for 
the programme. In 2020, HALO was planning to train and promote Assistant Team Leaders, and sees this as an opportunity to 
increase the representation of women in operational management.30 Relevant mine action data are disaggregated by gender 
and age, and data collected post-clearance is also disaggregated to ensure the understanding and analysis of impact of mine 
action activities takes gender into consideration.31
According to KMAC, Kosovo’s baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination has been established through inclusive 
consultation with women, girls, boys, and men, including, where relevant, from minority groups.32 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
KMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation version for its national mine action 
database. Data are disaggregated between mines, CMR, and other ERW.33 Operators were positive in their assessments of 
the quality and accessibility of data contained in the database and of KMAC’s information management systems in general. 
Operators report to KMAC on a weekly basis.34 However, there continued to be significant discrepancies between land release 
data reported to Mine Action Review by clearance operators, compared to data reported by KMAC.
According to its most recent mine action strategy, KMAC intended, as a means to show its commitment to the APMBC, to 
submit voluntary Article 7 transparency reports on an annual basis.35 In disappointing news, KMAC subsequently advised  
Mine Action Review that Kosovo would only start submitting Article 7 reports when it becomes a member of the UN.36
PLANNING AND TASKING
The GICHD supported the development of Kosovo’s new 
Mine Action Strategy for 2019–24, bringing together a wide 
range of national and international stakeholders in a strategy 
stakeholder workshop in Pristina in October 2018. The 
strategy, formally approved in January 2019 and launched  
by the Ministry of Kosovo Security Services on 4 April 2019, 
has three goals:
 ■ Mine/ERW threats managed and reduced 
 ■ Communication and awareness raising 
 ■ Management of residual contamination. 
The strategy declares that all known mined and 
CMR-contaminated areas will be addressed by the end of 
2024, leaving only residual contamination to be managed 
accordingly. It contains annual projections for anti-personnel 
mine clearance, including:
 ■ all high priority anti-personnel mine tasks (numbering  
8 as at October 2018) will be cleared by the end of 2020 
 ■ all medium-priority anti-personnel mine tasks  
(25 as at October 2018) will be cleared by 2022; and 
 ■ all low-priority anti-personnel mine tasks  
(15 as at October 2018) will be completed by 2024.37
Planned completion of clearance of the high priority tasks by 
the end of 2020 may be impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.38
The strategy states it is based on a number of assumptions, 
including that the necessary funding will be secured and that 
no new mined or CMR-contaminated areas are identified. It 
notes, however, that “so far each year 3–4 different affected 
areas have been reported” and that should this trend 
continue, capacity and progress will need to be reassessed 
with regards to the 2024 deadline.39 
As per the strategy, KMAC will develop annual operational 
work plans to implement the strategy’s goals.40 KMAC will 
also request an external mid-term review of the strategy 
in 2022 to evaluate progress and make any adaptations 
according to contextual changes if required.41 
In 2019, KMAC confirmed that it had developed annual 
operational work plans to target anti-personnel mined areas, 
according to impact-based criteria, including risk reduction, 
development priorities, and poverty reduction, along with 
the findings of a nationwide baseline socio-economic impact 
assessment carried out in 2018 by KMAC, with the support 
of The HALO Trust.42 The mine action strategy for 2019–24 
is also in alignment with the objectives of Kosovo’s National 
Development Strategy 2016–2021.43
In 2019, The HALO Trust developed a new prioritisation 
system that takes into account the “community profile” 
for a task. This system draws on several factors, such 
as socio-economic status, planned land use, government 
development plans, and demographics. All information is 
collected from government and public data as well as from 
extensive community survey.44
In 2020, KMAC planned that clearance would start on nine 
mined areas.45




STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
National mine action standards for land release are in place in Kosovo, which according to KMAC are in accord with the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).46 
A 2014 evaluation of Kosovo’s mine action programme, conducted on behalf of the International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing 
Human Security, concluded that an increase in capacity and improvements to land release methodology and equipment 
deployed would be necessary if Kosovo were to complete clearance operations by 2024. Since the 2014 evaluation, a number 
of significant improvements have been introduced to the mine action programme, including the introduction of HSTAMID 
detectors by The HALO Trust, which have advanced operational productivity.47 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2019, Kosovo’s national mine action programme’s capacity consisted of two international operators, The HALO Trust and 
NPA, and national operator, the KSF. However, NPA did not conduct survey or clearance of anti-personnel mined area in 2019, 
solely focusing on CMR.48 The demining season is from the end of March to the end of November, due to weather conditions.49
HALO Trust’s operational personnel are cross-trained for mine clearance and battle area clearance (BAC) and can move readily 
between activities. On average, in 2019, The HALO Trust deployed 48 deminers to mine clearance tasks – a slight increase on 
the previous year.50 
KSF operated two manual clearance teams in 2019, totalling 20 deminers, and expected capacity to remain the same in 2020.51 
KFOR supports the KSF and Kosovo Police with EOD response tasks and organising mine and ERW demolitions in Mitrovica 
and the north of Kosovo.52
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of almost 0.32km2 of mined area was released in 2019: 0.27km2 through clearance and 0.05km2 cancelled through 
non-technical survey.53
SURVEY IN 2019
A total of more than 0.05km2 was cancelled through 
non-technical survey in 2019 (see Table 1). Whereas KMAC 
did not report any mined area as having been reduced 
through technical survey in 2019,54 HALO Trust reported 
reducing 92,761m2 through technical survey during the year.55
Table 1: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201956




This is an increase in non-technical survey, compared to 2018, 
when no mined area was cancelled, but is a decrease on the 
114,000m2 reduced through technical survey in 2018.57
While KMAC did not report any anti-personnel mined area as 
having been reduced through technical survey in 2019, HALO 
Trust reported reducing 92,761m2, across the districts of 
Ferizaj, Gjakova, Mitrovice, and Prizren. HALO Trust applies 
reduction to tasks once clearance has been completed.58
CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, a total of almost 0.27km2 of anti-personnel mined area was cleared, with 21 anti-personnel mines, 1 anti-vehicle mine, 
and 5 items of UXO found and destroyed (see Table 2).59 This was a slight increase in the area cleared compared to 2018, when 
just over 0.22km2 of anti-personnel mined area was cleared, with 46 anti-personnel mines found and destroyed.60
Table 2: Mine clearance in 201961
Operator Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed UXO destroyed 
 HALO Trust 221,246 17 1 0
 KSF 47,390 4 0 5
Totals 268,636 21 1 5
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle 
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A further 20 anti-personnel mines were destroyed by the KSF in EOD response tasks in 2019.62 As Kosovo has strict national 
procedures for the management of explosives, the KSF, with support from KFOR in northern Kosovo, carries out the 
destruction of mines, CMR, and other ERW found by The HALO Trust and NPA.63
Compared to the previous year, in 2019, The HALO Trust saw an increase of mine clearance productivity by some 13% based  
on its own data, as a result of increasing team numbers and introducing a greater number of HSTAMIDS detectors.64 
During operations in 2019, three mined areas were cleared in which no anti-personnel mines were found: Deve (4,247m2),  
Rrasa e Zogut (3,227m2), and Shkoza (4,400m2).65 Evidence of mines, particularly PMR2-A, was present at some tasks,66  
but  
it still highlights the need for robust evidence-based survey prior to any clearance.
PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Kosovo cannot formally adhere to the APMBC and therefore 
does not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 5. 
Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human 
rights law to clear anti-personnel mines as soon as possible. 
As stated in Kosovo’s Mine Action Strategy 2019–24, which 
sets completion of mine and cluster munition clearance by the 
end of 2024, completion will only be achievable if sustained 
funding is secured.67 Specific concerns are elaborated in the 
strategy about the need to upgrade old equipment, including 
vehicles to proceed without unnecessary stand-downs or 
costly repairs.68 
As at April 2020, KMAC reported that it still expects to clear 
all known mined areas by the end of 2024.69 The HALO Trust 
reported that it requires increased capacity to complete mine 
clearance by the end of 2024, as the funding commitment 
as at May 2020 was not sufficient. HALO also highlighted 
the need for a review of the current data on mined areas, 
including an evaluation of survey polygons, and application 
of efficient land release methodologies, in order to ensure 
coordinated and cost-effective targeting of clearance.70
Assuming the target is met, completion of mine clearance in 
2024 would be 25 years after the end of the conflict between 
the FRY forces and NATO and more than 20 years after the 
UN claimed that clearance was largely complete.
Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance







PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
According to Kosovo’s Mine Action Strategy 2019–24, a separate national strategy on the management of residual 
contamination will be developed by KMAC by 2023, in collaboration with other national actors. This will clarify roles  
and responsibilities in order to manage what is expected to be a long-term residual contamination problem.71
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Nagorno-Karabakh should make a commitment to respect the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and set  
a deadline for the clearance of all anti-personnel mines.
 ■ Despite not being a State Party to the APMBC, Nagorno-Karabakh has obligations under international human rights 
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should commit to never use anti-personnel mines and provide resources for mine 
survey and clearance.
 ■ Nagorno-Karabakh should expedite creation of a mine action authority to centralise and strengthen information 
management and enhance coordination between all stakeholders.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The estimate of anti-personnel mine contamination more than doubled to 7.75km2 in 2019 (see Table 1) as a result of a 
nationwide survey started by HALO Trust and expected to continue until 2022. It found 125 confirmed hazardous areas  
(CHAs), up from 70 a year earlier, covering 4.72km2 compared with 3.78km2 at the end of 2018. It also identified 108  
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) affecting 3.03km2, mostly in the north-eastern Martakert area bordering Azerbaijan.1
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2019)
Region CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total area (m2)
Askeran 8 321,286 1 28,309 349,595
Hadrut 15 1,614,398 0 0 1,614,398
Lachin 19 560,044 0 0 560,044
Martakert 77 1,902,840 107 3,003,233 4,906,073
Martuni 2 154,715 0 0 154,715
Shahumyan 4 167,900 0 0 167,900
Totals 125 4,721,183 108 3,031,542 7,752,725
All regions of Nagorno-Karabakh have been affected by mines and unexploded submunitions as a result of the 1988–94 conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan and subsequent fighting. Mines were laid by both the Azeri and pro-Karabakh forces during 
the war, with a relatively high proportion of anti-vehicle mines being used in some regions.2 The mines were of Soviet design 
and manufacture, and due to the nature of the conflict certain areas were mined several times.3 Nagorno-Karabakh’s armed 
forces said they laid additional anti-personnel mines along the Armenian-Azerbaijani line of contact in 2013, east and north of 
disputed territory.4 
Of 183 CHAs and SHAs newly identified in 2019, 182 covering a total of 4,633,027m2 were within the Traditional Oblast while the 
remaining one, covering 14,318m2 was outside. The significant discoveries around Martakert underscored the many years that 
had elapsed since previous surveys, which were mostly conducted in the early 2000s with some additional survey in 2010–11 
and 2014, and increased knowledge of contamination accumulated by local communities.5 
Nagorno-Karabakh has a relatively small amount of anti-vehicle mine contamination but much more extensive cluster munition 
contamination (see Table 2), which covers approximately 10 times as much area as anti-personnel mines as well as explosive 
remnants of war (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munitions 2020).







Table 2: Explosive contamination by type (at end 2019)6
Type of contamination CHAs Area (m2) SHA Area (m2)
Anti-personnel mines 125 4,721,183 108 3,031,542
Anti-vehicle mines 20 1,171,238 8 73,319
Cluster munitions 213 70,481,083 0 0
Totals 358 76,373,504 116 3,104,861
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Nagorno-Karabakh does not have a mine action centre or authority. The HALO Trust established the Nagorno-Karabakh Mine 
Action Centre (NKMAC) in 2000, which it hoped would consolidate all mine action-related information and respond to requests 
from the government ministries, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and local communities. The project did not, however, 
attract local support and has been moribund for several years.7
Proposals for establishing a national centre were supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in meetings with The HALO Trust 
at the end of 2019 and discussions were set to resume in 2020. HALO reported constructive talks on the issue with the State 
Emergency Services and the Ministry of Agriculture.8 
A mine action coordination committee is responsible for liaising between the local authorities and The HALO Trust. Regular 
coordination committee meetings were held between the local authorities, The HALO Trust, and the International Committee  
of the Red Cross (ICRC) until 2018 when the head of the committee was moved to a new post. The position remains vacant,  
with HALO Trust continuing to lobby for a suitable candidate to fill the role.9
The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities do not provide The HALO Trust with any funding to clear mined areas.10
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
HALO’s Nagorno-Karabakh programme follows the organisation’s gender and diversity policies, providing equal access to 
employment for women and engaging them in management and operational roles.11 Its most senior national staff member is 
female and women were employed in both survey and clearance. In 2019, female staff were included in non-technical survey 
teams for the first time. From 2020, all HALO survey teams include at least one woman. Women made up around 13% of HALO’s 
staff in 2019, about the same as in the previous year, and expected to hire more women, subject to the availability of funding.12
All groups affected by anti-personnel mines, including women and children, are said to be consulted during survey and 
community liaison activities. Relevant mine action data is disaggregated by sex and age.13 But gender is said to be not taken 
into account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities.14
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Nagorno-Karabakh does not have a mine action information management system; The HALO Trust operates its own database.15 
No central mechanism exists for systematic sharing of data on mine clearance, underscoring the value of a mine action 
authority. The emergency services share information on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs and advance notice of 
demolitions.16 The Nagorno-Karabakh Army Liaison Officer shares information with The HALO Trust on items found, incidents, 
CHAs, and clearance on a regular basis. HALO is not authorised to share this data with others.17
PLANNING AND TASKING
There is no national mine action strategy currently in place in Nagorno-Karabakh.18
HALO Trust’s work plan has focused on completing existing tasks, giving priority to areas where confirmed accidents indicate 
the greatest humanitarian threat and where cleared areas are most likely to be put to use. HALO Trust started a nationwide 
survey in 2019, focusing on Malakert as Nagorno-Karabakh’s most heavily mine-contaminated region. When new information of 
contamination is received, such as a mine find or incident, HALO tasks a non-technical survey team to respond within 48 hours. 
Otherwise, the survey was due to continue in 2020 on a region-by-region basis.19
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Nagorno-Karabakh has no local mine action standards. The Nagorno-Karabakh police were planning to lobby the government 
to develop standards while The HALO Trust planned to support calls for national standards as part of discussions on creating  
a mine action authority.20
In the meantime, The HALO Trust follows its internal standing operating procedures. These were extensively re-written in 
2019 to support introduction of more efficient clearance techniques, including the use of Minehound ground-penetrating-radar 
detectors.21
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS 
The HALO Trust has been the main organisation conducting 
land release in Nagorno-Karabakh since it started working 
there in 2000. The Nagorno-Karabakh Emergency Service, 
formerly known as the Rescue Service, conducts EOD spot 
tasks and has reportedly conducted some clearance. One 
Nagorno-Karabakh army unit conducts limited demining.22 
Clearance is conducted mostly in the summer months 
between May and October. In 2019, HALO Trust operated 
with a total staff that peaked at 242 at the end of September 
before winding down in line with normal practice to 159 at 
the end of the year. At the end of 2019, HALO had 12 manual 
clearance teams with a total of 79 deminers together with 
four four-person non-technical survey teams and two 
mechanical teams with a total of eight personnel. Uncertainty 
over the level of continued United States (US) funding raised 
the possibility that HALO Trust would reduce staff further in 
2020 rather than build up capacity over the summer.23
After trialling Minehound GPR detectors and developing 
SOPs for them in 2019, The HALO Trust planned to deploy 
the detectors with demining teams in 2020.24 By May 2020, 
HALO Trust had received three of the detectors and had one 
in service. It planned to deploy the other two by mid-June 
after training which requires dry ground and was delayed 
by persistent rain. Initial results showed the detector had 
increased clearance rates by around 10%, a figure expected 
to rise with experience.25 
The HALO Trust introduced a mobile data platform, the 
Fulcrum App, to boost the effectiveness and efficiency of 
non-technical survey. It allows survey teams to track and 
map historical evidence related to mine contamination and 
will enhance survey of the remaining mine contamination 
in Nagorno-Karabakh. HALO Trust also introduced use of 
Differential GPS providing greater accuracy to survey data.26 
DEMINER SAFETY
HALO Trust did not experience any demining casualties in 2019.
In November 2019, Nagorno-Karabakh police concluded their investigation into a March 2018 anti-vehicle mine blast which 
killed three members of a HALO Trust technical survey team and injured two others.27 The HALO Trust and an external 
investigator had already conducted investigations that were concluded by June 2018. None of the investigations was able  
to determine with certainty the cause of the accident, which may have been a deep-buried mine. The other possibilities were  
that the area was missed during clearance due to the complexities of working around a previous accident site, or that the  
mine was not detected due to inadequate application of clearance techniques.28
The investigation, which was the most detailed in HALO Trust’s history, led to 28 recommendations, mostly focused on 
management systems. Manual prodding, halted after the accident, remains suspended.29 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
The HALO Trust released a total of 195,997m2 in 2019, all of it through clearance, almost a quarter less than in 2018.
SURVEY IN 2019
No mined area was cancelled through non-technical survey or reduced through technical survey in 2019. 
As part of its re-survey of Nagorno-Karabakh, HALO Trust teams surveyed 38 out of 362 villages in 2019. It expects  
to complete survey of the Traditional Oblast by early 2022 and finish the rest of the territory the following year.30








HALO Trust cleared 195,997m2 in 2019 (see Table 3), down from the 253,804m2 it cleared during the previous year, but, in the 
process, it destroyed more anti-personnel mines than it did in 2018.31
Table 3: Mine clearance in 2019
Province/Region/District Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed
Askeran 5,936 2 0
Hadrut 153,360 84 1
Lachin 18,221 5 0
Martakert 15,476 23 0
Martuni 3,004 0 2 
Totals 195,997 114 3
HALO survey teams are responsible for conducting EOD spot tasks and seven of nineteen tasks conducted in 2019 involved 
destruction of mines of which one was an anti-personnel mine and the remainder anti-vehicle mines.32
1 Email from Rob Syfret, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 7 May 2020.
2 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “De-mining 
Needs Assessment in Nagorno-Karabakh”, September 2013, p. 2.
3 HALO Trust, “Our role in Nagorno-Karabakh: History”, accessed 20 July 
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4 L. Musayelian, “Karabakh Enhances Defense Capabilities”, Asbarez, 
Stepanakert, 26 July 2013, at: bit.ly/3imvugM.
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11 Ibid.
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14 Ibid.
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18 Ibid.
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21 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO Trust, 7 May 2020.
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26 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO Trust, 7 May 2020.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) should reaffirm its written commitment to respect and 
implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), including clearance of all anti-personnel mines east  
of the Berm, consonant with its human rights obligations.
 ■ A resource mobilisation plan should be developed with the aim of attracting international donor support. 
 ■ Greater support should be provided to the Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO) to enable it to  
continue to coordinate mine action in Western Sahara, east of the Berm and ensure that capacity development  
efforts are not lost. 
 ■ Mine action in Western Sahara must not become forgotten or overlooked by the international mine action community. 
Support must still be given to address remaining mine, cluster munition, and other explosive remnants of war 
(ERW) contamination.
 ■ SMACO should revise its strategy to include a more realistic date for completion of clearance of anti-personnel mines 
with annual survey and clearance targets, and a detailed budget.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The exact extent of mine contamination across Western Sahara is not known, although the areas along the Berm1 are thought 
to contain some of the densest mine contamination in the world.2 The contamination is a result of fighting in previous decades 
between the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario 
Front) forces. 
According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the primary mine threat in Western Sahara east of the Berm, 
excluding both the Berm itself, restricted areas, and the buffer strip, is from anti-vehicle mines rather than anti-personnel 
mines; cluster munition remnants (CMR) are also a major hazard.3 As at end 2019, no areas suspected or confirmed to contain 
solely anti-personnel mines remained to the east of the Berm. The majority of mine contamination identified during ongoing  
and historical clearance efforts was from anti-vehicle mines though with some areas previously thought to contain only 
anti-vehicle mines found to also contain anti-personnel mines following non-technical survey conducted in the Agwanit Area  
of Responsibility.4
At the end of 2019, land in Western Sahara to the east of the Berm contained a total of 51 areas confirmed and suspected to 
contain mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine contamination covering a total of 275km2 (see Table 1).5 From 2018, this  
is an increase of 58.74km2 in total mined area and an increase of 25 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). According to UNMAS, 
this is due to previously unrecorded anti-vehicle mine contamination being found through survey and added to the database.6
Table 1: Mined area east of the Berm (at end 2019)7
Type of contamination CHAs Area (km2) SHAs Area (km2) Total CHAs and SHAs Total area (km2)
AP mines 0 0 0 0 0 0
AV mines 27 61.90 0 0 27 61.90
AP/AV mines 5 87.11 19 126.00 24 213.11
Totals 32 149.01 19 126.00 51 275.01
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle CHA = Confirmed hazardous area SHA = Suspected hazardous area
Both the north and south of Western Sahara are known or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, with 24 areas confirmed 
or suspected areas with a total size of 213km2 remaining to be addressed at the end of 2019, as set out in Table 2.8 This is a 
small decrease in total area from the end of the previous year when there was 216.25km2 contaminated with anti-personnel 
mines.9 According to UNMAS, this decrease is due to re-survey of contaminated areas.10
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Table 2: Mined area containing anti-personnel mines by province east of the Berm (at end 2019)11
Province CHAs Area (km2) SHAs Area (km2) Total CHAs and SHAs Total area (km2)
North Region 1 0.11 16 16.04 17 16.15
South Region 4 87 3  109.96 7 196.96
Totals 5 87.11 19 126.00 24 213.11
In September 2018, UNMAS reported that following non-technical survey efforts, east of the Berm, 10 of the then 27 mined 
areas remained, covering an estimated total of almost 120km2. These areas are located within the 5km-wide buffer strip 
and are inaccessible for clearance.12 Clearance of the buffer strip of mines and ERW is not foreseen in UN Mission for the 
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Military Agreements No .2 (with Frente POLISARIO) and No. 3 (with RAM), which, 
according to the UN, considerably limits the ability of MINURSO military observers to patrol and verify developments.13 No 
survey or clearance of the buffer strip was conducted during 2019.14
The RMA controls territory to the west of the Berm where it has been conducting large-scale demining. According to UNMAS, 
the RMA cooperates with the MINURSO mine action component and submits regular monthly reports of its activities in the 
Territory, west of the Berm, helping to build a clearer understanding of the mine and ERW threat across Western Sahara.15
CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS AND OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR
Western Sahara also has a significant problem from CMR and other ERW (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition 
Remnants 2020 report on Western Sahara for further information).16 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
UNMAS Western Sahara, formerly the MINURSO Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC), facilitates MINURSO monitoring of 
the ceasefire and ensures the safe passage of UN personnel. On 30 October 2019, MINURSO’s mandate was extended for an 
additional 12 months until 30 October 2020 under Security Council Resolution 2494 (2019). UNMAS Western Sahara serves as 
the UN focal point for mine action activities within the MINURSO area of operations. Its contracted teams work in areas east of 
the Berm only. The RMA conducts its own demining in areas west of the Berm. In 2013–14, the Polisario Front, with UN support, 
established the SMACO, which is responsible for coordinating mine action activities in Western Sahara east of the Berm, 
excluding the buffer strip.17
In 2019, UNMAS Western Sahara had a grant of $53,937 to cover capacity building and some operating expenses for SMACO. 
UNMAS also supported SMACO to develop its own internal strategy for 2019–23, which includes a communications and 
resource mobilisation strategy.18
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
UNMAS has reported that gender policies are implemented in accordance with UNMAS, the UN Office for Project Services 
(UNOPS), and MINURSO guidelines, as well as with direction from the Polisario.19 UNMAS also reported that gender has 
been mainstreamed into Western Sahara’s national mine action work plans and the SMACO 2019–23 mine action strategy.20 
During survey, efforts are made to consider the needs of men, women, girls, and boys to ensure more effective and efficient 
operations, despite challenges presented by conducting survey activities targeting Bedouin populations.21
UNMAS reported there is equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams in Western 
Sahara, east of the Berm, including for managerial level/supervisory positions. In 2019, 9% of operational roles in SafeLane 
Global were held by women and at a managerial level this was 7%. In SMACO, there is one woman at managerial level out of 
five positions.22
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
According to UNMAS, the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database for Western Sahara, east  
of the Berm, improved as a result of an ongoing data audit initiated at the end of 2015.23 The Geneva International Centre  
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has also provided ongoing support to correct database errors, and an upgrade to the  
latest database software version, IMSMA Core, was scheduled to take place in August 2019.24 However, as at June 2020,  
the updating of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for information management and the gradual shift to IMSMA Core  
had been suspended because of COVID-19 lockdown.25
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PLANNING AND TASKING
In 2019, SMACO developed its strategy for mine action in Western Sahara, east of the Berm, covering 2019–23 in line with the 
newly published global UN Mine Action Strategy 2019–2023. In order to achieve a Western Sahara that is free of the impact  
of mines and ERW, SMACO has established the following timed objectives:
 ■ to implement efficient and effective communication with national and international organisations by 2019. 
 ■ to establish an effective mechanism for data collection of accidents and victims which will be shared with partners 
according to the SMACO Data Protection Policy by 2019. 
 ■ to establish sustainable and constant funding of SMACO by 2020. 
 ■ to ensure availability of human resources to comprehensively manage mine action by 2020. 
 ■ to fully implement a professional management structure within SMACO by 2021. 
 ■ to create a discussion platform (think tank) for a national victim rights protection policy by 2022.
 ■ to establish a national employment policy for mine action activities by 2023.26
As at June 2020, it is not known if Western Sahara, east of the Berm, achieved its objectives for 2019. UNMAS reported there 
was no mine action work plan for 2019 or 2020 and that UNMAS Western Sahara mine action activities continue to be in 
support of MINURSO’s mandate.27
UNMAS and SMACO identify priorities for clearance of both minefields and cluster munition strikes to the east of the Berm in 
conjunction with MINURSO. Priorities are identified based on humanitarian needs for the safety and freedom of movement of 
local populations, while UNMAS Western Sahara facilitates the ceasefire and ensuring the safe passage of UN personnel.28
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Local mine action standards were developed and finalised in 2016 by UNMAS, together with SMACO, and in coordination with 
mine action partners. A first annual review of the standards was completed in November 2018 with a review board consisting 
of representatives from UNMAS, SMACO, and all implementing partners. No significant changes were made, and UNMAS 
reported in June 2019 that translation of the standards into Arabic had been completed and shared with SMACO.29
An external quality management system was in place from 2018 and implemented by UNMAS and SMACO to the east of  
the Berm.30
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Table 3: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2019
Operator Manual teams Total deminers* Dog teams Mechanical assets* Comments
SLG (for UNMAS 
Western Sahara)
2 20 0 0 Multi-tasking teams 
SLG (for UNMAS 
Western Sahara)
1 3 0 0 Survey and Route 
Verification Team 
Totals 3 23 0 0
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
SafeLane Global (formerly Dynasafe MineTech Limited, DML) was the implementing operator for UNMAS Western Sahara, 
conducting survey and clearance in 2019. There was a decrease in overall operational capacity from 2018 as Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA) had made the “difficult decision” to close down its programme, effective on 1 January 2019, after releasing 
the last known contaminated areas in Bir Lehlou province in August 2018.31






LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
In 2019, a total of 0.20km2 of mined area was cleared by SafeLane Global for UNMAS Western Sahara in the north and  
south regions. Of this 0.14km2 was mixed mine contamination with four anti-personnel mines and 42 anti-vehicle mines found 
and destroyed, and 0.06km2 was solely contaminated with anti-vehicle mines, see Table 4.32 This is a massive decrease from 
2018 when a total of nearly 3.71km2 of mixed mined area was released: more than 2.38km2 through clearance and 1.32km2 
through survey.33
Table 4: Mine clearance in 201934







North SLG (for UNMAS Western Sahara) 143,421 4 42 476
South SLG (for UNMAS Western Sahara) 58,895 0 8 0
Totals 202,316 4 50 476
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle UXO = Unexploded ordnance
Western Sahara is not a State Party to the APMBC. In June 2014, however, the SADR submitted a voluntary APMBC Article 7 
transparency report to the UN “as a sign of the support of the Sahrawi State for the goals of the Treaty”.35 
In SMACO’s new mine action strategy 2019–23, the vision is for Western Sahara to be free of the impact of mines and ERW.36 
UNMAS Western Sahara needs to maintain its level of funding of $3.265 million per year and to secure an additional $2 million 
per year to clear all known mine and ERW contamination in the territory of Western Sahara, east of the Berm, and outside the 
buffer strip, restricted areas, and the Berm itself by 2023.37
This is almost two years earlier than UNMAS’ previous estimate, which had sought to release all high and medium hazardous 
areas in Western Sahara east of the Berm by 2025.38 Temperatures of up to 60 degrees Celsius, strong winds, sandstorms, and 
heavy rain during the wet season can cause mine action activities to be suspended delaying progress.39
In 2019, with the loss of NPA as a key mine action implementer, along with the cessation of both German and Norwegian funding 
for mine clearance activities, the future of Western Sahara’s mine action programme remained uncertain. Additional resources 
and capacity, along with support to SMACO, needed to be secured urgently. There was a massive decrease in clearance output 
from 2018 to 2019 in Western Sahara and UNMAS reported that as at June 2020, operations had been partially suspended due 
to the outbreak of COVID-19, putting the already unrealistic 2023 completion date even further out of reach.40
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ANNEX 1: ARTICLE 5 OF THE ANTIPERSONNEL 
MINE BAN CONVENTION
ARTICLE 5: DESTRUCTION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES IN MINED AREAS
1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel 
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later 
than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or 
control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and 
shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its 
jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or 
other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines 
contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set 
out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
3.  If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all 
anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a 
request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the 
deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up  
to ten years.
4.  Each request shall contain:
 a) The duration of the proposed extension;
 b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
(i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining 
programmes;
(ii)  The financial and technical means available to the State Party for  
the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
(iii)  Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the 
anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
 c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of  
 the extension; and
 d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
5.  The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into 
consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide  
by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the  
request for an extension period.
6.  Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance 
with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State 
Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the 
previous extension period pursuant to this Article.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AIM Abandoned Improvised Mines (Afghanistan) 
AP Anti-personnel 
APMBC 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
AV Anti-vehicle 
AXO Abandoned explosive ordnance 
BAC Battle area clearance 
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina 
CCM 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions 
CHA Confirmed hazardous area 
CMR Cluster munition remnants 
DCA DanChurch Aid 
DDG Danish Demining Group 
EO Explosive ordnance 
EOD Explosive ordnance disposal 
EORE Explosive ordnance risk education 
ERW Explosive remnants of war 
EU European Union 
FSD Swiss Foundation for Mine Action 
GICHD Geneva International Centre for  
 Humanitarian Demining 
GIS Geographic information system 
HI  Humanity and Inclusion 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
IED  Improvised explosive device 
IMAS International Mine Action Standards 
IMSMA Information Management System  
 for Mine Action 
IP Implementing partner 
ITF International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing  
 Human Security 
LIS Landmine Impact Survey 
MAG Mines Advisory Group 
MDD Mine detection dog 
MoU Memorandum of Understanding 
MRE Mine risk education 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO Non-governmental organisation 
NMAS National Mines Action Standards 
NPA Norwegian People’s Aid 
NSAG Non-state armed group 
OAP Oslo Action Plan 
OAS Organization of American States 
OSCE Organization for Security and  
 Co-operation in Europe 
PPE Personal protective equipment  
QA Quality assurance 
QC Quality control 
QM Quality management 
SHA Suspected hazardous area 
SOP Standing (or standard) operating procedure 
TWG Technical working group 
UN  United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service 
UXO Unexploded ordnance 
VA Victim assistance 
VTF Voluntary Trust Fund (United Nations)
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